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FOREWORD
About two-thirds of the Philippine population residein the rural
areas, earning an averagefamily income of only half of their urban
counterparts. It is, therefore, not surprisingthat much interest has
been expressedin the progressof rural development strategies,the
impact they have had on rural communities, the means by which
they can be made more effective, and the various alternatives that
exist.
This timely book by Gelia"Castillo deals with a number of con-
temporary and, to some extent, controversialissuesregardingPhilip-
pine rural development. More specifically, it looks into two import-
ant aspects of rural development, namely: rural institutions and
people's participation. The former is about institutional changesin
the rural areas:changesin the way things are being done, as well as
changes in social organization and in the relationships among the
actors in that setting.Whether thesechangesare deliberately designed
and created, e.g., Samahang Nayon, Masagana99, compact farms,
etc., or result spontaneously from social, economic and political
changes that take place over time, e.g., the relationships between
farmer and hired farm labor, and between landlord and tenant, they
nonetheless form part and parcel of the Philippine rural setting.
Thus, to fully understand rural development in the country, one
mustappreciate theseinstitutional changes.
The other aspect of rural development which Castillo examines
is that of people's participation. Who should participate? Who are
"the people"? Are they interested in participating? What constitutes
participation? Does participation make a difference? What expe-
rience have we had in the practice of people's participation? These
are some of the questionsthat the author grappleswith in her work.
The coveragealone, as well as the complexity of theissues in-
volved, suggestshow courageous the author had been in venturing
into this study. Her work demanded that she personallysievethrough
volumes upon volumes of research reports,,evaluative studies, sur-
veys, graduate theses,etc., organize their findings into an integrated,
vii
readable form, and derive insightsfrom many otherwise apparently
innocentobservations.
Through this book, the author has done for usa great service.
Not only do we now haveaccessto the resultsof scatteredstudieson
important aspectsof rural development in the country. We can also
appreciatethem from the vantagepoint the author has taken, as well
asenjoy her fluid, thought-provokingand insightful style.
Gelia Castillo has, indeed, made anothervaluablecontribution to
our better understandingof Philippine rural society.
FILOLOGO PANTI_ JR.
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PREFACE
In researchaswell as in many other things in life, support to do
what one wants to do is not alwayspossiblebut the Philippine Insti-
tute for Development Studies,particularly Dr. Filologo Pante, helped
make this wish come true. Donald Wadley of USAID, Manila en-
couragedme to include Participatory Development, Part II and pro-
vided me accessto materials aswell as field exposure. It took more
than two years to complete this project becausethe tasksof review,
synthesis and interpretation could not be entrusted to somebody
else. I had to go through the "digesting" processmyself usingpre-
vious and current exposureto rural development asboth "sieve" and
"context".
Each chapter has an extended summary for thosewho want to
skip the detailswhich substantiatethe more generalizedobservations.
From the materials I've been through, my conclusion is that: The
Philippines has its shareof problemsbut lack of creativity is not one
of them. This book illustratesthe Filipino's versatility in insti_tional
designing.What "deeds" emanate from "design" is for the reader to
find in thesepages.
GELIA T. CASTILLO
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PART I
Changing Rural Institutions
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
RURAL INSTITUTIONS AND PARTICIPATORY DEVELOPMENT:
THE "SOFT" SECTOR IN AGRICULTURAL AND
RURAL DEVELOPMENT
Every society, every community has, through the years, evolved
its own ways of getting things done. Any development effort, whe-
ther by designor by default, toucheson theseestablishedpatternsof
doing things and after about three decadesof trying to "develop"
and "grow", the importance of institutionsasold patterns in transi-
tion or asemerging,new creationshascome to the fore in a big way.
Furthermore, the so-called "disappointment over a lack of progress
in improving the lives of the very poor has led to a reexamination
of present approachesto development," In the meantime, popular
participation or "people participation in their own development"
hasbecomevery mucha part of the development rhetoric.
For a slice of historical perspective regardingthe role of rural
institutions, let us turn to the first Asian Agricdltural Survey thir-
teen yearsago.1 On the assetsand liabilitiesfor agricultural develop-
ment prospectsin Asia, the Survey team noted that
in the pasttwo years,governmentofficials,agriculturalscientists,farmers,
politicalleadersandurbanworkershavebecomemuchmoreawareof the
needfor agriculturaldevelopmentandthereisnowanurgencyfor action
thatwasabsentbefore.[But] "translatingthissenseof urgency"intoaction
programscapableof beingimplementedrequires"a vision,skillandex-
periencethatarelackinginmostcountries.Governmentsin the regiondis-
playedlittle understandingof the severalelementsthat togethergenerate
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agricultural growth." The team lamented the lack of vision among persons
in positions of administrative power and even among advisory and pro-
fessional personnel, and in staff papers and notes on policy actions and
alternatives available for government decision. Added to this lack of vision
on what can and must be done for sustained rural progress are the various
organizational constraints such as: crass political interference, graft.and
corruption, bureaucratic struggles that stem from government over-organi-
zation and departmental proliferation, and confusion resulting from mul-
tiple lines of authority and responsibility.
Considering the problems in Asia, the members-of the Survey Team
are unanimous in the view that the only valid route, the single strategy
to sustained rural development is a movement toward a farming based on
the application of the latest in science and technology. It is "intolerant"
of development strategies that call for a judicious mixing of some aspects
of modern sciences with the so-called realities of traditional wisdom and
methods. They also indicated that there seems little validity in the general
argument that land reform is a necessary one condition to further agri.
cultural development although, in the long run, many countries will not be
able to escape the need for major tenurial reforms Whatever weaknesses
were found relative to land tenure seemed less of a constraint on output
expansion than the technical constraints of poor .varieties, inadequate
fertilizer, irrigation, etc. In a study group of the 1968 International Seminar
on Change in Agriculture, it was observed that in an ossified society where
no movement is possible without changes in structure, land reform could be
.an indispensable ingredient before other changescan take place.
The First Asian Agricultural Survey likewise emphasized that in the .
process of moving to scientific agriculture, the cultivator will be involved
in two levels of decision-making: the decisions he can make that will affect
only his own farm and those choices that demand collective action. The lat-
ter involves decisionsregarding pest control, feeder road construction, irriga-
tion management, and use of farm equipment. It was pointed out that
"indeed, the gains from joint action provide the basic rationale for en-
couraging the establishment of farmer organizations and neighborhood or
village a_ociation£ " (Underscoring supplied)
Almost ten years later in the Second Agricultural Survey, 2 the
.proposed comprehensive strategy for agricultural growth and rural
development, placed emphasis on
the needto realign institutions with the technologies available in rural
areas, or to create new institutions, where necessary, in order to facilitate
rapid .increases in. productive employment opportunities and to reduce
poverty. The misalignment of institutions has in the past led to pervasive
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market imperfections,constraintson the mobilization of resources,natural
and investible (including labor), limitations on the creation of effective
demand,and obstaclesin the way of providingmoreemployment. [In their
view], a rural developmentprogram shouldhave two essentialobjectives:
to increase the productivity of the rural poor, and to ensuretheir full parti-
cipation in planning and executing the program. The wide discrepancies
between previous intentions and past performance in rural development
have been primarily due .to lack of commitment at the top. Programs
oriented towards economic betterment of the poor have also been handi-
capped by substantial knowledge gaps; in particular, the capacity of indi-
genous rural institutions to deliver goodsand servicesto the poorer sections
of society arerarely assessedbefore poverty-redresselprograms are launched.
(Underscoringsupplied)
Organizational problems have been reiterated in the 1977 Survey,
e.g., the negative effects of hierarchical structures of patron-client
relationships and the need for effective horizontal groupings of small
farmers and laborers. Semi.spontaneous, small primary organizations
operating on the basis of direct participation and serving well-defined
common interests have likewise been regarded as "more likely to
ensure member loyalty than large, formal cooperatives."
Our guess is that even a decade or two from now, the organiza-
tional and institutional components would still constitute a major
problem. In the meantime, every agricultural and rural development
project tinkers with institutions and organizations. They either create
new structures or restructure existing ones. Such tinkerings cannot
be without consequences. As a matter of fact, they are meant to be,
for they constitute the essence of both development goals as well as
project strategy. Institutional innovations are never neutral in impact
for even when orphaned of sponsorship and deprived of support,
they do not just die. They have a way of leaving "white elephants",
a large fund of distrust and ill-will, and a residual skepticism of any-
thing vaguely similar. Even in the worst of circumstances, they also
provide a modicum of experience withalternative ways of organizing
for development.
In a paper entitled The Technology of Rural Development, 3 Mc-
Inerney underscores the role of institutional infrastructure ("institu-
tion" embraces a variety of formal and informal human groups;
behavior patterns; social, legal and administrative systems; and estab-
lished practices in social, political and economic activity that have an
important bearing on the workings of rural societies). He regards
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"institutional factors" as the "non-technical counterpart to the phy-
sical production components of the rural system, which condition
the reaction of that system to change. Thus, the establishment or
modification of institutional arrangements must become a prime fo-
cus for attention in the process of fostering rural development." He
therefore thinks that "institutional designing" deserves as much at-
tention as institution-building. In his Conditions for Successful Inn_
vation in Agriculture, he spells out that
It isassumedthat to be successful,an innovativeprojectmust: (a) gene-
rate economiceffects sufficient to justify its adoption in termsof thecon-
ventionalappraisalcalculus;(b) createsocialanddistributiveeffectsconsist-
ent with the ruraldevelopmentstrategy;and(c) promiseacontinuingdevel.
opment effort which sustainschangein a desireddirectionthroughoutthe
ruralsystem...
The first requirementfor successfulinnovationis the availabilityof a
packageof technicalcomponentsthat is complete, reliab'le and suitably
designedfor the conditionswithin which it is to be applied...
Second,the technologicalpackagemust be consistentwith the human
attributes,attitudesandabilitiesin the region...
Finally, it is essentialthat the newly introducedtechnologyhavee high
probability of technical successat its first trial, and be seento offer relia-
bility...
If all these conditions were fulfilled, it would indeed be a para-
dise prescription for rural development.
This is roughly equivalent to the concept of a perfect rice plant
which needs no fertilizer; does not allow weeds; is drought-tolerant,
disease and insect-resistant, flood-avoiding and typhoon-escaping;
labor-intensive; and most of all, high-yielding for the poor farmer
and low-yielding for the rich to take care of the equity issue.
Another way of looking at the social aspects of technological
innovation is offered by Nash who prefers to conceptualize the pr_
blem as an agro-system involving all the cultivators as they are locked
into a pattern and tied into the cities. The assumption is that
whateveris on the farmer's mind is probably lessinterestingthan the buf-
fetingsandconstraintsagainsthim asan actor in asystemof agronomyand
of politicalcity relationships.. The tinkerers and the felt needsof village
people will not provide the solution to their economic and socialproblem&
Farmem themselves only make small marginal and incremental change&,,
The developedproducts which will change the shape of Southeast Asia are
being made in research laboratories somewhere in the world and not in
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community discussions and self.t_p which were never very fundamental
to the proceu of social change. If onecomparesthe differencebetweenIR
8 and a PeaceCorpsworker, one _et_ the kind of image for which I am
striving... Changeusedto be thoughtof assomekind of supervised,bureau-
cratic enterprise without social upheaval. People who were tied to the
9overnmentwere sent out, worked in somekind of hierarchyand tried to
give some knowledgeto the benighted massesand farmers. This kind of
supervised,bureaucraticchange has been notoriously slow, unsuccessful,
and usuallyunimaginative.
The image of social change Nash has is one of
socialrisk -- an open challengein which nobody has an ideaof the out-
come.., a governmentis needed which can take thesesocialrisks,which
has confidence that however it turns out, - the governmentis willing to
livewith it. 4
Rural development is notoriously slow, complex and up to now
quite bereft of magic. "Miracles" are terribly short-lived but not
necessarily because "supervised, bureaucratic change" has been un-
imaginative. After all these years of institutional experimentations
in agriculture and rural development, one can only be humble and
less sanguine on what will work, for verdicts of success and failure
carry their own risks. A project is sometimes regarded a failure be-
cause it has not had a chance to succeed while another might be
considered a success because it has not had a chance to fail. Consi.
dering that most, if not all, of the developing world are under some
form of authoritarian regime, it is difficult to imagine a leader at-
tempting an open challenge, a "social risk" about which nobody has
an idea of the outcome. Although "undesirable" outcomes abound,
it is not because the rulers have deliberately been willing to take the
great social risk but perhaps because the results of their chosen
modes of institutional change had been unanticipated or had "back-
fired" relative to their original intent.
Economists, of course, use efficiency principles to explain insti-
tutions. As Roumasset proposes
If property rightsare well established,contracts are easily enforced,
information costs are negligible,and numbers are sufficient to make at-
tempts to monopolizeunstable,then, factorsof production will be allo-
ceted efficiently and recievetheir competitive factor payments,whether
marketsexist or not s
From a simpleminded perception, anytime all these conditions
are present in a particular setting, the only possible outcome is
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efficiency but it is precisely becauseimperfections abound that we
are in continuous search for the explanations to emerging institu-
tional patterns. We likewise tinker with a variety of institutional
forms with the hope of achieving productivity, employment and
equity in our agricultureand rural developmentprograms.
The Hayami-Ruttan induced innovation hypothesis is another
proposedexplanation which statesthat "... institutional innovations
occur becauseit appears profitable for individuals or groupsin so-
ciety to undertake the costs. It is unlikely that institutional change
will prove viable unless the benefits to society exceed the cost.
Changesin market prices and technological opportunities introduce
disequilibrium in existing institutional arrangementsby creating pro-
fitable new opportunities for the institutional innovations.''s
There is some intellectual discomfort in the ex-ante formulations
of Mclnerney and Roumassetwhich tend to be counselsand condi-
tions of perfection while the post factum interpretation of Hayami
and Ruttan seemstoo much of an irrefutable explanation. To what
extent do these "explanations" actually explain or are they in fact
handy conceptual descriptions of past and extant institutional hap-
penings?
For an answer to this question, a distinction between "motive
as description and motive as explanation" offers a useful analogy.
Development-literature, especiallyon peasantry, is fraught with mo-
tivations, attitudes and valuesoffered as explanations.for our under-
development .suchas fatalism, familism, lack of innovativeness,low
aspirational levels, lack of empathy,, dependence upon government
authority, lack of deferred gratification, perceived limited good,
interpersonaldistrust, etc. But curiously enough,thesevery elements
which are.offered,asexplanations for underdevelopmentare alsore-
garded .as the characteristics of an underdeveloped society.. For
.example, lack of innovativenessis inferred from the peasants'failure
to respondfavorablyto innovations, therefore,usinglack of innova.
tiveness to explain lack of positiveresponseto innovation in circular
•reasoning.7
Let us turn to Berelsonand Steiner'sexplication which saysthat
sincemotivesareboth inferredfrom andtakento accountfor purposive
•behavior,there is alwaysthe dangerof acceptingcircularreasoning- of
takinga motiveas anexplanationof theverybehaviorfromwhichit was
inferred,Whentheconditionsthat prOduceor arousea motiveareknown
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or when thereare Independentmeasuresof It, motiveshelp to explain be-
havior. When suchconditionsare not met, motivesmay serveto describe
behavior but they do not explain it. For example, in looking at motive
asdescription, "A man works hard and longhours,talksabout the import-
ante of getting ahead and asks his wife to invite important people to
dinner." This behavior is conveniently summarized by the observer that
he is ambitious or has so-calledachievementmotivation. That inductive
statementis descriptiveand may be predictiveof other acts;for example,
the probability that he will volunteer for a Sunday work assignment.But
the Statement is in no senseexplanatory. It is seductivebut fallaciousto
say that he works hard becausehe is ambitious;we know no more about
the causesof the observed behaviorthan we did before we applied the
term.a
Considering the distinction between "motive as description and
motive as explanation," is the principle of efficiency an explanation
or a description? When Roumasset says that factors of production
will be allocated efficiently "if property rights are well-established,
information costs are negligible, and numbers are sufficient to make
attempts to monopolize unstable," he is in fact describing a situa.
tion of efficiency and, therefore, efficiency cannot be used to ex-
plain efficiency. It is a useful definitive and descriptive concept
but it does not explain the emerging labor contracts between the
farmer and the landless and the changing sharing and rental arrange-
ments between landlord and tenant. Such factors as population pres-
sure on land, quality of land, new technology, land reform legisla-
tion, family obligations, etc. are potential explanations.
The attempt to reduce explanations to its most fundamental
element is certainly a desirable theoretical objective and so is the
need to move to e higher level of abstraction or to an even simpler
mode of explication. This could, however, be reductionism to a
point where a proposed explanation is so basic and fundamental
that it can explain everything. If one moves high enough in abstrac-
tion, a concept can be used to explain any social phenomena. Just
like the principle of efficiency, we can also invoke the principle of
social organization to account for every instance of social change
such that no matter what is observed can be adequately explained
by the proposition that "society is organized". There is a pattern,
a regularity, and a level of predictability which characterizes all
social phenomena which seems to rationalize itself in terms of social
organization. In this case, the explanation "society is organized"
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has become so fundamental and so universal as to have limited
heuristic value. From a theoretical standpoint, an economy of con-
cepts is worth striving for but from a development policy oriented
perspective, "handles" or "levers" must reveal themselves or must
be made evident as instruments to be acted upon or at least to be
taken into account.
Since institutions lie at the heart of agricultureand rural develop-
ment, they constitute an entire researcharenarelatively unexploited
compared to many other aspectsof development. Becausethere is
quite an element of the"process", the "behavioral" and the "ideo-
logical" imbedded in rural institutions, they do not conveniently
lend themselves to neat modeling and easy quantification, hence,
the "soft sector" label. I.t is curious that when technology fails to
"deliver", institutions take the blame but when technology produces,
institutions purportedly do not matter. The current interest in the
small farmer and the rural poor opens a fresh mandate to reexamine
rural institutions more seriously and systematically with a view to
building an operationally-relevant body of knowledge s6 absolutely
essential in the design, implementation and evaluation of develop-
ment projects: As a matter of fact, development project experiences
around the world are themselves objects of study for they provide
us the true-to-life "experiments" in institutional innovation.
By way of an initial effort, we can start with the following
descriptive categorization of a whole range of institutional pheno-
mena:
(a) Pre-designed, planned or "created" institutional innovations
suchas Masagana99, Samahang Nayon, compact farms, land
reform legislation,irrigation association,etc.
(b) Institutional adjustmentswhich come as a spontaneousre_
ponse to changesin the environment whether physical,social,
economic, or political. Changing labor contracts between
farmer and hired farm labor (the landless)and evolvingshar-
ing arrangementsbetween landlord and tenant which are out-
sidethe legal framework are examples.
(c) Institutional conflicts and/or accommodations between and
among the "created" institutions and between the old and
the new ways of getting thingsdone; between the traditional
informal and the legal formal means. Noteworthy among
these is the harmony or disharmony among and between
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the requirements of Masagana99, Samahang Nayon, land
reform, etc. The traditional paternalistic relationsobtaining
between landlord and tenant and the emergingcontractual,
formal provisionsof land reform legislation is another illus-
tration.
(d) Institutional "leakages" resulting from (I) imperfections in
the translation from design to implementation or emerging
from (2) misconceptions regarding the nature of existing
institutions as a basisfor designing new and "modern" or
modernizing ones.Upon the implementation of every created
institution, all kinds of aberrations popularly known as "ano-
malies" or "irregularities" occur. An illustration of the first
type of phenomena is the incidence of "fake" farmer-bor-
rowers who took advantage of uncollateralized loans. The
second problem pertains to such things as "bayanihan"
(mutual help or traditional forms of cooperation) as the oft-
repeated basis for expecting cooperatives to succeed.As a
consequence,a string of new institutions exist in form but
not in substance,hence, In a sense, even the "aberrations"
becomeinstitutionalized.
A researchagenda on rural institutions could very well include
the following:
1. Identification, inventory and description of existing rural
institutions with respect to nature, prevalence, locale, man-
ner of "practice", and role or function in the rural com-
munity.
2. Historical studies of particular institutions in order to trace
roots; discern emerging patterns; assesslikely directions as
well as possible sourcesof changesin pattern. Analyses of
how institutional innovations impinge on traditional or pre-
vailing institutional arrangementsin a locality.
4. Investigations of rural people's response to and perceived
benefits or disadvantagesfrom institutional changes,whether
spontaneousor designed.
5. Studies on the impact of different institutional arrangements
on the achievement of development goalssuch as producti-
vity, employment, equity, community and family relation-
ships.
All these require an examination of both anticipated and
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unanticipated consequences, the direct as well as derivative
impact. Although we should always aim for explanations, at
this stage, it is imperative to have good empirical descriptions
no matter how messy, rather than arrive at premature perfect
explanations of phenomena we have yet to identify and des-
cribe accurately. In the meantime, we will probably redis-
cover leadership, ideology, culture, attitudes, values, etc.
which lurk behind the structures just as we are now returning
to concepts of people participation, grassroots, indigenous,
bottom-up, etc. As the Kikuchi et al paper concludes
It is also important to recognizethat the new systemsrepresentan
institutional innovationbasedon the indigenousorganizationalprinciples
of the villagecommunity. This experiencesuggeststronglythat the effec-
tive design of rural developmentto promote social equity and stability
shouldbeginwith the studyof organizationalprinciplesat the grassroots.9
On the other hand, Roumasset and Smith remind us that
tinkering with organizationalconstraintsmay detract attention
from the fundamental source of rural-poverty-populationpressureon a
limited and declining resource base. It may also detract support from
promisinginvestmentopportunities.For example, investmentin irrigation
and researchon appropriate technology have substantial potential for
improving productivity and rural welfare by increasingthe demandfor
labor. In general,organizationalreform will only be productivewhen new
organizationsare madepossible,not when establishedinstitutionsare pro-
hibited,lo
Needless to say, this research agenda represent a "full plate"
which would require the skills and competencies of more than one
discipline with each contributing its particular theory and method-
ology to the comprehension of rural institutions. There are those
who would leave institutions aside research-wise because they are not
only difficult to conceptualize and operationalize but also politic-
ally and culturally sensitive. But some of the most important things
in life are difficult precisely because they are important. This is one
area where research lagsbehind "practice" for the "creators" of insti-
tutions have been more risk-taking in designing them than researchers
have been persistent in studying them. But unless some time, talent,
and effort are systematically devoted to it, institutions will always
remain "soft" yet they are the essence of what development and
social change is all about.
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":l=brt_hately,we are not starting from scratch in this venture. Nu-
merous studieshavebeen done in ancL,aroj_ndthe m_argio_ofth.is_re,
_a3_Tt'_L_da 6ut_-Rtos¢of them havebeen prompted by sectoralcon-
cernssuch as agricultural credit, irrigation, technology transfer, land
reform, etc. which are embodied in development programsand pro-
jects suchas Masagana99, irrigation associations,SamahangNayon,
compact farms, farmers' associations,seldas,etc. In many instances,
researchcomesas evaluation studiesto find out how the program is
doing or how its particular target clientele is respondingto particular
institutional innovations. Some studies have tried__l;0_,y_Ch_
nature and dyn_.ef traditi0nal:f0rms_0_ cooperation which for a
tong:ti_°have "been the rationale and basisfor hope that different
organized groups would meet the needsfor group action on many
problemsof agricultureand rural development.
Although institutional change or reform is an objective and/or
a consequenceof development programs and projects, rarely have
studiesonthem been regardedspecifically as researchon rural insti-
tutions. As an intermediate and modest step in the accomplishment
of the broad researchagenda outlined earlier, this research report
hastwo parts.
Part I attempts to review, Organize, analyze, and synthesize
available research,data and relevant experienceon the following:
(a) Pre-designedrural institutions such as Masagana99, Sama-
hang Nayon irrigation associations,compact farms, seldas,
group lending etc.
(b) Changes taking place in indigenous rural institutions and
traditional forms of cooperation.
(c) Emerging labor contracts between farmersand hired workers
and evolving tenure relations between landowners and te-
nants post land reform as reflected in changingpay ratesfor
weeding, harvesting and threshing, and variations of sub-
tenancy relationships.
This project took the view that it is prudent to determine what
can be learned from what exists before embarking on expensive
field data-gathering which often results in a "reinvention of the
wheel". At the moment, much valuable information is scattered
and/or buried in many researchreports, evaluation studies,graduate
student theses, surveys, etc. which are neither readily available nor
easily comprehensible. This project is a painstaking effort to bring
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the resUlts of researchon Philippine rural institutions and partici-
patory development to other researchers,teachers, policy makers,
development implementors and students of agriculture _tI/fI_ ......
development. As stated elsewhere,a Philippine social science is not
possiblewithout an empirically-generated, systematically organized
and cumulatively developed body of knowledge about our own
society. It is hoped that this end-product would contribute toward
a better understandingof Philippine rural society through Philippine
experience.
Part II examinesand reviewsthe following:
(a) Integrated rural dever0pment and Philippine versions of
integration; .......
(b) Concept and practice of "felt needs";
(c) The operational definitions and methodology of people par-
ticipation; and
(d) Field experienceswith rural organizationsand peoplepartici-
patory approaches.
This volume isdivided into 8 chapters.
Part I - Changing Rural Institutions
I - Introduction
Rural Institutions and Participatory Development:
The "Soft" Sector in Agricultural and Rural Develop-
ment
II - Samahang Nayon: A New Design for Cooperative
Development
III - Compact Farms and Seldas: An Attempt at Group
Farming
IV -- The Other Sidesto Masagana99
V Changing Land and Labor Relations in Agricultural
Production
Part II - Participatory Development: Concept and Practices
VI -- Integrated Rural Development and Philippine Ver-
sions of Integration
VII - The Concept and Practice of Felt Needs and People
Participation
VIII -- Field Experiences with Rural Organizations and
People Participatory Approaches
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CHAPTER II •
SAMAHANG NAYON: A NEW DESIGN FOR
COOPERATIVES DEVELOPMENT
When Presidential Decree No. 27 decreed "the emancipation of
the tenants from the bondageof the soil, transferringto them the
ownership of the land they till and providing the instrumentsand
mechanisms" for its implementation, the development of farmers
cooperativeswas envisionedas a direct support to the Agrarian Re-
form Program.Among itsobjectivesare:
a) To preparefarmers to becomebetter producers
b) To ensuretimely paymentsof land amortization
c) To enforce savingsamongfarmers
d) To encourage farmers to perform activities collectively, and
e) To developmarketingoutlets for farm products.1
Basedon hisdiagnosisthat the failures of cooperativesin the past
were due to lack of cooperative education, inadequate capital, and
poor management, Dr. O. J. Sacay, the architect of the new Coope-
ratives Development Program, conceivedthe notion of a pre-organi-
zational stage. The institutionalization of a pre-cooperativecalled a
Barrio Associationor what isnow popularly known asthe Samahang
Nayon (SN) was deemed as vitally important in order to teach pro_
pectJvememberson the inner workings of thc cooperativeand lay a
stronger foundation for its organization. Sin_plyput, Sacaysaidthat
"in the Samahang Nayon, members will do nothing but learn, save
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and practice discipline." This sumsup the three major features: Edu-
cation, Capital Build-up and Discipline.
The educational processis composedof: Phase I- Pre-member-
ship and Phase II - Manpower Development. The first phase in-
cluded lessonson agrarian reform, history and principlesof cooperao
tives and Samahang Nayon (SN) rationale, organization, policiesand
requirements.The secondwasdevoted to managementtraining, both
for officers and members, training of agricultural counselors and
technical lessonson agriculture for members. It wasbelievedthat "an
extended 65-week period of education and training ismore than suf-
ficient to prepare $amahang Nayon members for the more compli-
cated businessof a cooperative."
The compulsory savingsprogram was designed to generatefunds
for investment in a cooperative.The assumption is that "if farmers
investedtheir own money, they would seeto it that the cooperative
is run efficiently." Furthermore, it was argued that if they had
equity in the cooperative, unsecuredloansto cooperativescould be
grantedon a matching basis.Encouragingfarmers to saveand extend-
ing credit to them againsttheir own savingswasregardedasthe only
way to solve the perennial repayment problem. Two types of savings
were instituted. One is the Barrio Savings Fund (BSF) which would
come from farmers who borrow from financial institutions suchas
the rural bank, Philippine National Bank, and the Agricultural Credit
Administration through the 5 percent deducted upon releaseof their
loan and deposited in the fund. For memberswho do not borrow,
a monthly savingsof 1_5.00 is required. The accumulated savings
would be invested in the financial institution membersborrow from.
It essentially meanspurchasingequity in existing rural banks which
the SamahangNayon may establish.The other isthe Barrio Guaran-
tee Fund (BGF) which will be built from members'contributions of
one cavan per hectare per season.This fund is intended to guarantee
land amortizations of tenants who are paying for their land and 30
percent of annual collections can be utilized for the payment of in-
surance premiums at a coverageof at leastP2,000 each for life in-
surance. It will likewise finance the full-pledged marketing coopera-
tive. The capital build-up program is premisedon "strength in num-
bers" suchthat a few pesosper member multiplies many-fold when
added up.
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On the matter of discipline, a member of the SamahangNayon
must observethree cardinal rules:
a) he must practice improved cultural practices;
b) he must save;and
c) he mustpay for annual land amortizations on time.
Penaltiesfor violations of these rules range from fines, suspensions,
management take-over of a member's farm by the SamahangNayon
and expulsion. As declared guarantor of land payments, the Sama-
hang Nayon is expected to collect land amortization payments and
hasauthority to take recoursemeasureson defaulting farmers. Sacay,
therefore, arguesthat "if the Cooperatives Development Program
fai!s, Land Reform is likely to fail, too."
In the network of cooperativeorganization, the village-levelSa-
mahang Nayon serves as the foundation of a larger municipal or
provincial level organization called the Kilusang Bayan (Coopera-
tives), which all together make up the Cooperative Union of the
Philippines. Under the scheme,the Samahang Nayon can engage in
businessactivities only as part of a largebusinessventure. It can join
a marketing cooperative, a cooperative bank, an irrigation coopera-
tive, an insurance cooperative, etc. The "Samahang Nayon can,
therefore, become the multi-functional organization, but it can en-
gagein businessonly aspart of a major businessundertaking." "With
functional specialization," Sacay believesthat "cooperatives can be
better managed."
The Cooperatives Development Program is based on the follow-
ingpremises:
a) That cooperatives facilitate the distribution of wealth and
income.
b) That they are a means for rural development. Cooperatives
bring about, in _ome degree, "closer integration and greater
interdependenceamong rural people and groups.They serve
as effective channelsfor the disseminationof practical tech-
nicel improvements to farmers. They help reduce the cost
of credit, cost of goods and services,and, in some measure,
increasethe net prices received by them. Cooperation is an
exercise in education. Through this process,members of the
organization are transformed from otherwisepassiveto dyna-
mic participants in the drive for their own advancement."
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c) That cooperatives must be built from the boffom up. To
institutionalize cooperation demands and educational pro-
cess,where the rural people are gradually prepared to meet
their responsibilities and build up the necessary resources
required for full-scalecooperativeendeavors.
d) That cooperatives development must be systematic and
system-oriented. To succeed and develop, "cooperatives
must be functionally interrelated with all other agencies
and institutions which have to do with their operational
successsuch as: financing institutions, governmentor private
supervisory agencies, technical agencies, marketing outlets,
etc. All types of cooperatives have to be united and prop-
erly operating; by mutual interaction and proper manage-
ment, they eventually consolidate themselvesinto a potent
social and economic force in the national scene and enlarge
their influence in the interest of thecooperative ideology. ''2
It has also been argued that "through the cooperatives, a small
man's activities are .fused into larger operations to attain leverage
with the economies of scale. Through the cooperative institutions,
innovative productions, processing techniques and easy credits are
systematically transmitted to the grassroots level. Through the
cooperative process, the small man is given a little more dignity;.a
senseof be.longingnesswith his other brethren in sweat dignity; and
the realization that he,. too, can attain the economic common deno-
minator.with his brothers.3
Even at the lowest level of the Samahang .Nayon, .and at its
simplified form, the concepts underlying the new Cooperatives
Development Program are quite complex .but nevertheless designed
to remedy the weaknessesof previous efforts while at.the same time
trying to fulfill new objectives.
An early assessmentof farmers' response to end participation in
the Samahang Nayon stage of the program is provided by a.three-
year research project carried out by the Agricultural Credit and Co-
operatives Institute .(ACCI) of. the University of the Philippines at
Los Bafios.4 In many ways, the research.tells us how concepts trans-.
late into perceptions, operations and tangible impact. This paper at-
tempts to present and analyze relevant data from this and other
sourceswith respect to the following:
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A. Characteristicsof SN officers and memberscomparedto non-
members
B. SN's organizationalstructure in action
C. SN's direct and indirect educational activities and members'
learning
D. SN members' responseto the SavingsProgram
F. The pursuit of disciplinein SN
F. An early assessmentof performance and prognosisof the
future
A. Samahang Nayon (SN) Members, Officers and Non-Members:
Who are They?
Basicto the assessmentof any developmentprogram isan under-
standing of who the beneficiariesor the participants are. Equally
important, if not more so, is some indication as to who are left out
or who are not participating. Since the Cooperatives Development
Program has beendesignedassupportiveof agrarianreform, we must
know the tenure status of SN memberssothat its actual contribution
toward this role can be determined. Furthermore, the dynamics of
what happens in any organization depends as much on the charac-
teristics and responseof its membersas on the structure and objec-
tivesthat broughtabout itscreation.
1. Tenure Status
The composition of SN membership immediately tells us that
agrarian reform, particularly shift in tenure status,would not be of
major consideration since 61 percent of members are owners (43
percent) and non-farmers (18 percent). See Table 2.1. A mere 2
percent of total SN respondent membersare amortizing owners. In
a later study of 812 SNs during the Development Phase II stage,
only 144 or 17.7 percent reported having members who are reci-
pients of Certificates of Land Transfer. If these non-memberswho
are lower in the tenure ladder than members were to be drawn into
the SN fold, its supportive role for land reform might be consi-
derably enhancedalthough the tenacity of share tenancy cannot be
ignored. Table 2.2 showsthe extent of tenure shift before andafter
joining the SN. Of the share tenants studied, 24 percent changed
tenure mostly to leasehold. Lesseesremained lesseesexcept for 4
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percent who became amortizing owners. The role of the SN in this
tenuria! change is evident in that more than half of the sh/ftees (54
percent) _$aidthe)/would not have shifted without the 3N. About a
third said they would have done so evenwithout the SN. More than
40 percent of the shifting non-members responded in the same
manner. When sh/ftePmembers were asked whether the SN gave
them ass in the process, half of them replied positively.
Among the problems encountered in tenure shifting were landlord
• harrassment,psychologicalproblems, lossof goodwill and friendship,
etc. The assistancefrom SN came in the following manner:
1) SN brought the matter to proper authorities
2) SN helped me a lot in overcomingmy psychologicalproblems
3) SN •providedmeand my family, •security from physical har-
rassmentof the landlord
4) SN convinced my landlord
5) SN helped me financially
6) SN helped me find other sourceof income
At thisstage in the.implementation of land reform, it is worth
noting .that non-shifters gave "being happy and contented with pre-
sent condition" as their major reason for holding on .to current
tenure status. Other reasons mentioned are: "Don't want to be •
labelled ungrateful"; '"relative owns the land ] till"; and "1 earn more
by maintaining present tenure status." Share tenant officers, mem-
bers.as well. as non-members did not differ in their rationale for re-
maining share tenants. With regard to sharing of produce among
share tenants, there was some shift away from 50-50 to 75-25 from
the. period before to after membership: However, asimilar trend,
although to a. slightly lesserdegree, was observed among non-SN
members. This tendency is not necessarily an-unqualified benefit
for share tenants because almost 60 percent of them indicated that •
landlords do not contribute to farm expenses. Furthermore, con-
trary to the common sense belief that landlords dominate farm-
related decisions in a tenancy system, data .from this aswell as from
other research projects very definitely show that tenants them-
selves (for. more.,than 90 percent of. respondents, whether SN mem-
bers or non-members), not landlords, decide on the varietY to be
•planted, the use of. chemicals, and the application and rate of fer-
tilization.
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One of the oft-cited virtues of tenancy is the persistent creditor
role of the landlord vis-a-vis the tenant. Table 2.3 shows two dis-
cernable trends with respect to this role:
a) Whether for members or non-members of SN, the proportion
of share tenants who continued to receive production and
subsistence credit have declined but it has declined more for
SN members.
b) SN officers, more than members and non-members, appear
to continuously enjoy these benefits from the landlord in-
cluding credit for education, hospitalization, housing, etc.
Perhaps this is one significant incentive even fo_ SN officers
to remain share tenants despite land reform and SN.
Among thosewho are on leasehold, the average rental was 16.9
cavans per hectare before SN and 17.8 after SN. This is one cavan
less than the rental for non-members which was 17.9 before and
18.9 now. Perhaps this difference could not be attributed to SN
membership since the rental was already one cavan lessfor members
than for non-members even before the former joined the SN. What
is more important is the fact of high rental for both groups consider-
ing that for most lessees, they shoulder all the cost of farm inputs
and have to pay the fixed rental regardless of amount harvested and
in spite of natural calamities. This high rental has some implications
for SN viability since membership entails additional financial obliga-
tions and imposes more burden on the lessees. In the event of crop
failure or other competing family demands on income, plus the
need to pay this rental, SN financial requirements are not likely
to have high priority.
2. Farm and Farming Circumstances
•Seventy-eight percent of the SN farmer members grow rice;
13 percent produce corn and 9 percent produce both. Forty-seven
percent have rainfed farms; 43 percent obtain water from gravity
irrigation and 10 percent have a combination of pump and gravity.
Practically all of the corn farmer-members (97 percent) cultivate
rainfed farms. Due to the absence of irrigation, 44 percent of the
farmers grow only one crop of rice and 55 percent, two crops. Only
1 percent practices triple cropping. These circumstances regarding
cropping pattern and availability of irrigation are similar to the situa-
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tion of non-members.For almost half of the farmerswho haverain-
fed farms and grow only one crop a year, we can expect income to
be quite low unlessoff-farm and non-farm sourceswere available.
The chancesof havingaccessto suchopportunitiesare rather limited.
An earlier sutdy of prospective SN membersfound that more than
half (52 percent) Of the farmersdepended on farmingalone; 18 per-
cent had farm and off-farm work; 25 percent, farm and non-farm;
and 5 percent were engagedin all three types of work. Off-farm in-
come was derived mainly from hired work in other rice and corn
farms, some in coconut drying, a little in fishing, and a few in sugar-
cane harvesting. Non-farm employment consists of carpentry and
construction jobs; retail and other small business;employee, cottage
industry and transport occupations.5
On .the average, SN officers have been farming for 21 years;
members, for 23.5 years; and non-members, for 22.9 years. They
have, however, been operating their present farms for more than 17
years. It appears that these farmers are faced not only with occupa-
tional immobility in that they have been farmers most of their lives
but also with "farm fixity" in the senseof having operated the same
farm for almost 20 years. Considering population pressureon agri-
cultural land and the slow emergenceof non-farm jobs, this immobi-
lity would be aggravated by declining farm size. Data in Table 2.4
support this portent of the future. About two-thirds of SN officers
and membersoperate farms of 2 hectaresand smaller, but almost80
percent of non-members belong to this farm size category. Twenty
percent of the former and 8 percent of the latter have farms of 3
hectaresand bigger. SN membership is, therefore, composed mostly
of small farmers. However, non-members are evensmaller.
If SN is intended to assistfarmers, ideally, all farmersshouldbe-
long to it but this is almost never the case in real life. Nevertheless,
we need to know how many of the farmershave been brought into
SN's fold. Table 2.5 points out that majority of the farmers in the
barrio haveyet to join SN. Only 41 percent of rice farmers, a third of
corn farmers and a third of rice and corn farmers belong. This hasto
be kept in mind becauseif SN becomesthe channel for all govern-
ment services,then majority of the farmers will not benefit from
them. However, for a young nationwide movement,SN hasprobably
recruited more members than any other farmers' organization
26
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especially because majority of its members have never belonged to
any organization before.
Since SN also aims to prepare farmers to become better pro-
ducers, their exposure and response to agricultural innovations is
important. Compared to non-members, rice and corn farmer-mem-
bers of SN are more inclined to use recommended farming practices
such as certified seeds, herbicides, straight row planting, pesticides,
insecticides, and improved varieties. After membership in the SN,
members based their rate of fertilization more on recommendations
and information from technical and institutional sources rather than
non-technical sources such as neighbors and their own judgment. In
genera/, members were more "modern" in their agricultural practices
than non-members and became even more so after joining SN. They
a/so take more advantage of information from government field
workers and technicians while non-members rely more on neighbors.
3. Occupation and educational attainment
As earlier discussed, 82 percent of the SN members were farmers
and 18 percent, non-farmers. Among the officers and members, 31
percent are private and government employees; 21 percent are en-
gaged in retail and small business/cottage industry; 20 percent are
teachers; 5 percent, electricians, technicians, mechanics and transport
workers; 6 percent carpenters and construction workers; 3 percent
practice their profession; and the rest are other kinds of blue-collar
workers. As expected, more of the non-farmer officers have college
education than the farmer-officers (60 vs. 17 percent) while among
the members, 36 percent of the non-farmers and only 6,3 percent of
the farmer-members have college education. Among the SN officers,
there were more non-farm occupations than farmers. They a/so have
higher education than members. These facts deserve emphasis be-
cause SN, which is mainly a farmers" organization, is led more by
non-farmers than by people with occupational needs and interests
similar to their own. (See Table 2. 6.)
What is more instructive is the evident relationship between
tenure status and educational attainment. Table 2.7 shows educa-
tion rising with each higher step in the tenure ladder such that share
tenants have the lowest percentage with college education while
owner-cultivators have the highest. In genera/, farmers who own
their land have more schooling than tenants and lessees. For every
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TABLE 2.6
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF SN OFFICERS AND MEMBERS
Officers Members
(In Percent)
Advancedstudies 0.6 0.3
Collegegraduate 16.6 6.0
Collegeundergraduate 11.7 4.6
Highschoolgraduate 22.0 9.6
Highschoolundergraduate 15.6 14.1
Elementarygraduate 24.4 34.5
Primarygraduate 8.5 27.0
No schooling 0.6 3.9
100.0 100.0
Source: Arnold M. Naldoza, "Samahang Nayon Officers' Responsivity to
ManagementTraining," Unpublished M.S. Thesis, U.P. at Los BaBos,March
1979.
tenure status, officers are more educated than members. Since there
are more owners than share tenants and lesseesamong the SN mem-
bers, their level of education as a group is higher than that of non-
member farmers who are mainly share tenants and lessees.
4. Household Characteristics, Possessions and Decision.Making
Patterns
Sixty-three percent of SN members are between 36 and 55 years
old; 17 percent are above 56; and 21 percent are below 35. The aver-
age SN member is middle-aged, about 48 years old. He has a house-
hold size of six, with two breadwinners. Only a little over one-half
of the members consider their income adequate for food and cloth-
ing (Table 2.8). Adequacy for education, housing and other needs
was felt by lessthan 50 percent.
Comparing SN officers, members and non-members with respect
to adequacy of their income for different household needs such as
food, clothing, education, housing, etc., Table 2.8 shows e definite
pattern with more officers expressing adequacy than members and
non-members. The latter feel least adequate about their income. All
three groups consider their income more adequate for food and
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TABLE 2.8
ADEQUACY OF INCOME FOR BASIC NEEDS AS PERCEIVED BY SN
OFFICERS, MEMBERS AND NON-MEMBERS
Percent reporting adequacyof
income for different needs
Non-
Officers Members members
Food 63 54 44
Clothing 61 52 37
Education 56 46 31
Housing 57 47 32
Other needs 49 40 23
Source:ACCI - Socio-EconomicStatus.
clothing than for education, housing and other needs. This pattern
is subtantiated by more specific material indicators. More officers
than members and more members than non-members possess the
following items: durable house roof and wall; distinct house parti-
tions for bedroom, kitchen, _dining rooms; water sealed or flush toi-
lets; electric lighting;deep well or piped-in water supply; range cook-
ing stove; and other household appliances (Table 2.9).
Whether in terms of perceived income adequacy for basic family
needs or material household possessions, SN officers are better off
than non-members.
If the cooperative way is going to become part of the rural Fili-
pino's life style, it must be accepted not just by the individual mem-
ber but by his family. The role of the farmer's wife in family deci-
sions, directly or indirectly related to SN and farming matters, is
therefore a relevant concern. Table 2.10 shows that although 40 per-
cent of the respondents say the husband himself makes the decision
in joining an organization and paying the Barangay Guarantee Fund,
more than half indicate a joint husband-wife decision. Borrowing
funds for household and farming operations and repaying loans are
predominantly joint decisions although the wife holds the family
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TABLE 2.9
HOUSEHOLD POSSESSIONSOF SN OFFICERS, MEMBERS
AND NON-MEMBERS
Non-
Officers Members Members
(In Percent)
Houseroof (a) Light 30 39 51
(b) Durable 58 49 35
(c) Mixed 12 12 14
100 100 100
Housewall (a) Light 25 34 49
(b) Durable 43 32 21
(¢) Mixed 32 34 30
100 100 100
Housepartition
(a) Singleroom 8 15 24
(b) Distinct bedroomwith utility room 47 55 60
(c) Distinct bedroom,kitchen,dining
roomandlivingroom 45 30 16
100 100 100
Toilet facilities
(a) None 3 4 7
(b) Pit (open,covered,or raised) 36 44 58
(c) Watersealedor flush 61 52 35
100 100 100
Lightingfixtures
(a) Gasera/lampara 49 60 74
(b) Petromax 24 19 8
(c) Electric 27 21 •18
100 100 100
Sourcesof drinkingwater
(a) Rain/stream 12 13 11
(b) Communitywell 25 32 39
(c) Privatedeepwell/pipe 55 47 42
(d) NationalWaterSewerageAuthority 8 8 8
100 100 100
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Table 2.9 (con't.) TABLE 2.9
HOUSEHOLD POSSESSIONSOF SN OFFICERS, MEMBERS
AND NON.MEMBERS
Cookingstove
(a) "Tungko" 67 76 85
(b) Cemented"pugon" 11 12 8
(c) Heaterrange 22 12 7
100 100 100
Appliances
(a) None 13 20 30
(b) Radio/sewingmachine/flat iron 72 72 67
(c) TV/piano/stereo/refrigarator 15 __8 3
100 100 100
TABLE 2.10
FAMILY DECISION-MAKING PATTERNS FOR SN OFFICERS,
MEMBERS AND NON-MEMBERS*
Husband Other Elder
and Family
Husband Wife Wife Member
(In Percent)
1. Joiningan organization 44 3 51 1
2, Borrowingfunds for farm
operation 30 3 66 1
3. Borrowingfunds for
householdexpenses 16 13 70 -
4, Repaymentof loans 25 4 70 1
5. Paymentof BGF 40 3 56 1
6. Handlingfamily finances 3 86 9 2
*There is hardly any differencein the patternsfor the three groups,hencethe
data pertainto all of them.
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purse for more than 85 percent of respondents. In the light of the
Filipino wife being at least a ioint decision-maker on matters rele-
vant to the SN and related activities, it is unfortunate that at the
moment, the SN is a/most completely a man's worm with only 10
percent female membership.
5. Organizational Membership, Non-SN Training and Leadership
=Experience
Table 2.1 1 shows that SN officers and members are more "orga-
nization men" than non-members. Almost 60 percent of the officers
and 40 percent of the members belong to other organizations while
only 22 percent of the non-members do so. Joining the SN is, there-
fore, not an entirely novel experience for many officers and mem-
bers. They already belong to other civic, political, professional, reli-
gious, and community organizations. Needless to say, SN has at-
tracted 60 percent of its members and 40 percent of its officers from
among those who were previously "organization.shy" One can also
hazard a guess that among the "joiners", there is not only overlap-
ping membership but also multi-organizational leadership, i.e., the
same person being an officer of several organizations.
TABLE-2.11
AFFILIATION OF SN OFFICERS, MEMBERSAND NON-MEMBERS
WITH OTHER ORGANIZATIONS
Officers Members Non-members
(In Percent)
Belongto the organization 59 40 =22
Do not belong 41 60 78
100 100 100
When asked which farmers' organization they would prefer to
join m one where most of the members are relatives or one where
few or none of the members are relatives, a distinct pattern can be
identified, with 44 percent of the officers, 59 percent of the mem-
bers, and 71 percent of non-members choosing the former. Thist_Jp
gests the more ram/list/c, traditional inclinations of non.members
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compared to the more open, objective and universalistic attitudes of
officers and members in their choice of colleagues in a farmers"
organization. Although the preferencesare different, the reasons
given for their particular preference are very similar. Those who
expressedpreference for a farmers' organization where most of the
members are relatives gave the following reasonsfor their choice:
(a) stronger unity and cooperation, (b) more understanding,respect
and discipline, (c) mutual assistance,and (d) trust. Others saidthat
with relatives, their doubts can easily be voiced out and the organi-
zation is easier to manage.Those who prefer to join an association
where only a few or none of the membersare relativesgaveessen-
tially the same reasonsfor their preference except for the desire
to avoid nepotism and to havemore ideasfrom other people. With
non-relatives, they also felt that jealousy could be avoided. While
the other group said that with relatives one can easily expresshis
doubts, those who favored non-relativesthink that thiswould enable
them to decide freely. Curiously, both those who prefer relatives
and those who opt for non-relativeshave roughly the same reasons
for their preference. The desire for stronger unity and cooperation
isthe most prominent reasongivenby both.
In terms of non-SN training, less than half of the officers and
about a third of the membershaveundergonesomekind of training.
The situation is worse for non-members.Only 12 percent of them
have receivedthis benefit. Among those who had, they participated
in a variety of training programs for local government (barangay),
leadership seminars, farmers' classes,family planning and health
programs, community development training, manpower skills devel-
opment and eventraining sponsoredby the Armed Forces.
Although at the national level, one gets the impression that "the
whole world is undergoing training" it is nevertheless surprising that
54 percent of SN officers, 69 percent of members and 88 percent of
non-members have never attended any training program before SN
came along. For non-members this experience may continue to
elude them. Most likely, there are those who can be called "profe_
sional trainees" in the sensethat they repeatedlyget trainingoppor-
tunities, while others haveneverhad accessto any (Table 2.12).
Leadershipactivities in the form of calling, organizingand pre-
siding over meetings;initiating and implementing projects; settling
interpersonal conflicts among farmers; bringing barrio problems to
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TABLE 2,12
PARTICIPATION IN NON-SN TRAINING BY SN OFFICERS,
MEMBERSAND NON-MEMBERS
Officers Members Non-members
(In Percent)
Haveparticipatedin Non-SN
training 46 31 12
Havenot participatedin
Non-SNtraining 54 69 88
100 100 100
the attention of government officials; and being consulted on village
matters are within the experience of more than two-thirds of the
officers and less than 40 percent of the members. Only slightly over
10 percent of non-members have had similar experiences.
In summary, officers have had more organizational leadership
and training experiences than members and members have more than
non-members. Those who already have, stand to gain even more in
joining the SN (Table 2.13).
6. Attitudes toward Group and Community Action for Pro-
blem-Solving
One of the basic assumptions of the cooperatives development
program is that "a group can have better bargaining power than farm-
ers transacting individually. As a group, they are in a better position
to obtain higher prices for their produce and lower costs for their
inputs. By pooling their produce and purchases, they can decrease
the cost of transportation and get discount on bulk purchases. ''s
To determine what inclinations respondents have toward group or
community action in solving a potential farming problem, the fol-
lowing questions were asked: "What would you do: If a fertilizer
dealer refuses to sell fertilizers unless the group of farmers buys
chemicals? If a financing institution refuses to grant loans for the
group's farming operations? If the sole buyer of palay in the barrio
persists in buying the palay at a much lower price than the prevail-
ing price?" Questions were also asked to assesstheir attitudes to-
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TABLE 2.13
LEADERSHIP EXPERIENCES OF SN OFFICERS, MEMBERS
AND NON-MEMBERS
Percent_#)o ind/cated having O_e
pattlcular Imdership experience
Officers ,qemben Non-members
1. Callingandorganizing
meetings 71 38 10
2. Presidingovermeetings 69 36 10
3. Initiatingand/or imple-
mentingbarrioprojects 60 35 9
4, Beingconsultedon matters
affectingbarrio 67 40 12
5. Settlinginterpersonal
conflicts relatedto farmers'
activities 50 37 13
6. Bringingbarrioproblems
to the attention of govern-
ment officials 64 38 12
ward inter-village cooperation in procuring inputs and marketing
outputs; responsibility for the development of the community
and the organization. An attempt was also made to find out their
most pressing problem in the community and whether they think
the SN can help solve this problem as well as help realize their
expectations in life.
Table 2.14 shows that respondents are almost equally divided
in their desire to act independently or jointly with other villages
with respect to procuring inputs and marketing outputs. However,
officers were more inclined than members, and members more than
non_nembers, to favor inter-village action on these two metter¢
Of the three groups, non-members opt most for action independent
of farmers in other village¢ Rural people have often been accused
of wanting to leave development responsibility in the hands of bar-
rio officials. Data from this study fail to support this old notion.
Eighty-four percent of officers and 82 percent of members believe
that the development of the barrio is everybody's concern. However,
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only 77 percent of non-members subscribe to this view. More, non-
members (23 percent) than members (18 percent) and officers (16
percent) said that "the development of a barrio depends on the bar-
" rio officials" Consistent with this trend is the tendency for more
non-members to regard, the President as the most important man
in the organization while more, of the officers and •members men-
tioned the "entire membership" as important.
TABLE 2.14
SNOFFICERS', MEMBERS' AND NON-MEMBERS' ATTITUDES
TOWARD GROUPAND COMMUNITY ACTION INSOLVING PROBLEMS
Officers Members Non-
Members "
• (In Percent)
1. Alternativesof ,procuringfarm
inputsandmarketingoutputs
a. For all the:farmersin agiven
Villageto buy andselltogether
(independentof farmersin
othervillages) 50 54 60
b. For all the farmersinadjacent
villagesto buy andsell together 50 46 40
t00 100 100
2. Responsibilityfor the development
of the barrio
• e. The developmentOfabarrio
dependson the barrioofficials 16 18 23
b. The developmentof a barriois
everybody'sconcern 84. 82 77
100 100 100
3. The mostimportant manin an
organization
•a, President 77 82 84
b; Other officers- 4 2 3
•c, Entiremembership. 19 - 16 13
100 100 -i00
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Table 2.14 (Continued)
NOR-Off/cers Members
Memben
(In Percent)
4. Actionsto be taken in casea
fertilizerdealerin the arearefuses
to sell fertilizer unlessthe farmer
will buy chemicals
a. As agroup,we will decidenot to
buy from that dealeraml look for
anothersource.Asa group,we will
report the matterto the authorities 47 40 10
b. I will report it to the authorities
myself.As individuals,we will
look for other sources, 22 22 40
c. I cannotdoanythin_ I will
continueto buy. I will stop
applyingfertilizer. 22 28 40
d. I will resortto substitutes 2 3 3
e. Others 7 7 7
100 100 100
5. Actionsto betaken incasea
financinginstitution in the area
refusesto grant loansfor farming
a. Group ac/Jonssuchas:Uniting
with fellow farmersto having
a meetingwith SN membersand
talk with bankofficlal_ As
agroup,we will report the matter
to authoritie¢ Groupwill not do
businesswith the bank.We will
establishour ownbank. Asa
group,wewill look for other
financinginstitutionsoutsidethe
barrio. 52 50 13
b, Individual actions - I will go
to the bankmyselfandtalk to
bank officials,I will report
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Table 2.14 (Continued)
Non-Officers Members
Members
(In Percent)
to authorities myself. As an indi-
vidual, I will look for outside
financing institution which will
grant me a loan. I will go to private
money-lenders myself, I will sell
assetsto accumulate funds. 37 39 63
c. Others 11 11 14
100 100 100
6. Actions to be taken in case the
only buyer of pelay in the barrio
wants to buy the palay at a price
lower than the prevailing price
a, Group act/ons -- As a group, we
will contact outside buyer/dealer;
we will discussthe matter with
SN officials so we can look for
another buyer. We will stock the
palay and wait for a higher price. 66 61 42
b. Individual actions - As an indi-
vidual, I will look for another
buyer; I will sell it to the buyer;
I will deposit palay with SN and
discuss the matter with SN officials
for appropriate action; I will report
to the Price Stabilization Council
or proper authorities. 31 35 55
c. Others 3 4 3
100 100 100
7. Opinion on whether SN can solve the
most pressingproblem in the barrio
a. Yes 70 68 40
b. No 6 5 5
c. No comment 7 9 29
d. It depends 17 18 26
100 100 100
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Table 2.14 (Continued)
Non-Officers Members
Members
(In Percent)
8, Reasonswhy barrio peoplepartici-
pate in communityprojects
a. It maybe compulsory 3 3 8
b. They enjoyworking together 10 9 9
c, They seecommunitybenefits
from it 63 62 56
d. Becauseof goodrelations
(pakikisama) 19 21 22
e. They seeindividualbenefits
from it 3 3 3
f. Others 2 2 2
100 100 100
9. Opinionson whetherSN canhelp
realizetheir aspirations
a. Yes 74 72 35
b. No 4 3 4
c. No comment 8 8 16
d. Don't know 14 17 45
100 100 100
With respect to group or individual actions in dealing with com-
munity problems facing farmers, from almost half to two-thirds of
SN officers and members chose courses of action that are group-
oriented. On the other hand, ma/ority of non-members favored
individual actions and even helpless resignation to their inability
to do anything about the situation. This observation may be illus-
trated in the following: while officers and members are more in-
clined to act as a group in deciding to boycott the dealer who forces
farmers to buy chemicals with their fertilizer and to look for ano-
ther source, non-members will act as individuals in looking for ano-
ther source or will even stop buying fertilizers. With respect tO oh-
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raining loans from .a financing institution, more than 60 percent of
non-memberswould go as individuals to bank officials, authorities
or even private money lenders. However, more than half of the
officersand members would•unite with fellow farmers to meet with
bank officials,•report the matter to authorities or will evenconsider
establishingtheir own bank. In wanting to obtain a betterprice for
their palay, officers and memberswill contact anoutside buyeras a
group or will stockpalay for a higher price, while non-members
will continue to sell the palay to the same buyer anyway or look
for anotherbuyer asan individual.
When askedabout.the most pressingproblemsin the community,
the following were the most frequently mentioned: lack o.firrigation;
lack of infrastructurei high price of inputs; poor.transportation faci-
• lities, etc. Problems_of tenancy, credit, population explosion, health
and sanitation,facilities were leastmentioned. In the light of the fact
that two-thirds of non-membersandabout a fifth of SN membersare
share tenants, it seemsthat.this state of affairs.doesnot bother them
sufficiently to considertenancy a problem. AppaPently,problemsof
poPulation and. health at the village level are not perceivedon the
samescaleof urgencydefined .at the national scene.SinCethe SN was
.organizedto help solvesomeof our rural problems,.respondentswere
askedwhether they thought,the SN could.do so. Seventy percentof
officers and. members replied in the affirmative while non-members
-were.mostly non-committal or conditional,in their respond. Only 40
percent thought SN could solve the most pressingproblem of the
barrio. They were more skepticalabout SN. in this role. Perhapsthis
•.is one reasonwhy they have.stayed out ofthe organizationsofar. It
is interesting that although majority of the three groups believe that
• barrio people .participate in community projects-because they see
community benefits .from it,. non-members have a slightly greater
tendency to think that compulsion is the reason for people's partici-
pation, SN officers.and members (more than 70 percent) also ex-
pressedgreat .faith inSN's potential for .helping.them realize their
.aspirations.On the other hand, sixty,five percent of non-members
are uncertainabout this. Only a third gavean unqualified "Yes".
7. SarnahangNayon: Size and Location
No matter. how Skeptical one isabout, cooperativesor anything
like .it,"SNs as pre-cooperativesat the village,level all over the coun-
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try cannot be sneeredat. Although not all of the 40,110 barrioshave
an SN over a 5-year period (1974-1979), the number of organized
SNs grew from 15,320 in 1974 with a membership of 676,575 to
21,235 with a total membershipof more than a million (1,028;927).
Assuming one SN per barrio, this means more than half of total
villages covered. Those that have been registered increasedfrom
11,575 SNs with 545,582 members to 18,180 and 933,536 mem-
bers. Average membership per SN is about 51. Trends in size show
that SN's growth peaked during the second year and has slowed
down to practically a "halt" by the fifth year (Tables2.16 to 2.20).
This early peak and rapid deceleration in growth isprobably charac-
teristic of nationwide undertakingswhich receive maximum support
during the first two yearsant; not muchafter that.
Where are the SNs located in terms of the nature of the commu-
nities where they havebeen organized?From Table 2.21, we cansee
that the rich municipalities have not been sought out for this pup
pose. Sixty-five percent of the SNs can befound in barriosof fourth
to sixth classmunicipalities.On the average,the barriosare accessible
with 3.5 kilometers from the highway and 7.7 kilometers from the
municipal center. About three-fourths of them have all-weather
roads, regulardaily public transportation and the usualpublic build-
ings like the elementary school, chapel, basketballcourt and barrio
center. A little more than 40 percent have health centers and rice
mills. Only about a fifth havea high schoolandan SN office. Almost
70 percent have no electricity and about 60 percenthaveno gravity
irrigation. One-fourth hassomepump irrigation. The averagenumber
of householdsper barrio is 214. Assumingthat the SN member is a
householdhead (which is usually the case), if the averageSN sizeis
50, that meansa fourth of the householdsin half of our villageshave
been reachedby SN.
B. SN's Organizational Structure in Action
To develop and maintain organizational viability so that SN will
be able to fulfill its multiple long-rangegoalsdescribedearlier and
the more immediate objectivesof learning,savingand instilling dis-
cipline, the following committees have been established: Board of
Directors; Committees for Education and Training; Finance and
Development; Audit and Inventory plus the Agricultural Counsellor.
By the title alone of these committees, one can readily guess the
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TABLE2.21
PERCENTDISTRIBUTIONOF812SNBARRIOSBYCLASSOF
MUNICIPALITY
C/assof Municipality
ByAnnual Income Percent
First(aboveP1.5 million) 6.2
Second1 to 1.5million 11.2
Third 0.5 to 1.0million 17.5
Fourth0.3 to 0.5 million 20.4
Fifth 0.1 to 0.3million 33.4
SixthBelow 0.1 million 11.4
100.0
Very "rational ''• and task-oriented functions they are expected to
perform such as: planning, training, budgeting, auditing, savings
mobilization, organizational and financial management, and tech-
nology transferfor agricultural modernization. We are in fact intro-
ducing elements of technocracy and the ethos of planning in devel-
opment at the village level. How have all these fared in practice?
How have this organizationalstructure and the attendant functions
•been operationalized and what •problems have been encountered
in the Processof imPlementation?
From Table 2.22, we can make the following observations:
• a) Of the 4 committees, the Board of Directors has been the
most ac.tivewith more than three-fourth of them function-
ing in 19761 The Finance and Development Committee is
the leastactive.
b) A decline in proportion of SNs with functioning commit-
tees occurredbetween 1974 and 1976. In other words, there
are evidencesof increasinginactivity although more Boards
of Directors than other committees continue to meet.
(c) The most frequently mentioned reasons for inactivity• are
waning of members'and officers' interest in SN; lack of time
due to competing occupational demands;and lack of know-
how. What is culturally intriguing is the reluctance to per-
form the auditing function on the groundsthat the Secretary-
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Treasurer-is completely trusted, that they are ashamedto
audit him and would like to avoid a misunderstandingwith
the Secretary-Treasurer. in a small community, "auditing"
implies lack of trust on the custodian of funds, hencesome
•hesitanceto carry out this function amongsomeco-villagers.
It is encouraging,however,•to note that this reluctancedoes
not seemto be sowidespreadand that the new rulesare more
accepted than rejected. •Sixty percent of SN auditors said
• they have audited the Secretary-Treasurer'saccountsand a
similar proportion of Secretary-Treasurersadmit to having
been audited. Methods of •auditing rangefrom counting cash
•on hand, checking bank accountsand entries into all books
and verifying passbooksand ledgers. Lessthan 20 percent
who audited mentioned cursory checking only. Of the 161
or 20 percent of the-SNswhich havewritten budgets,65 per-
cent of the auditors said they have evaluated the written
budgets.One wonders•at this point whether•this gapbetween
the expertise and sophisticationof those who know and "the
accounting naivete" of the rest of the membershipdoes not
contribute to the temptation to usesuchexpertise in "spirit-
ing" away the funds.
Of the three major• •reasonsfor SN inactivity, lack of
know-how would_seem to be .themost amenableto solution
by way.of training activities. Lack of time due to their jobs
and lack of interest in SN need to be examined together.
Perhapsthey could find the time if they were more interested.
Furthermore, many studieshavepointedout that farmersare
underemployed,even "idle" for a good part of the year.•.It
is, therefore, curious that lack of time hasbeen frequently
mentioned asa reasonfor non-functioning committees. It is
probably.more of a rationalization-than a reason. Inability
to attend meetingscuts out Opportunities for the uninterest-
ed to become•interested,hence,the lack of interest isfurther
reinforced. A rather novel but apparently ,sensible" reason
for the Finance and Development Committee's •failure to
meet isthat there is "nothing to discuss". But perhaps it
is symptomatic of somethingelse that SN membersfeel that
• suchan important committee has"nothing to discuss".•
d) In this era of planned change•;planning lies at the heart of
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any undertaking but the planning process is not sufficient
in and of itself. The plan must be epitomized in a written
document. Since planning and writing out the plan require
some expertise, it is not surprisingthat SN memberschoose
more educated, even if non-farmers, for their officers. The
written plan, however, is far from beingpopular. Only about
a third of the Board of Directors, and the Education and
Training Committees have a written plan and about a fifth
havea written budget. Not surprisingas the major masonfor
failure to comply is the lack of know-how. Some of them
understandably assignthis task to the Municipal Develop-
ment Officer (MDO) or the Barrio DevelopmentWorker
(BDW). "It is their job", so to speak, But a more resistant
reason is the officers' skepticismas to the usefulnessof the
plan which '_will not be followed anyway". It is, therefore,
the process, the essence,substanceand purposeof the plan
which "will not be followed anyway". It is, therefore, the
process, the essence,substanceand purpose of the plan ra-
ther than the production of the document itself which de-
serve to be emphasized.The planningprocessmustbe viewed
as a learning experience in the "scientific approach" to
problem-solving in the context of their own peculiar pro-
blem-solving in the context of their own peculiar problems
at the villagelevel.
e) Another deliberate or side objective of the plan preparation
is the opportunity it affords for members to be involved, to
participate in the developmentprocess.While in 10 to 15 per-
cent of the SNs, the President himself, the Vice-President,
and the SN manager hadprepared the plan alone for their re_
pective committee, or had instructed others to do it, for me-
jority of the SNs, it was committee work. What is worth
noting is that almost half of the Secretary-Treasurerspre-
pared the written budget themselves.While this might be an
indication of their specializedexpertise, it could also be a
danger signalfor the SN particularly since the budget repre-
sentsfunds available, and proposedexpenditure¢ A broader-
based understandingof the organization'sfinancial situation
is one meansof safeguardingtheir funds.
One possible indicator of SN's viability is the extent to
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which it undertakesprojectsasan organization.Suchprojects
also help develop SN's relationships with the community.
About 6 percent of 812 SNs studied saidthat they have or-
ganized and initiated projects;3 percentcoorBinatedprojects
initiated by private organizationsand 9 percent coordinated
projects initiated by governmentagencies.This suggeststhat
SN might usefully perform a project initiator-coordinator
role which would provide the organization and its members
first-hand experience in project identification, initiation,
and managementparticularly at the stagewhen they are not
yet allowed to engagein business.It can also be an informa-
tion-receiver-disseminatorfor matters directly or indirectly
• related to SN but which are of community-wide interest,
thus enhancingits credibility.
Since the officers of an organization provide leadership
and set the pace for what happensor doesnot happen in SN,
it is important to find out what membersconsiderthe most
important characteristicsof an SN leader. From Table 2.23,
we can see that human relations skills are at the top of their
/hat;.This is understandablein the light not only of SN'sown
mandate and its internal group structure but alsoof the need
to relate to other SNs, representativesof developmentagen-
cies, politicians, landlords, and the rest of the community.
Competence comesas a far secondto human relationsabili-
ties. Their sensitivity to personal integrity is revealed in the
15 percent who emphasized honesty, trustworthiness,and
incorruptibility. Seven percent mentioned beinga good dis-
ciplinarian. Having time for SN was considered important
only by less than 3 percent although earlier, it has been
pointed out that "lack of time" is one of the major reasonsa
for SN officers' inability to perform their designatedfunc-
tions. One wonders at this point what lack of time really
means. Is it possiblethat officers, particularly thosewho are
non-farmers do not considerSN activities worth their time
although they relish whatever power and prestigego with
the position? Do SN officers carry multiple-responsibilities
because of affiliation with other organizations?At any rate,
the requirementsof technocracyat the village levelfor such
an organization as SN have yet to gain prominent recogni-
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TABLE 2.23
MOST IMPORTANT CHARACTERISTICS THAT MUST BE POSSESSED
BY AN SN LEADER (5292 RESPONDENTS)
Percent
1. Abilities in humanrelations 45.4
2. Competence 19.3
3. Honest,trustworthy, incorruptible 14.8
4. Good disciplinarian 6.9
5. Industrious 4.3
6. Cancommunicatewith all classesof people 4.1
7. Havetime for SN 2.8
8. Polite but firm anddecisive 1,1
9. Fair andjust 0.5
10. Status 0.2
11. No answer 0.6
tion. Competence which lags much behind human relations
abilities in members' perceptions of what is desirable in their
leader would need to be deliberately developed and added to
the repertoire of skills possessed by these leaders, This is
purportedly the objective of training activities.
When officers were asked whether they liked their present position,
eighty-seven percent said "Yes" and more than three-fourth of those
who did would readily accept a reelection to the position. Twenty-
one percent said they would either be reluctant or would not accept
a reelection although they liked the present position. Reasons for
disliking the present position centered on the complaint that it takes
too much of their time. Members' assessment of their officers' per-
formance shows that almost 80 percent of them are satisfied with
their Presidents, Vice-Presidents, Secretary-Treasurers, Managers,
and Auditors. The least satisfactory performance was attributed to
the Agricultural Counsellor with less than 60 percent of members
giving a satisfactory verdict.
As an organization designed to prepare farmers to become better
producers, the role of the Agricultural Counsellor in the SN is very
strategic. Anyone who has been trained for this purpose immediately
receives some direct benefits in the form of exposure to modern
farming practices which is one of the reasons specified by members
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for joining SN, At least 3 evidences attest to the importance mem-
bers attach to the role of agricultural counsellor:
1) While 87 percent of other officers said they like present •posi-
tion, practically everyone (97 percent) of the Agricultural
Counsellors expressed this same feeling for their job.
2) Seventy-five percent of Agricultural Counsellors occupy
other positions. They are holding it concurrently with being
President, Vice-President, Secretary-Treasurer, and Manager.
.This means they have been willing tO serve in this dual capa-
city despite the fact that there is no remuneration for their
services.
3) Although a little, more.than half of the Agricultural Counsel-.
Iors had conducted training for fellow $N members and only
9 percent had put up demonstration projects, about 70 per-
•cent Of them claim to have been consulted by other farmers
on farm practices, with an average of 23 farmers per SN
having done so.. In turn, Agricultural Counsellors consulted
Farm Management Technicians. If this had taken place only
after 12 months of incumbency, then some technology tran_
fer or at least some new knowledgehas been transferred.
4) Majority of =farmer.members regard adoption of modern
farming practices and production of .high yield as the marks
of a progressive farmer (Table 2.24). Supportive of this view
is their mention of wanting to learn modern agricultural prac-
TAB LE2.24 •
CHARACTERISTICS OF A PROGRESSIVE.FARMER AS VIEWED..
BY SN OFFICERS AND.MEMBERS (5292 RESPONDENTS)
Percent of total respondent=who
mentloned each characteristic
1.. Adoptsmodernfarmingpractices 74,5
2. Produceshighyield 48.9
3. Memberof a farmers'association 19,9•
4, Respectedby other farmers 17.4
5. Not indebted i 1,8
6, Cultivatorof largeareaof land 5.8
7. Blessedwith good luck 4.4
80 Others : 24.5
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tices as one important reasonfor joining SN. It might alsobe
inferred that being respectedby other farmers is related to
the possessionof thesetwo qualitieswhich havea direct bear-
ing on the role of the Agricultural Counsellor, Only about a
fifth mentioned being "member of a farmers' association"as
the characteristic of a progressivefarmer. Therefore, mem-
bership in SN is consideredas a far, far lesssalientquality of
a progressivefarmer than being a modern high-producing
one. It is also worth noting that about 12 percent maintain
some conservatismregardingcredit. They think that a "prog-
ressive farmer" should not be indebted. This is contrary to
the current thrust which more or lessfocus on credit as the
avenue to purchasedinputs and modern farming, Curiously,
being a large farmer is not necessarilyassociatedwith being
a progressivefarmer - but about 5 percent still feel that a
progressivefarmer isone who is "blessedwith good luck."
On SN's ability to develop on its own, a fifth of the SNs believe
that they could managewithout the Barrio DevelopmentWorker and
about a fourth said the same about the Municipal Development
Worker. This representseither a rather optimistic view of their own
capability or a pessimistic view of the BDW's and MDO's contribu-
tion toward the development of SN. However, almost two-thirds of
the SNs admitted that SNs could not develop without government
assistance.Some clues supportive of possiblepessimismon the part
of officers regardingthe role of MDO/BDWs in the development of
the SN (Table 2.25) show that about half of the officers indicated
that MDOs visited monthly. The rest visited lessfequently, including
about 9 percent who said "never" or "once since SN organization".
Visits made by BDWs are much lessfrequent and more than half did
not answer.Their visits were more socialand incidental rather than
instrumental and task*oriented in nature. In the caseof the MDOs,
the most specific purposesof their visits were to conduct training
and examine the book of accounts. Other visitswere more incidental
andsocial. More frequently, it isto inquire about SN problems.
To elaborate upon the finding that majority of respondents
believe SNs could not developwithout governmentassistance,evenif
they were not aspositivewith respectto MDO/BDWs, let usexamine
the members' reasonsfor joining SN (Table 2.26). Apparently they
believe that SN could improve their living conditions and that they
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TABLE 2.25
FREQUENCY OF VISITS OF MDO/BDW TO THEIR SN AS
REPORTED BY 2390 OFFICERS
MDO BDW
(In Percent)
1. Livesin the barrio 1.9 1.5
2, Weekly 7.7 4.7
3. Monthly 41.2 17.8
4. Bi-monthly 7.9 3.6
5, Quarterly 10.3 5,4
6. Irregular 15.6 5.4
7. OncesinceSN organization 3.9 2.8
8. Never 4,8 3.0
9. No response 6.7 55.8
Activitiesof MDO/BDWsduringtheir
SN Visits Percentof Total Respondents
1, AskSN problems 72.5 6.2
2, Conducttraining 57.5 -
3. Incidentalvisits 46.0 27.7
4. Meetthe BoardandCommittee 30.0 5.8
5. Socialvisits 13.4 22.2
6, Examinethe book of accounts 11.6 11.6
7, No answer 11,6 59,6
are convinced of its good objectives. Both of these are vague and
general and could be indicative of how they perceive SN. Nowhere in
these reasons do the respondents specifically suggest that they want
to save, learn, be disciplined and act as a group. However, they want
to avail of services from SN and the government, to learn modern
farm practices, to qualify for a Certificate of Land Transfer (CLT)
and to obtain supply of farm inputs. It should not be a surprise to
anyone that people join organizations supposedly designed for them
because of what they could get from it for their own advantage an_.
hardly because they want to contribute to it and help others. They
are self-rather than other-oriented, "opportunistic", rather than al-
truistic in outlook. Although membership in SN is regarded as man°
datory for CLT, only 10 percent mentioned this as their reason for
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TAB LE 2.26
MAJOR REASONSFOR JOINING THE SAMAHANG NAYON
(2390 OFFICERS AND 1600 MEMBERS)
Percent of total responden1_
mentioning eachreamn
1. BelieveSN couldimprovelivingconditions 62.8
2. Convincedof the goodobjectivesof SN 50.1
3. To availof servicesfrom government 28.9
4. To availof servicesfrom the SN 28.8
5. To,now the programsof government 18.3
6. To learnmodern farm practices 17.2
7. It isa felt need 13.1
8. To qualify for CLT or acquireland 9.9
9. To obtainsupplyof farm inputs 9.2
10. Forcedto join 1.9
11. Curiosity 1.4
12. Other reasons 12.4
joining and only 2 percent admitted being "forced to join". For
those who had hoped to see the SN as a "doubled-edged" organiza-
tion for cooperation as well as for a more effective lobbying force
for farmers, this was not an explicitly stated reason for joining SN.
Perhaps those who seek group action as a source of power to pro-
mote their own against "outside" interests are not the people who
join government,sponsored organizations.
C. SN's Direct and Indirect Educational Activities and Members"
Learning
The Training Program
In the new cooperatives development program, education is one
of the three basic components, in addition to capital build-up and
the practice of discipline. To carry out this massive educational
scheme, the following training courses were required:
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Number Number of
Type of Treinlng of Lessons Week8 Duration
1. Pre-Membership (Phase I) 8 10
2. Development Phase (Phase II) 55
a) Management training for
officers 20 10
b) Technical training for
Agricultural Counsellors 20 2
c) Techn!cal training for
members 20 12
d) Product specialization 8 16
e) Management training for
members 12 12
For Phase I, the 8 pre-membership lessons consisted of one lesson
on agrarian reform, 2 lessons on history and general principles of
cooperatives and four lessons on Samahang Nayon: its rationale,
organization, policies and requirements. The last lesson cited the factors
that work toward the Successof Samahang Nayon .7
These training courses were programmed such that officers who
were trained by tralnors could in turn train the members in cooperative
management; and the Agricultural Counsellors, who were trained by
agricultural technicians and extension agents, could in turn train the
ordinary members in technical agriculture.
The cooperative management for officers consisted of lessons in
•managing cooperative, including leadership and decision-making process,
the special SN features such as the capital build-up through savings and
the practice of discipline, records keeping• and reporting, and the
structuring of the Philippine cooperative system: The cooperative
management for ordinary members differed with that prescribed for
officers in that specific management techniques such as planning,
supervising, eccounting and reporting were not given to the ordinary
members.
• The training on technical agriculture for both the Agricultural
Counsellors and other SN members consisted of lessons on fertilizer and
pesticide application; the steps in the scientific techniques of growing
rice, corn, and vegetables, and the raising of hogs and poultry, including
procedures in obtaining loans for financial requirements, The product
specialization course included lessons on domestic crafts and cottage
industw to provide members and their families with sources of income
besides farming. 8
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For the massiveeducational program, a total of 65 weeks or one
year and 3 months from the organizational and pre-rnembership
educational stage to management training for members have been
allocated. The training strategy was one of "training the trainors"
who in turn trained the next trainees. The ACCI study, however,
observed that the actual conduct of the training was abbreviated
as shown by lessactual sessionsand shorter duration than required
for all the courses. Furthermore, on the average,only a little more
than one third of the SNs completed all the training courses.For the
ordinary members, Agricultural Counsellorsand officers, only an
averageof 58 percent attended all the training coursesoffered by
their SNs. The highest percentage of attendance was reported for
Agricultural Counsellors (83 percent); followed by Presidents(78
percent); Secretary-Treasurers(73 percent); Managers(63 percent);
Vice-Presidents(61 percent); and Auditors (59 percent). The lowest
percentage of attendance was for ordinary members (28 percent).
Reasons cited for failure to attend all the training courseswere:
"no time", physical incapacity, and such other reasonslike "train-
ing has not yet been held", "not aware of training" or "officers were
newly elected".
"Evidences" of learning
Two groups of workers were instrumental in organizing Sama-
hang Nayons; the Barrio Development Workers (BDW) of the Min-
istry of Local Government and CommuniW Development and
Vohmteers Barrio Workers (VBW}, most of whom were elemen-
tary school teachers. One small way of gauging barrio people's
familiarity with the organizers who were also the trainors was to
ask if they knew the namesand addressof the organizers.In general,
these two groups of workers were known but the VBWs were even
more known (96 percent) than the BDWs (87 percent). As expected,
the organizerswere lessknown by the non-members(72 percent for
VBW) than by the members. The BDWs were less known (46 per-
cent). The vigor with which pre-membershipeducation was pursued
is evidenced by the fact that 82 percent of all membersfinished all
•the 8 lessonsand 29 percent of non-membersattended at leastone
lesson. After a year, 15,729 barrios in 1,342 municipalities were
covered by the program with 10,419 Samahang Nayons organized
and reporting more than half a million members (559,054). Some
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2,260 field workers and 8,778 volunteer barrio workers were mo-
bilized for this task. There was roughly one worker per 50 members
organized. In addition to this personalizedstrategy, massmediawere
extensively used. The Samahang Nayon jingle was aired every 15
minutes all over the country. Of the eleven leaf|ets distributed, 43
percent of members did not get any, 41 percent received1 to 7 and
16 percent got 8 to 11 leaflets. However, when asked what their
sourceof information on SN was,94 percentof membersmentioned
the VBW and BDW. Only 5 percentcited radio and printed matter as
source. Almost 60 percent of non-membershave also learned from
the BDWs and VBWs either from a spill-over or an initial interest in
SN which did not materialize into membership. More of the non-
members mentioned massmedia (15 percent) as their source. Spill-
over information also came from other barrio leadersand barrio resi-
dents. Whether in agricultural extension, family planning, health
education or SamahangNayon, personalsourcesof information play
the lead role. Radio and printed matter are supportiveof, not substi-
tutes of, "personal messagecarriers".
For some idea about messageabsorption, Table 2.27 shows us
that members havea distinct advantageover non-membersas far as
knowledge about agrarian reform, cooperative principlesand Sama-
hang Nayon is concerned. Perhapsit is no exaggerationto say that
these pre-membership lessonscould be the most extensiveand syste-
matic "educational" campaignthat hasbeen undertakenon agrarian
reform. An averageof two thirds of membersgavecorrectanswersto
nine agrarian reform questions and to three querieson cooperative
principles. Although averagerating on the latter was almost as high
as that for agrarianreform, the concept of "limited returns to capi-
tal" is the least understoodof the three principlesand it happensto
be the least attractive feature of cooperatives.Unfortunately, the
performance on Samahang Nayon questionswere the lowest of the
three subject-matter areas. In two important and difficult SN con-
cepts such as the possibility of borrowingfrom SN andthe intended
usesof the forced savings,only a third answeredcorrectly. One can
therefore saythat the SN pre-membership education had been more
successfulin carrying the agrarianreform than the SN message.
Before assessingthe impact of managementtraining on officers
and members,we needto find out how much of the requiredtraining
program was actually carried out. Table 2.28 indicatesthat only a
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TAB LE 2.27
PERCENT OF RESPONDENTSWHO GAVE CORRECT RESPONSESTO
QUESTIONS FROM PRE.MEMBERSHIPEDUCATION LESSONS
Non-
Members Members
A. Questionson agrarianreform
1. Valuation of land 33 7
2, Number of yearsto pay the land 85 47
3. To whom paymentof land is given 64 29
4. First instrumentthat will serveas
provisiontitle of landownership 64 21
5. Beneficiariesof PD 27 66 34
6. Maximum heotarageof irrigated
rice landafarmercanown 71 30
7. Rightof retentionof landowner 77 41
8. First requirementbeforehe
becomesowner of the landhe tills 57 18
9. Guarantorof the paymentsfor the
land transfer 85 38
WeightedAverage 67 29
B. Questions on cooperative principles
Democraticcontrol 73 20
Limited returnsto capital 49 10
Patronagerefund 68 17
WeightedAverage 64 16
C. Questionson SarnahangNayon
Ownershipof SN 74 31
Possibilityof borrowingfrom SN 32 8
Intendedusesof 5% forcedsavings 32 4
Sourcesof fund of SN for paying
landamortizationof a defaulting
member 57 13
WeightedAverage 46 14
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TABLE 2.28
ACTUAL CONDUCT OF MANAGEMENT TRAINING COMPARED TO
REQUIREMENTS, (REPORTED BY 806 SNs)
ACTUAL CONDUCT REQUIRED PROCEDURE
Average Average Total No. ToP/No.
• No. of No. of of of
Weeks Sessions Weeks Sessions
Managementraining
for officers 5.8 11.3 10 20
Managementraining
for members 6.5 9.0 12 12
little over half of the lessons were given over half of the prescribed
number of weeks. In other words, fewer lessons were given over a
shorter period of time.
• Table 2.29 gives us a •rough idea of the extent to which the dif-
ferent lessons had been absorbed. For the four subject-matter areas,
officers have consistently scored •higher than members in tests of
message absorption given to them. Both groups Qxhibited their low-
est performance in the lessons on disciplinary measures. Apparently,
the "discipline" portion of the SN lessonswas the least learned while
'functions of officers ''•were the "most absorbed".
For the successof Samahang Nayon, however, we need to trans-
late concept-learning to actual behavior. About two-thirds of the
officers contributed to the BGF and the BSF (Table •2.30). Officers
were not that much responsive than the members although they
•TABLE 2.29
RATINGS OBTAINED•BY OFFICERS AND MEMBERSON DIFFERENT
LESSONSFROM THE TRAINING PROGRAMS
Officers Members
1, Functionsof officers 83.0 65.5
2. BGF requirements 82.9 65.6
3. BSF requirements 76,7 57.3
4. Disciplinarymeasures 42.5 34.7
m.
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TABLE 2,30
PERCENTOF OFFICERS AND MEMBERSWHO CONTRIBUTED TO THE
SAV INGS PROGRAM
Officers Members
1. Contributedto the Barangay
GuaranteeFund 64.5 56.5
2. Contributedto the Barangay
SavingsFund 66.4 60.0
scored much higher in terms of learning. This is rather discouraging
because officers should set the pace for the entire group. To explore
the relation between attendance in training, knowledge, and actual
contribution to the savings program, we present Table 2.31. Among
the officers, there is no relation between attendance and knowledge
about requirements, A very high percentage knew the requirements
whether or not they attended training. For the members, the same
trend is evident with respect to the BGF but not for the BSF. The
most predominant observation is the relation between attendance
in training and contribution; and between knowledge and contribu-
tion. Data suggest that among those who attended training and were
knowledgeable, there were more officers and members who contri-
buted than those who did not contribute. However, there is no one*
to-one relationship between training attendance, knowledge and con-
tribution because more than half of those who knew about the
requirements did not contribute to the savings program. To reca-
pitulate, training attendance does not seem to be necessary to ac-
quire knowledge but knowledge is a positive factor in promoting
contribution. Apparently, knowledge about the savings program
came from sources other than through direct attendance in the train-
ing program. Perhaps _vord-of-mouth transfers from those who at-
tended to those who did not, plus mass media, are as much a source
of information as actual attendance in training lessons. The latter,
in turn, is supportive of contributions to the savings program. At-
tendance in the training lessons apparently represents a greater com-
mitment to SN which is most likely reinforced further by the oppor-
tunity to get together with fellow SN members and SN trainors
during the training process.
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The most intriguing researchfinding about th_ knowledgegained
from the management training lessonson four subject matters is
that the number of correct answersto questions on management
lessons is negatively related to SN officers and members' educa-
tional attainment. Simply stated, the higher the educational attain-
ment is, the lower the knowledgescoresare. This finding iscertainly
most unexpected. In an attempt to explain this contradiction _.o
what is usually expected, Naldoza offers the following observations:
"The highly educated respondents preferred not to be physically
present throughout the sessionson the allegations that 'alam ko na
ang topic' (I already know the topic); 'rnagbabasana lang ako ng
manual' (1'11just read the manual); 'bakit sasamaako sa toga maba-
bang pinag-aralanat mas kailangen nila ang lecture' (Why should I
join those with low education who need the lectures more) and a
host of other excuses." Data on educationalattainment shown in an
earlier table reveal that most of the highly educated respondents
are non-farmers who are teachers, private government employees
and persons who are in private practice of their profession. Even
more discouraging is the evidence which suggeststhat the more
educated the respondent is, the less likely he is to contribute to
BGF and the higher one is in the tenure structure, the lower is his
compliance with the BGF. Owner-operators have lesscompulsion
to join SN and comply with requirements.
With respectto the functions of officers, knowledgeabout them
was not significantly related to the degreeof performance of these
functions. In a manner of speaking,this meansthat knowing what
their functions are does not mean they will actually perform them.9
Given all of these negative findings and their implications, we feel
that the processof translating knowledge and conceptual under-
standing into "desired behavior" is not at all understoodespecially
when the issueof motivation arises and the behavior expected of
the individual involvesmaking a financial contribution. This nega-
tive relationship between respondent'seducational attainment and
knowledge gained from managementtraining and between knowl-
edge and performance of functions deservesfurther study because
the basicassumptionbehind training ischallenged.
Unlike these negative observations, a more definitive and en-
couraging role for agricultural training can be gleaned from Table
2.32. Agricultural counsellors who have cor_pleted all agricultural
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• TABLE 2.32
RELATIONSHIP BETWEENCOMPLETION OF LESSONS,CONDUCT OF
TRAINING• FOR OTHER FARMERS, CONSULTED BY OTHER FARMERS,
AND FEELING OF COMPETENCE TO TEACH OTHER FARMERS.
(559 AGRICULTURAL COUNSELLORS)
Did not
Took all takeall
lessons lemons
(In Percent)
Conductedtrainingfor other farmers 56 33
Did not conducttrainingfor otherfarmers 44 67
100 100
Feelcompetentto teachotherfarmers 92 69
Do not feelcompetentto teachother farmers 8 31
100 100
Do not
Feel com. fee/com-
petent to petent to
teach other teachother
farmers farmers
Conductedtrainin_for other farme 56 23
•Did not conducttrainingfor other farmers 44 77
100 100
Consultedby other farmers 73 48
Wasnot consultedby other farmers 27 52
100 100
Numberof farmingtechniques learned
1-4 13 34
5 _ 8 50 44
9 - 13 37 22
100 100
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lessonsare more inclinedto conducttraining for other farmers.They
also feel more competent to teach other farmers and are more con-
suited by other farmers. Furthermore, they have learned more
farming techniquesthan those who did not complete all the lessons.
In summary, the processseemsto be as follows: completion of
training lessonswhich enablesthe agricultural counsellorsto learn
more farming techniqueswhich in turn makesthem feel more confi-
dent of their ability to teach other farmers. Apparently, this feeling
of confidencecontributes to their initiative_to conduct training for
other farmers. They likewise become more credible as personsto be
consulted by other farmers. Perhaps the very nature of technical
agricultureas personsto be consultedby other farmers. Perhapsthe
very nature of technical agricultureas specific, immediately applica-
ble and useful makesit easierfor the "trainee" to becomea "trainor"
to other farmers. This is reinforced by the high value placedon the
adoption of modern techniquesand highproductivity as characteris-
tics of a progressivefarmer. "Transfer of learning" would be more
impressiveif the end-receiversof the training actually implemented
the techniques they learned. Unfortunately, data on this "radiation
effect" are not availablefrom the ACCI study.
The ability of SN membersto act as a group to solve their pro-
blems and make group decisionsfor their collective welfare isa sine
qua non of cooperative activities. To train the membersfor group
action specifically in the form of group bargainingfor lower-cost
inputs and higher-priced outputs, SNs were encouragedto practice
joint buying from a designatedsource and joint selling through a
designated buyer. When 5,351 officers and members were asked
whether they havea designatedsourceof farm inputs,only 8 percent
said "Yes" and a similar percentageindicated they havea designated
buyer of members' produce. The most frequently mentioned reason
(about two-thirds) for not having joint buying and joint selling is
that the "matter has not yet been discussed,"and amongthose who
have, the members decided that each one should be free to choose
his own source or his own buyer. One can surmise that group bar-
gaining is not of high priority to the members. And eventhose who
havediscussedthe matter, the decision has favored individual rather
than joint action. Further support for this individualistic inclination
can be found in the observationthat even amongthe 8 percentwho
indicated having a designatedsourceof inDut and a designatedbuyer
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of produce, 67 percent said they did not buy their farm inputsfrom
the designatedsourceand 54 percent did not sell their crop to the
designated buyer. When asked why they failed to patronize the
designatedsourceof inputs, members reasonedthat needed inputs
were not availablefrom said source;inputs were cheaper elsewhere
or that credit could not be obtained from that source. Reasonsfor
not selling their produce to the designatedbuyer are: higher price
offered by other buyers;forced to sellto others for personalreasons;
and inability of buyer to purchase produce on time due to cash
shortages.Becausecanvassingof prices whether for farm inputs or
farm produce takes time and effort on the part of some officers,
respondents were asked whether canvassersshould receive mone-
tary returns for their efforts in lieu of salary. Only half agreed.
The other half disagreed. Members and even officers themselves
could not agreeon this matter and, therefore, the issueof incentives
for the additional effort involved in canvassingwhich is necessary
in looking for a group-designatedbuyer or seller remainsunresolved.
On the whole, only 5 percent of officers and members have actually
had any experience in doing business with SN designated source and
buyer. Group bargaining is the/east attractive and the/east practiced
of the several SN features; yet it is an excellent opportunity for
"learning by doing," One can easily absorb the concept of group
action and its advantagesbut practicing it in everyday life is infi-
nitely more difficult.
Another "learning by doing" aspect of SN's educational com-
ponent is the leadership experience acquired by officers and mem-
bers in the processof implementing SN activities. Tables2.33 and
2.34 reveal that more than 10 percent of officers and more than
5 percent of members indicated having acquired the following
leadership experiences only after SN's organization: calling and
organizing meetings; presiding over meetings; initiating and/or
implementing barrio projects; being consulted on matters affecting
the barrio; settling interpersonalconflicts related to farmers' activi-
ties; and bringing barrio problems to the attention of government
officials. Perhaps the most definitive and direct impact of SN man-
agement training can be mad from Table 2.34 which tells us that
from 6 to 12 percent of the officers attribute the acquisition of the
above-mentioned leadership skills to the Sill management training
they had undergone. SN, therefore, has made its contribution toward
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the acquisition of organizational, communication, implementation,
lobbying and intermediary skills among those who have never had
the experience before. All of these competencies strengthen SN's
capability for group action. Even if SNs fade away or members
drop out, these skills will remain with the individuals who acquired
them.
TABLE 2.33
LEADERSHIP EXPERIENCE OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS ACQUIRED
ONLY AFTER SN'sORGANIZATION
Percent who indicated having had the
particular leadership experienceonly
after SN'sorganization
Officers Members
1. Callingandorganizingmeetings 17 8
2. Presidingovermeetings 16 7
3. Initiating and/or implementing
barrioprojects 11 7
4. Beingconsultedon matters
affectingthe barrio 10 6
5. Settlinginterpersonalconflicts
relatedto farmers'activities 9 5
6. Bringingbarrio problemsto
the attentionof government
officials 10 7
Because of built-in disqualifications from membership in the SN
Board of Directors for such persons as big landowners, barrio cap-
tains, barrio councilmen, merchants and money-lenders, SN has pro-
bably contributed to opportunities for a new group of person to
assume leadership roles which they have never played before. These
disqualification rules help break the perpetuation of "professional
trainees," i.e., the same village leaders who repeatedly participate in
different training programs. In this regard, the SN training scheme
has probably helped in "spreading" the training opportunities more
widely and in sharing the "knowledge" a bit more. That this might
have actudlly taken place can be inferred from the impact of manage-
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TABLE 2.34
•PERCENT OF TOTAL OFFICERS AND MEMBERSWITH LEADERSHIP
EXPERIENCE WHO ATTRIBUTE THE ACQUISITION OF LEADERSHIP
SKILLS TO THE SN MANAGEMENT TRAINING WHICH THEY HAD
UNDERGONE
Percent of total officers and
• members
1. Callingandorganizingmeetings 12.3
2, Presidingovermeetings 11,5
3, Initiating and/or implementing
barrioprojects 8.0
4. Beingconsultedon matters
affectingthe barrio 7.2
5, Settlinginterpersonalconflicts
relatedto farmers'activities 6.3
6, Bringingbarrio problemsto the
attentionof governmentofficials 7,7
ment training on their:feeling of capability to assume leadership posi-
tions.
While 87 percent of the officers liked their presentposition, less
than 40 percent of the members expressed willingness to accept any
position in the-SN. The others were either reluctant, unwilling or
could not respond. After completion of the management training,
82 percent of the Presidents, more than 60 percent of the Vice-
Presidents, Secretary-Treasurers, Managers and less than 60 percent
of Auditors felt competent to assume any position in the SN. We can
therefore say that for the officers, management training has rein-
forced their feeling of competence to handle the position although
more Presidents expressed this than the lower-level officers. For the
ordinary members, about one fourth expressed this feeling of com-
petence to assume any position after completing management train-
ing. This could represent the new crew of potential SN leaders com-
ing from the rank and file membership.
Nevertheless, the differences between SN officers and members
which were described in the earlier sections of this paper continue to
be observed in other ways. To begin with, officers have higher socio-
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economic qualifications, more group-responsive attitudes, better
training attendance, and consequently a reinforced feeling of com-
petence to assume the/r leadership positions. While ordinary mem-
bers might be able to find some breakthroughs into the ranks of the
officers, the latter continue to maintain their advantage.
D. SN Members" Response to the Capital Build.Up Program
The Sources
The ACCI study briefly describes
the capital mobilizationdrive which has three basicsourcesname-
ly: the general fund, the barr/o savingsfund, and the barriogua-
ranme fund. The general fund is composedof a ten-pesomember-
ship fee, five*pesoannualdues,and other income of the SN such
as commissionsgiven by the Agricultural Credit Administration
for the collection of loansfrom delinquent borrowers,proceeds
from fund-raisingdrives,finesreceived,etc. This can only be dis-
bursed upon approval of the Board of Directors. This fun¢_is
intendedfor the necessaryexpensesof the SN, suchasstationery
and supplies,expensesfor training of the membershipand offi-
cials, transportationof officers, and other necessaryexpensesof
the SN. Any unexpendedbalance is expected to be depositedin
the depositorybank of the SN asa separatesavingsaccount...
The SN is initially not allowed to undertakebusinessactivi-
ties. All collectionsrelated to capital mobilization haveto imme-
diately be deposited in the bank. This is requiredto preventthe
possibility of defalcationsespeciallysincethe problemsof accu-
rate accountinghaveto be learned over a period of time. In the
sameway that excessiveliquidity in a bank without an adequate
system of internal control is tempting to the holders of such
funds, the same'istrue in the SN, particularly in its earlyyearsof
development...
The compulsory savingsprogram of the SN has two main
source¢ Thosemembers who are availing themselvesof short.
term production credit from the rural banks, the Philippine
National Bank and the Agricultural Credit Administration have
to chip in five percent of the amount of their loansto the barrio
savingsfund. This amount is deductedupon releaseof their loans
and is made as a time deposit in the nameof the SN for the ac-
count of the member. And those who are non4)orrowersare re-
quired to havea monthly savingsof P5.00.
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The barrio savingsfund has its own socialequity dimension.
In the past, the agriculturalcredit policy of enOouragingthe well-
to-do families to establishrural bankswith generousgovernment
subsidies,resultedinto the phenomenalgrowth of the rural bank-
ing system intermsof numberandresourcesgenerated.Thereis no
doubt that the return to investment,notwithstandingthe signifi-
cant increasein the market value of the original investmentserves
asthe magnetfor the establishmentof new ones.There ishardly a
bank, out of more than 700 presentlyexisting, savefor the very
few which are not ownedby a family or a groupof well-to-dofami-
lies. Interlockingdirectoratesare notuncommon. (Asof December
1979, there are 1000 rural banksin the country).
The information of the bankingsystems,in general,andof the
rural banking system, in particular, in the name of diffusion of
property ownershipand of profits, has likewisebeenundertaken.
The concept of community-orientedrural banksin terms of wide-
ningtheir ownershipbase is actively beingpursued. In thispolicy-
shift, the SN hasbeengiventhe option to purchasethe government
equity in rural banksfor, conversionto commonsharesof stock.
A maximum of forty percent equity for the SN hasbeenset. Of
course,suchpurchaseis subjectto negotiationsbetweenthe Board
of Directorsof the Rural Bank on the one hand and of the Board
of Directorsof the SN on the other. In this way, the capital base
of the rural bank will expand and the ruralareaswill havemore
credit available... Likewise,the farmersthroughtheir representa-
tives will have participationin the managementof the bank. It is
also hoped that the feelingof ownershipof the credit institution
from which farmers borrow will bolster the accomplishments
of the political, social equity and productivity objectivesof agra-,
rianreform.
Theoretically, a happy partnership between the SN and the
rural bankers will reduce the cost of administeringretail farm
credit throughgroup lending. Likewise,the problem of collection
will be minimized if not totally eliminated sincethe SN will serve
as the organizationto help in the collectionof loansof its mem-
bers.
The barrio savingsfund is intendedfor the purchaseof govern-
ment equity in the existingrural banks.Shouldno agreementbe-
tween the rural bankerand the SamahangNay0ns be reached,the
barrio savingsfund will be utilized to capitalizea cooperativerural
bank with the same subsidiesand assistanceprovided for by the
Central Bank of the Philippines.In the meantime,the barrio sav-
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ingsfund Is not withdrewable without the prior approval of the
Bureauof CooperativesOevelopment...
Dr. Sacaydescribes the barrio guarantee fund as essentially
e tax on land, with contributions basedon capacity to pay. The
sourceof the BGF isthe onecevanof palayper hectareper harvest
asthe requiredcontribution from everymember. (Thismeansthat
memberswho have largerfarms and who harvestmore than once
a year will contribute more to BGF.) For thosecultivatingcroPs
other than rice, the cash equivalentof one cavan is the require-
ment. For non-farmermembers,the cashequivalentof onecevan
of palay isthe fixed annualcontr_ution to the fund. The intended
usesof the fund are to guaranteeannual landamortizationfor the
recipients of Certificate of Land Transfer; to pay for insurance
premiums of all members;to guarantee loans of membersup to
three times the amount reservedfor this purpose;and to finance
a full-pledgedcooperative.Collectionof the BGF dependson the
initiative of individualmembersto honor thisobligationand on the
officers' ability to persuadecompliance. Unlike the BSF, com-
pulsorydeductioncannotbe applied to collect the amountdue.
Every feature of SN particularly its capital build-up program has
been conceived, reasoned and designed not as an academic exercise
and Dr. Sacay wrote the book on Samahang Nayon "to demonstrate
three things (a) how past experience moulded the program's frame;
(b) how logic provided its substance; and (c) how reality tempered
our decisions." The emphasis, he said, was not on cooperatives but
on development and the underlying objective of social equity is real-
ly based on the principle of human liberation whose major premise
is that "only man can change his society." All these concepts have
to meet the test of implementation. Attending the pre-membership
education program, signing up as a member and paying one's mem-
bership fee are the firstand lowest levels of commitment. From 1974
to 1979, the number of organized SNs grew from 15,320 to 21,235
and its membership from 676,575 to 1,02 million. On the other
hand, the number of registered SNs grew from 11,575 to 18,180 and
its membership from 545,582 to 933,536. It took more than 9
months to get organized and more than 13 to get registered. So the
registration process alone took an average of 4,5 months. Major
reasons for not being registered include: memers have not fully paid
membership fees and annual dues; wait and see attitude of members;
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reluctance to contribute to the savingsprogram;•declininginterest of
members and officers; and such things as registration papers sub-
mitted not acted upon, no followLup by Municipal Development Of-
ricers,_ack of forms, peace and order conditions, etc. Hence, even
after the initial decision or "compulsion" to join, skepticism and re-
luctance to make further commitments is a naggingproblem. Al-
though membershave already "put one foot inside" SN, soto speak,
it is iust aseasyto take this one foot out asto bring "the other foot"
into SN. In terms of motivational campaigns, therefore, the period
between organization and registration probably needs more rein-
forcing attention from development workers in order to minimize
discontinuities in commitment and reduce doubts as to the worth-
whilenessof the organization's objectives.
As far as knowledge about the BSF and BGF requirementsare
concerned, there was a reasonabledegree of absorption. Table 2.35
showsan averageof 70 percentamongofficers and 57 percent among
members knowing the correct responsesto 5 questionson the BSF.
For the BGF, the averageabsorptionwas 79 percent for officers and
66 percent for members. The BGF was better understood than the
BSF and more of the officers than the members knew the correct
responses.But knowing the requirements and actually complying
with them are two different things.Percentagecompliancewas com-
puted on the basisof the following:
•a) Expected BSF collection = number of monthsa SN hasbeen
in existence from date of registration to date of interview
multiplied by number of members times P5.00, Five pesos
is used as the constant since it is closest to the average
amount per month on the basisof 5 percent deduction. It is
also the required amount of savingsper member for those
who are not-borrowing from institutional sourcesof credit.
b) Percentagecompliance= actualcollection xl00
expectedcollection
The computed percentagecompliance for the BSF fund is 50.3
and for the BGF,28.7 percent. Becauseof the element of compul-
sow deduction from production loansborrowed by farmers from the
banks, we can really expect higher contributions for the BSF than
for the BGF. The 1974 survey done by ACCI indicatedthat 75 per-
cent of the BSF collections from 5,387 SNs and 278,099 members
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came from borrower, farmers, About 20 percent came trom non-
borrowing members and 4 percent from non-farmers. In effect, these
borrower-farmers borrowed the amount that they contributed to
BSF and are also paying an interest on it. To the extent that farmers
repaid their production loans, they have actually contributed to the
TABLE 2.35
PERCENT OF OFFICERS AND MEMBERS GIVING CORRECT RESPONSE
TO QUESTIONS ON BSFAND BGF REQUIREMENTS
Officers Members
BSF
1. Contributionby borrowing
farmer-member 73.0 55.7
2. Contribution by non-borrowing
farmer 74.7 57.8
3. Contributionby non-farmer
member 73.0 56.1
4. Withdrawability after membership 47.4 46.1
5. To be usedfor buyingruralbank
shares 82.5 71.3
Averagepercent 70.1 57.4
BGF
1. Contribution of riceandcorn
farmer-member 86.7 74.4
2. Contribution of non-riceend
corn farmer-member 75.6 61.0
3. Contribution of non-farmermember 73,2 57.3
4, To guaranteepaymentof land
amortization 81,8 67.1
5. To pay CISP (cooperative Insurance
Systemof the Philippines)premiums 84.2 71.9
6. To capitalize in KilusangBayan
and RuralBanks 85.2 73.0
7. To pay operatingexpensesfor
managementtake-over 67.1 50.8
8, Non-withdrawableafter membership 80.3 69.2
Averagepercent 79.3 65.6
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BSF. If they did not repay their loans, then it is the government
which has contributed to the BSF since funds for lending came from
the government.
One would have also thought that the compulsory deduction of
the BSF contribution from the farmers' production loan from the
rural banks would have been a fool-proof system of collecting the
BSF. Things have not quite worked out that way. As the ACCI
study explains:
The aggressiveimplementationof the supervisedcredit program(Maa-
gena 99) for all riceand corn farmerscreatedproblemsfor the bankersin
identifying membersof the SN, particularlyfor thoseborrowersnot coming
from the same municipaliw where the rural bank is located. This is also
the main problem of the agenciesand branchesof the PhilippineNational
Bank which coversmany towns per agency/branch.Not a few of its per-
sonnel involved in the Masaganag9 short-term productioncredit program
averredthat they cannot adequatelycope with the volume of work they
have to do in processingand servicingthe needsof the large number of
borrowers, much lessdo they have the time to identify whether or not
they are membersof which SN. In the absenceof the list of membersof
SN in its area of coverage, implementation of the compulsorysavings
program is contingent on the good faith of the borrowerswitll its own
implications(consideringthe compulsorynature of the deductions). It is
not an uncommon argument among farmers that the main reason why
they are obtainingcredit is the insufficiencyof funds for their family and
farm needs.
The BSF deduction is an additional burden from the point of view of
some farmers.
The "happy partnership" between.the SN and the rural bankers
which was expected to reduce the cost of retailing farm credit
through group lending did not prosper; neither did the role of the SN
as a collecting agent for loans granted by the bank to the members.
As a matter of fact, the SN-Rural Bank relationship was an unhappy
one. The SN option to purchase the government equity in the rural
banks up to a maximum of 40 percent did not materialize and the
farmers never had a chance to participate in the management of the
bank. In many ways, the altruism of the rural bankers has been
overestimated and the strength of their vested interests minimized.
Well-to-do families in the community are not about to yield their
financial position to anybody and share their profits with some-
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body else. Actually, because savings were deposited in the rural
banks and SNs were not allowed to withdraw, the rural banks bene-
fited from these deposits more than the SNs and the members them-
selves. It is the SNs which helped the rural banks rather than the
other way around. By the end of December 1979, the Central Bank
Governor explained that accommodations will be introduced by the
Central Bank which would allow the rural banks to discount the SN
deposits and allow the SNs to withdraw their BSF. The SNs may sub-
sequently reinvest their savingsin their own cooperative rural banks
to service the banking needs of the cooperative movement. 1° Whe-
ther or not the earnings from the proceeds of the capital build-up
program accrue to SN members depends on how well the funds are
invested and managed. So far, these benefits are still a promise, not
yet a reality. It will take a lot of learning and doing and failing plus
a great deal of integrity and discipline before SNs reap the rewards
from the capital that they mobilized among themselves.
Status of the Different Funds
By the end of 1974, more than 1_8million have been collected
for the general fund. Sixty-four percent came from membership fees,
22 percent from annual dues, half a percent from penalties and fines
and 14 percent from other sources. Fifty-seven percent of the general
fund was kept in the bank; 11 percent kept ascash on hand; 11 per-
cent for SN expenses and 21 percent was withdrawn for the purpose
of subscribing to the Capital stock of the Cooperative Insurance Sys-
tem of the Philippines (CISP). The ACCI study observed that this 21
percent investment in the CISP created a widespread false notion
among the officers and members alike that they were already insured
with the system. They thought this amount was used to pay their
premiums. In Dr. Sacay's scheme, premium payments are to come
from the BGF account in the SN's depository bank. Only one policy
will cover the entire SN membership. In the event of death of any
member, the SN immediately advances, the insurance payment to
the beneficiary. It later claims for reimbursement. As he envisioned:
"There will be no selling and collecting costs. Premium payment
can then be brought down to the bare minimum. Payments to bene-
ficiaries will be prompt. I believe that no insurance company can
sell 1_2,000 life insurance policies to barrio residents at low rates.
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But the insurance cooperative can, becausethe SN owns it and
works for it."
With respectto the use of BGF funds for _31SPpremiums,there
is some ev=denceon the accepY_b=lltyof the not=on that better_
members should have some responsibility for others. When asked if
members who contribute more to BGF should have higher CISP
coverage,70 percent said "No". Only 20 percent agreedand the rest
did not know. However, this seeming"acceptability" of the equity
feature of SN is more theoretical and indirect. By 1975, lessthan 20
percent of 805 SNs studied were insuredwith CISP. The more than
70 percent of SNs which were not yet insuredgave "inadequate BGF
collection" and "No BGF collection" astheir reasons.Without BGF,
there is no insurancecoverage.Side by side with some evidenceof
concern for "equity" is some evidence of selfish concern, Thirty
percent of SN's already insuredmembers expresseddesire for addi-
tional insurancecoveragebut more than half of them wanted this
additional il_surancecoverage to come from the BGF too. Only
about one fourth think it should come from members'personalcon-
tribution. In effect, there are some members who want additional
insuranceat the expense of other members through BGF rather than
their own. In the final analysis, the acceptability of the equity
objective can best be directly shown by members' willingness to
contribute to the BGF. The fact that percentagecompliance of the
BGF is only 29-percent does not exactly representan overwhelming
endorsement of SN's equ|ty objective• BSF which is a compulsory
deduction has50 percentcompliance.
The latter suspicion finds support in the reasonsgiven by SN
members for contributing to the BSF. Although 43 percent said
they are convinced of its wisdom, more than 34 percent said BSF is
required by the SN and 10 percent indicatedthe requirement of the
lending institution with reference to the compulsory.5 percent de-
duction from the production loans. Forty-four percent, therefore,
contributed to BSF because it is compulsory. On the other hand,
more than two-thirds (67 percent) of BGF contributors did so be-
cause they were convinced of its wisdom• Only 5 percent of the
officers complied simply to fulfill their obligations but they were
not convincedof its wisdom.
Failure to come through with the BSF requirement was attri-
buted by membersto: "poor harvest;.... waiting for others to pay;"
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failure of the lending institution to deduct 5 percent from produc-
tion loans; belief that "BSF is not compulsory;" and lack of aware-
hess of the BSF. In the case of BGF non-contributors, their two
most important reasonsfor non-complianceare: "nobody collected
BGF for me" and poor harvest. About 5 percent mentioned emer-
genciesand illnessesin the family and 4 percent do not believe in
the rationale for BGF. The non-enforcementof this requirement in
some SNs appears to be a significant issue.According to the SNs
who did not enforce the BGF, it was agreedupon by officers and
members not to enforce the requirement since there were no amor-
tizing owners in their particular organizations. Furthermore, some
SN officers were not aware of BGF and a few were eventold by the
municipal development officer and the barrio development worker
that BGF is not compulsory. Apparently, the "equity" feature is
unattractive to some members because they do not want to con-
tribute if they do not expect to benefit from it directly, i.e., as
amortizing owners. Additional evidence which supports this inter-
pretation is the fact that more officers feel that the BGF contribu-
tion for non-farmers and non-rice and corn farmers is too high.
Twenty-one percent believe that only land-amortizing members
should be compelled to contribute to the BGF and almost 60 per-
cent feel that they can be required to contribute more than other
members
On the whole, despite some level of compliancewith the savings
program, practically 90 percent of SNs studied regardBSF and BGF
collection asa problem.
As a final test of SNs capital mobilization scheme,we present
Tables 2.36 to 2.44 which contain data on actual collections and
growth trends from 1974 to 1979. The following observationscan
be madefrom thesedata:
1. On a cumulative basis,over a five-year period, SN has gene-
rated a total of I>94.67 million with P20.9 million from the
General Fund;P41.1 million from the BSF andP32.6 million
from the BGF. These amounts came from a total of 18,180
registered SNs with a total membershipof almost a million
(933,536). The total contribution per SN of about 51 mem-
bers is P5,207.52 which isabout P101.41 per member overa
5-year period. This amount is distributed as follows: P22.41
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for the General Fund; P44.06 for the BSF and P34.94 for
the BGF. Roughly, each SN member contributed P20 a year
to the capital build-up fund.
2. Although the grand total collection of almostaP100 million
is impressive,the trend in growth of additional collectionsis
not as encouraging.The annual percent increment to the
general fund declined from 39 percent in 1974-75 to 3.76
percent in 1978-79. For the BSF, the percent incremental
growth wasfrom 147.6 percent in 1974-75 to 4.21 percent in
1978-79. For the BGF, the correspondingfigures are 91.96
and 4.13 percent, respectively.SN seemsto havehit itspeak
during the second year of its existence. By 1978, collections
have dwindled considerably. From 1974-75, BSF contribu-
tions amounted to P9.58 million. By 1978-79, the incre-
mental collection was only P1.66 million. For BGF, contri-
butions reached P6.97.million for 1974-75; climbed to
P7.58 million for 1976-77 but dropped drastically to P2.96
million the following year and then dipped lower to P1.29
million in 1978-79.
Despite the downward spiralling of capital mobilization, SN
beastsof something quite unique. While almost all developmentpro-
gramsgive something material by way of loans,infrastructure, seeds,
subsidized inputs, etc., the cooperatives development program at
its SN phase gave nothing but training lessonsand "hope", as Dr.
Sacay puts it. The SN is probably the only program that has suc-
ceeded in raisingfunds from farmers although as mentioned earlier,
part of these funds especiallyfor the BSF alsocame from the govern-
ment-sponsoredagricultural credit program.
One other unmistakable lesson from these data is the power of
numbers. Even at 1='20per member per year, with almost a million
members,it is possibleto raisenearly a hundred million pesos.
E. SN and Discipline
For the pre.cooperative stage, the importance of discipline was
emphasized.Or. Sacay arguesthat
without discipline,a cooperativemovementwill not survive... Farmers
mustappreciatethevalueof disciplinebeforeendnotafterthey havebeen
organizedintoa cooperative.Thereare3 cardinalrulesa memberof theSN
mustobserve:
(a) a membermustpracticeimprovedculturalpractices;
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(b) he mustsave;and
(c) he mustpay for annuallandamortizationsontime.
Violations of any of theserulesmay bringa fineor suspension.The second
to the most severerecourseis the take-overof managementof a member's
farm by the SN. The most severeisexpulsion,which canbe orderedby the
Boardof Directors,althoughamembermay appealto the generalassembly.
Among the different lessons taught about the SN, those about
discipline or the penalties to be imposed for particular types of of-
fenses were the "least learned" or the percent of respondents giving
the correct response on disciplinary measures was the lowest com-
pared to other features of SN.
Table 2.45 shows the extent to which members committed the
different offenses 3 or more times. It is obvious that non-payment
of BSF, BGF and annual dues were the more frequent violations with
about half of the members being "guilty". Attending meetings and
training sessions seem to have been complied with by majority of
members. Non-repayment of loans is probably underreported be-
cause SN members who obtained loans from the banks were not
always identified as such and, therefore, their non-repayments are
not reflected in SN records.
TABLE 2.45
SNs WITH MEMBERS COMMITrlNG OFFENSES 3 OR MORE TIMES.
(Percentof averagenumberof memberscommittingoffense) (795 SNs)
1. Non-paymentof annualdues 43.3
2. Non-paymentof BSF 55.7
3. Non-paymentof BGF 50.3
4. Non-paymentof loans 22.4
5, Non-attendanceof meetings 27.3
6. Non-attendanceof trainingsessions 16.9
For the relationships between knowledge about disciplinary
measures and actual imposition of penalties, we can look at Table
2.46. Knowing the correct penalty does not necessarily mean the
penalty will be implemented. For such significant offenses as non-
payment of BGF and BSF, only 4 percent of those who knew the
correct penalty implemented it. There was better translation of
SamahangNayon 95
knowledge into practice for lighter offenses like non*attendance of
meetings and late payment of fees and dues. Apparently, lighter
penalties are easier to impose than heavier ones.
Although 80 to 95 percent of officers and members agree with
the required penalties, those who did not, suggested "none" or
lighter punishments such as fines. They made these suggestions in or-
der no to discourage prospective members and to keep the goodwill
TABLE 2.46
NUMBER OF OFFICERS WHO KNEW THE CORRECT PENALTIES AND
WHO IMPOSED PENALTIES, BY TYPE OF OFFENSE
Number Who Number Who
Offen_e Knew the Implemented CoL 3
Correct Penalty the Penalty Co/,--2 x
100
(2) (3) (4)
1. Non-attendanceof
meeting 3501 1207 34.5
2. Late paymentof
fees/dues 1858 409 22.0
3. Not usingimproved
varieties 850 27 3.2
4. Late paymentof
landamortization 1036 25 2.4
5. Non-paymentof BGF 1011 40 4.0
6. N0n-paymentof BSF 939 39 42
of the members. If has often been said that Filipinos are reluctant to
impose discipline on their own friends, relatives, compadres, and
barriomates. To look into this matter, officers were asked if discip-
line could be better imposed by outsiders. One third of 3,751 of-
ricers replied "Yes" and two-thirds disagreed. Those who believe in
discipline from the "outside", recommended the BDW/MDO, the
Military, the Mayor and Barangay Captain as outsiders who should
impose discipline on SN members. The desirability of outside author-
ity, therefore, is not without basis. There are those who prefer it,
Besides the fact that disciplinary measures have not been exer-
cised much, what minimal imposition of penalties was evident dec-
96 SamahangNayon
lined and mostly disappeared over a two-year period, Table 2.47
illustrates this. Reports on SNstaking "no action" on non-payment
of BGF and BSF increasedfrom 42 percent in 1974-75 to more than
70 percent in 1975-76, Even simple "warning" declined from about
50 to 11 percent. The only offense where a fourth of the SNs re-
ported continuing imposition of fines over the 2-year period is fail-
ure to attend seminarsand meetings.This is interestingbecausethe
tightest offense seemsto have been easier to penalize, Naturally, a
light offense also begets a light penalty. Heavier penalties for more
seriousoffenses havebeen more difficult to implement, It seemsthat
discipline is the /east implemented of the three major features of
Samahang NaFon.
F. The SN: An Early Assessment of Performance and Prognosis of
the Future
1. Assessment by SN members
Although SN's performance as an organization can be quantita-
tively assessedin terms of number of lessonscorrectly learnedfrom
training programs;amount of savingsthey have generated;and ex-
tent to which disciplinary measureshavebeen implemented, another
way of assessingis to ask members themselveswhat they think of
their own SN. If they do not believe in it, SN is almost doomed to
fail even from a "selfJulfilling prophecy" alone. From 5,289 mem-
bers, the verdict on their SN's status was less than 40 percent calling
it a "'success'; 11 percent "'failure" and about half "neither success
nor failure" Although the percent of memberswho regard SN as a
failure is small, the judgment of "neither successnor failure" is a
bothersome one. It could be a polite or compromise reply to the
question. At any rate, the trend of replies could be interpreted as a
more positive than negative assessmentof SN, thus far. in their enu-
meration of "successfactors," about a third of the responsescen-
tered on the quality of external input from governmentsuchaseffi-
ciency of the MDO, the BDW, the governmenttechnician inspiredby
serious government attention to rural development and incentives
given by the government. This latter factor was given much, much
more attention by members than by officers. Apparently, govern-
merit incentives are more salient to members than to officers in their
assessmentof what makes for a successful SN. About 70 percent of
Sam
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the responsesgave credit to themselvessuch as: the wholehearted
cooperation of members;efficiency of SN officers and their integrity
and honesty, in trying to identify the "failure factors", 82 percent
of the responsesplaced the blame on the membership as revealed
in such responsesas unwillingnessof membersto pay financial obli-
gations, low capacity to pay, non-attendance of members at meet-
ings, inefficiency, and dishonesty of SN officers. Only 12 percent
found, fault with the external input such as inefficiency of the MDO
and the BDW.
These findings are encouraging in the light of the desire to
develop SN as a village level institution. One can infer from the
responses that what government input served as incentives and
"inspiration," their successwas being attributed to their own mem-
bers and officers' efforts. On the other hand, the failure is only
slightly being blamed on the governmentinput suchasthe MDO'and
the BDW. More than 80 percenttrace the failure to their own inade-
quacies, both of membersand officers. Perhapsthis is an indication
that SN is regardedby members as their own organization. We may
recall the earlier findings which cited that 70 percent felt that of-
ricers can manageSN affairs without the MDO although they claim
that they could not managewithout governmentassistance.
When asked about the most serious problem of the SN, non-
payment of BGF and BSF by members topped their list with undi_
ciplined/uncooperative members as a very far second. Almost 90
percent of the officers admitted to having problemscollecting BGF
and BSF. To overcome collection problems, officers mostly called
meetingsto discusspossiblesolutions but almost as many took no
action at all. Members' assessmentof the benefits derived from SN
ranked its role as a source of information and guidanceon farming
as the most significant followed by better cooperation of members;
facility in obtaining credit; and facility in obtainingsuppliesat lower
cost and better prices for marketing produce. Insurance benefits
came next and SN's role asfacilitator in land transfer program asthe
least significant benefit derived from SN. About a third indicated
either insignificantor no benefit at all on this aspectof SN.
2. A_sessmentby local officials and field workers
In the new cooperativesdevelopment program, Dr. Sacay recog-
nized the need for support from the local level.As heexpressedit:
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I was dependingon local governmentofficials to push the program.So
after trainingat our educationand trainingcenter,the 1_ainorsheldsemlnars
in eachprovincethroughthe ProvincialRuralDevelopmentCouncil (PRDC)
which involvedthe ProvincialGovernor, the ProvincialCouncil, headsof
agenciesin the provinces,the leadersof private end religioussectors....
Our field workers, in turn, conducted seminarsfor the Municipal Rural
DevelopmentCouncil(MRDC) to involvethe Mayors,MunicipalCouncilors,
Barrio Captains,andother governmentagencyfield workers,civicand reli-
giousleaders...
Given this expressed need, the field workers' training and their
responsibiliw for program implementation and the attempt to bring
local officials into the orbit of SN, how do these field workers and
local officials view the different features of SN? From Table 2.48,
we can identify the trends in the opinions of three groups of res-
pondents: Mayors, Barangay Chairmen, MDOs and BDWs.
TAB LE 2.48
OPINIONS ON THE SAMAHANG NAYON AMONG MAYORS,
BARANGAY CHAIRMEN, MDOs AND BOWs
Posi. Neg_P Condi-
rive tire tional Othem
(In Percent)
Generalprospect for successof SN
Mayors (392) 61.7 1.8 29.1 7.4
BarangayChairmen (794) 72.0 1.0 21.8 5.2
MDO/BDWs (436) 58.0 2.1 37.4 2.5
Total 1622 65.8 1.5 27.7 5.0
Prospect for successof SN in the
localities
Mayors 59.2 4.1 34.9 1.8
BarangayChairmen 57.3 7.7 31.8 3.2
MDO/BDWs 54.8 4.8 38.8 1.6
Total 57.1 6.0 34.5 2.4
Opinions on _heBGF
Mayors 62.8 20.9 16.3
BarangayChairmen 76.6 11.8 11.6
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Table 2.48 (¢ont'd)
MDO/BDWs 73.4 25.0 1.6
Total 72.4 17.6 10.0
Opinions on ff_eBSF
Mayors 53.1 24.5 22.4
BarangayChairman 68.3 12.1 19.6
MDO/BDWs 73.9 20.6 6.5
Total 66.1 17.4 16.5
Opinions on the imposition of
discipline among SN members
Mayors 64.3 23.7 12.0
BarangayChairman 75.2 16.7 8.1
MOO/BOWs 68.7 28.2 2.1
Total 71.1 21.6 7.4
Opinions on SN asd_me/ of
farm inp_ andproducts
Mayors 66.6 17.1 5.3 11.0
BarangayChairman 74.2 8.1 5.9 11.8
MDO/BDWs 68.8 18.6 11.4 1.2
Total 70.9 13.1 7.3 8.7
Opinions on SN aschannel of
eov't sBrvicas
Mayors 68.0 8.4 15.6 11.0
BarangayChairman 65.4 8.9 12.5 13.2
MDO/BDWs 74.8 13.7 8.6 3.0
Total 67.8 10.1 12.2 9.9
Opinion on SN as facili=_ng
ins_vment for/and reform
Mayors 64.6 21.4 14.0
BarangayChairmen 61.5 22.3 16.2
MDO/BDWs 74.5 24.1 1.4
Total 65.7 22.6 11.7
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a) In the prognosisfor successof $N in generaland its prospect
for successin the localities,the field workers were the least
positive. Their replies were more conditional, with the "if
clauses", such as "if requirements were adapted to local
conditions", etc.
b) For the three groups, the most positively assessedfeature is
the BGF, followed by the imposition of disciplineamongSN
membersand SN as a channelof farm inputsand products.
c) For the field workers, the two mostattractive featuresof SN
are its roles as channelof government servicesand as facili-
taring instrument for land reform. This is understandable
since field workers are responsiblefor deliveringgovernment
services.A strong SN would facilitate this role for them. With
regard to the SN as an instrument for land reform, this func-
tion was one of the major rationale for its existence and,
therefore, MDOs and BDWs are well "educated" on its signi-
ficance.
d) Taking all the 8 aspectstogether, BarangayChairmen, MDOs
and BDWshavea more•positiveview of SN than Mayors.
e) When we examine the categorically negative assessmentsby
the three groups combined, we find that SN's land reform
role, discipline, BGF and BSF are the most unattractive.
While the land reform role was positively viewed by 75 per-
cent of the field workers, the 24 percent were clearly nega-
tive about it. This was the casealso with their viewsof BGF
and discipline. They have no conditional responseson these
aspects.In other words, while the majority of them endorse
these features positively, those who do not, are definitely
•negativerather than conditionally positive,
f) The most discouragingfinding from Table 2.48 is the fact
that the "prospect for successof SN in the localities" re-
ceived the lowest positive assessmentfrom all three groups
and the highest conditional response.Since these conditions
are not easy to meet, these conditional assessmentscan be
regardedas leaning more toward the negativethan the posi-
tive. Probably, they are also reflections of actual difficulties
encountered in the processof implementing the program at
the local level, and, therefore, there is more pessimismthan
optimism in the "if clauses". If only a little over one-half of
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TABLE 2.49
THE MOST FREQUENTLY MENTIONED COMMENTS ON
DIFFERENT SN FEATURES
Sill features MOST FREQUENT COMMENTS
commented upon Positive Negative Conditional
1. General pros- SN is of great so- Difficulty of suc- If requirements
pectofSN cio-economic be- cess due to: peo- were adapted to
nefits to mem- pie's bad expe- varying local con-
bers. riences with the ditions; if regula-
cooperatives in tions and require-
the past; poor ments were ira.
BGF and BSF posed and carried
collection; and out properly; and
no immediate be- if education and
nefits for SN services were giv-
members; educa, en to SNmember.
tion materials not
arriving on time;
field-workers'
lack of dedica-
tion; government
officials and
agency personnel
lack of knowl-
edge on the SN
program; and
non-coordination
of some govern-
ment agencies
with local offi-
cials.
Successof Members/officers Difficulty of suc- If there would be
SN in locality are cooperative, cess due to: peo- continuous co-
receptive, and pie's bad ex- operation and in-
show interest in periences with terest inSN activi-
their SN. the cooperatives ties by SN offi-
in the past; poor cers and govern-
BGF and BSFcol- ment fieldwork-
lection; no imme- ers.
diate benefits for
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Table 2.49 (Continued)
SN features MOST FREQUENT COMMENTS
commented upon Positive Negative Conditional
SN members; edu-
cation materials
not arriving on
time; fieldwork-
ers' lack of de-
dication; govern-
ment officials and
agency personnel
lack of knowl-
edge on the SN
program; and
non-coordination
of some govern-
ment agencies
with local offi-
cials.
3. BGF BGF is good and BGF is difficult N O N E
being implement- to implement be-
ed because it cause members
would be benefi- cannot afford, no
cial to SN mem- immediate bene-
bers especially if fit, past bad ex-
spent "realistic- periences, poor
ally"; it is in ac- harvest, wait-and-
cordancewith the see attitude of
rules of the Board members, and
of Directors; and members are small
it is accepted by landowners.
both members
and non-mem-
bets.
4. BSF BSF is being im- BSF is difficult N O N E
plemented and to implement be-
accepted because cause: it is too
it would• be be- burdensome;
neficial to mere- there is no co-
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Table 2.49 (Continued)
SN features MOST FREOUENT COMMENTS
commented upon Positive Negative Conditional
bets; it will be operation among
used in forming membersand of-
AMC/CRB or for ricers; it is diffl-
emergency; it cult to under.
teaches saving; stand; lack of
and it is refund- DLGCD supervi-
able. sion;notenforced
by officers result-
ing to no/low col.
lection; and no
immediate bene-
fits for SN mem-
bers.
5. Disciplinary The disciplinary The disciplinary
"vleasures measuresmust be measures should
imposedon erring not be -implemen-
members to in- ed becausethey
sure the realiza- areinapplicableor
tion of the SN's too harsh/drastic,
objectivesandpe- to preventdriving
naltiesmustbeen- away members
forced by the and prospective
military, members.
6. SN as channel It makespossible SN doesnot func- SN is not yet pre-
of farm inputs lower prices for tion aschannelof pared to serveas
andproducts farm inputs and farm inputs and channel of farm
higher prices for products because inputs and pro-
farm productsand technicians are ducts.
middlemenwill be againstsuchprac-
eliminated tice; besides,it is
impractical.
7. SN as channel SN is a meansof No government SN, to be an ef-
of government getting technical/ services were fectivechannelof
services financial assis- channeledthrough government serv-
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Table 2.49 (Continued)
SN features MOST FREQUENT COMMENTS •
commented upon Positive Negative Conditional
tance from the the SN because ices, must have
government and it is notfunction- responsible offi-
private agencies; al; it would be in carsandmembers,
facilitates out- conflict•with Bar- fully trained and
reach of govern- rio Council;other active, and-must
merit programs governmentagen* be recognized as
to•rural people, cies do not cooro, partner, not rival,
dinate with SN; in rural develop-
not all barriopeo- ment.
• pie are SN mem_
bers.
8. SN as instru- SN complements SN as a facilita- N O N E
merit of land Agrarian Reform, ringinstrumentof
reform bringingaboutte- landreform is not
nurial changes •applicable be-
and making far- causetheir area is
mers owners of not covered by
the land they till. landreform.
local officials and field workers themselves are definitely
positive on SN's prospect for success in the localities, then
the SN can easily become the victims of a self-fulfilling pro-
phecy. Furthermore, as a local village-level institution, if
they think SN cannot succeed there, it cannot succeed any-
where.
For more insights on what lies behind the positive, negative and
conditional assessment, let us.turn to Table 2.49. The positive com-
ments are easy to comprehend because they are the obvious rationale
for SN anyway except for the disciplinary measures which respond-
ents indicated "must be enforced by the military" in order to insure
the realization of SN's objectives. • What are more instructive for
program and training implications are the negative and conditional
comments.
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Some of thesewhich deservemore than cursoryenumeration are:
a) The feeling that SN would succeed if requirements were
adapted to varying local conditions insteadof a one-system-
one-blueprint-one-modelfor operations;
b) The admissionthat government officials and agency person-
nel lack knowledgeon the SN program;
c) The realization that BSF providesno immediate benefits for
SN members;
d) The fear that disciplinary measuresare too harsh and drastic
as to drive away present and prospective members, In the
light of previousfindings on discipline as the least learned
and least practiced of SN features, perhaps this deservesre-
examination.
e) The revelation that technicians are againstthe useof SN as
a channel of farm inputs and products, The reason behind
technicians' objections to this vital role defined for SN must
be determined. One cannot help speculatingthat their objec-
tion derives from the rumor that technicianswork together
with dealers Jnthe provision of farm inputs, If SN were to
assume this function, this would cut out the technicians'
business,
f) The reservations on SN's role as a channel of government
servicesare very well-founded indeed. SN cannot be a chan-
nel if it is non-functional. Moreover, if not all barrio people
are SN members, the rest cannot benefit from SN-channeled
services.Furthermore, this role is presently being played by
the barrio council.
All the discussionsin this section have focused on the opinions
held by local officials. We need to know how they actually behaved
with respect to SN. This is important becauseright from the start,
implementors were not sure how local officials would respond to
the program. This uncertainty about SN's acceptabilityto localoffi-
cialsarisesfrom two sources:
a) As a new organization at the village level andwith the expli-
cit proviso that barrio oficials could not becomemembersof
the Board of Directors, there was some apprehension that
barangayofficials would not look at SN with great favor.
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b) Since SN is not part of local governmentand municipaloffi-
cials would have no authority over it, there wasa feelingthat
SN would at best be of marginalor of no interestto them.
When asked whether SNs were assisted by barangay
officials, 80 percent of the officers said "Yes". This assist-
ance came in the form of help in membership campaigns,
arranging membership meetings, securing loans, accommo-
dating SN visitors and disseminatingSN related information.
For those who said that they did not receiveany assistance
from barangay officials, less than 10 percent said that they
exerted negative influence against SN. Perhapswe can say
that most of those who did not help SN did not hurt it
either. Those who actively impeded SN's activitiesdid soby
becoming membersof SN but deliberately not fulfilling their
obligation, thereby influencing members; making discour-
aging remarks and disseminating derogatory information
about SN; blocking SN activities in the barrio; dissuading
other members in paving their financial obligation; and
conniving with landlords in harassingtenants who are mem-
bers of SN. It is quite clear that the few barangay officials
who worked against SN did so in a variety of organizational
"sabotage" efforts.
Although more SN officers mentioned having been
assistedby barangay (80 percent) than by municipal officials
(55 percent), the latter's assistanceappears to be more
substantial. In addition tohelping in the membershipcam-
paign, municipal officials arranged for the extension of
technical assistanceto SN; obliging barangayofficials to help.
SN; coordinating activities of all SNs in the municipality;
allowing SN to usemunicipalgovernmentfacilities; allocating
some funds for SN projects and activities; and initiating in-
frastructure projects supportiveof SN. About those munici-
pal officials who did not assistSN, lessthan 4 percent of the
SN officers mentioned that such officials had exerted nega-
tive influences. In other words, while they did not help, they
did not deliberately hurt SN either. The few who did en-
gagedin roughly the sametypes of organizational sabotageas
the barangayofficials.
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3. The View from Non-Members
As the ACCI "Evaluation Report on the Development Phase of
Samahang Nayon" explains:
One of the salientobjectivesof the landreform programis the creation
of a truly viable socialand economic structureconduciveto greaterpro-
ductivity and farm income, complemented by a cooperative systemof
production, processing,marketing,distribution,credit and relatedservices.
UnderPresidentialDecreeNo. 27 (Emancipationof Tenants)datedOctober
21, 1972, unpaid amortization of land transferredto the tenant farmers
shall be paid by the tenant-farmer'scooperatives.Thus, all tenant-farmers
are compulsorilyand mandatorilyrequiredto becomefull-fledgedmembers
of duly recognizedfarmers'cooperative¢
A further requirementunder the development(PhaseII) of all Sama-
hang Nayons is the expansionof its membershipto two times the original
number of membersor a minimum of fifty, it is the obligationof the field-
worker, the volunteer barrio worker, and the SamahangNayon members
to promotethe conceptof the SN andto recruitmoremembers.More mem-
bersmeanmore peoplewho will help build up the SN. Moreover,morepeo-
ple will benefit from servicesoffered,not to mentionthe addedfundsthese
memberscouldcontributefor a biggervolumeof business.
The targetof this massrecruitmentareall qualifiedpersons,principally
sharetenantsand lessees,aswell asowner-tillerswho are barrio residents.
This massiverecruitment campaignemphasized,amongothers,groupunity,
mutual benefit,groupwelfare,and the services/benefitsthat the SN canpro-
videits members.
In terms of numbers, the recruitment campaign can be regarded
as a success. Over the 5-year period from 1974 to 1979, the number
of registered SNs increased 1.57 times, from 11,575 to 18,180. The
membership grew 1.7 times, from 545,582 to 933,536. The average
number of members per SN was 47 in 1974 and 51 in 1979. This
even exceeds their target- figure of 50 per SN. It should also be
pointed out that the growth occurred not only in new SNs but also
in additional members to existing SNs. However, data do not indi-
cate drop-outs and inactive members in "old established" SNs,
hence the "fluidity" of membership is not reflected and should be
kept in mind.
Although the "numbers" seem to be satisfactory, it will be in-
structive to look at how non-members view SN because similar views
probably underlie the problem of drop-out, inactive and marginal
members.
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Table 2.50 shOws non-member share tenants' and lessees'aware-
ness of and attitudes toward certain features of SN. It appears that
they have some awareness of the services/benefits provided by SN
to members and the requirements for membership. More than 60
percent approve of the BGF and the BSF requirements although
the non-withdrawable feature of BGF is much less endorsed, The
'_no comment" and "NO" replies outweigh the positive approval.
•As in the case of previously cited findings regarding members, SN
disciplinary measures are least known to non-members. Although
almost 80percent said they intended to join the SN, we can inter-
pret this in two ways:• much of this intention is a courtesy reply
or that they probably want to join SN as a "matter of course" but
with less enthusiasm, knowledge and belief in what it is all about.
This latter interpretation comes from the fact that less than 30 per-
TABLE 2.50
NON.MEMBERS' AWARENESS OF AND ATTITUDES TOWARD
CERTAIN FEATURES OF SN (1074 SHARE TENANTS AND LESSEES)
Don"t No
Yes No Know Comment
1. Awarenessof services/benefits
providedby SN to members 40.8 38.1 - 21.1
2. Awarenessof requirementsfor
SN membership 43.3 35,4 21.3 -
3. Knowledgeof SN disciplinary
measures 17.2 50.1 32.0 0.7
4. Intention to join the Sr_ 78.9 17.7 1.7 1.7
• 5. Approvalof the forcedsavings•
requirement 63.0 20.0 5.1 11.9
6. Approvalof BarrioGuarant_-e
fund requirement 63.7 18.7 5.2 1.2.4
71 Approvalof BGF
non-withdrawability 39.6 16.7 3.1 40,8
Succe_ Failure Neither Don't Know
8. Eva_uationof SN currentstatus 28.6 6.5 30_7 34.2
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cent regard SN as a success.About two-thirds are either unable or
unwilling to evaluate its current status. This again jibes with mem-
bers"and local officials" verdict of "neither a failure nor a success"
For greater understandingof what motivations might lie behind
joining or not joining SN, let us examine what non-membersknow
about the organization. Those (40 percent) who areaware of services
and benefits SN can provide mentioned the following:
1) SN facilitates land transfer under the land reform
program (by assistinggovernment workers in deter-
mining the owners and tillers of the land, the area of
farms, production during the past years, etc.) 33%
2) It is a sourceof technical information and guidanceon
farm producttion 33%
3) It makes possible group life insurance coverage to
membersat very low cost 32%
4) It provides opportunity for members to buy capital
sharesof rural bank 26%
5) It acts as a channel for the saleof farm produceat bet-
ter prices 22%
6) It provides a source of lower-priced inputs through
group purchase 15%
7_) It guaranteesland amortization of farmer-members 11%
Except for providing technical information on farmingand group
life insurancecoverage,the other benefits perceivedby non-members
are more of what SN was conceivedto be. Actually, basedon mem-
bers' assessments,not much of the other serviceshave materialized
yet. One wonders, therefore, if "late joiners" do not face greater
expectations and more frustrations than those early members who
were part of the pioneering stage. Or perhaps, these non-members
never become members because they have had an opportunity to
wait and seewhich of these expected servicesmaterialize.
On the specific requirements for membership,completion of the
prescribedmembershiptraining course was the requirement "aware"
non-members were most knowledgeable about (63 percent). Pay-
ment of membership fee and annual dues came next (56 percent).
Compliancewith the Barrio SavingsFund was known to 41 percent
of thosewho are aware and only a third knew about the BGF. Least
salient among the membership requirements is the adoption of im-
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proved farming practices(11 percent). What is interestingin this pat-
tern of awarenessis that non-memberstended to be more aware of
the easier,than the more difficult-to-comply-with requirements,such
as the BSF and the BGF, non-payment of which existingSNs admit
istheir most seriousproblem.
But for more direct insightsabout negativemotivations, the fol-
lowingreasonsgivenby 1,074 non-membersare cited:
1) Cannot comply with the savingsprogram 36%
2) Wait and seeattitude 34%
3) Small sizeof farms 11%
4) Badexperienceswith cooperativesbefore 4%
5) Convinced of the benefits but doubt whether they are
worth the required financial obligations 4%
6) Don't believethe SN can succeedin my area 2%
7) Don't turst the SN management 1%
8) Other reasonssuch as no money when SN was organ-
ized; no time to attend lessons;don't see anything
good came out of it; too old; other members of the
family are already members; physically unfit; SN not
given priority in loans; heavily indebted; landlord pre-
vented farmer from joining; and good relations with
landowner 47%
From these, we can seethe variety of reasonsfor non-member-
ship. Most of them have somethingto do with the financial obliga-
tions involved while the rest prefer to wait and see. It is very pro-
bable that the latter makesup the group who think that SN is nei-
ther a successnor a failure or that they had "no comment".
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The New CooperativesDevelopment Program envisionedthe ins-
titutionalization of a pre-cooperativeat the village level popularly
known as the Samahang Nayon whose "members will do nothing
but learn, save,and practice discipline." Since this most extensive
cooperatives development scheme ever undertaken at the village
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level was also intended as a direct support to the agrarian reform
program, a large-scaleresearchproject was carried out by the Agri-
cultural Credit and Cooperatives Institute of the University of the
Philippines at Los Bafios to find out how concepts translate into
perceptions, operations, and-tangible impact, From this massive
research, this chapter synthesized relevant data with respect to:
characteristicsof SN officers and members comparedto non-mem-
bers; SN's organizational structure in action; SN's direct and indirect
educational activities and members' learning;SN members'response
to the SavingsProgram;the pursuit of discipline in SN; and an early
assessmentof its performanceand prognosisof the future.
Characteristics of SN Officers and Members Compared to Non-
members
About a fifth of SN officers and memberswere share tenants, a
similar proportion were lesseesand non-farmers. There were more
owner-operator types including amortizing owner and part-owt_er.
However, it isdefinite that there were three times more share-tenants
among non-members than members. Among those members who
shifted tenure status, half indicated that SN gave them assistancein
the process.For the persistentshare tenants, the creditor role of the
landlord declined but more for SN membersthan for non-members.
Curiously, share tenant SN officers, more than members and non-
members, appeared to continuously enjoy traditional benefits from
the landlord. Another important finding is the high land rental for
the lesseeswhich has implications for SN viability'since membership
entailsadditional financial obligations.
SN farmer members were mostly rice farmers, almost half of
whom had rainfed farms. They had been farming for more than 20
years. Although SN membershipwas mostly small farms (two-thirds
less than 2 hectares), non-members were even smaller (80 percent
lessthan 2 hectares), Although SN was intended to assistfarmers,
only 41 percent of rice farmers, and a third of corn and rice, and
corn farmers were members. In general, members were more "mo-
dern" in their agricultural practices than non-members and became
even more so after joining SN. They also took more advantage of
information from government field workers while non-members
relied more on neighbors.
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Although 82 percent of SN memberswere farmers and 18 per-
cent, non-farmers, amongthe SN officers, there were more non-farm
occupations than farmers. They also have higher education than
members. These facts deserveemphasisbecauseSN which is mainly
a farmers' organization was led more by non-farmersthan by people
with occupational needsand interestssimilar to their own. Further-
more, farmers who owned their land have more schooling from
tenants and lessees.For every tenure status, officers are more edu-
cated than members.Needlessto say, non,memberswho were mainly
share tenants and lesseeshave lower level of education than mem-
bers.
The averageSN memberwasabout 48 yearsold; hada household
size of sixwith 2 breadwinners. Only a little over one-half of the
members considered their income adequate for food and clothing
with more officers expressingadequacy than membersand non-mem-
bers. The latter felt leastadequate about their income. In terms of
material household possessions,the pattern is similar, with officers
better off than membersand membersbetter off than non-members,
The Filipino wife was found to be at leasta joint-decision-maker
on matters relevant to SN and related activitiesbut it is unfortunate
that SN is almost completely a man's world with only 10 percent
female membership.
SN officers and members were more "organization men" than
non.members but SN had attracted 60 percent of its membersand
40 percent of its officers from among those who were previously
"organization-shy." Although at the national level, the "whole
world seemsto be undergoing training", it is surprisingthat more
than half of the officers and more than two-thirds of members,and
almost 90 percent of non-membershad neverattended any training
program before $N came along. For non-members,this experience
may continue to elude them. Officers havehad more organizational
leadershipand training experiencesthan members and membershad
more than non-members.Those who already had, stood to gain even
more in joining SN.
Rural people have often been accusedof wanting to leavedevel-
opment responsibility in the hands of villageofficials. Data from the
ACCI study failed to support this notion. More than 80 percent of
officers and members believed that development of the barrio was
everybody's concern. Less of the non-members subscribedto this
SamahangNayon 115
view. With respect to group or individual actions in dealing with
community problems facing farmers, almost half to two-thirds of
SN officers and members chose courses of action that were group-
oriented. On the other hand, majority of nommembers favored
individual actions and even had helpless resignation attitude towards
their inability to do anything about the situation. Seventy percent
of officers and members also thought that SN could help solve some
of our rural problems while non-members were rather skeptical about
SN in this role. Perhaps this is one reason why they had stayed out
of the organization. They also had a slightly greater tendency to
think that compulsion was the reasonfor people's participation.
No matter how skeptical one is about the SN, over a 5-year
period (1974-1979), the number of organized SNs grew from 15,320
in 1974 with a membership of 676,575 to 21,235 with a total mem-
bership of more than a million. About a fourth of the households in
half of our villages had been reached by SN and the program had not
necessarily sought out rich municipalities. Sixty-five percent of the
SNs were located in barrios of fourth to sixth class municipalities
although these places were accessible by roads and public transport.
However, almost 70 percent had no electricity and no gravity irriga-
tion.
SN's Organizational Structure in Action
Each SN is supposed to have a Board of Directors and Commit-
tees for Education and Training; Finance and Development; Audit
and Inventory; plus the Agricultural Counsellor. In the operationali-
zation of their functions, it was found that of the 4 committees, the
Board of Directors had been the most active while the Finance and
Development had been the least active. Furthermore, a Jecline in
SNs with functioning committees occurred between 1974 and 1976.
The most frequently cited reasonsfor inactivity were: waning of
members' and officers' interest in SN; lack of time due to competing
occupational demands;and lack of knowhow. What is culturally in-
triguing is the reluctanceof some to perform the auditing function.
it is encouraging,however,that this reluctancedid not seemsowide-
spread. Sixty percent of SN auditors said that they had audited the
Secretary-Treasurer's accounts and the latter admitted to having
beenaudited.
The production of a written plan was far from being popular,
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Only a third of the Board of Directors and Education and Training
Committees had a written plan and a fifth had a written budget.
Major reasonfor failure to comply was lack of know-how but a more
resistant reasonwas the officers' skepticismas to the usefulnessof a
plan which would not be followed anyway. It is noteworthy, how-
ever, that for those who prepareda plan, it was mainly committee
work and few had individual officers doing the plan alone. In other
words, there was some group "participation." Secretary-Treasurers,
however,tended to prepare the written budgetthemselves.
Sixteen percent of the SNs organizedand initiated projectsand
12 percent coordinated projects initiated by private and government
agencies. This suggeststhat SN might usefully perform a project-
initiator-coordinator role which will provide its members first-hand
experience in project identification, initiation and managementthat
would enhance its credibility.
When asked what they consideredthe most important charac-
teristics of an SN leader, members mentioned human relationsskills
at the top of their list. Competencecameasa far secondand honesty
came third. Havingtime for SN was barely mentionedalthough "lack
of time" wasearlier pointed out as one major reasonfor officers' ina-
bility to perform their functions.
More than three-fourth of the officers liked their presentposition
and would accept a reelection. Those who disliked their position
complained that it took too much time. Although members were
leastsatisfied about the performanceof the Agricultural Counsellors,
practically everyone of the latter liked their job. Most of them were
performing this function concurrently with another position. Half of
them claimed having conducted training for fellow SN membersand
70 percent said they had been consulted by other farmerson farm
practiceswith an averageof 23 farmers per SN havingdone so. Ma-
jority of farmer-members regarded adoption of modern farm prac-
rices and high yield asthe marks of a progressivefarmer. Considering
this and the desireto learn modern agricultural practicesas import-
ant reasons for joining SN, the role of Agricultural Counsellor in
technology transfer becomes rather significant.
Almost two-thirds of the SNs admitted that SNs could not devel-
op without government assistancealbeit claiming that officers could
manage SN affairs without the MDO. Reasonscited for joining SN
included such vague statements as "SN could improve their living
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conditions" and that they were "convinced of its good objectives."
Nowhere in these reasonsdid the membersspecifically suggestthat
they wanted "to save, learn,be disciplinedand act asa group." How-
ever, they wanted to avail of servicesfrom SN and the government;
to learn modern farm practices; to qualify for CLT and to obtain
supply of farm inputs. Their reasons were self-rather than other-
oriented; "opportunistic" rather than "altruistic" in outlook. The
possibility of usingSN as a lobbyingforce for farmers neversurfaced.
SN's Direct and Indirect Educational Activities and Members" Learn-
ing
For the massiveeduational program, a total of 65 weeksfrom the
organizational and pre-membershipeducational stageto management
training for members had been allocated. The actual conduct of the
training, however, was abbreviated as shown by lessactual sessions
and shorter duration than required for all the courses.Furthermore,
on the averare, only more than a third of the SNs completed all the
training courses.Nonetheless, after a year, 15;729 barrios in 1,342
municipalities were covered by the program with 10,419 SNs organ-
ized reporting more than half a million members. Some 2,260 field.
workers and 8,778volunteer barrio workers (mostly school teachers)
were mobilized for this task; roughly one worker per 50 members
organized. In addition, mass media were extensively used. When
asked, however, about their sourceof information bn SN, 94 percent
mentioned only the field and volunteer workers, Only 5 percent
mentioned radio and printed matter assource.
Regardingmessageabsorption, the SN pre-membershipeducation
program had been more successful in carrying the agrarian reform
than the SN message.Samahan9Nayon questionsreceivedthe lowest
proportion of correct answers. On the different lessonsfrom the
management training programs such as functions of officers, BGF
and BSF requirements, and disciplinary measures,both officers and
members exhibited their lowest performance on "disciplinary mea-
sures"while "functions of officers" _Nerethe most absorbed.
On whether concept-learning translates to actual behavior in
terms of actual contributions to the BGF and BSF funds, data sug-
gest that among those who attended training and were knowledge-
able, there were more who contributed than those who did not.
However, there is no one-to-one relationship between training at-
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tendance,, knowledge and contribution becausemore than half of
those who knew about the requirements did not contribute to the
savingsprogram.
Other significant research findings included the following: (1)
The higher the educational attainment is, the lower the knowledge
scoresare. The explanation is that higher educatedmemberstended
not to attend training sessionson the grounds that they already
know the subject or that they could just read the manuals.(2) The
more educatedthe member is, the less likely it was for him to con-
tribute to the BGF and the higher he was in the tenure structure,
the lower was his compliance with BGF. (3) With respect to the
functions of officers, knowledge about them was not significantly
related to the degreeof performance of thesefunctions. (4) A more
encouragingrole for agricultural training was evident in the observa-
tion that agricultural counsellorswho had completed all agricultural
lessonswere more inclined to conduct training for other farmers and
were alsomore consultedby other farmers.
To train the membersfor group action, SNs were encouragedto
practice joint buying from a designated source and joint selling
through a designatedbuyer. On the whole, only 5 percent of officers
and members had actually hadany experiencein doing businesswith
SN - designatedsourceand buyer. Group bargainingwas the least
attractive and the leastpracticedof the severalSN features.
Perhaps the most definitive and direct impact of SN manage-
ment training is that 6 to 12 percent of the officers attributed the
acquisition of specific leadershipskills to the SN managementtrain-
ing they had undergone. Even if SNs fade away, someof theseskills
would remain with these individuals. For the officers, management
training had reinforced their feeling of competence to handle their
position. For the ordinary members,about one-fourth expressedthis
feeling of competence to assume any position after completing
management training. Nevertheless,the differences between officers
and members described earlier remained evident. To begin with,
officers had higher socio-economic qualifications, more group-res-
ponsive attitudes, better training attendance, and consequently, a
reinforced feeling of competence to assumetheir leadershipposi-
tions.
SamahangNayon 119
_SN Members" Response to the Capital Build-Up Program
Despite some level of compliance with the Savings Program,
practically 90 percent of SNs studied regardedBSF and BGF collec-
tion as a problem. On a cumulativebasis,overa five-year period, SN
generated a total of P95 million from almost a million memberswith
an averagecontribution of 1_5,200 per SN of 51 membersandlPlO0
per member. The collections peaked during the second year of its
existence but started to dwindle in 1978. Despite the downward
spiralling of capital mobilization, SN is probably the only program
that has succeeded in generating funds from farmers. The other
unmistakable lesson is the power of members. Even at P20 per
member per year with almost a million members, it was possibleto
raisenearly P100 million in 5 years.
SN and Discipline
Among the different lessonstaught about SN, those about dis-
cipline or the penaltiesto be imposedfor particular types of offenses
were the "least learned." Besidesthe fact that disciplinary measures
had not been exercised much, what minimal imposition of penalties
was evident declined and almost disppeared over a two-year period.
It seemsthat disciplinewas the least implemented of the three major
features of SN (learningand savingare the other two).
The SN: An Early Assessment of Performance and Prognosis of the
Future
Assessmentof SN status by members gave a verdict of lessthan
40 percent calling it a "success"; 11 percent "failure"; and about
half "neither successnor failure". In their enumeration of "success
factors", about a third of the responsescentered on the quality of
external input from government suchas efficiency of the MDO, the
BDW and the technician; inspiring government attention; and in-
centivesto rural development. About 70 percent gavecredit to them-
selvesas revealed in suchresponsesas: the wholehearted cooperation
of members; and efficiency of officers and their honesty and integ-
rity. In identifying the "failure factors", 82 percent of the responses
placed the blame on the membership as revealed in such responses
as: unwillingnessof membersto pay financial obligations; low capa-
city to pay; non-attendanceof membersat meetings;and inefficiency
and dishonesty of SN officers. One can infer from these responses
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that while government inputs served as incentives and inspiration,
their successwas being attributed to their own members' and of-
ficers' efforts. On the other hand, the failure was only slightly
blamed on the government input. More than 80 percent traced the
failure on their own inadequacies(both of members and officers).
Members regardednon-payment of BGF and BSF asthe mostserious
problem of SN with undisciplined and uncooperative members a
very far second.
Members' assessmentof the benefits derived from SN ranked its
role as source of information and guidance on farming asmost signi-
ficant followed by "better cooperation of members" and facilitator
in obtaining credit, lower priced supplies and better market prices
for products. Insurance benefits came next and SN's role as facili-
tator in land transfer program was considered the least significant
benefit derived from SN.
Assessmentby local officials and field workers showed that only
a little over one-half of them were definitely positive on SN's pros-
pect for successin the localities. This discouragingassessmentsug-
geststhat SN could easily becomethe victim of a self-fulfilling pro-
phecy. Another negative observation is that many members felt
disciplinary measures"must be enforced by the military." What are
instinctive for programand training implicationsare the negativeand
conditional commentson different SN features such as: the needto
adapt SN to localconditions;savingsprogramprovidesno immediate
benefits to members; disciplinary measuresare too harsh; reserva-
tions on SN's role asa channelof governmentservices.
Although there was an uncertainty about SN's acceptability to
local officials, SN officers mentioned that they had been assistedby
barangay and municipal officials although more by the former than
the latter. There were few reports on attempts by local officials to
"sabotage" SN activities,
Non-members had some awarenessof the services/benefits pro-
vided by SN to membersandthe requirementsfor membership. Less
than one-third regardedSN as a success.The restwere either unable
or unwilling to evaluate its status. Most of the reasonsfor non-mem-
bership had something to do with the financial obligations involved
while the rest preferredto wait and see.
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CHAPTER II NOTES
1, Conredo F. Estrella, Agrarian Reform in _e New Soc/ety, Philippine Report, July
1974.
2, Agricultural Credit and Cooperatives Institute (ACCi), First Progress Report,
(June-Nov. 1974) on the Research and Evaluation of the Cooperatives Program, University
of the Philippines at Los BaSos.
3. Annual Report 1978, BCOD. Ministry of Local Governments and Community
Development (MLGCD)
4, Sixteen research reports from the ACCl project were reviewed and relevant find-
tngssif¢ed to highlight the particular concern of this rase_ch project on rural institutions.
Because the research reports produced by ACCI are so confused and results ere quite
difficult, if not impossible, to disentangle and reconcile, data and analysis presented here
should be regarded more as suggestiveof trends rather than definitive orders of magnitude
for evaluation purposes. Attempted explanations and descriptions of SN-related phenomena
are better regarded as hypotheses which should be subjected to more studies designed speci-
fically to investigate the social phenomena indicated. Over 8 period of four months, repeat-
ed reviews of the reports were made in order to ferret out what were judged to be the most
promising leads in terms of understanding the dynamics of cooperatives development parti-
cularly because the "cooperative way" appears to be our preferred alternative for organizing
small farmers. Since no other organizational effort along this line has been extensively at-
tempted at the village level on a nationwide scale as Samahang Nayon, we have tried to ex-
tract whatever lessonsfnom experience we could extract despite weakneses in the available
data.
Prom the volumes of data and materials reviewed, highlights were painstakingly ex-
tracted and a synthesis of indicative rather than definitive trends were arrived at, The
research reports which constitute the most extensive but perhaps also the most expensive
information source on SarnahangNayon were produced by the Agricultural Credit and Co-
operatives InstJttuze (ACCI), University of the Philippines at Los BaSos with support from
the International Development Research Centre of Canada and the Department of Local
Government and Community Development. The synthesis of trends presented in this chap-
ter represents a small attempt to digest "tons of data" so that we can have some reasonable
picture of the Samahang Nayon story. It has been a most difficult job carried out over a 7-
month period by the reviewer herself, Despite the laborious work she has put into the
"digestion process", it is impossible to feel that justice has been done to the materials. The
process of reducing thousands of pages to more than a hundred is fraught with the usual
risks which accompany condensation and interpretation of a mass of data but investments
on such a research project must somehow yield findings which can be made readily avail-
able. This is the intent of this exercise but whatever has been presented here must be regard-
ed as suggestive, not conclusive.
Sources of data for this chapter include the following:
1. Preliminary Report on the "Benchmark Survey of Prospective Samahang Nayon
Members in Cagayan Valley (First Partial Report on Study I, Project I, of the
Research and Evaluation of the New Cooperatives Development Program in the
Philippines," 1974.
2. First Progress Report on the "Research and Evaluation of the Cooperatives Deve-
lopment Program" (June.Nov., 1974}
3. Second Progress Report, "Research and Evaluatio n of the Cooperatives Develop-
ment Program of the Philippines" (December 1974-July 1975)
4. First Partial Report on the Evaluation of the Development (Phase II) of Samahang
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Nayon, "A Component Study of the Research and Evaluation of the Cooperatives
Development Program of the Philippines" (1975)
5. Special Report on the Research and Evaluation of the Cooperatives Development
Program (Presented at,the IDRC-University Sains Malaysia Workshop on Techni-
cal and Social Progress in Rural Development, Penang, Malaysia, Dec. 16-19.
1975)
6. "Evaluation of the Operations of 25 Farmers' Barrio Cooperatives in Area I,"
Nueva Ecija, 1975
7. Third Progress Report, "Research and Evaluation of the Cooperatives Develop-
ment Program of the Philippines" (August-December 1975)
6. Fourth ProgressReport, "Research and Evaluation of the Cooperatives Develop-
ment Program of the Philippines" (January-July 1976)
9. Fifth Progress Report, "Research and Evaluation of the Cooperatives Develop-
ment Program of the Philippines" (August-December 1976)
10. Second Partial Report on the "Evaluation of the Development (Phase II) of Sama.
hang Nayon" (July 16, 1976)
11. Second Partial Report on the "Benchmark Survey of Prospective Samahang
Nayon Members of the Philippines," Study I. First Year Studies, Research and
Evaluation of the New Cooperatives Development Program in the Philippines
(September 1976)
12. "The Samahang Nayon After the Phase II Development Training Program: An
Evaluation," October 1977
13. Third Partial Report on the "Evaluation of the Development (Phase II)of Same-
hang Nayon" (March, 1977)
14. "An Evaluation of the Implementation of the Organizational Activities of the
Samahang Nayon Development Program", Phase I, (June 1977)
15. "Highlights of the Research and Evaluation of the Samahang Nayon Development
Program" (November 1977)
16. "Profile of Prospective Samahang Nayon Members in the Philippines," (March
1978)
17. "The Cooperative Management and Technical Agriculture Training of Members
and Officers of Samahang Nayon" (March 1978)
18. "Socio-Economlc Status of Members During Samahang Nayon Development
Phase" (April 1978)
19. Arnold Naldoza, "Samahang Nayon Officers' Responsivity to Management
Training," Unpublished M.S, Thesis, UPLB, March 1979)
5. ACCI, "Profile of ProSpective Samahang Nayon Members in the Philippines,"
Loguna; UPLB College, March 1978.
6. Department of Local Goernment and Community Development, Overview on the
Philippine Cooperative Development Program," Bureau of Cooperatives Development,
Metro Manila. p, 34,
7. Orlando J. Sacay, Samahang Nayon: A New Concept in Cooperative Develop*
roans, National Publishing Cooperative, Inc. 1974. p. 48.
8. ACCI, "The Cooperative Management and Technical Agriculture Training of
Members and Officers of Samahang Nayon," UPLB, March 1978.
9. Arnold M. Neldoza, "Samahang Nayon Officers' Responsivity to Management
Training," Unpublished M.S. Thesis, UPLB, 1979.
10, -Romy V. Mapile, '=PI00 million in SN funds for investment in banks," Bulletin
Today, December 31, 1979. p. 8.
CHAPTER III
COMPACT FARMS AND SELDAS: AN ATTEMPT
AT GROUP FARMING
In searchingfor the official originsof the compact farm strategy,
we stumbled upon two little piecesof information. From the Fore-
word to the Guidelines in the Organization and Operation of Com.
pact Farms, the Agricultural Credit Administration (ACA) definesits
role as an integral part of the machinery for the "accelerated imple-
"nentation of the Agrarian Reform Program, increasedfood produc-
tion and economic viability of the farm population." In fulfilling this
new role, ACA believesthat its loaning program must be directed to
the individual farmers. However, it wasalsostated that "past experi-
ences.., have shownthat the administrative cost of servicingindivi-
dual applications is prohibitive, not to mention the difficulties in the
control and supervisionof loaning operations under this system, It
becomes necessary, therefore, for the ACA to utilize the farmer
group as the main channel for its loaning program." This approach
finds legitimation in one of the President'sstatementsregardingland
reform, viz:
Now, we keeptalkingaboutdividinglandsandwewill getall thebig
landedestatesanddividethem.., theexpertsreportto usthatfarmingof
biggerareasismoreefficient,.. Arewe goingto abandonthissmallland-
ownershipbecausebiglandedestatesaremoreefficient?.., No,wewillnot
abandonthesmallfarmownersor ownershipbutwewillbindtogetherand
groupto_letherthe smallfarmssothat wewill attaintheefficiencyof bigfarms...
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In 1975, the Assistant Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform, in defining the content of their agrarian reform extension
work, indicated that in their agricultural development, the emphasis
is on "compact farming geared toward the building of economies of
scale on the farm" As he explained, the rationale for it is:
What we are now givingto the tenant isan uneconomicunit. The aver-
age holdingis lessthan one hectare,at mostoneanda half. Thiscan hardly
be an economicfamily sizefarm. Basedon the decree,if the land is irrigat-
ed, the tenant getsthree hectares;if not, he gets five. Whatwe aredoing is
merely givingto the tenant what he is actually tilling becausethere is no
more land. How do we lick the disadvantagesbroughtabout by the small-
ness of holdings?We went into compact farming. Compact farmingwas
merelythe resultof the "seldas" and "damayan" which weredesignedmere-
ly asjoint liability groupsfor agriculturalcredit to ensurerepayment.When
a farmer is a memberof the selda,he is jointly and severallyliableto repay
the loan of any memberwho defaultsin paying.Therefore,the rationalebe-
ind the "seldas" and the "damayans" was for credit purposes,not for pro-
duction purposes.So we expandedthe concept.We pooledthe farmerstoge-
ther usingcontiguity of holdingsasthe criterion. Underthe seldaanddame-
yen schemes,the criteria were kinship, confidence,etc. regardlessof con-
tiguity of farms.But when we went into compactfarming, the main crite-
rion was that the farms of the member-farmersmust be contiguousfor
wider economiesof scale.
What are the purposesof thesecompactfarms?First, to ensurerepay-
ment of credit; second,we are usingit asa traininggroundfor cooperative
farming becausewhether we like it or not, in the near future, we must
undertakea land consolidationprogram in thesetransferredareasbecause
the ownershippattern of the land beingtransferredis erratic. It ismoreor
lesslike a jigsawpuzzle becausethe dikesare erratic.We are of the belief
that if we want to modernizeagriculture,we must first startwith a physical
restructuringof the landholdingso we can put in the irrigationfacilities,
the drainagecanals,andthe farm roadsina mannerthat will be mosteffec-
tive to supportthe agriculturalenterprise.We cannot do this if we are not
goingto reconsolidatethe landholdings.And we cannot consolidateif the
farmerswill not allow us to do so. In the experienceof the National Irriga-
tion Administration (NIA) in Talavera,they found that land consolidation
is 10 percentengineering,90 percent land administrationin the sensethat
you haveto convincethe farmerto accept it... We are nowusingthe com-
pact farmingschemeasa traininggroundthat if they want to modernizela-
ter on, they haveto consolidatetheir holdings.
We havePhaseII compactfarmingaddressedto the non-irrigatedareas
and the main ingredient that we put there is the tubewell.We organizethe
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compactfarmsbutweputin a tubewelltogivethemthewater.Onthebasis
of our simplearithmetic,the farmerswhoaregivennon-irrigatedfarmswill
notbeableto Paytheamortizations.Theonlywayfor themto payisto be
able to plantcontinuously12 monthsa year,otherwise,sooneror later,
theyaregoingto losetheirproperty.2
As with other development strategies,the perfection of designis
seldom achieved in implementation for the human responseto a
blueprint is rarely, if ever, to serveonly the planner'sobjective. Any
attempt at perfection is quite often "sabotaged" by the primacy of
recipients'and implementors' own prioritiesand immediate realities.
In examining compact farms, we would like to review:
a) The concept
b) Other farmer groupssuchas seldas
c) Compact farmsand seldasin practice
d) Some experiences with the different features of compact
farms and seldes
A. The Compact Farm Concept
The Guidelines on Compact Farming describe the compact farm
as "a grouping together of contiguous adjacent farms of approxi-
mately equal productive capabilities, fully irrigated (gravity or by
pump), for purposesof consolidating separate, individual resources,
methods and activities by cultivating the aggregateconsolidatedarea
asa singleunit under a singlemanagement."
The operational policiesareas follows:
a) Consolidation of operations appliesonly to farming activities
and does not disturb ownership or right of occupancyof the
land.
b) Sing/e management following one farm plan and budget and
work schedule.
c) Poo/ed resources with the participation of each member and
shared in the same proportion as the area of his farm to the
total area of the compact farm.
d) Pooled labor provided by the farmers themselveswith the
help of their immediate farm householdpreferably underthe
bayanihan system.
e) Shared expensesand produce or income pro-rated among
members in proportion to the area of his individual farm to
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the total of the compact farm.
f) " Pooled produce marketed by the group itself.
g) The compact farm as a channel for ACA (Agricultural Credit
Administration) credit assistanceto smallfarmers isexpected
to maximize the effectiveness of the loaning program in
terms of the size of the clientele aswell asits impact.., i.e.,
through the compact farm, the ACA can servemore farmers
and createdeeper, more lastingimpact on their lives.
h) Joint liability with members assumingjoint and severalliabi-
lity for all loansgrantedto them.
i) Capital generation through a savingsprogram coming from
5 percent deduction from loans•grantedto membersand con-
tributions in kind.
j) Right of recourse against a defaulting member. Incase a
member fails to pay his obligationsor is unable to cultivate
his farm, the group shall undertake the cultivation to pay
land rental and other encumbrancesfrom the produce there-
from. Any excessaccruesto the group.
The significanceof the compact farm was centered on the "far-
met group itself asa point of convergencefor all developmentalef-
forts, i.e., any and all government programs intended to help the
farm sector can be channeled through the samegroup. It will alsoal-
low these efforts to reachdown deepenoughto touch the livesof in-
dividual farmers and spreadout wide enoughto embrace all aspects
of his growth."
• It has likewise been argued that "the twin idea of reciprocalre-
sponsibility and collectiveaction are basicto the nature of the group-
ing and makes it an attractive module for rural development pro-
grams." As a matter of fact, the compact farm wasexpectedto func-
tion as a channel for technical assistance,credit, a vehicle for group
action, a medium for capital generation and a forum for group dis-
cussion.3
As of 1972, there were 240 compact farms organizedin Camari-
nes Sur; as of 1973, 11 in Nueva Ecija, and by 1975, the Angat-Ma-
gat integrated Agricultural Development Project of the NIA with a
loan from the Asian Development Bank wassupposedto haveestab-
lished42 compactfarms in Bulacanand Isabela.4
These operational principles center on the compact farm asa ve-
hicle for efficiency mainly on the assumptionof an effectively func-
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tioning group acting as a group. This presumesthat farmers join for
group-oriented reasonsand that they are as concerned about effi-
ciencyasthe designersof the program.
B. Other Farmer-Groups Such as the Selda
Along with compact farms came another type of farmer group
known in different regionsby a variety of namessuchas: Saranay,
Damayan, Rabus, Tiklos, Jamaah and Selda. All theseterms express
the same theme of helping one another, mutual and reciprocalre-
sponsibility. Unlike the compact farm, the Seldawhich is the most
widespreadof all doesnot require that farms becontiguous.
It is a small-scaleproduction unit made up of 5-10 farmers,
generallynot exceeding30 hectaresand not operated asa singleman-
agement system although members live in close proximity to each
other. The Selda has been organizedto act as a joint liability group
for credit application and collection; serve as a channel for facilitat-
ing distribution of farm inputs; serve as a collection and assembly
point for agricultural marketing; act as a rural nucleusfor concen-
trated technical training and extension assistance;and serveasa sub-
unit for socialdevelopmentwithin the barrio structure.
In 1971, membership in the Selda became a prerequisite to ob-
taining loansfrom the rural bank under the SpecialAgricultural Loan
Fund. When this Fund was adopted nationwide, the Seldawasintro-
duced throughout the country and by 1975, the number of Seldas
was estimated to be 40,000. The rationale behind the creation of the
Seldaswasthree-fold:
a) the need for an improved scheme for safeguardingagricul-
tural credit by reducingrisk;
b) the need for an internal policing system at the farmer level to
superviseloan application and collection; and
c) the feeling that with small groupsof farmersjointly andsev-
erally liable for eachother's loans,the socialpressureexerted
by the darnayan spirit (farmers voluntarily helping one an-
other) would insure improved credit delivery and repayment
systems.
The establishmentand support of the Selda was the primary re-
sponsibility of rural banks, the Agricultural Credit Administration
and the Philippine National Bank. The Seldagenerallyservesas a sub-
unit wthin the Samahan_9Nayon or other larger cooperativestruc-
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tures. In some cases,a farmer may be a member of two or more Sel-
das within a barrio since Seldasare typically singlepurpose in terms
of agricultural activities. A farmer who receivesrural bank financing
for rice and swine production may be required to join two Seldas,
one for eachenterprise.5
C. Compact Farms and Seldas in Practice
Available information6 tells us that compact farmingwas fir_
tried in Cotabato in 1964 by the Agricultural Credit Administration
(ACA) purportedly to "help blunt the threat of insurgencyand to
bring dissident farmers back to.the government fold." Apparently
this initial effort was encouragingbecauseseveralACA branch man-
agerswere brought to Cotabato to learnfrom the experiment. In the
meantime, similar groups were organized in Iloilo and Pangasinan.
By 1969, Barrameda reports that Camarines Sur had joined the
compact farm movement and eventually became an areaof concen-
tration. ACA's concern with credit collection and practical experi-
ence fortuitously got together with the Nueva CaceresArchdiocesan
Secretariat for Social Action (ASSA) which at the same time was
preoccupied with evolving "a blueprint for organizingfarmers into
groupsthrough which they could revive their flaggingconfidence in
democratic institutions, and at the sametime learnself-reliance.The
ideawas to lessenthe farmers' stifling overdependenceon the embat-
tled government for their economicand social upliftment."
The two-pronged strategy pursuedwas: (1) the church involving
herself directly and actively in social action in order to regainthe
confidence of the peasantry;and (2) the lay group assuringthe far-
mers that rural bank credit would bereadily availableto them if they
would follow the modernfarming practicesrecommendedby techni-
cians. In choosingthe locale in which to implement their plans, the
following criteria were applied: (a) the place had tobe economically
depressed,(b) the farms had to be irrigated; and (c) the farmersare
no longer acceptable to government agricultural financing institu-
tions as good credit risks.
Inginan, Minalabac, Camarines Sur became its first experiment
and the principal stresswasshifted from production to social so/ida-
rity thus laying the groundwork.for.what was referredto asthe rural
bank type of compact farm.. To keep the social orientation of the
Inginan prototype, proximity of residencewas required of all mem-
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bers, who were jointly and severally liable for their loans.Specifical-
ly, the members had to be neighbors, which was interpreted as
meaning "with houses a stone's throw from one another." With
about 10 groupsorganized, the term compact farming beganto take
hold and the Rural Bank of Nueva Caceresprovided credit to these
compact farms. Unfortunately, the worst typhoon ever to hit the
Bicol Region came in 1970 and undid compact farming. In the reha-
bilitation of the compact farms, the assistanceof the food-for-work
program of the Catholic Relief Serviceswas sought through ASSA.
Given the circumstances, the Archbishop saw an opportunity for
more vigorous social action and urged other rural banks to support
the compact farm program by extending agricultural production
loans. For added impetus, the ASSA and the BICOM (Bicol Central
Cooperative Marketing Association) embarked on a joint cooperative
farm developmentprogram. More and more compact farms sprangup
in Buhi, Naga, Bula, Pili and Goa and CamarinesSur becamethe first
provincein the country where support for compact farms has been
provided by rural banks. Farm contiguity asa requirement for group
membership started to be applied at this time. It was said that the
successof the compact farm financing schemeled to the organization
of the Inter-agency Bicol River BasinTeam which wasto draw up an
integrated development program that would build on the compact
farms of Camarines Sur. As a matter fof act, Lynch arguesthat it isa
historical fact that "without compact farming, there would probably
havebeen no Bicol River BasinDevelopment Program."
While the rural bank-supported compact farms were developing,
a parallel movement was taking place in the Bulapilot project under
ACA sponsorshipbut with the cooperationof the Bureauof Agricul-
tural Extension. Similar farmers'associationfollowed in Pill, Pamplo_
na and Libmanan. Barramedacharacterizesthe Rural Bank type con-
cept as essentiallysocially based while the ACA approachwasabove
all production-oriented. In the Bula experiment, the ACA project
initiator made the observationthat the basic sourceof weakness in
cooperative undertakingsis the "failure to useexistingorganizations
at the barrio level as a base for strong membership. A barrio zone
organization, the rabus (Tagalogpurok) became the foundation on
which the ACA built compact.farm groups, supplanting the indivi-
dual-farmer membership in the Farmers' Cooperative Marketing
Associations." Both concepts, however, had the same basic under-
pinningsin joint-liability groups.
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Table 3.1 shows the features which characterize the RB and ACA
approaches to compact farming. The ACA formula has more require-
ments than the RB type for the farm as a p,'oductive unit such as:
contiguity of farms; equal productivity of members' farms; pre-mem-
bership training; consolidated farm operations and pooled marketing.
Actual membership size and number of hectares were not specifically
prescribed as in the RB type. Rather, these two factors were left
flexible depending upon what is required for efficient and effective
supervision. In reality, however, the compact farms never totally con-
formed to the formula. For example, although lessee or ownership
status is called for, about 45 percent of compact farm members stu-
died were share tenants and almost half were working on unified
farms, contrary to the specification that member farms be irrigateo_.
In other words, the formula is, more often than not, "violated" in
practice.
As Lynch describes the situation:
Although two kinds of compact farms are currently distinguished,
adaptationto localconditions hasresultedin an endlessvarietyof arrange-
ments. The one elementwhich seemsto characterizeall compact farms is
the acceptanceby its membersof joint responsibilityfor the production
loansthey receive.Ordinarily, this credit is supervised,but beyondthis re-
quirement, little else is consistentlydemandedin practice.Thus pre-mem-
bershiptraining may or may not be required.The numberof membersper
compactfarm may be fixed, or may bedeterminedinthe particularcaseon
groundsof efficiency.The farmer-membersmay or may not be neighbors,
and may or may not work adjoiningfarms; consequently,their aggregate
holdingsmay or may not be operated as a singleproduction unit. Farms
may be irrigatedor rainfed.Producemay be pooledfor marketing,with the
proceedsof salepro-ratedamongthe membersafter deduction of the loan
repaymentor the membersmay handlesalesand loanpaymentsseparately.
in October 1973, an • .stimated18,000 ricefarmersof CamarinesSurfollow-
ed one or the other of thesevariousalternatives,or a combinationof both.7
In the meantime, compact farming had also caught on in Panay.8
In 1972, the first compact farm was established in Iloilo. By 1976,
there were 3 in Aklan, 2 in Antique, 19 in Capiz and 12 in Iloilo with
a total membership of 1,023 farmers. The Seldas had more extensive
membership in Panay with 50,242 farmers in 8,625 groups distribut-
ed as follows: 1,393 in Aklan; 396 in Antique; 1,763 in Capiz and
5,073 in Iloilo. There was an average of about 6 members per Selda.
Although these numbers are impressive and one wonders about the
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TABLE 3.1
COMPARISON OF THE ACA AND RB FORMULAS
FOR THE COMPACT FARM ORGANIZATION
Agricultural Credit Rural Bank
Feature Administration (ACA) (RB)
A. Membership qualifications
I. Contiguity of members'
farms Required Not requilned
2. Irrigation (gravity or
pump) Required Required
3. Equal produ0tivity of
members' farms Required Not required
4. Acceptability of members Not required
to all others in the group Required as such(see
A,5)
5. Kinship (bloOd or mar-
riage)with other mem-
bers; residencenear
Others Not required Required
6. Pre-membershiptraining Required Not Rquired
7. Acceptability Of program
packageespecially modern
farming techniques Required Required
8. Lesseeor ownership
statu= Required Required
B. Membership size
9. Numberof_s Oependentonrequlrements 15-20membe"
foe efficient and effective
supervi_on
10. Number of hectares Dependent on requirements
for efficient and effective
supervision 40-50 hectares
C. Operat/on
11. Members jointly and
severallyresponsiblefor
loans Required Required
12. SUlO_visedcredit Required Required
13. Farm operations Consolidated, following Individual, fol-
one overall plan lowing indivi-
duralplims
14. Marketing Pooled, with first proceeds Individual, with
usedto repay loans individual re.
payment of
loan
Source: Jole V. _ Jr. "_ Farming In Camarines Sur', SSRU
Resweh RqmortBarle¢ NO. 2 (Appandtx), Jenumy 1B'/4.
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speedat which these farmer groupshavebeen organizedthroughout
the four provinces,we shouldexamine Table 3.2. The compactfarm
and the Selda as originally conceivedare quite different from the
compact farm and the Selda asoperationally modified. As seenin
Table 3.2, the phenomenon of "groupness," "jointness" or pooled
activity practically disappearsaswe go from original compact farm
to modified Selda. The latter does not even require joint liability
which is supposedto be the sine qua non for this type of organiza-
tion. As the PICRAD study observed: "The Manager is more subs-
tantially involved in the modified compact farms than in the Seldas
where the team •leader is in many casesa figure head. In fact, in
modified•Seldas,he may be non-existent." The transactionsin the
latter are between the technician and the farmersas individualsand
only in the formalities 0f loan proceduresdo they emergeasa group.
From Antique, it was reported that farmers "do not know their
Selda leaderson even other Selda members.The Seldaseemsto bea
mere formality farmers haveto go:through to comply with the tech-,
nicalities of the program.''9 In other words, the only thing that is
• "joint"• in the Selda isthe formal act of gettinga loan.
The only real point of convergenceof interest amongthe Selda
and eventhe compact farm membersis credit. In general,we can say
that many compact farms were not very compact and most of the
Selda joint liability groupsturned out to be neither joint nor liable
but everybody obtained credit. This isdramatically illustratedin the
• sourcesof credit before and after the advent of these two farmer
groups. Before membership in compact farms, 35 percent of them
borrowed from individual money lendersand 29 percent from insti-
tutional sourcessuchas banks. Under the compactfarms, morethan
90 percentof the members obtained credit only from one source,
i.e., the Agricultural Credit Administration. On the other hand,
amongthe Selda membersduringthe pre-Seldadays, 44 percent bor-
rowed from individual money lenders;Only 19 percent used banks.
After joining the Seida, almost everyone (99 percent) borrowed ex-
clusively from the Rural Bank and the Philippine National Bank.1°
A more significant trend is the shift from beinga non-borrower
to a borrower as farmers became Selda members. Data on this phe-
nomenon come from Antique where before the advent of Masagana
99, 88 percent of farmers studied did not get loansin cashor kind
but when Masagana99 was launched, 100 percent decided to bor-
row.11 They hadjoined the credit bandwagon.
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All these developmentsare quite a contrast to the SeldaSystem
which was organized in Cotabato in 1969-by the Rural Bank of Sul-
tan Sa Barongis.12 This rural bank came into being becausea physi-
clan-owner of a local hospital who had previously been involved in
community development for 15 years found out from a surveythat
many farmers could not be servedby 2 other existing rural banks.
However, even after setting up his own bank, he found out that only
landowners and businessmenwith collateralswere taking advantage
of it. No tenants ever came for a loan and they ,were also the same
people who came to hishospital but were unableto pay for medicine
andservicesof the physicians.Usingthe Agricultural Guarantee Loan
Fund (AGLF), he initiated the Seldasystem.
The Selda is composedof 10 to 20 farmers, either landownersor
tenants who are required to till 2 to 3 hectaresof their own land or
land they cultivate as tenants. Memberswork for a common cause,
i.e., efficient land preparation, planting,weeding,controlling diseases
and pests and harvesting for better production, in the spirit of the
bayanihan system, each-farmer helps the other and together, they
pay their debts asone. Integrated Seldas are financed by the bank for
a whole year but they must have a good leader who has strong com-
mand over his co-members and the members must have good records
of loan repayments. The non-integrated Seldashad to apply for loans
everycrop season.
By 1970, there were 54 Seldas in 15 barrios of Sultan Sa Baro-
ngis, Tacurong and Buluan covering770 hectareswith a total of 381
members. There were 3 administrative bodies that jointly operated
the Selda System, namely, the Central Bank, the Bureauof Plant In-
dustry and the Rural Bank. The Central Bank provided the funds
under the AGLF; the BPI appointed and sent technicians; and the
Rural Bank laid out the plan and approachof the project. EachSelda
hada set of officers with their respectivefunctions:
1) Farm Manager Technician (one per six Seldas)
He receivesremuneration from the RBSSB (10 percent
of fees charged for tractors that cultivate the Selda Farms).
He representsthe CB in the Selda, helpsprocessthe loansand
giveslectureson scientific farming.
2) Farm Project Manager and Coordinator
He is the overall leaderof the Selda, a liaisonbetween his
group and the Rural Bank.
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3) Assistant Farm Manager and Chief on WeedControl
4) Logistics and MessengerOfficer
He takes care of the funds released by the RBSSBand
seesto it that funds are spent as intended. As a messenger,
he carried information from membersto the ProjectManager
and other officers, if necessary,or vice-verse.He is responsi-
ble for callingall Seldamembersfor meetings.
5) Chief Field Inspector and Chief on Rat Control
He overseesthe farm conditions and looks out for the
presenceof rats.
6) Chief Field Inspector and Chief on Genera/ Surrounding
Cleaning
He seesto it that surroundingsof the farms are free from
tall grassor bushes.
7) Chief Field/nspector and Chief on Water Control
8) Chief Field Inspector and Chief on Insect Control
The bank initiates the organization of the Selda in places
which had been chosenon the basisof presenceof irrigation
and the attitudes of farmers, that is, whether they are hard-
working and eagerto improvetheir condition. Every member
•was required to signa contract that he must follow all recom-
mendations of the technician;that he must bea bonafide far-
mer (work'ingfull-time) and havehisequipment and working
animals; that he must take good care of the crops as the
technician adviser;that he mustdo away with vicesespecially
gambling that may lead to misuseof funds and time; and that.
the landowner agreesto the legalsharingbasisas provided in
the Land Reform Code. Furthermore, farms had to be adja-
cent and farmers were required to till only one to 2 hectares
rather than 4 to 5 which they could not take care of well and
would result in poor harvests.The farmer:member might be
allowed to till more than 2 hectaresand obtain financing if
he hadhelpersor children to assisthim in farming. It had also
been observedby the President of the Rural Bank that Iloca-
nos in general had "good credit standing, are hard workers
and are easierto organize than other ethnic groups." Conse-
quently, the first Seldaswere organized among Ilocano bar-
rios.
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The RBSSBbought fertilizers and chemicalsinbulk for a cheaper
price. Whatever savingswere made were passedon to the members.
After loans had been released, the technician gave lectureson what
the bank was doing for them and what they were expected to do in
return. Lectureson new knowledge for better production were also
given from time to time. There was closesupervisionon the use of
loans in kind and cashl The latter was given to the LogisticsOfficer
who paid for the hired labor of Selda families, tractor servicesand
other similar expenses incurred by the individual farmer. An emer-
gency loan was possible from 10 percent of the farmer's total
amount borrowed. In caseof sickness,a Selda family was admitted
to the hospitalowned by the Rural Bank president.The serviceswere
free but farmers had to pay for the medicine. Members' producewas
sold in block to a dealer contacted by the RBSSB in order to get a
better price. If market price waslow, the ricewas stored in a bonded
warehousedesignatedby the RBSSBto wait for a higher price. Under
this system, the bank was assuredof loan repayment. However, in
some barrios,a number of farmerswould sella part of their produce
superstitiouslybefore declaring their yields. By sodoing, it appeared
that their harvestwas low and the bank, therefore, could not force
them to repayall their loansfrom the produce.
The personalitieswho were identified with the conception and
• introduction of the compact farm and the Seldaare:
1) Romeo Serqui_a -Cotabato Branch Manager of ACA. His
reason• for pushing this form of cooperative,farming was to
help blunt the threat of insurgencyand to bring"dissident
farmersback to the governmentfold.
2) Jose C. Morano- ACA regionalaccountant in CamarinesSur
who developed his own ideaof compact farming andtried to
translate his ideasinto reality in Minalabac. Hewas a member
of the ASSA Task Force that started the inginan, Minalabac
experiment. Also as a member of the Knights of Columbus,
he enlisted the support of Catholic Relief Services for the
good-for-work program. Furthermore, as a resident auditor
of the Bicol Central Cooperative Marketing Association, he
saw in the compact farm a possiblesolution to the organiza-
tion's two major problems: a small volume of businessand
substandardrice production by members.
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3) Msgr. Jose T. Sanchez, head of the Nueva CaceresArchdio-
cesen Secretariat for Social Action. The Secretariat, spon-
soreda Congresswhich evolveda committee chargedwith the
task of drawing up a blueprint for organizing farmers into
groups which could help revive their flaggingconfidence in
democratic institutions and at the same time learn self-
reliance.
4) Archbishop Teopisto V. Alberto urged other rural banks to
support the compact farm program through production
loans. He, together with Atty. Oscar Ravanera,the President
of the Rural Bank of Nueva Caceres,explored meansto ex-
pand and continue the compact farm financing scheme.Their
efforts to link up with technocratsand cabinet members in
Manila and with the US Agency for International Develop-
ment led to the organization of the Inter-agency Bicol River
BasinTeam which was asked to draw up an integrateddevel-
opment program that would build on the compact farm of
CamarinesSur.
5) Arturo Torralba, Sr., ACA provincial credit officer, initiated
an educational drive on cooperative farming and the ACA-
type compact farm in the Bula pilot project; He introduced
the use of the barrio zone organization (tabus or purok) as
the foundation for the compact farm.
6) Dr. Antonio Velasco, President of the Rural Bank of Sultan
sa Barongisand owner of Perpetual Help Hospital, started the
Selda System in Cotabato in 1969, after havingbeen involved
in community development activitiesfor more than 15 years.
Quite often in the proce_, of implementing a new mode, a new
approach to delivering development servicesand bringingabout rural
development, Whether in terms of increasingproductivity, employ-
ment and equality, we tend to forget how it came about, whose idea
it was, and what the prevailingcircumstanceswere which motivated
its creation. This happens more so when the new way hasbeen so
institutionalized that it hasbecome pert of our way of life. But espe-
cially at the initiation and experimental stages,institutionsare really
people, persons and individuals who were responsiblefor bringing
them into being, In the expansion or multiplication of a particular
approach, the proceduresare readily reproducible but the essenceor
substance of these personalities is seldom, if ever, given attention.
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They are the plus factors which manuals of procedure and training
programsseldomcapture. On the minusside, there are alsopersonali-
ties whose behavior distorts, subverts, undermines or adapts the
original blueprint and initial intent for their own purposes,in lay-
man language, these institutional aberrations are referred to as
anomalies.
Since compact farms and Seldas have been around for about a
decade, itwould be interesting to find out what has happened to
those personalitiesresponsiblefor their creation, where they are and
what their presentthoughts are about the conceptsthey originated.
For example, with the peaceand order problem in the area, Dr. An-
tonio Velasco has sold his Rural Bank of Sultan Sa Barongisas well
as his hospital. He left Cotabato and set up a new one in Calamba,
Laguna. One wonders what is left, if any, of the Seldashe started in
1969. An "institution" that has been institutionalized transcends
personalitieseven as it changes in responseto pressuresfrom all
sources.
D. Some Experiences with the Different Features
of Compact Farms and Seldas
New ways of doing thingssuchasbank credit, singlemanagement
of adjacent farms, etc. do not become a way of life unlessthey have
withstood the test of time and experienceand havebeen found to be
acceptable,workable and useful to those who have been engagedin
their practice. Compact farms and Seldas have been designedwith
characteristicfeatures which need to be validated through actual ap-
plication if they are to endure and find wider application even in
modified or sometimeswatered-down versions. In this section, we
examine empirical evidenceson experienceswith thesefeatureswhen
compact farms and Seldaswere implemented.
1. Comparative acceptability of different compact-farm features
Studies done by LalP3 and LimTM provide us with inte-
resting data on farmers' perception of attitudes toward, and
practice of, different compact farm features.Table 3.3 shows
that in CamarinesSur, even contiguity of farms hasnot been
complied with as envisioned, with lessthan one-fourth of
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members in three municipalities reporting adjacent holdings.
Less than three-fourth live in the same barangay. Of the pro-
duction processes, cooperative transplanting and harvesting
were mentioned by less than one-fourth of farmer-members.
Preparing land and buying fertilizer cooperatively have like-
wise been minimally practiced. Marketing produe,ai_oopera-
tively has hardly been done and pooling of land for common
cultivation was never attempted. However, everyone utilized
credit from banks. This is one feature that every compact
farm member followed.
The experience in Capiz is shown in Tables 3.4 and 3.5.
In terms of perceptions or what farmers think about some
aspects of compact farming, they recognize most of all,the
importance of right of recourse, group action, savings and
TABLE 3.3
STATUS OF COMPACT FARMS AS PRODUCTION UNITS
(CAMARINES SUR, 1974)
CompactFarmMunicipalities
Bula Librnanan Nabua
N=60 N=120 N=60
(In Percent)
1. Haveadjacentlandholdings 40 13 27
2. Livein the samebarangay 80 72 67
3. Utilize credit from banks
commonly 100 100 100
4. Buy fertilizerscooperatively 7 3 11
5. Preparelandcooperatively 2 5 9
6. Transplantseedscooperatively 15 21 "14
7. Harvestcrop cooperatively 22 28 5
8. Market producecooperatively 0 2 3
9. Pool the land for common
cultivation 0 0 0
Source: Vidya Sagar Lall, Diffusion of IR.26 Rice Variety in Compact and
Non.Compact Farms in Camarines Sur, Philippines,UnpublishedPh.D.
Dissertation,UP at LosBanos,June1975.
capital generation. Single management of farm and adoption
of modern farming technology were also positively regarded.
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So was pooling of labor and capital resourcealthough the lat-
ter was much lessappreciated.Negatively assessedby the ma-
jority was pro-rata sharing of input and produce and most
negative of all was the joint and several liability on the loan.
And this was regardedasthe essential.feature,of the compact
fawn lending scheme!
Translatingthe perception scoresinto qualitative state-
ments, we can say that the compact farm members in Mam-
buseo,Capiz believethat:
1) It is necessary for compact _farm members to adopt a
right of recourseagainsterring members.
2) Group action will be effective in developing among far-
mers the spirit of cooperation and social responsibility.
3) It is beneficial for farmers to put up a savingsand capital
generationprogram.
4) Single managementwill be efficient as far as planningand
programmingof farm operationsisconcerned.
5) Adoption of approved farm technology will slightly in-
crease farmers' production.
6) Pooling of capital and labor will slightly complicate the
planningand programmingof farm operations.
7) It is slightly unfair to base the sharingof inputs and pro-
duce on the proportion of the size of the farm to the
total aggregatearea of the compact farm.
8) Farmers will be unwilling to becomejointly and severally
liable for eachother's loans.
As seen in Table 3:4, there is a very close relationship between
farmers' perceptions of and attitudes toward aspectsof the compact
farrfi. For example, becausethey consider right of recourseagainst
erring members necessary,they also have a very favorable attitude
toward this particular aspect.They believethat "a right of recourse
adopted by any organization servesas a guide for membersto be in
keeping with the discipline needed in the organization" and that it
"teaches the farmer-membersto be upright and fair in their deal-
ingswith other members". On the other hand, they believethat far-
merswill be unwilling to becomejointly and severallyliable for each
other's loans.Consequently,more than 85 percent of them are not in
favor of this practice. As far as they are concerned, "Joint and sev-
eral liability for a loan motivatesdelinquent membersto neglecttheir
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loan." Furthermore, "a farmer could hardly pay his own loan, henc_
he must not be made responsiblefor others' loans."
In terms of actual experiencewith thesedifferent aspectsof com-
pact farming, the adoption of modern farming technology was the
most satisfying, followed by the savingsand capital generation pro
gram, right of recourseand group action. Single management, pool-
ing of labor and capital and pro-rata sharingof input and produce
were the features least experienced. They had hardly been imple-
mented by the farmer groups. As expected, becauseof previously
cited findings, joint and several liability on loan gavethem the most
unsatisfyingexperience. On the basisof data from Tables 3.4 and
3.5, we can infer that farmersdo not regard singlemanagementof
farm, pooling of labor and capital, pro-ratasharingof input and pro-
duce, and joint liability on loans as group action. This inference
comes from the fact that while group action is positively perceived
and favored and satisfactorily experienced, the activities just men-
tioned have not been as positively perceived, favored and were least
practiced. In the caseof joint liability, it had been tried but the ex-
perience had been mostly unsatisfying.Perhaps,farmershavea limit-
ed definition of what constitutesgroup action.
Lim's study which employed personal observations in addition
to the more formal survey lendsmore insightsinto the dynamicsof
compact farm implementation. From her field notes, sheobserved
the following:
a) Active participation by the membersin mostof the activities
mentioned was observed only during the initial stagesof the
program, after which and up to the time of the survey,these
activitiesdid not seemto be in operation anymore.
b) Group action took the form of "bayanihan" (mutual help)
participation in land preparation, transplanting, weeding
and other farm chores and was also observed in the con-
struction of the tractor shed, irrigation canals, the compact
farm office and other minor activities such asattendance in
group meetings and decision-making in dealing with delin-
quent members.
c) Group marketing of produce was tried by the farmers but
was discontinued due to some unpleasant experiences in
pricing, complicated requirementsprescribedby the National
Grains Authority, and disagreements among the farmers
themselves.
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d) The modern farm technology adopted were the use of new
rice seeds,fertilizers, irrigation water, pesticides,herbicides,
insecticides,and the useof the tractor.
e) The true concept of single managementof farm, i.e., placing
the production cycle from seedselectionto harvestingunder
one managementwhich is responsiblefor the planning, direc-
tion, and control of all activities was not practiced in the
compact farms studied. Only the farm plan and budget part
of single managementwas in operation. However, it was re-
ported that this activity was done mostly by the technician
as a basisfor determining credit requirement. It was evident
that it was only when obtaining loans that the members ac-
tively participated as a group. The most frequently mention-
ed reasonsfor joining the compact farm were availability of
low interest loans and farm supplies; and desire to increase
production, learn modern methodsof farming and availabilio
ty of technical assistance.Whether or not they would go on
as members depended on the continuing availability of the
advantagesof credit, efficient farm management, technical
assistanceand desireto increaseproduction. Only one farmer
mentioned a group-oriented reasonsuch as desire to work
with the group as his motive for joining the compact farm.
However, one reasoncited for wanting to go on asa member
was the pleasant company of other members. Disagreement
among members, inefficient management, and compulsion
were given as reasonsfor quitting. The latter reasonmeans
that farmers do not want to be forced to purchaseunneces-
sary farm supplies,to pay loans, to become membersand be
threatenedby managementto be denied loans.
f) It was also found that the membersdid not actually put up
a suitablesavingsand capital build-up funds. Certain amounts
were deducted from them after harvestseasonfor a so-called
"administrative fund." The fund was used to defray salaries
of compact farm officials and other miscellaneousexpenses
incurred by them when these officials attended seminarsor
transacted other activities related to operations of the com-
pact farm.
g) In the right of recourse, all the farmers indicated that they
were involved in the formulation of basic policiesand regu-
CompactFarmsandSeldas 145
lations as well as in their implementation. Farmers seemed
to recognizethat the presenceof order and disciplinewases-
sential for the existenceand successof their respectivefarms.
h) Pro-rata sharing of inputs and produce and pooling of labor
and capital resourceswere no longerpracticed. Farmersfound
these very difficult to implement,because farms within the
compact farm area had variable labor and capital resources.
They also claimed that other members were lazy, non-
cooperative, negligentand irresponsiblein their work. Others
wanted to work with their respective household members
only.
i) Joint and several liability for eachother's loanswas most un-
acceptable to the members. The reasonscited for this very
unfavorable attitude were: (1) not all members could pay
their loans on time; evenfarmerswho havecompletely repaid
their loanscould not get another set cf loans from ACA. This
delayed farm operations and sometimes deprived them of
farm inputs like fertilizer, chemicals,etc.; (2) some members
were sometimes negligent of their responsibility in paying
their loans, knowing that other members would help them
so that everybody could get the next set of loans; (3) other
farmers did not necessarilyspend the loans on their farms
but on some other things not connected with their farm
operations, hence, were unable to produce enough to pay
their loans, In view of farmers' resistanceto this particular
practice, the joint liability on loans was modified in actual
operations, Members did not necessarily put up some
amounts to repay unpaid loans of their delinquent co-mem-
bers. Instead, no group member had his loan releasedunless
everyone in the group had settled hisaccount.
Lira's major conclusion from her study was that "the findings
that compact farmers group themselves only to obtain loans, after
which they tend to act individually, plus the findings of non-opera-
tion of pooled labor and capital resources,pro-rata sharingof inputs
and produce, absenceof true concept of singlemanagementof farms
due to non-consolidationand lack of contiguousnessof farms make
the compact farm program a 'theoretical' exerciseonly."
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• 2. The.productivity dimension
One important rationale for bringing together individual
growers into organized production •unitsis to improve farm
productivity. To what extent have compact farms and
Seldascontributed •toward the achi_a/ementof this objective?
Lynch, in his 1973 study of 600 Camarines Sur rice
farmerslS, did a rigorouscomparative analysisof the follow-
ing categoriesof .farmerswhich •are relevant for this review:
a) Those who belong to compact farms and those who
do not;
b) Those who belong to the Samahang Nayon and those
who do not,
c) Those who received Masagana 99 rice production
•" loansand those who did not; and
d) Those who farmed irriga_d parcels and. those who
farmed rainfed parcels.
These groupsof farmers were comparedwith respectto farm
size, harvest per hectare, and practice of modem farming
techniques.
The study• reported the following average"harvest in
cavans per hectare; compact farm-alone, 58; compact farm
plus M 99, 55; M .99 alone, 50; and neither,• 44. Although
these figures showed some advantagefor thecompact farm,
statistical tests showed no significant differences between
these yields. However, CF membership and M 99 assistance
both appear to have a positive effect on the averagesize of
harvests with compact farm membership contributing more
to this effect than M 99 loan.
TO elaborate .further, the otherfindings maybe stated
as follows: Among both CF and.non-CF members, thosewho
received M 99 assistancereported approximately the same
yields as those who.receivedno suchhelp. Among both those
who receivedand did not recei_/eM 99 assistance,CF mem-
bers reported about the same yields as-no*n-members.Length
of membership.in the compact farm alsoshowed no correla-
tion •with per hectare yields. As a matter of •fact,there was
a reverse trend - some tendency for. the most recently
recruited CF members to do better than those who joined
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earlier especially for the irrigated farms. M 99/CF farmers
have bigger parcels than others but they reported signifi-
cantly bigger per hectare yields only for rainfed but not for
irrigated parcels. Furthermore, M 99/CF farmers working
irrigated parcels are no more modern than others cultivat-
ing the same kind of riceland,except in the greater tendency
to use fertilizers (Table 3.6). However, among operators of
rainfed rice farms, M 99/CF farmers stood out asbeingmore
likely than others to usemodern farming techniques.A com-
parison of farmers belongingto the SamahangNayon and the
compact farm with thosebelongingonly to thb compact farm
revealed no important differences between the two kinds of
farmers in terms of farm size or per hectare yield. The same
is true Of farm practiceswith the one exception of modern
rice varieties, reportedly used more frequently by the former
than by the latter group of farmers.
In summary, the Lynch study found that neither com-
pact farm nor Samahang Nayon membership or both showed
any significant differences in per hectare yields. The com-
bination of M 99/CF reported bigger per hectare yields and
more use of modern farming _echniques only for rainfed but
not for irrigated parcels.
These two general conclusions may be interpreted as
follows. Because government programs such as Samahang
Nayon, compact farms and M 99 have many overlapping
functions and have proliferated with a focus on irrigated
areas, significant differences among farmers belonging to
these different groupswere not likely to be observedin terms
of productivity and adoption of modern farming techniques.
Those who are not members of the SN, the CF and M 99,
even in irrigated areas,exhibited a slightdisadvantagebut not
significantly so. However, in rainfed areaswhich havebeen of
low priority for these programs,any efforts to pay attention
to them by way of CF and/or M 99, havehad significantpay-
off. In other words, for rainfed areas, M 99/CF made a
difference. They were higher adopters of modern farming
practices and reported better yields than those rainfed
farmerswho did not participate in theseprograms.
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TABLE 3,6
SIGNIFICANCE OF DIFFERENCES OF PROPORTIONS OF RICE FARMERS USING SELECTED MODERN
VARIETIES AND TECHNIQUES, BY KIND OF RICELANG, BY RESPONDENT CLASS. AND BY M-99 LOAN
STATUS OF CULTIVATOR (Clmarlne= _Jr, 1973)
IRRIGA TED M 99 v_. RAINFED M 99 w
A w B C v¢ D Non-M 99 A v_ B C t¢D Non-M 99
1, Farmers using modern
varieties
Significance 0.05 e N,S. N,S, N,S, N.S. 0.01 a
2, F_Tner$ _Jing modern
v_ed[ng technlqu_
Significance N,S. N.S. N,S. N,S, N,S. 0,01 =
3, F#llwers _/singmodern _d-
testing techniques
SignificanCe N.S, N,S, N,S, N,S, N.S. 0.01 s
4. Farme_ ¢l=tngmodern land.
p_ra_ion _chnique_
Significance N.$. N.S. N.$. N.S. N.S. 0,01 =
5- Farmers using modern tranP
planting techniques
Signifl_Bnce N.S. N.S. N,S, N.S, N.S, 0,01 =
6. Farmers using rnod_n p_t
C_ntrO/ technlques
Significance N.S, 0,01= N,S, N,S, N,S. N,S,
7. Farmer= uling modern weed
COntrol technlques
Significance N.S, N,B, N.S. N.S. N,S, 0.05 a
8. Falw_ersusing rnodern ferTilize_
Significance N.S. N,S, O.Ola N.5. 0,01 j O_Ols
Source: Frank Lynch, Of), clt 8Whefeai;gnifisantdiffefence_¢¢urs,thevespO_nt ¢ltt/_Jrywith zbe
liar proportJoh_ _n_lrla_yA. C, (_¢M _,
Note:
A means member of C_*npact Farm and Sam&hangNayon
B member of CF but not of SN
C member of SN but not of CF
D riot rnember of either CF or SN
Lall's Camarines Sur study found higher yields per hectare for
non-compact than for compact farm members, with the latter also
incurring more farm expenditures. Torres, reporting on data from
the same province, observed that compact farms did not increase
farmer productivity andthat in most cases,farmersjoined in order to
obtain accessto official credit under group borrowing. But once the
joint credit application has been made, the group tended to disinteg-
rate.16
Montemayor's study of 5 compact farms in Nueva Ecija, Buiacan
and Iloilo and Seldas in Infanta, Quezon showed mixed remits. In
two cases;more farmers reported decreasesrather than increasesin
harvestswhile at the sametime, the costsof production have gone
up. Crop failures were attributed to typhoons. In one compact
farm in Iloilo, the yield levelsremained the samewhile farm expendi-
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tures increased. In another Iloilo case, the harvestshad markedly
gone up, The Seldasexamined in Infanta found that more than two-
thirds of the farmer-members had attained higher net farm income
than before.17
The experience of Seldas in Cotabato is is instructive because
significant yield increasesfrom an averageof 41 cavansper hectare
to 65 were reported. However, in one village (Katiku), there was a
total lossof harvest due to rat infestation. Despite this failure, Vic-
torio, the researcher estimated that "on the basisof other Seldas'
yield at 90-120 cavansper hectare, the farmers wouldhave increased
their yields by an additional 39 to 79 cavansmore." It is uselessto
calculate what might have been because it could never be. Such
calculations only create false hopes, exaggeratedexpectations and
a lot of unrepaid loans.Estimatesof profitability are always basedon
normal crop years which are rather few and far between.
Another illustration of the optimistic bias in derivingnet income
figures from farming and repayment capability isshown in Victorio's
estimates:
At anaverageyieldof 65 cavans,the farmergetsa shareof 45 onthe
70-30 sharingsystemrequiredfor membershipin the Selda.To payhis
loanof if'400perhectare,hecansell16cavans.At thecurrentprice(1971)
of 1=0.60perkilo,hewouldgetP432(atP27percavanof 45 kilos)whichis
morethanenoughto pay his debtof if'400perhectareplusaninterestof
onepercenta month.He is to pay the debtafterharvest,that is,four
monthsafterplantingplusan interestofffl6. Thishecaneasilyrepayfrom
the proceedsof IP432.His grossincomeafterloanrepaymentis!P783(29
cavansat 1P27Dercavan)parhectareorIP1,566for2 hectareshecultivates.
There are at least4 fallacies in these estimates:
1) If the farm expenseshad been taken into account, the net
income would be much lessthan lr/83 per hectare. But even
in instanceswhere suchexpanseshave beendeducted in order
to arrive at actual net returns, the productivity figures are
almost alwaysbasedon the averageyield. Aswe all know, the
average means that some farmers have lower and others
higher than the averageyield, Therefore, to use this average
figure for this computation either underestimates or over-
estimatesthe results. In real life, the averageis a myth.
2) It assumesa normal cropping season which is quite often
not the case, There are droughts, typhoons, floods, disease,
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insects and pests which disturb the normal rhythm of the
production cycle. When any of these calamities strikes, the
repercussionson production cannot be erased, The losses
haveto be assumedby someone- usually the farmer.
3) It. assumesthat farmershaveno.previousindebtednessand no
unusualexpenseswhich haveto bemet during the year.
4) It assumesthat the farmer would beable to sell at the prevail-
ing price. This is not alwaysthe casebecausequite often, the
.farmer'sproduce-hasalready been "sold" before harvesttime
- due to earlier borrowings usinghiscrop as "pledge". It isall
right if he can sell abovethe price, but if he doesit at a lower
price, then the estimate of returns is completely exaggerated..
•To Obtaina more realisticpicture of costsand returnsand farmer
viability, farm and farmers might be categorized and differentiated
as to productivity, size, location,, availability of irrigation, tenure
status including sharingarrangementor leaserental, capitaland labor
resourcesavailable,.credit utilization, family size,accessto favorable
market .price, etc. Obviously, .yield per hectare, especially average
yield, is a very inadequate and evenmisleadingbasisfor determining
economicviability and repayment capacity of a farmer.
The Pila, Laguna compact farm coveringan area ofmore than 50
hectares with 47 farmers (31 lessees.and.16 owner-operators) was
studied by Panisales.19 He found an increase in production,from 75
cavans per hectare to 109 for owner-operatorsand from 73 to 114
for Ieaseholdersduring the year 1977 to 1978.1n terms of net
returns; however,-the estimated amount accruing to the owner-
operator increasedfrom an averageof P2,125in 1977 to P3,610 in
1978. For lessees,thechange wasfrom P436 tO P1,541. This favor-
able development, however, was not beingattributed by Panisalesto
the compact, farm-per se. He thinks, that the adOptionof modern
farm technology-and water management could havehad a greater
-influence. Although the increasein net returns is very encouraging
despitethe increasein cost of production.from 1_1,424to.P2,104 for -
owner-operators and from 1_3,008 to tF3,052 for lessees,Panisales
emphasizedthat the social cost of the project hasnot been included
here. He points, out that the national government through the
National IrrigationAdministration (NIA) hasinvestedfarm level irri-
gation facilities worth 1_7,727 which so.far was only. benefiting 57
hectares and 47 farmers. On the otherhand, no investment from
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within the compact farm itself as a cooperative enterprise had been
forthcoming. He arguesthat this government investmentcould have
been diverted to other farming groupsand not given exclusivelyfor
this compact farm.
The PICRAD study2° of 30 compact farms and 91 Seldasin the
island of Panay reported that 64 percent of compact farm mem-
bers experienced an increase in net returns; 16 percent of compact
farm members experienced an increase in net returns; 16 percent
reported a decline and 20 percent, no change•from pre-compact
to compact farm operations. Among the Seldas, 58 percent of the
members reported an increase;33 percent, a decrease;and 9 percent,
no changein net returns.
A separateanalysisof what happened in Antique21 showedthat
for the Seldas, the percentage of farmers reporting favorable net
returns before and during their Selda membership did not differ
much. Whatever difference occurred was more favorable before the
Selda. This can be explained by the fact that whatever advantages
came from productivity were practically wiped out by higher costs.
More than 90 percent of the farmer-membersreported increasesin
production expensesregardlessof farm size. There was one impor-
tant development, however, which contributed to a more positive
assessmentof the situation as a whole and that is, more of the rain-
fed than the irrigated farms exhibited yield increases•regardless of
farm size. In the caseof compact farm members,all the farmershad
been able to plant two crops a year whereasbefore, only 38 percent
wereable to do so.
One very noteworthy trend with respectto findingsfrom studies
• of compact farms and Seldaswhich have been reviewed is the small
farm size of members. Except for 4 percent of compact farms sur-
veyed by Lall in CamarinesSur who had more than 5 hectaresand
there was even a farmer member who had 70 hectares, all of the
studies indicated that majority of the farmers had farms of less
than one to 3 hectares. At this point, it would be pertinent to
raise the issue of land consolidation for economies of scale as one
of the rationale behind the compact farm concept as enunciated
by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. Previousresearchesparticularly
on the social and economic aspectsof rice production have found
that smallerrice farms registeredhigher productivity per hectare than
larger farms,22 hence, one wonders how significantthis objective is
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for the compact farm. Would an enlargement of production units
constituteeconomiesof scalein thiscontext?
3. Dynamics of production loan at the micro-level
To better understand the dynamics of production loans
at the micro-level, the 1976-77 Javier study in Antique23 of-
fers insightsnot otherwise available in every quantitatively
oriented analysesof credit. The 166 Selda farmers, 33 Selda
leaders,21 compact farmers and 2 farm managerswere inter-
viewed regardingtheir loansfrom PhasesIV and V of the M
99 program. We must recall that Seldasand compact farms
were envisioned as efficient channels for credit under a
group-lendingscheme.
Since the farm managementtechnician (FMT) is the Sel-
da farmer's link with institutional credit, his availability is
crucial. For Phase IV, the ratio was one FMT for every 63
farmers, 29 with credit and 34 without; for Phase V, one
FMT for every 106 farmers, 33 with credit and 73 without.
Although 96 percent of Phase IV and 91 percent of PhaseV
farmers mentioned the FMT asthe personwho assistedthem
in obtaining the loan, 37 percent of thosewho borrowed un-
der Phase IV and 17 percent under PhaseV said their farms
were nevervisited by the FMTs at all. This would imply that
for these borrowers, the farm plan and budget as a basisfor
the loan approval was prepared and approved without the
FMTs actually seeingthe farm. The averagenumber of farm
visits by FMTs was 2 per cropping seasonand the highest
was 3 times a week. Seventy-eight percent for Phase IV and
89 percent for PhaseV said FMTs were available when their
help was needed. Majority of the farmers got their loans
from lessthan a week to two weeks and more than 90 per-
cent found banking servicesefficient. Furthermore, all the
Selda farmer-members interviewed got the full amount they
applied for.
In contrast to the Seldas, the compact farms received
considerably more intensive technical services. The ratio
of technician-to-compact farm members is one FMT from
*he Ministry of Agrarian Reform (MAR) for one Compact
_rm and one technician from the Agricultural Credit Ad-
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ministration (ACA) for one compact farm to attend to
financing and repayment. Hence, there was one MAR and
one ACA farm management technician.for 21 farmers.
The highest reported number of visits is everyday in one
croppingseasonand the lowest is 5 times in one season.The
average number of visits is 10 per farmer in one season.
When the farmers were asked whether the technician was
available when his help was needed, 95 percent said "Yes".
They got the full amount they applied for and were assisted
by ACA personnel in obtaining their loan. Although more
than half had to wait one to two months for their loan
releases, they considered banking service efficient. Ninety
percent said they were better off after than before joining
the program. They all mentioned production increasesand
the advantagesof financial and technical assistance.They
likewise attributed changesin farming methods to the com-
pact farm. Considering the intensity with which the com-
pact farms were provided technical and financing services,
positive resultscould almost be predicted. Unless, however,
there were radiation or spill-over effects to other farms,
the cost of compact farm operations is terribly high for
21 farmers. But perhaps,the high cost of effectivenessduring
the early stage can be offset by the efficiency which comes
from an accompanyingdemonstration effect which is socon-
taminating as to lead to program expansion. Evidences of
this phenomenon are, however, not available becauseall the
studies are cross-sectionalat one point in time. We need
longitudinalobservationsto trace thiseffect.
Whether for the Selda or the compact farm members,
though, bank credit was easily available. Hence,we want to
know how this modern institution proceeded at the micro
level. For purposesof comprehendingsome ramifications of
production credit and the intricacies of farm management
and credit utilization, farmer-borrowers may be categorized
into:
1) Farmers who obtained loans in proportion to their
farm size or whose loans were the actual amounts allowed,
The loan ceiling at that time wasP1,2 .(X)per hectare. What
was clearly emphasized was farm size and the amount al-
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lowed rather than amount-needed or required by a particular
farm and farmer circumstances.The Antique study showed
that 54 percent of Phase• IV farmers receivedamounts they
were entitled to as per farm size.For the next Phase,84 per-
cent did so.
2) Farmers who got less than the amount they were en-
titled to, although everyone received what they asked for,
This could mean that some applied for less than the maxi-
mum they.could have asked for. For PhaseIV, this category
was 42 percent, I:n the next phase, this was reduced to only
11 percent of the borrowers. Apparently, borrowers event-
ually catch on as far as taking advantage of .the maximum
allowable amount. .
3).. Those whose loans exceeded the loan ceiling. The
following.cases illustrate this particular category:
Amount of " Amount
Area loan allowed borrowed Excess
•3 ha. P3,600 ?'5,040 P1,440
•2/3 ha. ?" 800 ?'1,200 ?" 400
1/2ha. ?" 600 ?'1,200 • ?" 600
1/2ha. ?" 600 ?'1,800 ?'1,200
1/2ha. ?" 600 ?" 816 ?" 216
1/3ha. ?" 400 ?" 630 ?" 230
These-cases stimulate one's curiosity as to how they
came about, how these excessloans were usedand whether
they were the farmerswho had not been able to repay.
4) Those who spent more than their loan. For Phase IV,
there were 18 percent such borrowers; for PhaseV, 30 per-
cent, The lowest excessexpenditure was?'5 while the high-
est was?'590. For the,next Phase,the corresponding figures
were tD22,and P2,900. In the compact farm, there were 30
•percent such tarmers with an excessranging from ?'20 to
?'600. The respondent who usedP600 more than his loan
spent rnuch on hired labor on his one hectare farm. While
there were farmers with the same farm size who relied on
family labor for weeding, this farmer hired 10 men for 7
days. He also made useof hired labor on practically all farm
operations.
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5) Those who spent less than their loan. For Phase iV
farmers, 82 percentbelongedto this categorywhile for Phase
V, 70 percent. The great majority of them have loan left-
overs of less than PI,000. The rest have more than PI,000
with P2,086 being the highest amount. In the case of the
latter, the farmer's loan was more than the establishedloan
ceiling. He got P5,040 for his 3-hectare farm when he was
entitled to P3,600 only. Even if he borrowed P3,600, he
would still have a left-over of ff'1,440 after his expenses
worth P2,952 were deducted.
Another case is that of a farmer who had 4 hectares.
His loan of ?'2,200 was lower than the allowed loan ceiling,
but his expensestotalled only ?'1,027. There was a left-over
of P1,173. This "saving" was possible because he did not
buy seedsand for his 4-hectare farm, he bought only 6 bags
of fertilizer and ?'43 worth of chemicals even if the whole
farm was infestedwith hoppers. His production wasadversely
affected, with only 21 cavansof harvest for the whole farm.
Other loan left-oversare illustrated in the following:
Area Loan Expenses Excess
(1) 3 ha. P3,600 P2,108 ?'1,492
(2) 2 ha. P2_O0 ?'1,094 ?'1,306
(3) 2 ha. ?'1,800 ?" 656 ?'1,256
(4) 1.5 ha. ?'1,800 ?" 600 ?'1,200
(5) 1.5 ha. ?'1,800 ?'1,512 ?" 288
(6) 1.5 hs. ?'1,800 ?" 541 ?'1259
(7) 1 ha. P1,200 ?" !65 ff'1,035
(8) 1 ha. ?'1,200 ?" 190.50 ?'1,009.50
(9) 1 ha. ?'1,200 P 192 ?'1,008
(10) 1/2ha. P1,800 ?" 383 IP1,417
In the case of the tenth illustration, the loan was ex-
cessivebecause the farmer was entitled to a loan of ?'600
only. Even if the amount givenwas ?'600, there would still
be a left-overof P217 becausethe expensesamounted to only
1P383.
Reasons cited for loan left-overs were the use of less
hired labor because of available family labor; use of own
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rather than purchased certified seeds; fertilizer applied
less than prescribed amount; less or no chemicals at all
were bought; and money borrowed by someSeldamembers
is only partly usedor never used at all in farming. One Selda
leader used loan as capital for small scale businessbut the
venture failed sothe loan could not be repaid.
The cases mentioned above indicate that the same
amount borrowed even for the same farm size is spent
differently by different farmers. Naturally, these must
have produced different outputs and consequences for
the repayment potentials.
6) Those farmer-borrowers who were not really bor-
rowers. There were two farmerswhosenamesappearedin the
list of borrowersbut when interviewed, said that they did not
considerthemselvesM 99 borrowersbecausethe FMT got the
full amount they applied for. As a consequence,both of
them refused to pay the loan. There were also 3 persons
whose names appeared in the list of borrowersbut did not
get the loans they applied for. They were asked by a land-
owner for whom they usually worked as hired laborers to
sign the M 99 loan application papers. They did not know
whether the loans had been paid for or not.
7) Those Selda and Compact Farm members who did -
not get loans in cash or kind before. Almost 90 percent
of Selda members and one-third of those in the compact
farms did not get loans in cash or kind before M 99. Those
who did, borrowed such things ascashrangingfrom ff150 to
P1400 from a friend, usurer and landlord; 5 bagsof urea
from a neighbor; 3 bagsof ureafrom a usurer;6 to 30 cavans
of rice from the landlord; or P26 to P'125 from a friend,
relative or usurer.
This category of farmers shifted from a non-borrower
to borrower status in a big way. Those who.borrowed before,
did so in much smaller amounts,whether in cashor kind. We
must recognizethat for all these categoriesof borrowers, the
FMT had been responsiblefor making the loanspossible.It is
a wonder that despite the standard loan ceiling per hectare,
there is an infinite variation in the way production loans
came out. This would suggesthat there is no suchthing asa
standardfarm plan and budget.
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Of course, after the loans have been approved, released and
spent for inputs, labor, and. non-inputs comes the inevitable task
of repayment. When Selda leaders in Antique were asked about
repayment difficulties in their respective Seldas, the following
answerswere given:
(a) Poor production (16)
(b) Income from produce usedfor other purposes (9)
(c) Money intended for bank spent for next
croppingseason (4)
(d) increasein production but income all went to
hospital bills (3)
(e) Low price of palay (2)
(f) Money intended for the bank spent on:
irrigation pump installed and farm tuition
fees ( 1)
(g) Loan not usedfor farming. One Selda leader
investedit in a small scalebusinesswhich did
not work out (1)
(h) Some membersdo not seemto care about their
loan (1)
(i) Loan obtainedby one memberwasexcessive.
He declaredtwo hectareswhen heactually had
only one (1)
Obviously, poor production was the most significant reason
for repayment difficulties but one cannot ignore the range of other
reasons,some of which are "unavoidable diversions"while othersare
deliberate misapplications.Still others are worthwhile alternative uses
of money which would have otherwise been applied for repayment.
These include the installation of irrigation pump in the farm, pay-
ment of tuition fees, and the use of repayment money for next
cropping season. In other words, non-repayment of loans is not
always a negative phenomenon for the borrower although it is
certainly sofor the sourceof credit.
When the same Antique Selda farmers who did not find diffi-
culty in repayment were asked how they were able to pay their
loan, the foIIc_Ninganswerswere givenfor PhasesIV and V of M 99:
(a) Increasein production was sufficient to pay
loan and buy other necessities (24)
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(b) Gave priority to M 99 loan when the produce
wassold (9)
(C) I usually exhaustall possiblemeansto beable
to pay my debts (9)
(d) I paid my installment so I did not havedifficulty (1)
(e) I wasable to raisemoney by sellinga pig (2)
a cow ( 1)
copra ( 1)
: muscovedosugar (1)
(f) I withdrew someof my savingsfrom the bank
to be able to pay my loan (1)
(g) I paid the loan•with my salary (1)
These reasonsindicate that although increasein production is a
major reasonfor not having any difficulties in loan repayment, we
must not assumethat ability to repay meansthat the farmer had a
profitable harvest. The above-mentioned data suggest that those
who repaid gavepriority to the loans and did all they could in order
to .meet their obligations: The others used non-farm sourcesfrom
other membersof the family and somesold their other farm produce
to repay loans. The latter two groups apparently regard loansas
serious obligations from which they did not want to default and
therefore sought alternative means.•One can infer that their produc-
• tion was not sufficient to take care of farm and other expensesplus.
the loan.
4. Decision-making and operational management of compact
farms and seldas
The compact farm under a single managementconcept
was expected•to function asa channel for technicalassistance
and credit; a vehicle for group action; a medium for capital
generation and a forum for group discussion.The Selda, on
the other hand, was organizedto act asa joint liability group
for credit purposesand as a rural nucleus•for concentrated
technical training and extension assistance,collective mar-
keting, distribution of inputs, etc. If these functions are to
be carried out, these farmer groups have tobe organized and
managed in a certain manner. Instead of describing the ideal
set-up as designed and conceived, we present information
from researchon compact farms and Seldas.The intention
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is to describe actual happenings so that we can illustrate
the decision-making and management processes as they
occurred in the farmer groupsstudied. In this section, Mon-
temayor's studiesare a major source.
The Minabuyoc compact farm in Talavera, Nueva Ecija
shows different facets of its operations as a "group". This
compact farm came into being from 80 farmerswho in 1973
borrowed individually from the Rural Bank of Talavera as
M 99 members. Due to crop failure, 50 percent were unable
to repay their loans. Soon after, the Agrarian Reform FMT
was assignedto organize a compact farm in Talavera. After
three organizational meetings,the compact farm was created
in April 1974 with 53 members, only three of whom had
undergone a pre-membership training. By 1975, there were
70 members divided into 10 groups, cultivating a total of
152 hectares. Seventy percent lived within the barrio while
the rest were in another barrio but in the samemunicipality.
There were no regular meetings and only three had been
held over a one-yearperiod.
The functions performed by the FMT and the compact
farm officers are describedin these excerpts from the Mon-
temayor study:24
The main sourcesof outside information for the CF are
government agencies such as the Integrated Development
Program for Nueva Ecija (IDP - NE), the ACA and the DAR.
The latter, through the FMT, relays the messageto the MCF
through its President. The latter, in turn, calls for the Secre-
tary-Treasurer, who is his brother, and requestshim to Call
for other officers for a meeting. The group leadersconvey
the messageto the members. Whenevernecessary,members
are also invited to the meetings. The MCF President is also
the Barangay Chairman. The Secretary-Treasurer is also
the Barangay Treasurer. The Vice President who is the
brother of the DAR FMT is also a Barangaycouncilman and
so are two of the group leaders.There is, therefore, a great
deal of overlap between the MCF and the BarangayCouncil.
The Presidentpresidesover meetings, follows up loan papers
of the members and sometimes contracts buyers for mem-
bers' produce.
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The other personswho influence decision-makingin the
operations of the compact farm are the DAR FMT, the DAR
Team Leader,and the ACA Credit Officer. The FMT prepares
the farm plan and budgetby groupsand a group loan applica-
tion is made. This is submittedto the Agricultural Credit Of-
ricer (ACO) together with the Joint PromissoryNote, Farm-
ers' data, farm plan and budget. The ACO decides when and
how much of the loanswill be released.After approval and
audit, the cashier prepares the checks. The ACO receives
them and handsthem over to the FMT or the President.The
latter, through the Secretary, calls for a meeting of all the
members to distribute the checks for individual signatures.
After signing,the membersreturn the checksto the President
to be givento the FMT. Upon receipt of the signedchecks,
the FMT and the President encash the checks at the PNB
Branch. The President takes charge of purchasing the farm
inputs for distribution to the members. CF membersdecide
on the manner of loan repayment (whether individually or in
groups). The ACO determines when and how much of the
loan will be paid. Of the 6 percent interest,4 percentgoesto
ACA and one percent servesas incentivefor the FMT and the
President. In case of crop damage, the FMT certifies. For a
40 percent damage, 60 percent of the loans must be paid
after 6 months.
The FMT and group leadersdecidewhen, what type and
how many sacksof seedsto produce. Then the FMT pur-
chasesthe seedsfrom the Maligaya Rice Researchand Train-
ing Center. The group leadersand the FMT also determine
when to purchase small farm equipment like sprayers,the
type and number to be bought. The FMT purchasesthe knap-
sack type sprayersat the Del Rosario Farm Supply. For fer-
tilizers and chemicals,the group leadersand FMT choosethe
type, amount, and place to purchasethem. The FMT pur-
chasesthem from the same supplier. Upon delivery of farm
inputs, the President calls for the group leaderswho are in
chargeof distributing them to their respectivemembers.
Group members decide when and how=to prepare the
land. FMT and group leadersdecideon datesof sowing,type
of seedling,varieties to be planted, and date of transplanting.
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Officers andgroup leadersrecommendthe particular planters'
group to be hired and this is appointed by the Presidentwith
the approval of the members.Weeding,harvesting,threshing,
and milling decisionsare made by individual members. Each
member, in consultation with the NIA ditchtender, decides
on when to irrigate and how muchwater to use.Marketing is
done individually. If there is a negd to construct irrigation
canals or to repair dikes in the area, decisionson when to
start and whom to involve in such activities come from the
District Engineer of the NIA. By rotation, the barrio people
are usually hired by NIA as laborersand are paid on a daily
basis.
In the Banga-Tabang Demonstration Compact Farm in
Plaridel, Bulacan, the decision-makingpatterns are similar to
the one in Minabuyok but the Tagsing-BuyoCF in Sta. Bar-
bara, Iloilo which had 35 members at the time of study was
run by a management committee. This committee is com-
posed of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, Secretary-Treasurer,
inspector-Collector, Auditor and production technician,
2 farm managersand 2 assistantfarm managers.The positions
of farm manager and production technician are occupied by
one and the same person, a technician from the Bureau of
Plant Industry. It must be noted that only one assistantfarm
manager, the auditor, and the inspector collector are mere-
bers of the compact farm. However, most of them haverela-
tives who are members.The ManagementCommittee directs,
controls, and supervisesthe major farming activities. It de-
cides matters .regardingthe purchase of inputs, land prepara-
tion, planting, transplanting, application of fertilizers and
chemicals, weeding, irrigation, harvestingand milling. Hiring
laborers needed in the compact farm is decided by the man-
agernent committee also with the help of the farm manager
and the production technicians.Non-members may be hired
to work within the CF, most of whom are either friends or
relatives of members. These hired laborersare paid on a daily
basis,in cash,from common funds of the Association.
The Iloilo Compact Farmers'Associationalsohada man-
agement committee but decision-makingis influenced to a
large degreeby the Vice-Chairman who hasa numberof rela-
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tives in the Associationand who is in close contact with the
Agrarian Reform. personnel. The Chairman who is a close
friend of the Vice-Chairman plays the role of a formal figure-
head. The Vice-Chairman is effectively the group's leader.
The management committee, after consultation with the
members and with the technicians, formulates a farm plan
and budget, taking into account the variety to be planted,
water, supervision, land preparation, transplanting, fertiliza-
tion, weedingand pest controll It also formulates a .planfor
the storage,.drying, sack procurement, delivery, milling and
marketing of members' produce. Each member is obliged to
contribute to .the labor pool. Members and their family can
..work in farms of other members and.receive a daily wage
based on. prevailing rates. In general, farming operatioQs.
jointly .performed by:membersinclude: plowing, harrowing,
•seedbed preparation, planting, harvesting,and threshing. On
the other hand, fertilizer application, weeding, and spraying
are performed individually with the help of householdmere-
bers. Am0ng.the problems cited by this CF is insufficiency
Of irrigation water which means that not all members'farms
are irrigated and some harvesttwice while others only once
a year. Since pr0-rata sharing of net harvest is done solely
on the basisof land area contributed to the CF without tak-
ing into account the productivity of the land, there is pres-
sure on .those with irrigated farms to revert to individual
production while maintainingjoint financing operations.
The General Ricarte Farmers' Multipurpose Cooperatives
Association which is consideredas patterned after the Israel
"Moshav" had.3 officers.(President,Secretary-Treasurer,and
warehousewoman) and 5 membersof the Boardof Directors.
Information comes to this Association from the Integrated
Development Program of Nueva Ecija (IDP-NE) which relays
informationrelevant to the. implementation of policiesand
guidelines; Department of Local Government and Commu-
nity Development, regarding Cooperative operations and
continuing education of members; Department of Agrarian
Reform on the inputs needed and farming problems of the
cooperative (pests and diseases and land reparcellation);
Agricultural Credit Administration on loan operations;Na-
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tional Irrigation Administration - Upper Pampanga River
Project, on irrigation matters, and the Israeili consultants,
on day to day operations.Members submit loan applications
to the cooperative. These are submitted to ACA by the Trea-
surer, the President and one of the Israeli consultants.Upon
approyal, the loan isreleasedin the form of a check. Endorse-
ment by the president, treasurer, and either of the Israeli
consultants is required before the check is cashed. The
DLGCD technician with the officers determine who should
get a loan,the amount and when. Members get their I()ans
from the cooperative in groups. Just like other compact
farms, the FMT decideson inputs. As a matter of fact, these
are purchased by the FMT and the Secretary-Treasurer.
Farming activities are performed jointly but harvesting,
threshing and milling are individually decided and hired
laborersare used. After harvest,individual membersturn o,
their produce to the cooperative.
From the description of 5 compact farms, the following pattew
of organization, decision-makingand managementemerge:
a) There was evidence that one of the reasonsfor organizing
compact farms is to improve loan repayment after unfortu-
nate previous experiences of poor collections. There was
hardly any training either before or during membership.
There were also few group meetings. It is obvious that the
initiatives for the organization of compact farms and Seldas
did not come from farmers. The desireto facilitate the opera-
tions of the sponsoringagencieswas the more predominant
motivation.
b) Communication channelswere well-structured from the top-
down (from government agenciesto farmers) but very un-
clear and minimally existent from the farmers upward to
upper-leveldecision-makers.Only the FMT served asthe link
between farmers and agencies. A classicillustration of the
downward flow of information is evident in this description
which is repeated here for emphasis:
Informationcomesto thisAssociationfromthe IntegratedDevel-
opmentProgramof NuevaEcijawhichrelaysinformationrelevanto
the implementationof policiesandguidelines;Departmentof Local
Governmentand Community Development,regardingcooperative
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operationsand continuingeducationof members;Departmentof
AgrarianReformon the inputsneededandfarmingproblemsof the
cooperative(pestsand diseasesand land reparcellation),on loan
operations;National IrrigationAdministration- Upper Pampanga
River Project;on irrigationmatters,and the Israeliconsultantson
day-to-dayoperations.
One can deduce from this description that a whole bureaucra-
tic system governsthe operations of thesefarmerswho usedto deal
mainly with the landlord. Perhaps the bureacracy has replacedthe
landlord as the patron. It is pertinent to ask the question: Is the
bureaucracy more concernedwith the farmer's lot than the landlord
was in the past?
c) Decision-makingfor and in behalf of farmers liesin the hands
of a few people, namely, the FMT, the credit officer, the
Farm Manager or President of the association.Practically all
the power rests with the FMT who is responsiblefor farm
plan and budget, loan application, amount, time of release,
encashingchecks,and purchaseof farm inputs or selectionof
dealer whom to patronize. He even certifies crop damage to
restructure loansor obtain "grace" from different agencies.
d) There was not much evidence that these functions of farm
planning, budgeting, credit managementwere being taught
or transferredto members.
A look at the labor sourcesfor the 5 compact farms studied by
Montemayor reveals no evidence of truly pooled labor. At most,
there was some centralized hiring, and somegroup labor (bayanihan)
in certain farming operations. For example, in the Talavera CF, land
preparation, sowing, weeding, fertilizer and insecticideapplications
were performed by the group and their householdmembers. Trans-
planting, harvesting and threshing were hired out for pay either in
cashor kind. There were two groupsof riceplanters- the Barangay
composed of 40 members whose cabesilya (team leader) was ap-
pointed by the Barangay Council, and the CF rice planters group
made up of wives, children, nephews, nieces, and grandchildrenof
CF members. Their leader is appointed by the President with the
approval of members. For harvestingand threshing,individualmem-
bers decide when and whom to involve. If threshing is done mecha-
nically, members decide individually whose thresher tO patronize.
Group membersand their householdmemberspile the harvestedrice
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and transport them to areas accessibleto the thresher. All milling
decisionsare macleby the individual members.
In Plariclel, all the farming activities are performed by farmers
themselves with the help of household members and hired agricul-
tural laborers who are mostly friends, relativesand neighbors. If land
preparation is mechanized, CF officers decide whose tractor to hire.
Members join hands with NIA FMT in repairing dikes damaged by
floods. In Sta. Barbara, Iloilo, the management committee decides
on the hiring of labor with the help of the farm managerand the
production technician.
The highest degree of jointnessin farming activitieswasreported
in Oton, Iloilo. Planningand harrowingare generallydone by the use
of a tractor owned by the Association. Members hire the tractor at
a per hectare rate. Members whose landholdings are contiguous
usually prepare a common seedbed jointly. Pulling of seedlings is
likewise performed jointly by members and their household. Trans-
planting is similarly carried out. in case of labor shortage,the man-
agement committee brings over outside labor. Fertilizer application
and sprayingof insecticidesare done individually. Weedingis usually
a family affair and requiresno outside help. Harvestingcum thresh-
ing is done jointly with other group members. Some farmers lend
work animalsand farm tools to CF membersfree of charge.
Montemayor's study also included seldas in Infanta, Quezon.
Becausethese seldaswere an offshoot of FMTs, havingattended the
extensive training on rice production at the IRRI to ensureeffective
implementation of the M 99 program, the objectives of the seldas
were specificallyenunciatedas follows:
a) To group the farmers to facilitate the extension of technical
and financial assistance;
b) To help the farmer cooperators improvetheir production per
unit area through the implementation of advanced techno-
logy on farming;
c) To maximize the implementation of the program and the
profitability of the land includedin the selda.
Except for the loan application in which farmers and their co-
makers sign a prom[_ory note to the effect that they bind them-
selvesjointly and severally, all activities of the seldasare carried out
individually. The promissory note which is collectively accomplished
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by the members is done under the guidance of the FMT. It is di_
heartening that in this study, 71 percent of the membersnever at-
tend the selda meetings; 27 percent seldom attend and only 2 per-
cent attend regularly. However, the FMT preparesthe farm plan and
budget in•coordination with the bank; He also determineswhen and
how much loan can be obtained. Decisionson the type, quantity,
when and where to purchaseinputsother thanseeds are madeby the
FMT. Members individually purchase their farm inputs. Those who
are being finance by the Philippine National Bank in Siniloan, La-
guna have their own dealer of fertilizers•and other •materialsneeded
by them; Thesedealers,however,are recommendedby the FMTs. For
most of the production processes,hired labor is generally used.
However; in some cases,the selda members and their families per-
form the chores.The role of the selda leader is not mentioned at all
except to say that "each selda is composed of not lessthan 5 mem-
bers,one of whom isdesignatedas the titular head of the group."
This lack of an active role for the selda leader is probably an
indication of the absenceof groupness in the selda.Where 71 per-
cent of members have never attended meetings, there could not be
much of a group. As mentioned earlier, in the PICRAD study in
Panay:"... in the seldas,the team leader is in many casesa figure
head. In fact, in modified Seldas, he may be non-existent". In the
Antique study, it was reported that "farmers do not know their
Selda leadersor evenother Seldamembers".•
Panisales,in his report•on Pila, saidthat members were made to
understand that the labor requirements of the compact farm shall
be provided not by outsiders,but as much as possible,by the farm-
ers themselvesor their immediate householdmembers.At the time
the study was done, he found no significant evidencethat the labor
requirementsin the compact farm had been suppliedby either lessees
or owner-operators and their family members. •There is a heavy
dependenceon labor force from outside the compact farm as sup-
ported by the high costs of hired labor. Only about 6.5 percent of
total labor cost is accounted for by family and farmer labor. Fur-
thermore,Panisales arguesthat insteadof absorbingfamily labor and
other agricultural laborers,mechanization is being introduced in the
area which could displacelabor.25
Panisalesconcludesthat "the current managementschemein the
compact farm is heavily guided by the external operator, i.e., the
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government extension worker. Thus, we can call it aguidedmanage-
ment scheme. In the beginning, this scheme seems encouraging but
at the end, as what has happened in the past when the government
tried to pull out, the clientele farmer could not stand anymore. As
usual, a babying strategy like this one will only produce a spoiled
brat who could not walk alone by himself without any external as-
sistance. Hence, it would be inimical to the present government
policy of liberating farmers from the shackles of poverty and ulti-
mately making them independent and self-reliant".
Regarding the savings and capital formation programs of the Pila
compact farm, Panisales found that it was attached to another farm
organization - the Samahang Nayon by contributing to the latter's
Barrio Savings Fund, Barrio Guarantee Fund as well as other contri-
butions. The identiW and independence of the CF operations will
be very much affected because the savings program is entrusted to
another management on the assumption that the members of the CF
are also members of the Samahang Nayon.
In an analysis of the compact farm, Hunt has this story to tell in
excerpts from this brief case study: 26
The compactfarm format appearedto offer everythingwhich agricul-
tural operations required: credit, expert extension, labor irrigation and
proximity to market. In addition, all fees were supposedlyscaledto
farmers"ability to pay... The actual operation, however, proved con-
siderably lessidyllic than had been envisioned.While'the credit resources
were generous,the funds invariablyarrived later and farmerseither had to
plant after the optimum time or make arrangementswith private money-
lenders... Irrigationwas a great boom to thosefarmersliving closeto the
source, but farmers farther down the line reported scanty supplies.The
river dried up during the summermonths so only thosefarmerswho had
deep wells on their property had irrigation at this time. The allocationof
laborby the managerran into difficulties.... i.e., frequently a farmerwas
told to work elsewhereon the compactfarm when he felt that his own
landneededhis attention...
The repaymentof loansproved a sourceof dissension.Through a ra-
ther complicated procedure, the entire compactfarm was responsiblefor
the loansof each individualmember.Thus, a farmer couldeasilyfeel that
the rewardsof his labor were goingto repay the loanwhich someoneelse
had failed to take care of due to lazinessand carelessnes¢As a resultof
thesedifficulties, membershipin the compactfarm droPPedfrom 73 mem-
bers in 1973 to 35 in 1974, 34 in 1975 and 28 in 1976. Memberswho
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withdrew lost access to credit through the compact farms and had to pay
a flat fee for the use of water or for the use of equipment owned by the
farm. Some of the members exprec6ed dissatisfaction with the manage-
ment and rec=nted being held responsible for the debts of others. Others
were dissatisfied because they felt they had not received their fair share of
irrigation; some pulled out because they had changed their major crops
and felt that compact farm was mainly interested in rice and corn cultiva-
tion...
A fairly drastic type of reorganization resulted from the withdrawal
of more than half of the members. First, the manager no longer allocated
labor; instead, he negotiated between farmers and the various technical
services as well as settled disputes among farmers within the compact
farm... Still another major change was that profits were no longer divided
on the basis of the total income of the compact farm and each farmer re-
ceived the proceeds from his own land. , . Thus, in 3 years time, this par-
ticular compact farm lost nearly two-thirds of its members and moved
from collective decision-making and rewards to a more individualistic
format...
There are two alternatives open to the Philippines and other countries
that have decided that landlordism must go but are still concerned about the
consequences of an uneconomic fragmentation of land as a result of land re-
form. One alternative is to do everything that they can to make compact
farms or some other form of cooperative farming work. This type of pro-
cedure assumes that failures in cooperative farming have come about be-
cause of the lack of technical sophistication or perhaps of cultural insight,
of government planners...
• There is another approach and this is based on the assumption that
the major difficulty in cooperative farms is the basic individualism of the
peasant. The peasant does not like to be under the dictation of a supposedly
sophisticated !supervisor nor does he like to be yolked to his fellows in some
kind of joint endeavor. This may be simply because he dislikes to adapt
his own rhythm to that of either hired management or group consensus.
It may also be that the supervisor is not always wise and his fellow farmers
are not always reliable, Therefore, he feels that his best prospect for success
is through a system in which he reaps the rewards of hisown labor and makes
his own decisions. However• misguided this feeling may be, it is certainly
possible to understand.
If one accepts this feeling, then the question is how we can provide
needed services while maintaining a nation of independent small farmers.
Perhaps the best suggestion is that every provision of serviceshould make as
little regimentation of the rural community as possible and should rely on
voluntary efforts and the private market to the greatest possible degree.
Some of the possible lines of action to aid small farmers may be observed
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in considerationof methodsof providingirrigation, technicaladvice,ma-
chineryandcredit.
After examining the operations of 5 compact farms and several
Seldas, Montemayor arrives at the following conclusions:
The only joint activity commonto the groupsstudied,relatesto loan-
ing from institutional sources(e.g. ACA and Rural Banks)... It would
seem that forming into a group is principally motivated bY the desireto
take a loan inasmuchas suchgroup formation is a necessaryand sufficient
condition for obtaininga loan. The membersassociatethemselveswith one
another in order to borrow money. Once money is made available,the
group memberstend to act individually.Pakikisama (trying to get along
with each another) becomesa double-edgadsword. It helpsform a group
of like-minded individualsaiming at a certain short-termgoal, e.g., bor-
rowing moneyor increasingproduction.Oncethe goalsareattained,kenya-
kenya (lat-the-devil-get-the-hindmostindividualism)getsthe upper hand. It
would seemthat group unity is not a highly valuedend in itself but only a
means to a further end. Under circumstancesperceived as typified by
scarcity,poverty and deprivation, individualsurvivalwould seemto be pos-
sible only by taking advantageor by convenientlyignoringthe interestof
others. , , In times of crisiswhen group unity becomesa condition for
individualsecurity,the bayanihan spirit pervades.It would seemnecessary
therefore either to maintain a perpetual state of crisisor (what amounts
to the samething) to focustheir attentionon the crisisconfrontingthem --
whateverthey may be...
The power, kinship and communication structures internal to the
group as well as the external linkagesof each groupmay be expressedin
terms of patron_clientrelationships.As traditional forms of suchrelation-
ships (e.g. landlord-tenant relationships)disappear,new formsarise.These
new patron-clientrelationshipsmay be seen in the dispensingof new and
moderntechnology... Developmentprogramsin the New Societyalthough
not completelyeradicatingvertical relationshipshelp strengthenhorizontal
ties. If institutionalized, these horizontal ties can transform patron-client
relationshipsinto bondsof inter<lependence...Masagana99 and Operation
Land Transfertend to discouragecooperationto the extent that beneficia-
ries to these programsas suchcan fend for themselves.Operation Land
Transfer cannot be realizedfrom the farmer's standpoint,of course,unless
he joins the SamahangNayon. However,many do not want to join the
SamahangNayon, although they want to hold on to their landholding...
The existing modesof production,credit and marketingmake of farmers'
groupsfrom others'viewpoint assourceof profit. For instance,ACA views
compact farms asits productivearm, enablingit to recoverloansfrom FA-
COMAS. Credit and marketing institutions relate themselvesas patrons
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vis-_-v,isthe farmersasclients.The.trend thereforeis for theseinstitutions
to operateascorporationsrather thancooperativeswith respectto compact
farms. Ultimately, giventhe existingcorporation-wpeof operations,credit,
dealers and marketing institutions as well as governmenttechniciansto
some extent profit from compact farm¢ Farmers'groupsare treatedmore
asclientsthan partners.
E. Some Farmer Assessment of Compact Farm and Selda Activities
Table 3.7 and other data from the PICRAD study enable us to
look at some characteristics of these two farmer groups and how
members assesssome of their activities, Several observations may be
made from these data, to wit:
Majority of the compact farms have 11 to 30 members while
practically all the Seldas have less than 10. The most outstanding
observation is that all the membersborrowed money, with about 90
percent of compact farm members obtaining loans from ACA and
FACOMA and practically all Selda members using Rural Banks and
PNB. Majority of the Seldas borrowed less than P1,000 while CF
farmers have about half obtaining loans worth more than PI,000 up
to P5,000. Repayment rates (ratio between amount paid and amount
borrowed) were only about 70 percent for the four provinces, with
Aklan registering the lowest rate of repayment for both compact
farms and Seldas. Aklan also reported the lowest rating from techni-
cal services received. For Panay as a whole, 62 percent of CF mem-
bers and 74 percent of Selda members gave low ratings to technical
services. This means farmers' assessment of extension services pro-
vided by the technician which includes answers to such questions
as to whether the FMT was present when his help was needed; whe-
ther he was able to meet the needs in the farm; and whether farmers
trusted or doubted farm information given to them. Apparently,
even if there was a favorable technician-farmer ratio, their technical
services were not very satisfactory. Furthermore, frequency of tech-
nician visit does not have an independent effect on repayment. The
PICRAD study found that:
(1) High frequency of technician visit led to higher repayment
under conditions of high sharinq in farm knowledcle with
technician and higher degree of farmer's satisfaction with
technical services as' well as total farmer's association. This
was true for both compact farms and Seldas.
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TABLE 3.7
CHARACTERISTICS OF PANAY COMPACT FARMS AND SELDAS AND
ASSESSMENTOF SOME ACTIVITIES (1976), 358 SELDA FARMERS
AND 91 SELDA LEADERS. 226 COMPACT FARM MEMBERSAND
30 FARM MANAGERS
Compact Farms Se/das
(in Percent)
1, Size of the organization (number
of members)
a) 1 - 10 - 99.5
b) 11 - 20 57.5 0.5
c) 21 - 30 17.0 -
d) 31 - 40 12.8 -
e) 41 -_50 10.6 --
f) 51 - 60 2.1 -
100.0 100.0
2. Sourcesof credit
a) ACA and FACOMA 88.9 5.6
b) RuralBanksandPNB 0.0 92.5
c) PrivateBanks 0.9 1.9
d) Privatemoney lenders 0.2 -
100.0 100.0
3. Amount borrowed
Below1D1,000 15.0 61.0
P1,001 - _'5,000 _5.0 38.0
1)5,001 - I_10,000 2.6 0.7
Did not knowor would not
report amount. 7.4 0.3
)O.O 100.0
4. Rating of technical _ervicesreceived*
Low _2.1 73.5
High 37.9 26.5
5. Repayment rates (ratio betweenamou
paid andamountborrowed)* 39.7 69.6
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6. AssesSmentof formal organizational
functioning
Poor 46.4 48.9
Fair 47.6 46.4
Good 7.0 4.7
7. Assessmentof informal organization
Low 21.1 26.8
Medium 38.8 34.9
High 40.1 38.3
8. Estimated trend in net returns
• asa result of the Program
Decrease 16.3 32,7
Increase 63.9 58.1
No chanqe 19.8 11,2
9. Distribution of irrigated and
rainfed farms
Irrigated 65.2 41.1
Rainfed 34.8 58.9
10. Changesin farm labor utilization
a) Family labor
Nochange 43.6 44.4
Decrease 11.5 19,1
Increase 1.8 4.1
Not utilized 43.1 32,4
b) Hired labdr
No change 52.9 38.3
Decrease 26,4 25.4
Increase 2.6 3.3
Not utilized 18.1 33,0
• c) Exchangelabororbayanihan
No change 3.5 2.8
Decrease 2.2 1.1
Increase 1,3 0.8
Not utilized 93.0 92.3
*Note: The ratingsgivenby the 4 provincesare asfollows:
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-_ Aklan Antique Capiz Iloilo
CmnpactFanns _
Low 89.6 9.5 79.5 40.0
High ..... 10.4,_'-="90,5 ._21_5 60.0
Repaymentrate 30.8 82.9 86.4 78.7
Seldas .' . ;
..... 7,
Low 74.1 '67.4 I_ '_ 66.7
High 25.9 33.6 13.9 33.3
Repaymentrate 42.0 85.1 77.4 73.7
Source:PanayIslandConsortiumfor RuralandAgriculturalDevelopment,"An
Evaluationof CompactFarmsandSeldasasChannelsfor Improving
Credit Repaymentin Panay,"CentralPhilippineUniversity,Iloilo
City,1977.
(2) Frequency of technician visits led to higher repayment
under conditions of high net returns per hectare and the
following indicatorsof farmer satisfaction:
a) highsatisfactionwith technician
b) a positiveassessmentof his life situation
c) highsatisfactionwith irrigationfacilities
d) occurrence of change in farm practices associatedwith
the program
e) acknowledgment of the change in farming practices as
due to the team leader
f) total satisfactionwith the program
Both thesefindingssuggesthat frequent technicianvisit by itself
does not lead to loan repayment, There are many interveningfactors
which either soften or strengthen the effect of the FMT. A whole
series of positive cimumstances must accompany or must be asso-
ciated with technician visits for theseto havean effect on farmer's
repayment behavior. Hence,evenif the FMT visitsfrequently but the
farmer does not acquire farming information which leadsto changes
in farm practicesand high net returns,which in turn improvehis life
situation, frequent technicianvisit will not result in repayment. What
the PICRAD and other studies did not examine is the FMT's new
role in credit as a representativeof the bank vis-it-vishis usual role
as an agricultural extension - farm managementtechnician. How do
these two roles harmonize, conflict, complement or reinforce each
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other? Consideringthe additional incentivesgiven to te FMT in his
credit role, is it possiblethat the traditional FMT role had beensalc-
rificed in favor of the former? Besidesthe monetary incentive,there
is a great deal of power attached to the "credit" role and it iseasy,
almost natural, for the situation to deteriorate into a patron-client
relationshipbetween the FMT and the farmer becausethe technician
hasaccessand evenactualControl over resourcesthe farmer needs In
addition, this position makesthe FMT very vulnerableto the tempta-
tions offered by suchan accessto valued resourcesparticularly when
farmers the intended beneficiaries- are not as sophisticatedand
wiseto the intricacies of the modern world especially institutional
credit.
Table 3.7 shows a not-so-favorable assessmentof the CF and
Selda formal organizational functioning only 7 to 5 percent,respec-
tively, rating it as good; almost half said fair and lessthan half said
poor. The informal organizational aspects were more positively
viewed. These include such things as sharing in non-farm activities
like borrowing/lending household supplies, equipment, petty cash
or helpingduring festivities and calamities;sharingof farm informao
tion with the technician and within the group. About 40 percentof
both groups gavea highrating to these non-formal group activities.
This is quite a contrast to the poor rating of the formal organiza-
tional aspectsof thesefarmer groups. It is entirely possiblethat the
sharing in non-farm activities and farm information with the techni-
cian and among members have been strengthened by the fact that
the groupshave been organized. More than 80 percent of the mem-
bers also indicated changes in farm practices since they joined CF
and Seldas.
On the net returns from the farm, 64 percent of the CF farms
and 58 percent of the Selda farmers reported an increasewith more
of the CF farmers reporting an increase.About a third of the Selda
farms registered a decrease in net returns. They rated technical
services,formal and informal organizational aspectslower, had more
rainfed farms, and borrowed lessmoney than CF farmers.
In terms of the labor-absorbing expectations of these farmer
groups,Table 3.7 showssome 12 and 19 percentof the farms report-
ing a decrease in family labor, about a fourth in hired labor. There
are very, very few farmers who reported an increasein 3 typesof
labor. The overall net resuit Seemsto be a decreaserather than an
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increase in labor utilization. But even more significant than this is
the observation that more than 90 percent do not practice exchange
labor and that more than a third do not use family labor, with more
CF than Selda farms in this category. More of the Selda than CF
farmers do not use hired labor. In general, and on the basis of data
from the PICRAD study, it cannot be concluded that CFs and Seldas
have succeeded in absorbing more labor.
Wong and Reed, in tl_eir Seminar Report on Group Farming in
Asia concludes that
the South and SoutheastAsian casepresentations,diverseas they were,
broughtout substantialdifferencesbetweenthis region and East Asia, in
terms of both the institutional and technologicalbase and the forms of
group farming. In East Asia, resort to group farming is in response to a
rural manpower shortage in th context of a fairly equalaccessto resources
and relatively widespreadadoption of modern agriculturalpractices. In
South and SoutheastAsia, however, industrializationhas not developed
to sucha levelas to absorbthe rural surpluslabor,to Slowdown tl_erate of
population growth, or to create a significant impact on agriculturalpro-
ductivity. In fact, the South and SoutheastAsian regionisconfrontedwith
• a dilemna.On the one hand, it may needto try out someforms of group.
farmingprogramsin orderto alleviatethe seriousruralunemploymentpro-
blem and to help 1_esmall farmers.On the other hand, the existinggroup
farming programmes,with only few exceptions,haveso far not produced
encouragingresultsto match thoseattained in EastAsia,primarily because
of lack of sufficient institutionaland technologicalsupport.Group-farming
enterprises,to succeed,dependon enormousorganizationalefforts on the
part of local leadershipaswell ason adequatematerial supplyin termsof
servicedelivery.27
F. Diffusion and Adoption of New Farm Technology through Com-
pact Farms and Seldas
LaWs experimental study on how an agricultural innovation gets
diffused among small farmers when introduced through compact and
non-compact farms provides us with some very relevant, albeit sur-
prising, finding¢ From three compact municipalities of Bula, NA-
BUA and Libmanan, the researcher chose 50 compact farms, each
at random. To each of the coordinators of these compact farms, one
kilogram of IR 26 "foundation" class seeds were given along with a
set of printed instructions regarding the cultural practices to be fol-
lowed in the production of IR 26. Only the coordinators of NABUA
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were specifically instructed to share (sell or barter) at least50 per-
cent of their first season'sharvestseedwith fellow-membersof their
compact farms aswell asother farmers. The municipality of Ocampo
was selected as the non-compact farm municipality. The extension
workers assignedto this municipality were requestedto prepare a
list of all those farmer cooperatorswhom they consideras informal
leadersand through whom they approach other farmers in the disse-
mination of new innovations. From a list of 421 farm leaders,300
were selected at random and given one-half kilogram of IR 26
foundation seeds.Each recipient also received printed instructions
regarding cultural practicesto be followed. From the original reci-
pients of IR 26 (compact and non-compact municipalities), a list of
farmers who had planted 50 percent or more of their rice area under
IR 26 by the end of the secondseasonwas prepared.These farmers
were asked to name those farmers to whom they had given seeds
after the first harvest and had also planted IR 26 on at least50 per-
cent of their rice land.
Table 3.8 revealsthat compact farm members have more among
initial recipients who planted half or more of their farmsto the new
seedsduring the secondseasonafter the first releaseof the seeds.On
the other hand, there were more late recipients from the non-com-
pact farm areas. Lall found that the first recipients from compact
farms tended to saturate their own rice fields with IR 26 before
sharing the seeds to others outside their groups. They showed a
tendency to hold on to the innovation and to restrict the movement
of the seeds.This could be due to the fact that for the first seasons,
IR 26 seeds sold for P80-PIO0 per cavan. When asked why they
planted large areas to IR 26, farmers replied that for the first time
they could make money on the sale of seedsfrom this variety be-
causethey were not available from other seed growers.Table 3.9
suggeststhis greater "restrictive behavior" or inclination to "hoard"
the technology among the compact farm members. Only 67 percent
of late recipients in non-compact farms were neighborswhile for the
compact farms, more than 80 percent were neighbors. This be-
havior can be regarded as group action, a "we-feeling" priority
among compact farmswith respectto the potential benefits from the
new seeds.
Table 3.10 also showsthat compact farm members relied con-
siderably more on the extension worker for farm information at all
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TABLE 3.8
EARLY AND LATE RECIPIENTS OF IR 26 SEEDS DURING WET SEASON
1974WHO HAD 50 PERCENT OR MORE OF THEIR FARMS PLANTED
TO THE NEWSEEDS
Non.compact Compact farmfarm
Ocampo Bula Libmanan Nabua
N= 120 N = 60 N= 120 N = 60
- Percent-
Originalrecipients 58 68 73 71
(Dry season1974)
Laterecipients 42 32 27 29
(Thosewho received
seedsfrom original
recipients)
100 100 100 100
TABLE 3,9
RELATIONSHIP OF LATE RECIPIENTS TO ORIGINAL RECIPIENTS
, J
Non-compact
farm Compact farm
O_mpo Bula Libmanan Nabua
N= 120 N---60 N= 120 N=60
Neighbors 67 80 91 87
Friends
Samebarangay 14 17 6 3
Outsidebarangay ....
Relatives
Samebarangay 9 - 1 2
Outsidebarangay ....
Customers
Samebarangay 10 3 2 8
Outsidebarangay ....
10o; ioo" too too
* This does not include 4 relatives who live in Albay, Sorsogon and Visayas,
Source: Vidya SagarLag, "Diffusion of IR 26 RiceVariety in CompactandNon-
Compact Farmsin CamarinesSur," UnpublishedPh.D. Dissertation,
UPLB, June1975.
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TABLE 3.10
INFORMATION SOURCES AND STAGESOF ADOPTION IN
NON-COMPACT FARMS
Percent of farmers utilizing each information source
Information at eachstage
Source Awareness
Interest Evaluation Trial AdoptionN= 120
Massmedia 4 ....
Extensionworker 76 79 75 43 32
Friends,relatives,
neighbors 20 21 4 23 16
Self - - 21 34 52
Total 100 100 100 100 100
For compact farms
N -- 240
Massmedia 4 3 - - -
Extensionworker 86 92 90 77 57
, Friends,relatives,
neighbors 10 5 4 3 4
Self - - 6 20 39
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Vidya SagarLall, "Diffusion of IR 26 Rice Variety in Compactand
Non.Compact Farms in CamarinesSur," UnpublishedPh.D. Disserta-
tion, UP at LosBaSos,June 1975.
stages of the adoption proc.essthan non-compact farmers. The latter
relied more on "self" during the evaluation, trial and adoption stages
than compact farms who continued to rely on the extension worker
even during these later stages of adoption. This could mean that
they end up better informed and more enlightened in their adoption
than non-compact farmers but perhaps at the expense of other
farmers who need the extension worker's technical services. It is also
noteworthy that non-compact farmers scored significantly higher in
the farm management knowledge test than CF farmers.
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From an earlier CamarinesSurstudy done by Lynch (Table 3.11 ),
there are evidencesthat in irrigated rice lands;non-membersof com-
pact farms and SamahangNayons tend to lag behind membersin the
use of modern farming techniques although the differences are not
large. In rainfed ricelands, the trend is the same but differences be-
twean members and non-membersare much greater with more of the
former applying modern rice production techniques. Although M 99
borrowers for both irrigated and rainfed areas exhibited greater
use of modern practicesthan non-M 99 farmers, the differences are
more pronounced among the rainfed farmers. All these suggestthat
although CF and Samahang Nayon membership is associatedwith
more modern farming, this is much more evident among rainfed
farmer£hIn other words, there seemsto be more pay-off in working
with the latter.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The compact farm strategy was officially defined as an integral
part of the Agrarian Reform Program. Its purposeswere to build
economiesof scaleon the farm; to ensure repayment of credit; and
to: use it as a trai0ing ground for cooperative farming. This Chapter
examined the compact farm concept; other farmer groups such as
seldaS;compact farms and seldasin practice; and some experiences
with the different features of compact farms and seldas.
TheCompactFarmConcept
Conceptually, compact farm has the following features: con-
tiguity; equal productive capabilities; fully irrigated consolidation of
operations; single management; pooled resources; pooled labor;
sharedexpenses;pooled produce; channel for credit assistance;joint
liability for loans; and capital generation through a savingsprogram.
The compact farm itself wasintended to be a point of convergence
for all developmental efforts.
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other's loans was most unacceptableand most unsatisfying to the
members. Only the farm plan and budgetpart of singlemanagement
was in operation becauseit was usedto obtain credit, it wasonly in
getting loans that the members actively participated as a group. A
major conclusion from one study summed up the situation neatly
in the following: "The findings that compact farmers group them-
selvesonly to obtain loans,after which they tend to act individually,
plus the findings of non-operation of pooled labor and capital re-
sources,pro-rata sharingof inputs and produce, absenceof true con.
cept of single management of farms due to non-consolidationand
lack of contiguousnessof farms make the compact farm program a
'theoretical' exerciseonly."
On the productivity dimension of compact farms, significantdif-
ferencesbetween members and non-memberswere difficult to estab-
lish consistentlyfrom the different empirical studies. In other words,
there were mixed results from the analysis.In one area, the research-
er raised the issueof the compact farm's socialcost where only a few
farmers were benefited by a substantialpublic investment. Further-
more, previousstudieshave establishedthat smaller rice farmsregis-
tered higher productivity per hectare than largefarms.This questions
whether land consolidation for economiesof scalein riceproduction
is a justified rationale for establishingcompact farms.
The dynamicsof production loan at the micro levelwere illustra-
ted by a variety of farmer-borrower categorieswith respect to loan
size, credit utilization and repayment with instancesof over-borrow-
ing, underspending,"dummy-borrower", repayment difficulties and
the credit "bandwagon". Despite standard loan ceiling per hectare,
there was an infinite variation in the way production loanscame out.
From descriptionsof severalcompactfarms, the patterns of orga-
nization, decision-making and management which emerged are as
follows: The initiative for organization of compact farms and seldas
came from a desire to facilitate the operationsof sponsoringagen-
cies. Communication channels were well-structured from the top-
down. Only the FMT servedas the link between the farmer and the
technician. Decision-makingfor and in behalf of farmers lies in the
hands of a few people. Practically all the power rested with the
FMT who was responsiblefor farm plan andbudget and even for
choosingwhich dealer to patronize. There were no evidencesof truly
pOoled labor. At most, there was some centralized hiring, and some
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group labor for certain farming operations. Labor absorptionhad not
increased. All activities of the seldasstudied were done individually
except for the co-makers signing a promissory note in joint credit
liability. There was an absenceof groupness in the selda. Farmers'
assessmentof the compact farm and seldawasrather negativeon the
formal organizational functioning and more positiveon the informal
aspectssuch as sharing in non-farm activities and sharing of farm
information.
The useof compact farms as channelsfor new farm technology
showed that members tended to saturate their farms first before
sharingwith outsiders.They held on to the innovation and restricted
its movementamong members.
From concept to practice, compact farms and seldas had
"strayed" considerably from the ideal features which justified their
creation. The consequences,therefore, were also far from the ex-
pectationsbasedon the concept.
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CHAPTER IV
THE OTHER SIDES TO MASAGANA 99
Masagana 99 is a Program of Survival launched in 1973. As the
brochure says: "Masagana is a Tagalog word meaning bountiful and
99 quantifies the goal of the program to increase rice production up
to 99 sacks per hectare or 4.4 tons of unmilled rice. It was conceived
out of the need to massively increase rice production." The key
elements of the program are:
a) A revolutionary credit system: loans without collateral
Some 420 rural banks, 102 branchesof the Philippine National
Bank and25 officesof the AgriculturalCreditAdministrationagreedto
giveloans.
A guaranteeof 85 percent of all losseson Masagana99 loansper-
suaded bankers to drop their old-fashionedpawnshopmentality and
gaveloanswithout collateral.
Another changewasthe complete revampingof the rediscounting
systemso that more loanscould be rediscountedeasily,efficiently and
at leastcost.
..... Farmers' loanapplicationswere processedon the spot.Bankrepre-
sentatives,togetherwith field technicians,processedthe farm plan and
budgetof farmerswho were groupedinto "seldas"composedof 5 to 15
farmers who were jointly and severally responsiblefor each other's
crop loans.
Money was lent out in jeep, on foot, by motorcycle, on pump-
boats and even by helicopter. A hundredjeepswere initially usedby
the Philippine National Bankto bring money, literally at the farmer's
doorstep.Thus, the PNB "bank onwheels" wasborn.
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.... The farmer was allowed $100 loan per hectarewith onepercent
interestmonthly. Pert of the loanwasgiven in cashto cover laborcost,
while the balarmewas given in purchaseordersfor pesticidesandferti-
lizer whk:h he could exchangefor actual products at the local store.
With this, the storekeeperthen redeemsthe purchaseordersfor cashat
the bank.
b) Transfer of Technology
To revolutionize the system of rice prixluction, transfer of tech-
nology had to be done. To make sure that the farmer followed 16
steps of Masagana 99, four strategies were adopted.
a package of technology was developed through extensive
tests done in the field;
[_ the deployment of field technologists numbering 3,200 who
were to teach farmers the new technology and to guide them
in forming seldas, obtaining bank loans, harvesting, storing,
marketing, and bargaining;
mass media dissemination; and
I_ smooth coordination by management with cooperating agen-
cies at all levels.
To insuretotal coordinationat all levels,provincialgovernorswerede.
slgnatedchairmen of ProvincialAction Committees, the mayors,headsof
municipalAction Teams.They were made responsiblefor coordinatingthe
activitiesof variousagenciesinvolvedin Masagana99 - the banks,the rice
millers and traders, fertilizer and pesticide dealers,k_.al radio network,
and all governmentagenciesconcernedwith agriculture,local government
and land reform.
in effect, these local officials were put in charge of a national
management committee composedof leadersboth from the government
and privatesectors.
c) Low-Cost Fertilizer
Despite swiftly rising world fertilizer prices in 1973, which
escalated further during the oil crises, the government subsidized fer-
tilizer to rice farmers reducing prices by 21 percent. Before M 99,
it took over 3 kilos of rough rice to buy one kilo of nitrogen ferti-
lizer nutrient. During the first year of M 99, this was reduced to only
1.6 kilos of rough rice to buy a kilo of nitrogen nutrient - the most
favorable ratio in our history. Thus, farmers were encouraged to
apply fertilizer dosages.
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d) Good weather, other elements
• The fourth element that propelled M 99 to its successfulfirst
year wasgood weather.
The other elements were the price support program that gua-
ranteed the farmer $6 per sack if market pricesfell at harvesttime
and the timely supply of chemical inputs for diseaseand pest
control.1
The brief description of M 99 just cited is a necessaryback-
ground and frame of reference in understandingthe changesasso-
ciated with the "modernization" of credit asart institutional innova-
tion.
This Chapter focuses on agricultural credit as a changing rural
institution with its "other sides", i.e., other than its productivity-
increasing objective. The ramifications of M 99 make fascinating
sociological study because "incurring debts" or borrowing is very
much a sociocultural phenomenon. There are basic social values and
even a lifestyle imbedded in a "credit society". It involves the
future and, in effect, having faith in the promises for the future in
return for the "fruits" which can be enjoyed today. At present,
credit seems to be one major development instrument. One can say
without fear of successfulcontradiction that "the whole world lives
on credit". As the individual farmer borrows ostensibly to be produc-
tive, so do governments around the world depend on foreign loans to
realize their dreamsof a better life for their people. Otherstake the
view that present borrowings have mortgagedthe lives of the next
generations. Living within one's means;tightening one's belt; thrift
and savingsfor the future haveapparently becomeold-fashionedand
gOne out of style. On the other hand, it has also been argued that
using credit asa development instrument now preparesthe country
for better tomorrows for the next generations.
At the farmer level, when land reform liberatedthe sharetenant
from his "life of poverty, bondageand injustice", hewas also liberat-
ed from indebtednessto his landlord and from thepatron-client
relationsip with him. To take his place and that of other private
money lenders,an entirely new systemof borrower-creditor relation-
ship was introducedvia the bankingsystemthrough the intermediary
of the farm management technician who legitimized the loan by
affixing his signatureto a farm plan and budget. The latter has also
replaced the collateral as a passport to loan releases.This shift in
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policy by itself has significant social implications particularly with
the group lending schemesthrough different joint liability farmer
groupingsorganizedaround credit.
In examining the other sides of M 99, we must remember that
the program came after crop years 1971, 1972 and 1973 had been
plagued by typhoons, floods, tungro and drought. It is alsoa fact
that the Philippine rice situation can be characterized asa century
of very low productivity levelsand of recurring shortages,importa-
tions and annual crises. Although credit subsidyas the core of the
rice production program was regardedas "part of the total effort to
reduce the cost of borrowing of farmers, thereby enhancingtheir
chances of becoming self-sufficient, inducing their participation in
government programsand promoting social equity, ''2 it isclear that
the "... overriding objective of the M 99 program isto achieve self-
sufficiency in rice, not to improve the income of small farmers. It
was a coincidence that the target clientele of the program, the
Filipino rice farmers numbering close to one million, has an aver-
age farm sizeof around 2.7 hectares.''3
From all indications and computations, the rice self-sufficiency
objective of M 99 has been a great successalthough it would be less
than accurate not to mention expansionof irrigatedareasasa crucial
element in this successstory. The latestaccount of program benefits
makesthe following estimate:
As the mostimportantcontribution,M 99 broughtthecountryself-
sufficiencywith someexportsurplusfor thefirst time in 1976.Estimated
incrementaloutputdueto theprogramisabout5.3 millionmetrictonsor
about3.2 millionmetrictonsof additionalrice.Foreignexchangesavings
from non-importationof riceandriceexportearningsamountto about
US$647millionorP4.7 billionat the officialexchangerate.Theeconomic
valueof M 99foreignexchangesavingsi aboutP5.5 billioh.
Qualitativeprogrambenefitsincludesocio-economicstability,transfer
of technologyandincreasedfarmproductivity.4
Precisely becauseof M 99's successin attaining the increasedrice
production objective, it is important to identify the various social
components which accompanied or resulted from program imple-
mentation.
This Chapter presentsthese other sidesto M 99 through research
findingsfrom a variety of studieson the following:
a) Patternsof borrowing
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b) Non-repayment behavior
c) Group lending
d) M 99 and informal financial markets
e) Who benefits?
A. Patterns of Borrowing
Before M 99 came along, rice farmers, particularly tenant farm-
ers, were dependent on the landlord, private money lenders,relatives
and friends for credit whether for production or consumptionpur-
poses.Such credit was _upposedlygiven at usuriousratesof interest
except for relatives whose loans are often interest-free, It has like-
wise been lamented that small farmers do not have accessto low-
interest institutional credit becausethey have no collateral to offer.
Table 4.1, for example,showsthat regardlessof tenure status,private
money lenders were the most important credit source,followed by
relatives and friends and the landlord. However, owner-operators
and leaseholdershad greateraccessto banksand other institutional
sourcesthan share tenants. The latter were more dependent on the
landlord and other private sources.It is surprisingthat evenduring
those days, the landlordwas not the dominant sourceof credit for
sharetenants. The role of relatives and friends in this regard should
not be discounted because they are quite often an interest-free
source.
With the advent of M 99 for the crop year 1972-73, about 34
percent of farmer-borrowers studied by the Bureau of Agricultural
Economics participated in this program. Jn1974, participation went
up to 84 percent. This is actually the peak period of the program
with more than half a million borrowers;866 thousandhectaresand
a total of P7!6 million loans granted (Table 4.2). The averagefarm
size financed was lessthan 2 hectares.This certainly representswide-
spreadcountryside coverageof small farmers,which ismore than 50
percent of the total estimatednumber of Filipino rice farmers. At its
peak, there were 636 rural banksand PNB branches involved in this
lending operation. Repayment rates were 94 percent for Phases I
and II (1973-74). As of 1980, the number of borrowers dropped to
54,250 which is only about 10 percent of the peak period. Repay-
ment also dipped to 68 percent which is really quite low consider-
ing the reduction in number and the likely selectivity of these re-
maining borrowers. Total loans were only Pl17 million, a mere 11
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TABLE 4,1
FARMER-BORROWERS BY SOURCE OF LOAN AND BY TENURE
(In percentof total farmerborrowers)
Share
Sourceof Loan Owners Leaseho!ders Tenants
1970.71 Philippines
ACA/FACOMA 19.1 23.9 8.3
Ruralbanks 13.3 5.4 6.7
DBP/PNB 7.6 0.0 0.8
Landlords - 7.8 15.9
Privatemoney-lenders 38.2 41.5 38.8
Relatives/friends 21.8 21.5 28.2
1971.72 Philippines
ACA/FACOMA 9.8 24.0 8.0
Ruralbanks 13.5 6.3 6.2
DBP/PNB 6,8 0.4 0.0
Credit Unions 2.5 0.4 0.9
Landlords - 9.7 19.4
Privatemoney-lenders 40,9 38.7 36.6
Relatives/friends 26.5 20.6 28.8
Source: Bureauof AgriculturalEconomicsFarm IndebtednessSurveys.
percent of the highest level of lending.
The major reason for the shrinking loan portfolio is the borrow-
ers' inability to repay their loans. The $64 question therefore is -
why farmers failed to pay. tlB
To help us understand this downward spiralling of M 99, we need
to examine micro-level data to supplement the aggregate trends
shown previously. In this study of rice farmers' credit absorptive
capacity, Cruz identified the following patterns of borrowing before,
during and after the cropping season of June 1978 to May 1979. 5
Although there is nothing complicated about this piece of work,
it takes us further than the usual categories we deal with such as
"borrower-non-borrower". Starting from these 2 basic categories,
overtime, we see the dynamics of borrowing behavior and the emer-
gence of other types of borrowers and non-borrowers;
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Of the 226 respondents,63 percent had borrowed before the
June 1978 cropping seasonand 37 percent did not avail of credit
from any source.Figure 4.1 showsthat only 9 percent were "regular"
borrowers regardlessof source of credit. These farmers used credit
before, during, and after the cropping seasonas a meansto improve
farming. They were able to establish good credit lines with the
sources.On the other hand,9 percent did not borrow at all from any
source, hence, they are called "non-borrowers': These farmers are
capableof self-financing their rice farms. Their rice farms are small,
thus, they need only a small amount of capital to finance the farm
operation. They are also the type of farmers who are not used to
borrowing from any sourceof credit.
Twenty-nine percent are "drop-outs': These are farmers who
initially borrowed capital for farm production but were unable to
borrow during the cropping season under study because of their
inability to pay their previous loans.They were motivated by fellow
farmers and/or farm techniciansto usecredit but were not capable
of paying their loans, hence, they could not avail of credit during
and after the cropping seasonof June 1978 to May 1979. Other
respondents (13 percent) are "intermittent borrowers'; i.e., the
farmers who availed of farming capital before but failed to pay it
thus could not obtain loans during the cropping season.However,
upon payment of the previous loan, they decided to borrow once
more. The counterparts are "intermittentnon,borrowers" who make
up 14 percent of the respondents.They did not avail of credit at the
start of the credit program but decided later to borrow. However,
they could not borrow thereafter becauseof failure to repay.
Some respondents(5 percent) were of the "cautious" type. They
did not borrow at the initial phaseof the credit progra_rn,decidedto
borrow in the next phase, becamesuccessfulin their farming opera-
tions, and were able to pay their loans. As a consequenceof their
good farming performance, they renewed their loan applications to
finance their farm operations.
Eight percent of the respondentsare rather "late" usersof credit.
These farmers decided to borrow at the latter phase of the credit
program after having been convinced by their peerswho benefited
from the credit program. They may be called the "/aggard borrowers"
in so far as the use of credit as a facility in improving the farm busi-
nessis concerned.
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On the other hand, 12 percent of the respondentsare "tem-
porary dropouts': These farmers were usersof borrowed capital in
the initial phaseof the credit program and had temporarily stopped
from borrowing either due to their inability to pay the previousloan
or to their decisionto finance the farm operation out of the income
generated from the farm. This type of borrower availed of credit
once the unpaid loans had been settled or when he did not have
enoughcapital to finance hisfarming enterprise (Table 4.3).
The other credit behavior pattern which is of equal concernto
us is credit source.Tables4.4 and 4.5 show the trends before, during
and after the croppingseasonof June 1978 to May 1979.
a) Institutional sourceswere used by 60 percent of farmers
before. This dropped to 13 percent in the "after" period but
only 20 percent shifted to non-institutional sources.More
than 60 percent became "non-borrowers". The question that
remains unanswered is how farmers managed during this
period. Has the amount borrowed been "dissipated" or have
the farmers chosen to plow it back as capital rather than
repaying it to the source?If the former were true, production
is likely to suffer. However, if the latter obtains, credit func-
tions as an addition to the income stream and production is
probably not affected although the cost is borne by the gov-
ernment or by the non-institutional source.
b) Tables4.4 and 4.5 showa decline in the total amount of loan
from 1_30,000 before 1978 to 1_115,472 during the period.
This is a reduction to only about a fourth of the previous
amount. Although there was an increase in repayment rate
from 38.5 to 46.5 percent, this is probably due to greater
selectivity since the number of borrowers dropped from 143
to 91.
c) A total of 192 loanswere made for the "before" period and
98 for the "during" phase but the borrowers were only 143
and 91, respectively. This meansthat 50 loans for the first
periods were multiple loans obtained at the same time. For
the secondphase,7 loanswere of a multiple nature.
d) Loans obtained from institutional sourcessuch as the Rural
Bank and Land Bank were considerably larger than those
from non-institutional sources. Although the landlord has
ceasedto be a supplier of credit, relatives continued to be
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important and became even more so during the second phase.
e) The repayment rate during this phase was higher for institu-
tional than for non-institutional sources but there were only
38 as against 60 borrowers from the latter with relatives
being resorted to as the single most frequently mentioned
source.
Other data from the Cruz study indicate that although
72 percent of the borrowers from institutional sources were
assisted by government technicians, only 58 percent were
visited by them and 42 percent were not visited by the tech-
nician at all. Only 25 percent of borrowers from banks
obtained loans on their own initiative. On repayment status,
almost half, 46 percent, had not paid anything for the second
phase loan and yet two-thirds of these borrowers were never
contacted regarding repayment.
These findings have wider implications considering that
TABLE 4,3
PATTERNS OF CREDIT SOURCESBEFORE, DURING AND AFTER
THE CROPPING SEASON OF JUNE 1978 TO MAY 1979
(226 samplefarmersfrom Libmanan-Cabusao,
Buhi-LaloandBula-Minalabacareasof Bicol)
Sourcesof Credit Before During After
(In Percent)
institutional 50 13 13
Non-institutional 5 25 21
Non-borrowers 36 60 65
N = 226 100 100 100
Source: Federico A. Cruz, "Credit Absorptive Capacity of Rice Farmers"
(UnpublishedM.S. Thesis,Universityof the Philippinesat Los BeSos),
August 1980.
rice farmers included in this study are small (average 2.18
hectares), with 30 percent below 1 hectare and 75 percent
having 6 years or less schooling; 20 percent are share tenants
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and majority are owner-operators, amortizing owners and
lessees;and average household size is 6.3 members. What
many studies such as this one fail to observe in greater de-
tail is the credit and repayment behavior of below average
and above averagefarmers suchasthose who havelessthan a
hectare or 4 to 12 hectares;those6 percent who havecollege
education; those whose yields are below 20 cavansper hec-
tare; as well as those who are owner-operators. Is the
behavior of such above.average or below-average farmers
different from that of the "mythical average"? In this era of
concern that increased benefits should accrue to those who
are more disadvantagedrather than to those who are more
privileged, it is very important to examine what ishappening
to the two "tail-ends" of any frequency distribution.
In general, we can say that institutional borrowing
•behavior is very much "technician-influenced" if not "?ech*
nician.induced" but repayment behavior is not. Judgingfrom
patterns of borrowing, one suspectsthat "credit opportu.
nism" rather than "credit need" influences what the farmer
doeswith respectto credit.
Looking at both macro and micro leveldata, we can identify the
following patternsof borrowing:
1) In pre-M99-period,• landlords, private money lenders, rela-
tives and friends were the dominant sourcesof credit. With
the advent of M99, the shift was definitely toward rural
banks and PNB branches. So it was from informal to institu-
tional credit sources.
2) Non-collateralized loans opened bank loansto small farmers,
hence, the tremendousexpansion of short-term credit in the
countryside.
3) With increasing non-repayments, drop-outs mushroomed
although the decline in M99 participants is not a linear one.
There were intermittent borrowers and intermittent drop-
outs.
4) Although there was a revival of informal credit sourcesas
M99 borrowers declined, the proportion of non-borrowers
increased. It should likewise be noted that if there are inter-
mittent borrowers, there are also "persistent borrowers"
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(they are also called viable borrowers) and "resistant non-
borrowers"
5) The major reasonfor the shrinking M99 loan portfolio is
borrowers' default. The $64 question therefore is why
farmers fail to repay the "idea/ loan" which is non.colla-
teralized, low-interest, available to small farmers and rela-
tively easy to obtain, One would think that M99 hasall the
ingredients we were looking for to bail out the farmer from
his quagmireof indebtedness.
B. Non-Repayment Behavior
Why do farmers fail to repay their loans? Unless otherwise
stated, this review draws heavily from the Technical Boardfor Agri-
cultural Credit (TBAC) study on non-repaymentof agricultural loans
which covered a two-tiered survey of 82 financial institutions and
1,113 farmers drawn from 10 regionsand 22 provincesthroughout
the country.6 Two major issuesare dealt with here: the viability
issue or the capacity to repay and the attitudinal issue or the willing
ness to repay.
1. Capacity to repay
The basic rationale for providing credit is to enhance produc-
tivity in order to make farming a profitable enterprise and hopefully
increase farm incomes. Unless this happens, the agricultural credit
system cannot survive. Production performance is therefore of pri-
mary significance.
[] Production Performance
The TBAC study aswell as other surveysreveal that production
constraining factors were the predominant reasonsfor non-repay-
ment. Crop failure due to pest and calamities and lack of irrigation
water is the most important reason cited by respondents. Other
studies on M99 loan delinquency reported similar findings. The
NFAC-SGV 7 performance review, for example, identified poor pro-
duction brought about by natural calamitiesand incidenceof pests
and diseasesas the major cause of non-repayment, The BAECON
nationwide survey in 1975 likewise found crop failure as the cul-
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prit.a An earlier TBAC study alsolendssupport to the generalobser-
vation that production performance heavily influencesthe farmer's
capacity to repay.9
Since yield per hectare is the most important indicator of pro-
duction performance, we need to examine yield levelsattained by
M 99 farmers. Do these farmersreally produce enoughto make them
viable borrower_? Table 4.6 presentsM 99 yield figures from the
National Food and Agriculture Council (NFAC). Irrigated areas
through the 12 phasesof the program averagedabout 76 cavansper
hectare and rainfed farms were reported to havean averageof about
58 cavans. For the purpose of ascertainingcredit viability, average
yield is probably a very misleading measure because it is easily
distorted by extremes in values. Tables showing frequency distri-
bution of yields would show us a more realistic picture. Table 4.7
illustrates this point. Almost 68 percent of irrigated rice farms and
83 percent of rainfed farms reported yields lower than 45 cavans
per hectare. With these production figures, and with 78 percent of
these farmers being share tenants and lesseeswho have to share
the produce or pay a fixed rental to the landlord, it is not difficult
to understand why they havenot been able to repay their loans. If
we look at Table 4.6 once again, the picture is much more optimis-
tic becauseit doesnot showthe "spread of the yields." What propor-
tion of the area produced yields below or above the average?It is
also interesting that none of the studies available report yields
which come close to the NFAC statistics.The BAECON survey for
1972-73 and 1973-74 estimated average production per hectare to
be 28.4 for those without loansand 35.5 for those with M99 loans.
For the first, second and third semestersof 1974, the averageyields
were 34 cavansper hectare;40.6 and 32.4, respectively.The TBAC
Central Luzon study on arrearages (Table 4.7) showed only one-
third of irrigated; 17 percent of the rainfed and 20 percent of the
combined irrigated/rainfed farms which registeredyields above 45
cavans per hectare. On the other hand, PhasesIV and V of NFAC
report average yields of 77 and 80 for irrigated and 54 and 61 for
the rainfed, If the NFAC yield estimates are used as a basis for
assessingcapacity to repay, the conclusionswould be much more en-
couragingand expectationsof repayment would be higher.
Table 4.8 illustrates the usefulnessof presenting both frequency
distribution as well as averageyields. For example, in 1978, 61 per-
Masagana99 203
TABLE 4.7
DISTRIBUTION OF BORROWERSWITH IRRIGATED, RAINFED ANO
IRRIGATED/RAINFED LANDS BY YIELD PER HECTARE
IN M99 PHASESIV AND V (1976)
370 FARMERS CENTRAL LUZON
Yield per hectare Combined
(cavan$of Irrigated Rainfed Irrigated and
5Ok#.) Rainfed
0 3.8 4.5 6.7
1 - 15 15.1 20.1 23.3
16 - 30 25.9 34.2 30.0
31 - 45 22.7 24.6 20.0
46 - 60 19.5 7.5 13.3
61 above 13.0 9.0 6.7
Total i00.0 100.0 100.0
Source:TBAC, "A Survey of the Causesof High Arrearagesof Central Luzon
Farmersin PhasesIV and V of the Masagana99 Program," April 1976, PCAC,
Manila.
cent of Camarines Sur farmers obtained yields of below 25 cavans
per hectare with anaverageyield of only 8.7 cavans. However, for the
entire Camarines Sur sample, the average is 38.3. The average figure has
been pulled up considerably by the 6 percent who obtained yields of
more than 100 averaging 170 cavens. For this particular group, per-
haps 11 percent has a higher probability of repaying their loans.
Forty-five percent of the Bulacan sample reported yields of below
25 averaging 14.6 cavanrh Such farmers have a very slim chance of
being a viable borrower.
When 912 farmer-bOrrowers from Bulacan, Isabela and Camarines
Sur were asked about the frequency of bad harvests over the years
1973-78 or ten seasons, those from the first two provinces reportedly
experienced bad harvests in 4 out of 10 harvests on the average
compared to 6 out of 10 harvests among the sample farmers in Cama-
tines Sur. For 1978, 43 percent of the farmers regarded their harvests
as "bad"; 45 percent rated them as "good" and 12 percent said "nor-
real'. I° The frequency of bad harvest should be of special concern in
assessing capacity to repay because in a country which receives an
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averageof 19.5 typhoons a year and suffers periodic pest, disease,
drought and flooding problems, normal harvestsare "abnormal"
occurrences.We cannot just put asidethe "bad years". They are part
of everyday life which farmers and lending institutions haveto live
with.
An intensive record-keeping project to examine how 34 small
farmers allocate income between the farm and the household and
how farm and household needsrelate to credit use and repayment,
found the season's(1980) harvest exceptionally good, coming after
the heels of Typhoon Kading. The conclusionwas that the average
sample respondent would have the resources to meet repayment re_
quirements for that season. But that was an exceptionally good
seasonll Because of the bumper harvest, an increase in farm and
family outflow during those months was perceptible as evidenced
by payment of loan obligations and tendency for family expenses
to risewith incomestream, usually accounted for by increasein food
expenditures, June tuition fees and the purchase of household ap-
pliances. Other findings of this analysisdeservemore attention such
as:
E] The financial structure of sample farm-households indicates a
generMly limited internal source of liquidity, thus defining a
weak internal capability to generate cash flow for the season's
farm and household needs.Credit provides a valuable source of
liquidity for farm.household activitie¢
[] In terms of future prospectsfor growth and development, the
farm household financial structure of CLT holders (amortizing
owners) and full owners as well as bigger-sizedfarms indicates a
move towards the acquisition of new productive structures on
which long-term development and increasesin productive cape-
city may be based. They have used credit to build new farm
capital-farm tools, machinery, equipment, and farm land. In con*
trast, lessees(smaller farms) have usedcredit largely for produc-
tion and consumption purposes and have relatively low invest-
mants in fixed farm capital. As such, they havevery little hedge
against inflation. The increase in net income realized from the
loan supported production activity may just be eroded by the
falling purchasingpower of money.
[] Tenure change improvesthe equity positions of farmers and en-
hancesgrowth in net worth. Amortizing owners and full owners
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have higher hedge against inflation. The increasein net income
realized from the loan supported production activity may just"
be eroded by the falling purchasingpower of money.
[] Tenure change improves the equity positions of farmers and
enhances growth in ne_ worth. Amortizing owners and full
owners have higher levelsof qet worth than lessees.Land amorti-
zation is plowed back into the farm equity by a decreasein liabi-
lities. In contrast, farm rent paid by lesseesaccruesto the land-
owner.
[] Loans are used predominantly to straighten out incometroughs,
and trickle out over the seasonasfarm income streamsin. More-
over, in addition to the credit demand for actual needsof the
farm household,a credit demand for liquidity also exists.
[] Loans are the biggestflow itemsduring the plantingseason,cons-
tituting 58 percent of resourcesavailable to support production
as well as household activities. On the average,savingsprovides
25 percent while income flow contributesonly 17 percentto to-
tal inflow. Lesseesgenerallyshow greater dependenceon credit
use to generate inflow of resourcesthan full owners and CLT
holders becausethe latter two groupshave greater initial savings
accumulated from previousseasons,
[] A comparison of debt burdenand repayment potential indicates
availability of resourcesto meet repayment requirementsthissea-
son. However, 2 months after the harvest in May, repayment to
current farm loans was only 57 percent. Moreover, there wasa
tendency among sample farmer.sto settle current loans first than
carry-over debt obligations. Some possible reasonsfor this low
repayment behavior may be due to farmers anticipating better
market conditions compared to prevailing prices. The bumper
harvest during the season exerted a downward pull on prices.
Farmers intended to take advantageof the season'sgood harvest
to offset harvest lossesincurred in the previous seasondue to
typhoon Kading. Farmers contemplated partial default in loan
obligations.
l-1 Multiple cropping provides additional sourcesof income to im-
proveoverall flow positionsof farmers.
[] The study recommendedthat the debt burden aswell asfinancial
capacity of potential farmer-borrowers be evaluated rather than
base credit lending decisionsentirely on the financial needof the
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farmer. Overlookingtheseaspectsmight simply leadto worsening
of the farmer's financial position.While results of the study indi-
caw the farmer's capability to repay loan obligations due to that
particular season,current as well as carry.over, this finding might
have been biased by the bumper harvest experienced that season.
What remains clear is that carry-over obligations are claims
againstfuture income.11
Another very potent issuein addition to productivity which
is related to capacity to repay isthe price receivedby farmers for
their produce. Table 4.8 showswhat sample farmers in Bulacan,
Isabela and Camarines Sur received in 1978. More than 45 per-
cent in the first seasonand 43 percent in the secondseasonre-
ported receivingP0.79 and lessper kg. for their palay. Only 29
and 36 percent for the two seasons,respectively, got P1.00 and
above which is the official support price.12 Given this state of
affairs, the high cost of inputs and hired labor added to the risks
from natural calamities, capacity to repay becomes precarious
indeed!
By the very nature of rice production, it is very vulnerable
to the whims of Mother Nature. The weather is not a minor ele-
ment in the M99 program and it cannot be ordered and tailored
to the production process. Rather, production has to follow
nature's rhythm sometimesmore successfullythan at other times.
As farmers often say: "We don't know how much of a harvest
we have until the produce is safely stashedaway in the house".
What looksgood on the ground at somepoint can still behit by a
destructive drought, typhoon, or flood. Weather is therefore
often cited asone important determinant of production perform-
ance. When asked about the main reason for the ability of the
Philippines to export some surplusrice, more than 40 percent of
farmer-respondents mentioned modern technology; 17 percent
said "accessto creditand capital"; and another 17 percent attri-
buted the rice surplus to good weather.13. In another study,
farmers viewed weather positively as well as negatively in the
sensethat increasein yield was due to good weather (41 percent
of farmer-respondents) and an equal percentage blamed poor
weather for decreasein yield.
Since weather is such a primary determinant of production
performance, how does one "deflate" for it in bad times and
208 Masagana99
"inflate" for it in good times so as to more accurately assessca-
pacity to repay?
[] Economic and Other Factors Affecting Viability
The 1978 TBAC study of non-repaymentwhich includedcompa-
risonsof good and delinquent M99 borrowersshowed a generalten-
dency for good borrowers to have higher value of assets,yield per
hectare, production value, salesincome, net income, income from
other sources,savingsand material level of living. Although this is
the generaldirection of the differencesbetween good and delinquent
borrowers, general characteristicsof both groupsas borrowers need
to be highlighted becausethey affect viability. About 80 percentof
all farmers have sales income of only P5,000 and below and net
income of below P1,000. Income from other sourcesis also small
with morethan two-thirds receiving1P1,000or lessfrom suchsources.
The study revealed that the probability of borrowers being unable
to repay their loan decreasesas income level increases.However,
there comes a point where at very high levels of income, a higher
proportion of delinquent than good borrowersis noticeable, suggest-
ing .that the relationship between income and repayment may be
non-linear.
Type of farm seemsto affect credit standingsignificantly asthe
percentage of delinquent borrowers appear higher for rainfed than
for irrigated farms.
Savingsappear very minimal with 72 percent of the total sample
reporting savingsof only PS00 and less.With small net income and
minimal savingsfor more than three-fourths of the borrowers,capa-
city to repay is a problem. More of the good than the delinouent
borrowers Possessedbetter material level of living as evidencedby
the type of dwelling, fuel supply and household appliances used.
They also had a slight edge in terms of food consumption. Further
evidenceson the role of viability may be gleanedfrom the fact that
thosewho made repaymentsindicated that thesefunds came mainly
from their income/earnings.Another possible indication of low re-
payment capacityis the fact that 30 percentadmitted usingthe loans
for family livingexpenses.
Although the economic indicators of capacity to repay showed
the expected relationship to repayment behavior, the differences b_
. tween good and delinquent borrowers as far as these indicators are
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concerned are never very great suggesting that there are other factors
influencing repayment.
Education was the one variable which significantly distinguished
good from delinquent borrowers. It was observedthat the majority
(59.5 percent) of delinquent borrowersfall within the rangeof those
who had no schooling and thosewho were elementary school gra-
duate¢ On the other hand, most of the good borrowers (54.2 per-
cent) attained high school and college education. A likely explana-
tion for the significant relationship between education and repay-
ment behavior is that it representsboth capacity and willingnessto
pay basedon a more enlightened long-runview on the value of main-
raining credit worthiness. Higher education, of course, isalso usually
associatedwith higher income, networth, and higherstatusand pres-
tige in the community. He has more to lose in terms of a blemished
reputation and therefore more inclined to come through with his
repayment. However, for those with really high education and in-
come levels, the borrowers' status could be so secure that they be-
come "untouchables" and therefore the usual social sanctionsmay
no longer beeffective.
Tenurial status also significantlyaffected their viability and cred-
it standing. A larger proportion of good borrowers (45.9 percent) are
owner-operators compared with "delinquent" owner operators (31.2
percent). On the other hand, share tenants comprisea largerpropor-
tion (27.1 percent) among delinquent than good borrowers (17.2
percent). This pattern is understandablebecausean owner-operator
dpes not have to pay rentals or sharesto the landlord, thus he is
expected to be more viable than the share tenant or the lesseewho
still hasto meet all these paymentson top of his farm expenses.
Household size seems to place a burden on the repayment ca-
pecity of the borrowers. More good than delinquent borrowers be-
long to the one-to-three family size group while more delinquent
than good belong to the seven-to-ninemember group. A similar pat-
tern was exhibited in terms of number of dependents.
Another TBAC study done by the UP BusinessResearchFounda-
tion looked into the common impressionthat low repayment of M99
loans is due tO the practice of diverting these loansfor consumption
purposes.The assumption often made is that since consumption is
unproductive, any amount of M99 funds diverted to it will reduce
the ability of the farm households to generate higher farm income
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resulting in poor repayment perVormance.The analysisfound no sig-
nificant relationshipbetween repayment of M99 loansand percentof
M99 funds usedfor consumption. One possiblereasonfor the lack of
significant relationship is the small percentageof diverted funds re-
ported by M99 borrowers. Table 4.9 shows the extent of diversion
of M99 funds as reported by 237 sample borrowers from Nueva
Ecija, Davao del Sur and Iloilo. Thetotal amount of M99 loansused
for consumption is only about 4 percent of total M99 loansgranted.
Only about 53 percent reported to have used some of their M99
loans for consumption and the averageamount used by such bor-
rowers isabout P239.
On the consumption loan requirements of farm households,the
same study found that 36 percent of total sample(1215) reported to
have usedsomeamountsof credit for consumptionpurpbses.The to:
111amount involved comprisedonly 11 percent of the total loansob-
tained during the year. Comparedwith findingsof previousstudies,it
can be observedthat there has been a declining percentageof loans
used for Consumption since the pre-M99 period to the present. Of
the respondentswho acquired consumption loans, 18 percent re-
ported consumption loansonly while the remaining 82 percent had
both consumption and production loans. Informal sourcesplayed a
more important role than other sourceswith 62 percent of total con-
sumption loans coming from professional moneylenders, friends,
relatives, landlord and other privatesources.
Those who resorted to consumption loans during the year used
them mainly for food and other subsistenceneeds (49 percent);
education (19 percent); consumerdurables (12 percent); health (9
percent); ceremonial expenses (5 percent); housing/real estate (4
percent);and others (2 percent).
Results of cross-tabulationand regressionanalysis revealed the
following:
F1 The acquisition of consumer durablesas one of the reasons
for obtaining consumption loans is found to be not a signi-
ficant variable,
[] Total outstanding liabilities are negatively relatedto demand
for consumption loanswhich indicatesthat farm households
tend to limit their consumption loansin the presenceof out-
standingdebt. This implies that some kind of internal credit
rationing measure is being employed. As liquidity increases,
M
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the need for consumption loan tendsto decreaseand the ex-
pected negative effect of the proportion of loans for con-
sumption on repayment performance isnot supportedby the
data.
[] Consumption loans are obtained mainly to augment depleted
liquidity brought about by some asset acquisition and pro-
duction expenditure¢ The direct application of these loans
were for legitimate purposes, mainly for food and subsistence
needs and not for consumer durables or ceremonia/ expenses.
The analysis also showed gnat repayment of loans isnot ad-
versely affected by the amount or proportion of loans used
for consumption purposes.14
[] Overfinancing and overborrowing
Another factor possibly associatedwith non-repayment is the
tendency to overborrow. The TBAC 1976 study indicated that the
burden of other debts (besidesM99) exerts a significantpressureon
their repayment capacity. During the period covered by PhasesIV
and V, more than 65 percent of the delinquent borrowers had al-
ready past debts compared to less than 55 percent of good bor-
rowers. Furthermore, more delinquent borrowers (61 percent) as
against51 percent of good borrowersincurred new debts from other
sourcesof loans. In general, for both groups, almost two-thirds had
• past debts in addition to borrowing from other sources besides M99.
The 1978 TBAC survey also found more delinquent (49 percent)
than good (39 percent) borrowers, having 2 or more outstanding
institutional 4oans.Are thesenot evidencesof too much borrowing
which eventually catches up with the borrower? Should we be sur-
prisedby the resultingnon-repayment?
Besidesincurring multiple debts, there is another closely related
practice called overfinancing which comes in at least 4 different
forms:
[] Borrowers whose approved loan was based on the P1,200
ceiling per hectare but whose area actually planted was less
than the number of hectaresapplied for financing.
(Bank data) 29 percentof total
sampleborrowers
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[] Borrowers whose approved loan was,based on a ceiling
greater thanP 1,200/hectare. 10 percent
(Bank data)
I-I Borrowerswhoseavailedloan wasgreaterthan P1,2OO/ha.
(Bank data) 35 percent
[] Borrowers whose availed loan was greater than P1,200/ha.
(Farmer's data) 17 percent
With these casesof overfinancing, we have yet another contri-
butory factor to non-repayment because it starts from "malicious
inaCcuracy" or dishonesty on the part of either borrower, farm
managementtechnician or banker or of all three parties. This particu-
lar 1976 TBAC study reported 79 percent of farmer-borrowers
whose loan data are not the same as the information held by the
bank. The 1978 study which did a more thorough investigation of
this matter found almost one,third of borrowers whose reported
credit data differ with bank credit records with respect to amount
of loan, number of loan releases,date of loan approval/release,
amount paid, outstanding amount, and past due amount. To make
the repayment situation even more complicated, about 25 percent
of borrowers indicated making repayments to personsother than
the bank suchas the technician,se/da leader,SamahangNayon lead-
er, etc. The question is whether such payments ever reached the
bank.
[] Self-Financing Post Masagana99
When a farmer-borrower fails to repay his M99 loans,the most
predictable result is that he will drop out from the program either
voluntarily or forcibly becausehe loseshis eligibility. What happens
to these dropouts? TBAC's study of 551 M99 dropouts found that
71 percent of them borrowed from non-M99 sources(relatives,43
percent; private money lenders, 21 percent; friends/neighbors, 20
percent; and landlords,traders/millers, input dealersand other M99
banks, 16 percent). Of the 146 who did not borrow, we can identify
two types of self-financing.
[] Truly self.financed are those farmerswho are eligible to bor-
row from the program but havestoppedparticipating because
of the ability to finance their farm operationsfrom internally
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generated funds. In addition, they utilize the package of
technology recommendedby the program.
r] Self-financed but With outstanding loan are those farmers
who are also able to finance their palay operationswith in-
ternally generatedfunds and employed the packageof tech-
nology but had past due loans. It would be ideal for the pro-
gram if self-financing were accompanied by a continuing
use of the technology package. However, it was observed in
both casesthat the recommendedlevelof technologywascut
down due to budgetary constraints.The study did not indi-
cate whether productivity was.affected by such input cons-
traints.
The truly self-financed category made up 9 percent of
those who refrained from outside borrowingsfor farm opera-
tions. They constitute only 2.5 percent of the total number
of dropouts studied. Table 4.10 shows how M99 dropouts
were able to be self-financing. What is worth noting in this
table is the fact that income from rice production is not the
most mentioned sourceof funds. There were more who used
income derived from ,working in other farms and selling
Other farm products such as livestock and vegetables. For
those with past due loans, income from own business,from
other farm products andcash contributions from family
members were resorted to by more M99 non-eligible drop-
outs.15
These latter observationsmake onewonder to what extent credit
viability dependson incomefrom other sourcesincludingfamily con-
tributions rather than on riceproduction per se.
'Some further clues on potential viability came from the 1978
TBAC surveyon non-repayment through responsesto the question:
"If you cannot borrow now from institutional sourcesbecauseof
past due loans,how do you financeyour farm activities?"
Sixty percent replied "own funds" and thirty-five percent borrowed
from non,institutional sources.Of the 30 percent of 600 M99 bor-
rowers who indicated making loan repayments, 84 percent who re-
paid mentioned income or earnings; 11 percent, sale of assets;4.1
percent, borrowings;and 1.2 percent, cashgivenby relatives.On the
basis of these figures, about 24 percent of total 600 sample bor-
rowers studied are potentially viable borrowers becausethey have
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TABLE 4.i0
DISTRIBUTION OF MASAGANA 99 DROPOUTS ACCORDING
TO METHOD OF SELF-FINANCING, PHASE IX
Not eligible
Source of Eligible becauseof To_al
self-financing (Self.financed) past due
loans
N Percent N Percent N Percent
Incomefrom rice
production 3 23 15 11 18 12
Income from other
farm products1 2 15 30 23 32 22
Income from farm
labor 6 46 19 14 25 17
Incomefrom own
business2 1 8 37 28 38 26
Cashcontributions
from family
members 1 8 32 24 33 23
Total 13 100 133 100 146 100
1proceeds from salesof vegetables, poultry and livestock.
2Small transport business,sari-saristore, rent of farm equipment.
Source: TBAC, "Survey of M99 Dropouts in Nueva Ecija," PCAC, December
1977.
been able to repay loans from income and earnings. It does not say,
however, whether such earnings came from rice production or from
other earnings.
The 60 percent of borrowers who resorted to use of own funds
when they were unable to obtain M99 loans belong to the category
called "self-financing but with outstanding loan". Perhaps in their
case, M99 loans function as external infusions into the farmers' in-
come stream which enable them to survive on a very rationed capita-
lization. Had they repaid their loans, would they really "go under",
so to speak?
Bruce Best,,in his analysis of low repayment rates,draws the fol-
lowing conclusions:
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• . . it seemsthat farmersWith credit arespendingmore for inputsthan
farmerswithout credit, but that, at most, only half of the increase.isbeing
spentonfertilizer andthe other half isbeingspenton hiredlabor. In seasons
with adverseweatherconditions,suchaswet season1974, thin increasein
inputscausesfarmers'incomestofallbelow the incomesof farmersnot using
institutionalcredit and higherinput levels.In Seasonswithout adversewea-
ther conditions,suchasdry 1975, increasesinfertilizer probablyresultedin
higher yields, but income is still not increasedbecauseof the increasein
expendituresfor hired laborwhichwould not necessarilyincreaseincome.
[] Farmerswith institutionalcredit may haveslightlyhigheryieldson
the averagedue to higher levelsof input usethan farmerswithout institu-
tional credit, but there is no differencein net incomefor the two groups.
The amount of loan hasbeenshownto haveno effect onthe net incomeof
samplefarmers•It hasalsobeen shownthat net incomehas little or no ef-
fect onthe farmers'repaymentrate.
[] The main reason for the low repayment rates is the lack of incentives
for farmers to repay, which is due mostly to the non-collateralaspectof
the loan. Clearly, most farmerswill be better off if they do not repaytheir
institutional loans.When granting non-collateral loansto small-scalerice
farmers, it must be expectedthat eventually,the costly problem of high
arrearageswill arise.16
2. Willingness to Repay 17
[] Institutional credit as an innovation
Where the capacity to repay is problematic, perhaps willingness
to repay becomes even more so particularly as Bruce Best points out
that there is lack of incentives for farmers to repay. But M99 is a
major institutional innovation and the process by which it gets
adopted is not unlike that of any other technology introduced to
potential users. The typical adoption process takes the shape of an
inverted pyramid from awareness to adoption. This is illustrated by
the following table regarding knowledge and use of contraceptive
methods. 18 It will be observed that percent of eligible women who
are aware or recognize a method starts from 87.3, a high percentage
which goes down as we look at percent who know how to use the
method. Further reduction is registered as we consider those who
have used the method and finally dwindles to a very small percent
of those who are currently using a method (Table 4.11). However,
the reverse observations occur whereby adopters short-circuit or
skip stages in the adoption process. This is illustrated in Table 4112
which traces the situations of 90 farmer-adopters regarding the pro-
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TABLE 4.11
KNOWLEDGE AND USE OF SELECTED CONTRACEPTIVE METHODS.
1968 AND 1973 (AN ILLUSTRATION OF THE INVERTED PYRAMID)
Percentageof Currently Married WomenAged 15.44
Any Method Pill I U D Rhythm
1968 1973 1968 1973 1968 1973 1968 1973
Recognizemethod 63.1 87.3 43.5 82.9 15,7 67.8 38,6 51.8
Know how to use
method 36.4 50,7 16.7 38.7 4.7 24.7 19,1 22.3
Haveusedmethod 18.7 28,0 3.5 14.2 1.2 4.3 8,9 7.5
Currentlyusing
method 15.5 17.3 1.3 6.9 0.9 2.6 5,5 3.9
Adapted fromi M.B. Concepcionand P.C. Smith, "The DemographicSituation
in the Philippines:An Assessmentin 1977/' Papersof the East-WestPopulation
Institute No. 44, East-WestCenter,Honolulu, Hawaii,June1977.
cess they went through in adopting the innovation. About a third
started with a perception or a definition of farm problem for which a
solution was being sought. Almost 70 percent proceeded from an
awareness of the innovation to adoption without a clear definition
of their farm problem and how the innovation relates specifically
to this problem, Sixty percent skipped the interest stage which in-
volves additional information-seeking especially on the how-to-do-
it aspects of the innovation. Thirty-two and twenty percent omitted
the evaluation and trial stages, respectively, and proceeded directly
from awareness to adoption, thus, shortcircuiting the adoption pro
cess, quite often without the necessary knowledge, skills and under-
standing of the pros and cons surrounding the innovation being
adopted. Twenty percent of the farmer-adopters "rationalized" or
justified their use of the innovation after they have used it. 19
In the case of M99, we cannot help suspecting that adoption pro-
ceeded very much in this "short-circuiting" fashion without regard
to the complexity of this institutional innovation which is composed
of many new and difficult components like:
a) using a bank
b) keeping records
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TABLE 4.12
STAGES IN THE ADOPTION PROCESSUNDERGONE BY 90 FARMER-
ADOPTERS OF AN AGRICULTURAL INNOVATION
Percent of farmer.adopters
Stages who went through each
stage
1. Perception definition of farm problem*
suchasunproductivesoil or damaging
pestsanddiseases 31
2. Awareness-- first knowledgeor first
exposureto the farm practiceor
innovation 69
3. Interest- additionalinformation-
seekingespeciallyonthe instructional
or how-to-do-itaspectsof the interest 40
4. Eva/uation - consideringprosandcons
before applyingthe innovation 32
5. Trial- tentativeor provisionalappli-
cation of the farm practicefor testing
purposes 20
6. Resolution - givingpost-mortem
explanation,rationalization,or
justificationfor the useof the farm
practice 20
*e percent of the adopters perceived their particular farm problem after the trial or
evaluation state,
Adapted from: V. Pb. Samonte,et al, Socio.Communication Factors and
Agricultural Innovativene_ of Coconut Farmers, UP at LosBai_os,April
1976.
c) farm planning and budgeting (hopefully) with accurate and
useful estimates of input-output
d) supervision of the production and marketing process so that
agricultural credit could be optimally used to enable farmers
not only to increase production but to make the enterprise
profitable; and
e) loan repayment which is the indispensable other side of bor-
rowing.
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M99 borrowers,as adopters of agricultural credit, have probably
proceeded from awarenessto adoption without going through the
interest, evaluation and trial stageswhich would_provide them the
knowledge, skills, experience, and management ability needed to
assesstheir repayment capacity and to usecredit effectively and pro*
fitably. This is a new era in rice farm management. In the pastwhen
there was no irrigation, minimal use of purchasedinputs applied on
traditional rice varieties and farmers borrowed only for emergency
and not for production purposes,it was not necessaryto learn how
to usefertilizers and insecticideseffectively, keep records,compute
costsand returns. Now that we have expensiveirrigation, fertilizer,
insecticides,new rice seeds,hired labor and bank credit, the farmer
has to acquire a great deal of farm management sophistication and
appreciation for the scienceand economics of agricultural produc-
tion in order to increaseproductivity, make money to repay loans
and improve quality of life (despite recurring natural calamities,
pestsand diseases).This is a pretty tall order indeed.
In a sense,we might have "oversold" the bright and seductive
angles of credit (the receiving side) but we might not have focused
with equal vigor on the difficult, lessattractive but more demanding
aspect of credit (the giving or returning side) which spells REPAY-
MENT. Let us therefore examine the issueof repayment incentives
and other credit-relatedattitudes and practices.
[] Repayment incentives
In this study, Best reexamined the assumptionsunderlying in-
centives for farmers to repay their loanssuchas: (a) they cannot get
more financing if they fail to repay their current loan; (b) they may
be prosecuted in court or even put in the stockadefor failing to re-
pay; and (c) they will feel morally obligated to repay. Bestattempted
to show why suchincentivesdo not work.
I-I Using revenue and production cost figures based on survey
data and national rice statisticstaken in Central Luzon, Best
illustrates hypothetically how a farmer who does not pay his
loan is better off than the farmer who repays. Comparing
a hypothetical Farmer A who always repays; Farmer B who
does not pay his first loan; and Farmer C who does not pay
his fourth loan, one can see that by PhaseVI, Farmer A
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would have managed to save 1"354; Farmer 8, P980; and
Farmer C, 1_1,842. This showsthat farmers who fail to repay
are rewarded with an increasein their cumulative savings.
F3 Of course, Farmers B and C are taking a chance that they
might be persecuted and put in jail but under the present
system, it is highly unlikely. The rural banker must under-
take the expensesof prosecuting the farmer; but with no col-
lateral, even if the farmer is convicted, the banker still may
not collect the loan. Also, the delinquent farmers are pro-
tected by the large, growing number of past due loans. There
must be thousandsof farmers with delinquent accountssince
Phase I of the M99 program. It is also generallyfelt that the
number of farmers who have actually been prosecuted is
very small.
[] Farmers are supposedto feel morally obligated to repaytheir
loansand probably many of them do; but it is alsoeasy for
others to rationalize not repaying. Often the feeling is that
bankers are wealthy and can afford to take some losses,and
anyway, the money for the loans iscoming from the govern-
ment. This isthe concept of the "dole-out mentality", where
anything that comesfrom the governmentis free.2°
[] Attitudes toward credit
This notion plus other attitudes toward credit, non-repayment,
group borrowing, etc., were examined more intensively by the 1978
TBAC study in the hope of understanding better the other side of
the loan default problem- that of willingness to repay.
Table 4.13 suggeststhat farmers seemto havegotten themessage
and the conviction on the role of credit in increasingproduction and
farm income. There is a very substantialconsensus(92 percent) that
"the best way to increasefarm income isto borrow capital" and that
"if production loans are not made available to farmers, production
will decline" (86 percent). Although respondentsin generalviewed
credit very positively, and regardborrowing from the bank as some-
thing a farmer shouldnot be ashamedof (87 percent), it is not con-
sidered as an "unqualified good", There is a seamy side to credit.
More than 30 percent felt that "farmers borrow money from the
bank only becausethey have been encouragedto do so and not be-
cause they want to." Whether this is an actual experienceon their
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TABLE 4.13
FARMER.BORROWER'S ATTITUDES TOWARD CREDIT, LOAN
REPAYMENT, THE BANK, GROUP BORROWING, AND THE
DOLE-OUT SYNDROME
Attitudes toward credit Yes , No Tom/
Pe/cent
1. The bestway to increasefarm income
isto borrowcapital. 92 S 100
2. If productionloansarenot made
availableto farmers,productionwill
decline 86 14 100
3. One shouldborrow moneyonly in caseof
emergencycrisis. 62 38 100
4. Borrowingfrom the bank issomethinga
farmershouldbe ashamedof. 13 87 100
5. Farmersborrow moneyfrom the bankonly
becausethey havebeenencouragedto do
soandnot becausethey want to. 31 69 100
B. Borrowinghasmadelife difficult for
many farmers. 32 68 100
7. Farmersshouldobtain productionloans
only when thereisa technicianto
supervisethe useof the loan. 60 40 100
Attitudes toward loan repayment
1. A farmerwho cannotrepayhisloancan
only blamehimself. 67 33 100
2. If there aremany farmerswhodo not
repaytheir loans,it isall right for a
farmernot to pay hisloanevenif he
canafford to do so. 7 93 100
3. Farmersdo not pay loansbecausebanks
do notgoto themto collect. 11 89 100
4. Delinquentfarmersshouldbe penalized. 71 29 100
5. A farmer shouldnot losesleepoverhis
unpaid loans. 41 59 100
Attitudes toward the bank
1. It is betterto borrow moneyfrom the
privatemoneylenderthanthe bank. 17 83 100
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Table 4.1.3(con't)
Attitudes toward credit Yes No Total
Percent
2. It isdifficult to borrow from the bank. 37 63 100
3. One of the objectivesof the bank is to
help farmersimprovefarm income. 97 3 100
4. The bankertreatsthe farmeras a friend. 94 6 100
5. The bank isa safeplaceto depositmoney. 99 1 100
ThedOle-out syndrome Yes No Total
1. It is the government'sresponsibilityto
provideproductioncreditto farmers. 93 7 100
2. Fundsof the bankcomefrom the
government 79 21 100
3. Farmershavea rightto production loans
from the bankregardlessof capacityto
repay. 49 51 100
A ttitude$ toward group borrowing
1, Do you preferto borrow asan
individual? 89 11 100
2. In caseof grouploans,if the other
groupmembersdo not repay,do you
considerit your obligationto repay
-their loans? 45 55 100
Soume: TBAC, "A Study on the Non-repaymentof Agricultural Loansin the
Philippines,"PCAC,1978,
part or a rationalization is not clear but nonetheless the possibility
of an "overexposure" or "oversell" on the advantages of credit
cannot be totally discounted. There is even a tendency to revert to
the old traditional value as shown by 62 percent who agreed with the
statement that "one should borrow money only in cases of emer-
gency and crisis". The other piece of evidence on the "negative side"
of credit was sugges(ed by one-third of the borrowers who said that
"borrowing money from the bank has made life difficult for many
farmers". An element or a "tinge of regret" could be detected from
these reactions.
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Despite all these, it appearsthat with the advent of M99, borrow-
ing money for Production has become more fashionablein compari-
son to the past such as evidencedin a 1963 study which gave "ab-
senceof debts" as a characteristicof a progressivefarmer. A restudy
in 1969 of the same sample reported a decline in respondentsgiving
thisanswer from 26 to 6 percent.21
[] Attitudes toward repayment
Since borrowing money is not regardedas something a farmer
should be ashamedof, does it mean that inability to repay loanshas
also become socially acceptable? The evidencesare mixed in this
regard. More than two-thirds of the borrowers believe that a farmer
who cannot repay his loan can only blame himself. About 70 percent
also endorse penalty for delinquent farmersand practically everyone
rejected the "bandwagon" hypothesison non-repayment, The res-
pondents disagreewith the notion that "if many do not repaytheir
loans, it is all right for a farmer not to pay his loan even if he can
afford to do so". The cutting edge of the "wrongness" in "joining"
the delinquents seemsto lie in the condition "if he canafford to do
so". Apparently, a farmer might be "morally comfortable" about
joining the ranksof the "delinquents" if he does not havethe capa-
city to repay. A more disturbing note on what appearsto bea grow-
ing acceptability of loan default may be gleanedfrom the fact that
more than 40 percent said "a farmer should not lose sleepover his
unpaid loan". In the light of these attitudes, one could speculate
that perhaps penalty for delinquents have been endorsed by the
majority for either of three reasons.Penalty might be consideredas
a substitute for or in lieu of repayment. In other words, if they are
penalized, they do not have to repay. A second possible reasonis
that farmers realizethe limits to penalty which can be imposedwhen
their loans are non-collaterized. Imprisonmentalsohasits coststo the
government. A third possibility is that penalizing so many farmers
might not be as easy and as practical to implement. As Bestputs it:
"Delinquent farmers are protected by the large growing number of
past due loans."
On balance, we could say that non-repayment is still regardedas
"wrong" but not "so wrong" that one needsto be terribly concerned
as to losesleepabout it.
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AS far as feelings about group borrowing are concerned, more
than half of the respondentssaid that "in group borrowing, if the
other group members do not repay, they do not consider it their ob-
ligation to repay their loans". Assuming responsibility for defaults
of group members is not well accepted. The preference is over_
whelmingly in favor of individual borrowing and as far asrepayment
behaviorgoes,there are more good borrowersamongindividual than
amonggroup borrowers.
[] Attitudes toward supervision by the technician
M99 is meant to be a supervised credit scheme and as such, the
technician really lies at the heart of the program between the farmer
and the bank. In effect, he provides the farmer his passport to the
M99 loan via his signature in the farm plan and budget which is pre-
sented to the bank. It is important therefore to ascertain what farmer-
borrowers think of him. On the whole, technicians are highly re-
garded and technical supervision is valued. More than 80 percent
believe a technician will make a good farmer. Furthermore, about 60
percent think that "farmers should obtain production loans only
where there is a technician to supervise the use of the loan". A ma-
jority of them would like to be visited by the technician one to three
times a month or oftener. Despite these encouraging reactions to
supervision, it is necessary to find out why 40 percent do not think
that technical supervision is necessary. To what extent have techni-
cians played their supervisory farm management role by assisting in
the farm plaoning and budgeting? Or is the farm plan and budget
used just as an "expedient paper work" to legitimize non-collaterized
credit?
[] Attitudes toward the bank
Respondents have positive assessment of the bank as a better
place to borrow from than a private money lender; as a farmer's
friend whose objective is to help the farmer increase his income and
as a safe place to deposit money. The bank's image however suffers a
little bit in terms of easewith which one can obtain loans. About a
third of them think it is difficult to borrow money from a bank.
Majority also do not blame non-repayment on the bank's inability to
go to them to collect.
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[] Credit-related Record Keeping and Decision=Making
In obtaining and utilizing loans, record-keeping of some kind is
needed. Less than 40 percent of M99 borrowers kept records and
among those who did, the wife performed the function for almost
half of them. The farmer did it himself for more than a third. Unfor-
tunately, record-keeping by the wife is not associated with better re-
payment although in total, there were more record keepers among
the good than the delinquent borrowers.
Decisions on whether or not to borrow, how much, where to
borrow, when and how much to repay are made more jointly by
farmer and his wife for almost 60 percent and farmer only for a third
of the borrowers (Table 4.14). Although less than 10 percent of the
borrowers admitted that the technician made decisions in the credit
process, we are inclined to believe that this influence is considerably
greater and is probably imbedded in the 30 percent of farmer only
decisions. After all, the technician's endorsement of the farm plan
and budget is a prerequisite for the loan approval. The most interest-
ing findings in Table 4.14 are those which pertain to "who obtains
the loan proceeds from the bank and who holds the cash portion of
the loan." Two-thirds of the farmer-borrowers obtained the loan
proceeds but the same proportion of wives held the cash portion of
the loan. The wife therefore has to be made as much a participant
in the credit-extension-farm management-educational process as the
farmer especially in the light of the fact that loans have also been
used for family living expenses, It is virtually impossible to separate
farm and home expenditures especially for small farmers. It is also
very curious that 4 percent said the technician and 14 percent indi-
cated that other relatives obtained loan proceeds from the bank.
What happens to the loan proceeds between these intermediaries
and the farmer-borrower? Is this an indication that the M99 loan is
not held "sanguine" by the borrower and therefore it is entrusted
to somebody else?
[] The Dole-Out Syndrome
There has always been the s_picion that farmers regard the
loans as dole-outs and therefore there is no senseof urgency to re-
pay. Because it is difficult to ascertain the prevalence of this men-
tality, we can only infer from indirect evidence such as 93 percent
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of borrowers who believe that "it is the government's responsibility
to provide production credit to farmers". Almost 80 percent know
that "the funds of the banks come from the government". Further-
more, about half of th.embelievethat "farmers havethe right to pro-
duction loans from the bank regardlessof capacity to repay". When
these evidencesare related to the important role which they think
credit plays in preventing production decline, yvecan interpret these
responsesas suggestiveof an incipient dole-out mentality especiallyif
they are aware of how anxious the government is to enhance pro-
duction.
[] Credit-Shy Farmers
In contrast to the rice farmers who have been the dominant tar-
get of M99, the small coconut farmersremain quite conservativewith
respect to indebtedness. A survey of 2,000 coconut farmers in
20 Leyte municipalities who obtained a total of 1,503 loans re-
vealed that 87 percent of these loans came from non-institutional
sources such as middlemen, private stores patronized, landlords,
friends and relatives.When askedabciutsourcepreference,they rank-
ed middlemen first; followed by "stores patronized", and "relatives",
as third. Themost frequently givenreasonfor preferring non-institu-
tional sourceswas "credit is readily available when needed". Some
said that the lender, particularly the middleman, was usually the
buyer of their produce. Most of these respondentsalso claim that
credit from such sourceswas interest-free. This may not be an accu-
rate picture of the situation becausesomelenderswho did not charge
interest got other formsof rewardsuchaspegginga slightdiscounton
the price of the debtor's copra which are sold exclusivelyto them.
This is true to most middlemen-lenders.
As regardsthe usesof credit, lessthan 4 percent of 2,000 respon-
dents obtained credit solely for coconut production; 10 percent used
credit partially for coconut production while 61 percent obtained
credit but not for production. Money was used mainly for family
needs. About one-fourth did not usecredit at all for that year. Those
who borrowed for farming purposesusedthe money to finance most-
ly the labor inputs.
Becauseof the subsistencelevel existence of most of these coco-
nut farmer-respondents, and the predominant use of credit to meet
home and family needs, there is ironically a credit aversiondue to
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fear of being unable to repay and the feeling of insecurity when in-
debted. Credit hasa "negative" value becauseit is associatedwith the
urgency of meeting basicneedsrather than the "positive" promiseof
productive uses.As a matter of fact, even with referenceto produc-
tivity, 64 percent of the farmers prefer "lower yield without debts"
to "higher yield with debts". They likewise prefer a "life of scarcity
without debts" (76 percent) than "an abundant life without
debts.''22 Is it really possibleto promise these farmersa life of abun-
dancethrough the useof credit?
[] Post-M99 Credit "Viability" Aversion or Opportunism
While the small Leyte coconut farmer exhibited a traditional
"credit-shyness" associated with borrowing mainly for emergency
and subsistencepurposes,someM99 non-repayersdeveloped"credit-
aversion", after their "unpleasant" experience of successiveloan de-
faults since 1975, In July 1980, a study was conducted amongthe
149 defaulting members of the PinagbayananBarrio Association in
Pila, Laguna in order to determinethe statusof their projects andto
inquire into possibilities or alternatives available to help liquidate
their debts, Fifty-seven percent continued on with projects mostly
on duck-raisingand a few were engagedin swine production. Forty-
three percent had ceasedto manageprojects. When those who had
projectswere askedasto how their enterpriseswere financed,55 per-
cent indicated using their own capital and resources; 32 percentwere
assistedby the Barrio Association, while 5 percent combined their
own resourceswith those from the Association. Eight percent bor-
rowed capital from private money lendersor resortedto the old live-
stock sharing system with the animals (called iwi system) provided
by the owner. Lessthan half of thosewith projectsreported that they
were earning from these. About 40 percent were not making money
from their enterprises and 14 percent were not yet earning.When
asked if they want to have a new project, 21 percent of total loan
defaulters said "No" becausethey are afraid of getting deeper in
debt, consideringthe large unpaid loan balancesin the Rural Bank.
The most frequently mentioned reasonfor inability to repay loans
was the death of their ducks; the low eggproduction due to incle-
ment weather and fluctuating feed supply especially during the
typhoons.
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Since the loans to these farmers were given through the Barrio
Association which was organized in 1970 with an initial member-
ship of 19, the accumulation of unpaid loansfrom the Rural Bank
has taken its toll on the .organizationitself. In 1979, out of 223
members, only about 20 percent were actively supporting the Asso-
ciation in terms of attending meetings,giving the eggsproduced to
the Barrio Association store and repaying their bank balances. In
view of this, the Rural Bank thought of refinancing new projectsto
enable membersto repay. What is intriguing is the presenceof groups
of farmer defaulters:
a) those who are able to continue on with projects usingtheir
own capital and resources(31 percent of 149 defaultersstu-
died)
b) those who continue to haveprojects usingcapital from other
sources
c) those who havediscontinuedprojects;and haveno desireand
in fact a real fear of borrowing again for a new project.
d) those who already have continuing projects and want to use
credit againfrom the Rural Bank
e) those who have no project but want to borrow anew in order
to haveone.23
Since all of thesefarmershaveunpaid loan balances,is it possible
that the first group who havebeen able to continue on with projects
using their own resources have attained viability by not repaying
their loans?Who among these groupsare "rehabilitable" in terms of
new infusion of credit and who among them are just waiting for an-
other round of "income transfers" from the government via the
Rural Bank? There is no question that the loan defaults have also
"burned" a group of farmers as far ascredit is concerned. How does
this group compare with the others in terms of willingness to take
risks,opportunism and entrepreneurship?Are those wanting to take
advantageof new loans being "opportunistic" or "entrepreneurial'"
C. Group Lending
One of the most important features of the M99 program is the
lending to groups of farmers who usually do not havecollateral to
offer. Other farmers with collateral to offer can participate in the
program even if they are not membersof a group which is popularly
known as the Selda. It is composed of 5-15 farmers (reducedto 5.7
230 Masagana99
in Phase VII) and organized based on any or a combination of the
following criteria:
I-I Affinity of farmers to each other. Farmers must know each
other intimately, either as close friends, neighbors in the bar-
rio or closely related to each other.
[] Contiguity of farms. Farms must be adjacent to each other
or located in the same barrio,
[] Size of farm. The size of the farms must more or less be
equal.
[] Comparable yields. Productivity performances must likewise
be similar for all members of a given selda,
[] Same number of cropping seasons. Selda members must at
least have the same number of cropping seasons based on
available irrigation facilities or cropping patterns in case the
second crop is not rice.
[] Willingness to undertake the joint liability agreement.
On April 1, 1976, the Executive Director of the National Food
and Agricultural Council (NFAC) issued a memorandum restructur-
ing the Selda for M99 and Masaganang Maisan (Corn program). From
this memo, we could gather that group lending was in trouble:
The existingselda systemhasbeenidentifiedasoneof the major impe-
diments to effective collections.Farmerswho can pay, do not pay since
they will be disqualifiedfrom newcrop loansbecauseoneor more members
of the selda haveunpaid pastdue loans,Farmersare not alsofully awareof
the ioint liability concept - that in the event of a defaultingmember,the
rest of the selda must jointly andseverallyshoulderthe paymentof the un-
paid loan of its defaultingmember.On the other hand,someseldamembers
do not want to shoulderthe unpaidloansof defaultingmemberssincetheir
co-membersare strangersto them.
The instruction on the restructuring of the selda focused on the
joint liability is evidenced by the following guidelines:
[] Provincial ProgramOfficersand productiontechnicians(PTs) conduct
educationalcampalgn/farmers'classeson the mechanicsOf the super-
visedcredit schemeemphasizingthe conceptof theselda systemandre-
sponsibilitiesof farmer-borrowersundertaking a joint liability agree-
ment.
[] A minimum of 5 farmers shouldcomposea selda with one of them
electedas Selda leader.Five to seven,preferably five, shouldbe target
selda size.The selda leadershall act as the spokesmanof the selda.He
shall report to the bank any misgivingsthey mayhave in respecto the
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actionsor lack of It on the part of the PTsassignedto work with them
or on the part of any bank field personneldealingwith them or on the
part of any seedor inputsupplier.He shallalsoseeto it that all require-
meritsof the programarefulfilled by the #e/damembers.
The minimum of 5 isset so that in caseany memberor members
fail to pay for their loans,the restof the memberscan sustainamortiza-
tion installmentson unpaid balancesof the non-payingmemberswith-
out too great a difficulty. Installmentsover a three-seasonperiod or
moreshouldbe allowedasmuchaspossible.
[] New seldasmay be formed to regroupfarmersaCcordingto previously
mentioned criteriaand arewillingto acceptthe responsibilitiesimposed
by the joint liability conceptandon the followingcondition:
[] If the farmerscomefrom a seldawhereone or moremembershavepast
due loan obligations,underthe program,they can only be allowedto
form a new selda after signinga new promissorynot_ undertakingto
Paythe unpaidbalanceof the delinquentmembersundera planof pay-
ment of the institution. The farmerswill be reimbursedaccordinglyif
and when the Bank succeedsin enforcingcollectionsfrom the delin-
quent farmers,The first installment must be made beforea new crop
loancanbe extendedto the new selda.
I-I Old se/dasthatmeetthe abovecriteriacan be maintainedwith the same
membership.They likewisewill be allowed new loanson the condition
that they havepaid their loan obligations. If somemembersof sucha
se/da have past due balances,the memberswill haveto enter into an
undertakingto amortizetheseoverdueloansunderthe sametermsand
proceduresdescribedinthe preced_!ngparagraph.24
It is quite obvious from the requirements cited above that the
Selda from the M99 point of view is a device for ensuring loan repay-
ments. It has not been intended for group development and not even
specifically for increasing productivity. In effect, as far as the pro-
gram is concerned, grouping borrowers into seldas is a "substitute"
for collaterals.
How has the Selda as a group lending scheme performed in its
"repayment insurance role"? Matienzo's detailed analysis of 90 sel-
das, 296 selda borrowers, 214 non-selda borrowers from Camarines
Sur revealed the following findings:
[] Group lending has shown no effect on repayment. Selda
members reported a 67 percent repayment rate while non-
selda borrowers registered 65 percent.
[] One of the benefits expected from grouping borrowers is the
possible reduction in the transaction cost of acquiring loans.
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It was assumedthat under grouped situations, insteadof all
borrowers taking time off from work to negotiate loansindi-
dually, only one or two membersof the group may go to the
bank and make the loan transaction for all the members.
Number of trips, therefore, would be lower on per individual
basisand sowith the other costsassociatedwith thesetrips.
Data showed that se/da groupinghasnot effected the expect-
ed cost reduction. On per individualbasis,the estimatedaver-
age expenditures per loan for the selda borrowers wasP20.64
againstP21.02 for the non-selda borrowers.
[] Comparing old and new se/das,those with borrowing experi-
ence showed a higher repayment rate (71 percent) than the
new ones (64 percent). The more experienced se/dasalsoex-
hibited lower transaction costs P11 asagainst P8 for the new
se/das. Since no comparisons between experienced and new
non.seida borrowers are available, it is not possibleto attri-
bute better repayment to the Selda grouping. Perhapsit isthe
borrowing experienceand not the fact of belongingto a selda
for a longerperiod which contributed to better repayment.
[] Two-member and five-member seldas did not differ in their
repayment rates (67 and 68 percent, respectively). In terms
of credit transaction costs, the two member-groupsincurred
P8 cashcost per individual while P11 was incurred by the 5-
membergroups.
[] One of the criteria for selda formation is the degreeof close-
nessof relationship among members. Seldas made up predo-
minantly of relatives (blood or affinity) could be assumedto
be more closely knit than those made up largely of friends,
neighbors, etc. Fifty-five percent of seldas studied were
predominantly relativesasagainst45 percentwhich were pre-
dominantly friends. The former groups reported higher
repaymentrate (73 percent). The latter registered58 percent.
I-I Although contiguity of farms is a requirement for selda for-
mation, 55 percent of seldasstudied hadpredominantly non-
contiguous farms. In any case,contiguity of farms failed to
show better repayment and reducedtransactioncosts,
[3 Twenty-two percentof the seldashad no leadersbut the pres-
ence of a leader in 78 percentof the groupsshowedno signi-
ficant difference in repayment rate and transactioncosts.
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[] One of the expected advantagesof organizing farmers into a
joint liability group is "the group and related pressuresthat
can be exerted on any one memberwho may or may want to
default in the repayment of his loan." Group pressureis pre-
sent since the group cannot negotiate for another loan until
all accountabilitiesof all the membersare settled. Pressureon
the members can also come from the selda leader and the
technician assignedto the group. Thirty-three out of 90 ael-
das studied were paid selda$.Among these33, fourteen selda$
could have becomedelinquent had pressurefrom the group,
the leaderand the technician not preventedat leastone mem-
ber in each selda from defaulting. In 10 of these 14 seldas,
collection pressurecame from the group members_in 3, from
the technioian;and in one, from the group leader. In one of
the seldas, the individual concerned was forced to sell his
farm and household assets;in 4 seldas, the borrowerswen
forced to obtain tunds from outside sources,while in the 9
other seldas, members did not know where and how their co-
members were able to procure the funds needed for the re-
payment of their loans.For the M99 program, suchpressures
on the borrowers are certainly regardedas a positive effect
whether it relates to those who did not have the capacityto
repay but were forced to do soor to others who had the ca-
pacity to repay but may havehadthe inclination to postpone
full or partial repayment.
[] Group pressurecan also have a negativeeffect, i.e., members
who have the capacity to repay Would choose not to do so
because his co*members are not repaying. It is therefore
among members of delinquent seldas Where the negativeef-
fect becomesoperational. A delinquent selda could be com-
posed either of: (a) all fully delinquent selda members;(b) all
partially delinquent selda members;or (c) a mixture of fully
paid, partially delinquent and fully delinquent selda mem-
bers. The 57 delinquent se/daswith a membershipof 193 had
48 fully paid members; 26 were fully delinquent and 117
were partially delinquent. For the 48 fully paid selda mem-
bers, the negative effect was not operational. They fully re-
paid their loans despite the fact that their co-memberswere
defaulting for various reasons. Pressure from the paying
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members could not havebeen effective sincethey were a mi-
nority in the group.
When the partially delinquent and fully delinquent se/da
members were askedwhy they had defaulted, 75 percent of
them indicated "no capacity to repay". Twenty_five percent
include those who admitted the "negative effect" and others
who did not specify their reasons. Based on income esti-
mates, only about 64 percent of delinquent borrowers did
not have the capacity to repay becauseof negative net in-
come. Hence, there is a difference of 11 percent between the
75 percent who gave "no capacity to repay" as a reasonfor
defaulting and those who actually had negative net income
(64 percent). This 11 percent can be regardedas those who
might have h_d the capacity to repay but had chosennot to
do so due to the negative effect. Adding this11 percent to
the 25 percent who openly admitted the negative effect, we
havea total of 36 percent of delinquent borrowerswho had
succumbedto the pressure not to repay from their non-re-
paying co-members.
['3 Although 78 percent of borrowers know rural bank lending
procedures,83 percent do not know how to prepare an ac-
tual farm plan and budget even the simple one beingusedin
the program. Furthermore, although 75 percent hadattended
at least one training course on rice production, 76 percent
still felt they needed the supervisionof technicians.Majority
of the borrowers said that technician visitswere made before
harvest time; not during harvest and threshing times which
are the more strategicperiodsfor collection efforts or at least
loan reminders.
[] Of the 9 rural bankers included in the study, 8 indicatedthat
a certain number of their borrowers couldgraduate from be-
ing a group borrower to an individual borrower without colla-
teral and co-maker.2s (This is again another evidence that
group lendingis a substitutefor collateraland that graduating
into individual lendingis a "higher-order" objective.)
D. M99 and the Informal Rural Financial Markets
During the peak of M99 lending sometime in 1974, informal
sourcesof credit seemedto be on their way out but by 1975, the
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rapid deterioration in loan repaymentsand the drop in the number
of eligible borrowers triggered off a revival of informal credit mar-
kets. The nature and magnitude of this revival has been captured in
many ways by the 1978 TBAC study on informal rural financial
markets.2e The following trends are particularly relevant to this re-
view because of the relationship between M99 and the informal
credit system:
[] Shift in credit source and purpose. A survey of 1,828 farm
householdsin 115 barriosof Bulacan,CamarinesSur and Isa-
bela revealed that although 60 percent of them were able to
participate in at least one supervised credit program in the
past, by 1978, more than 90 percent of them borrowed from
informal sources.A more intensive study of the 1,828 farm
households showed that only 39 percent of the sample in
Bulacan,32 percent in Camarines Sur and 19 percent in Isa-
bela were able to obtain loans from banking institutions.
Total loansfrom formal sourcesaccountedfor 38 percent of
total volume of loans for Bulacan;43 percent in Camarines
Sur; and 23 percent in Isabela. These figures suggestthe de-
cline in the role of formal credit source and the upsurge of
informal private money lending.
In addition, the farmer's purpose for obtaining loanshas
changed from one that was primarily consumptive in nature
in the 1950s to one that is primarily for production. Farm
studiesin the fifties reported that the bulk of farmers' loans
were used for subsistenceand quasi-consumptivepurposes.
Preliminary survey resultsin 1978 revealedthat 65 percent of
farm households interviewed in Bulacan, 58 percent in Isa-
bela and 72 percent in Camarines$ur reported they obtained
production credit from their informal sources in 1978. On
the other hand, only 30 percent in Bulacan, 15 percent in
Isabela, and 63 percent in CamarinesSur reported that they
alsoobtained consumptioncredit from informal loan sources.
A more intensive survey from this sample found that 72.4
percent of the total number of informal loanswere reported-
ly for farm production purposes.Almost 90 percent of for-
mal loans were used for production although as mentioned
earlier, the volume of credit coming from this sourcehad de-
clined. The intensive survey of 915 farmers who obtained a
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total of 2,153 loans showsthat only 16 percent of them
came from formal sources.
Further evidences of production.oriented borrowing is
the substantial fertilizer and pesticide components of infor-
mal credit amounting to as much as 43 percent in Bulacan,
25 percent in CamarinesSur and 21 percent in Isabela.More-
over, 1 out of 6 of the money lenderssurveyedwere engaged
in input dealershipeither as a key or a secondarybusiness
line. It is probably this involwment of private money lenders
in servicingthe fertilizer and pesticideneedsof farmerswhich
has sustainedyields despite the decline in the volume of for-
mal credit.
[] Emergence of new private money lenders. The classcomposi-
tion of private money lenders seemsto have been altered
with landlords and palay traders losing their formerly maior
control of the rural credit market, and input dealers together
with farmers cultivating an averagefarm of lessthan 7 hec-
tares (48 percent of them had less than 3 hectares)joining
the group of moneylenders.In this TBAC study, formal lend-
ing institutions in the 3 provincescontributed around one-
third of the total volume of loans of the sample farmers,
while landlords and palay traders contributed 12.2 and 14.8
percent, respectively, or a total contribution of 27 percent.
On the other hand, farmer-lenderscontributed 13.6 percent
while input dealerscontributed 9.6 percent or a total contri-
bution of 23.2 percent of the total volume of loansof the
samplefarmers.
With the above changes in the structure of rural credit
markets, the older crop of moneylenderswho have been in
money-lending since the fifties, seem to have been replaced
by a new group of moneylenderswho startedtheir money-
lending operations in 1968 or later. For a better picture of
these 163 moneylenders,the following are their generalcha-
racteristics:one-fourth of them are female; 15 percentare 60
years old and above; 24 percent are 39 years old and
younger, with an averageage of 37; more than a third have
only elementary schooling: another third havecollegeeduca-
tion; 21 percent (35) havehad 11 to over 20 yearsof money-
lending experience but half startedthe businessonly in 1973
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or later. Three out of the 35 moneylenderswith this much
experience are currently ownersof rural banks.Sixty-two of
163 samplemoneylendersare farmersengagedmostly in crop
production (54) and 8 are livestock/poultry raisers. Twenty-
four are landlordswho are simultaneously either rice millers
(5); palay traders (9); input dealers (3); storeowner (1); and
construction materials dealer/contractor (6). Thirty-two of
the moneylenders are engaged in palay training as a key
business;10 in rice milling; 13 are input dealers; 7 are store-
owners; 5 are mainly moneylenders; 3 are construction con-
tractors; 4 are in cottage industry; 2 are teachersand one isa
midwife. Since majority of thesemoneylendershaveonly ele-
mentary or high school education, they havehad humble be-
ginnings making it to their present position by engagingin
entrepreneurial activities, 82 percent of whom were in key
businessesdirectly associated with the rice production-pro-
cessingindustry.
Tracing the entry of moneylenders into rural credit mar-
kets, the study found an accompanyingexpansion of their
entrepreneurial activities through diversification of invest-
ment. For example, as of 1967, only 2 out of 10 farmer mo-
neylenders were engagedin moneylending. This increasedto
6 out of 10 as of 1972 and by 1978, all of them were in-
volved in the business.As of 1967, very few of the farmer-
moneylenders had other undertakings except farming. As
of 1972, one out of 5 had a backyard poultry or piggery proj-
ect; one out of 7 was engagedin palay trading, one out of 10
had a sari-saristore;one out of 20 had a passengerjeepney or
a cargo truck. By 1978, one out of 3 operated a backyard
poultry or piggery project, one out of 5 had a sari-saristore;
one out of 4 wasengagedin palay trading.
Table 4.15 showssome very interesting trends. All types
of moneylenders(farmer, landlord, palay trader, miller, input
dealer and storeowner) registered increasinginvolvement in
rice production from 1967 to 1978. Does this mean they
have had greater accessto farm land over this period because
of gains from their entrepreneurial activities? Among the
landlords, for example, only 50 percent were engagedin crop
production in 1967 but as of 1978, all of them were in it.
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This could suggest that post-land reform transfers of cultiva-
tion or even ownership rights are taking place. Does this
imply that some farmers had likewise dropped out of being
farm operators and become hired farm labor or moved to
non-farm jobs?
Every moneylender also registered increasing diversifica-
tion during that period but the landlord and the palay trader
registered the greatest diversification and the storeowner, the
least. It is evident from the data that once an entrepreneur
gets a foothold in one business, opportunities to enter other
businessesopen up for him, too.
To illustrate the expansion in product and credit mar-
kets:
As of the year 1967, only 94 out of the 163 privatemoneylenders
were engagedin at leastone form of businessundertaking.These94 en-
trepreneursoperated168 businessundertakingsor an averageof 1.8 un-
dertakings per entrepreneur. Between 1968 and 1978, the other 69'
samplemoneylendersbecame involvedin rural entrepreneurialactivi-
ties. A total of 383 new businessundertakingswere establishedby all
the samplemoneylendersduring thisperiod,thus raisingthe total num-
ber of businessundertakingsof the sampleto 551 asof 1978. The aver-
age number of businessundertakings roseto ,3.4 per moneylenderin
1978, an increaseof 89 percentoverthe 10-yearperiod.
Only 35 out of the 94 entrepreneurswere engagedin moneylend-
ing asof 1967. By 1978, all of the 163 samplemoneylenderswere al-
ready involved in moneylending.This implies a 266 percentincreasein
the numberof entrepreneurswho diversified into the rural credit mar-
ketsduringthe period 1968 to 1978.
As of 1978, more than half of the samplemoneylendersalready
had two to three businessundertakingsand one-thirdhad four to five.
In 1978 alone, they generateda total of P218.7 million funds, 72.4
percent of which camefrom merchandisesalesof their variousunder-
takings, 10.2 percent were collectionsof accountreceivables,9A per-
cent were loan availments,of which 8.9 came from banking institu-
tions and0.4 from informal sources`
Of the total funds generatedin 1978, P160 million were usedto
finance inventory, as well as to defray operatingexpenses,Forty-one
percentof this amountwasinvestedby input dealers,28 percentby pa-
lay traders,20 percentby rice millers and only 3.5 percentby farmer-
moneylenderL Investmentsin moneylendlngoperationsalone amount-
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ed to P19.7millionio 1978, of which94.7 percentwereloangrants
and5.3 percentwentto administrativeexpenses.
The trend of theseinvestmentsclearly suggeststhe profit-
able opportunities opened up by the seed-fertilizer revolu-
tion, the irrigation expansion and cheap rural credit which
theseentrepreneurshad taken advantageof.
Lending practices and lenderborrower relations
Private moneylendershavetraditionally been stereotyped
as "leeches" sucking blood from the poor and the needy.
How much of this stereotype is borne out by this study of
both lenders and borrowers?When askedabout their reasons
for being engaged in moneylending, 50 percent of 162
moneylenders interviewed gavethe obviousresponse"to earn
additional income"; 44 percent said "to help people in
need"; 4 percent mentioned that "they cannot refuse a
friend" and 2 percent, other reasons.Criteria used in select-
ing borrowers on the basis of rank were: (1) good credit
standing; (2) urgency of need; (3) kinship tie; (4) good finan-
cial standing; (5) availability of security and (6) guarantor/
co-maker.
We can be cynical about such motivations as "to help
people inneed" but this is the function they perform even
for a "juice". Table 4.16 showsthat private moneylendersare
primarily businessmen.Their clientele are mostly "non-rela-
tions." ,Only a fourth of the farmer-borrowerssaidthat their
lendersare neighbors,friends or relatives but the other bor-
rowers are not necessarily"unknown" to the lender or his
"agents." It is important for lendersto know their clientsbe-
cause the private moneylending businessis based very much
on "mutual trust". Table 4.17 showsthat while 75 percent of
formal loansrequired promissory notesand the rest and gua-
rantors, land titles and chattel mortgage,informal loanswere
securedonly by verbal promises (61 percent) and the rest by
promissory notesand crop liens. These verbal promisesseem
to work becauseTable 4.18 indicatesthat for fully matured
loans in 1978, only 48 percent of formal loanshad beenfully
paid as against72 percent of informal Iodns.Moreover, total
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TABLE 4.16
RELATIONS OF FARMER-BORROWERSWITH SOURCESOF
INFORMAL LOANS OBTAINED IN 1978
Camarines
Kinship des Bulacan Sur Isabela Total
N=537 N=417 N=811 N= 1298
(In Percent)
None 70 56 84 74
Neighbor 11 25 4 11
Friend 1 1 1 1
Relative 19 18 11 15
lstdegree relativea (6) (9) (5) (6)
2nd degreerelativeb (13) (9) (6) (9)
8Includes members of immediate family, i.e,, I_¢ents and children.
blncludes all other relatives who are not members of immediate family,
Source:TBAC, "Explaining InterestRatesin Informal Rural FinancialMarkets,"
PresidentialCommitteeon AgriculturalCredit, February 1980.
TABLE 4.17
COLLATERALS USED ON 2,153 FORMAL AND INFORMAL LOANS
OBTAINED BY 915 FARMERS 1978
Formal Informal
Collateral used loans loans Total
No. _.347 No. = 1806 No. = 2153
- Percentwho usedeachcollateral-
Verbal promise - 61 51
Written promi_zorynote 75 0.7 13
Guarantor 5 0.8 2
Croplien1 and promissorynote - 35 29
Land title 14 1 3
ChattelMortgage 6 0.8 2
Land title andchattelmortgage - 0.2 -
Others - 0.5 -
1Ved)al agreements to _11 the fizrmer's produce to the moneylender.
Source: TBAC, "Explaining Interest Ratesin Informal Rural Fi_l_ial
Markets," op. ci¢
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TABLE 4.18
REPAYMENT RATES ON 347 FORMAL AND 1,699 INFORMAL FULLY
MATURED LOANS OF 915 FARMER-BORROWERS, 1976
LevelsOf Repay-
ment (In per- No, of Per- Average No, of Per- Average
cent of the Loans cent Repavment Loans cent Repayment
amount of loan)
0 75 21.0 0 281 16.5 0
1 - 20 29 8.4 13.3 11 0.6 15.0
21 - 40 32 9.2 38.4 3 2.3 34.8
41 - 60 25 7.2 51.0 55 3.2 49,9
61 - 80 14 4.0 71.0 65 3.8 71.8
81 - 99 6 1.7 92.8 33 1.9 88.8
100 166 147.8 100.0 1215 71.5 100.0
Total 347 100.0 60.6 1699 100.0 78.5
Source: TBAC, "Explaining SnterestRatesin Informal Rural Financial
Markets," op. c/t-
loan payments as a percentage of total amount due was re-
corded at 78.5 percent for informal loans as against 60,6
percent for formal !oans. The most common reasons for non-
repayment were poor harvest (60.7 percent); crop damages
(20.5 percent), and lack of funds (13 percent).
When asked whether they wouldstill lend to delinquent
borrowers, 36 percent said they would no longer do so. Al-
though 53 percent said they would still lend to loan de-
faulters, they cited certain conditions for them to be able to
borrow again. Most of them (43 percent) would require delin-
quent borrowers to pay their loan first before they can bor-
row again. About 25 percent said they would impose penalty
charges such as doubling interest rates. Another 21 percent
would require collateral in addition to the good character of
the borrower. Only a few could lend again if the loan is need-
ed for emergency and the delinquent borrower must also be
of good character. As a component of the "mutual trust"
relati9nship, good character seems to be a sine qua non.
What must be pointed out is that:
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Most of these conditionsmentioned by samplemoneylendersare
being practiced by formal lending institutions but they seemto be
more effective in small face-to-facerelationshipssuchas that main-
rained betweenthe private money lendersand their clientele.The bop
tower's willingnessto pay hisinformal loanscouldbe enhancedfurther
by the absenceor unreliability of alternativesourcesof credit.As relat-
ed by the borrowersthemselves(72 percent), they considerbuyersof
their farm produceasreliablesourcesof loan.
The reliability of a private moneylender asa sourceof emergency
credit couldbe oneof the considerationstaken into accountby farmers
who acquiesceto pre-marketingarrangementsthat lead to undervalua-
tion of farm produce.
The limited scaleof this practiceis partly explainedby the pres-
, ence of a sizeablenumberof privatemoneylenderswho are not engaged
in palay trading and who prefer to receivepayment in cash.On the
other hand,the farmersthemselvesarenot entirelyhelpless.They seem
to be well,informedabout the palaymarket in their locality. In making
this observation,the samplefarmerswere askedto enumeratealterna-
tive selling outlets for their palay and then asked to identify who
amongthe potential buyersthey cited offeredthe betterprice in 1978.
About half cited the samplemoneylendersincludedin the study (who
were alsopalay traders)as the onesoffering the better bargain.Some
38 percent mentioned other palay trader-moneylendersnot included
in the studysamplebut from whom the farmersalsoborrowedin 1978.
The palay market is quite competitive,what with the presencein
this market of peoplefrom all walksof life. Amongthe samplemoney-
lendersthemselves,the list of those involvedin palay trading includes
16 farmer-moneylenders;17 landlord-moneylenders;3 rice-millers;
1 storeowner;and 1 professionalpractitioner, not to mention the 31
money-lenderswhosekey businessispalaytrading.
From our perspective, what deserves more explanation
is why repayment rates for the informal loans are not much
better than they are. For example, 17 percent of the fully
matured informal loans in 1978 (Table 4.18) had not been re-
paid at all compared to 21 percent of the formal loans. In
other words, the difference between the non-repayment of
formal and informal loans does not seem to be all that great.
Perhaps the desire to protect a "single" credit source is no
longer very pressing due to the presence of other lenders. As
discussed earlier, the increase in the number of rural entrepre-
neurs engaged in rice-trading and input dealership has given
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the farmer-borrowers more alternative outlets for their pro-
duce and consequently more credit sources. Two pieces of
evidence seem to support this possibility. About 9 percent of
moneylenders said they do not have borrowers every year
and 77 percent of farmer respondents said they have informal
sources of production credit. Only a fourth said they did not
have this. It is in consumption credit where the alternatives
seem to be less available with about half of farmer respon-
dents admitting that they have no source for it.
One other intriguing potential explanation for the less
than impressive repayment rates for informal loans is the pos-
sibility that the "dole-out mentality" might have started con-
taminating the informal credit borrowers. Although the funds
loaned out by private moneylenders are purportedly "pri-
vate", in the case of rural-banker-cum-moneylender-input-
dealer-palay trader-landlord, would borrowers not suspect
that informal loans are in a way also coming from govern-
ment funds and therefore are to be regarded as "soft" loans,
not to be treated with great urgency to return? This is a pro-
mising research area.
[] Changes in interes_ rates
The TBAC study concludes that "Notwithstanding the
general decline in the overall share of formal credit in the ru-
ral credit markets, the average level of interest rates on in-
formal loans seem to have declined to lower levels compared
to those in the 1950s, most particularly in areas where the
presence of agricultural lending institutions is strongly felt."
At the outset, if only traditional credit arrangementswere pre-
sent in the rural areasandtherewere noformal credit, legalcredit from
non-bank sourcesand non-commercialloans, the average levelso_
interest rateswould have stood at 58 percent per annum in Bulacan,
80 percentin CamarinesSur and 88 percentin Isabela.Theselevelsare
quite closeto thosereported in the middleof fifties. The introduction
of formal credit, legal credit and non-commercialloans reducesthe
averagelevelsof interest rate to 25 percent per annumin Bulacan,
47 percentin CamarinesSur and 66 percent in Isabela... Theaverage
level of interest rates in Bulacan is lowest among the _hreeprovinces
because of the combined impact of formal credit, legal credit types
from nonbank sourcesand non-commercial loan& In CamarinesSur,
legal credit types were few but the densityof formal credit was high
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as well as that of non-commercialloans. In contrast, the density of
formal credit was lowest in Isabelaand their scarcitywasnot mitigated
by the presenceof a substantiallylargesupplyof noncommercial loans
as inCamarinesSur.
The reletl_e dens/ties of formal credit in _e 3 provlnces may be
tracedto the scope of operations of the rural banks in the areassurvey-
ed. In 1978, there were 7 rural bankscateringto the 6 municipalities
surveyedIn Bulacanand 6 rural banksservingthe 5 municipalities in
CamarinesSur. In Isabela, however, there were only 4 rural banks
servingthe 5 municipalitiessurveyed.While the 4 ruralbanks in Isabela
transacteda total of 6,552 supervisedandnon-supervisedloan accounts
in 1978 or largerthan thosetransact_ by the 6 ruralbanksin Camari-
haS Sur, these accountsamounted to only P15.1 million in Bulacan
compared to P24 million in CamarinesSurand 1>26million in Bulacan.
On the other hand, the relative densityof low-costinformalcredit
arrangementsis traceableto the type of moneylenderspredominantin
the area. In Bulacan,90 percentof the total volumeof loansgrantedto
all the borrowersof the samplemoneylenderswere contributed by in-
put dealersfrom whom legal credit types bearing 12 percentinterest
per annum were mostly obtained. In CamarinesSur, the largestvolume
of loans grantedto all the borrowersof the samplemoneylendersin
1978 came from storeownersand farmer-moneylenders,Thesetypesof
moneylendersare the most likely sourcesof non-commercial loans
which were observedto be highly predominant in CamarinesSur. In
comparison,palay traderswere the largestcontributor to the total vol-
ume of loansgrantedby the Isabelamoneylendersto all their borrow-
ers in 1978. These tradersarethe most likely sourcesof traditionalcre-
dit types suchas the TERClAHAN (Averageeffective interest rate of
30 percent from date of loan releaseto agreeddate repayment)and
they usuallyrequiretheir borrowersto pay in palay...
The combined impact of formal credit, legalcredit and non-com-
mercialloanstendsto be highwherethe density"of theseloansis high
•.. Wherethe combined shamof _e low-cost loans to the to_al volume
of loans of the sample farmers is high, averageinterest rams tend to be
lower, Furthermore, different types of moneylenderstend to charge
different interest rates.Among the input dealers,palay traders, land-
Iord_noneylenders and farmer-moneylenders, the input dealersgeneral-
ly charged _helowest interest rate while palay traderscharged the high-
act interest ratet_ _
[3 Creative informal credit arrangements
Private moneylenders reduce default risk and information
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cost by the creative adaptation of their techniques to suit
• local conditions. Among the stepstaken by them are the fol-
lowing:
[7 Integration of product markets with credit marke_s like
/inking money/ending with pa/ay trading, farming with
money/ending or input dealership with money/ending.
• • The multiple servicesprovided cater to the basiccon-
sumption and production needs of the farmers thus
enablingthe moneylenderto spreadrisks and lower trans-
•action costsof farmer-borrowers.
O .Lending by most moneylenders• to small circles of friends,
neighbors, relatives and suki (i.e., regular business clientsj
which simplifies, in effect, •information gathering, and
record-keeping..
In Camarines Sur, nearly half of the informal loans
were granted to farmer-borrowers who were •related to
the moneylenderseither socially as a •friend,a neighbor
or asa blood kin. Most of the.moneylendersin this prov-
ince recordedtheir transactionsin a handy notebook. In
Isabelaand Bulacan,however, lending to farmer-borrow-
ers outside the moneylender'scircle of friends, neighbors
and relativestend to be more extensivecoveringabout 85
to 70 percent, respectively,of the total numberof infor-
real loans in the 2 provinces. The largerscope•ofmoney-
lending operations in Isabelaand 8ulacan may partly ex-
plain why many of.the sample moneylendersin these 2
provinceskept more sophisticatedCredit files.
[] •Moneylenders, particularly those engaged in palay trad-
ing, requiring their borrowers to pay their loans in terms
of palay. This innovation circumventsthe need for a loan
Collateral,assures.themoneylender of a future supply of
" .palay which in turn :reduceshis market•risks, lowers the
transaction costs of both lender and borrower .but also
•givesthe•moneylender the opportunity •to undervaluethe
farmer's produceand thus realizesome "hidden" charges.
About 58 percent of the total number of loans of the
.sample farmer-borrowers• recorded • such arrangement,
covering around 55 percent of their total volume of
loans.
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[7 Employment by an urban-based entrepreneur money-
lender of a rural-based "Katiwala" (farmer overseer) who
is known to the local folks to extend moneylending
operations in the rural areas in order to reduce transac-
tion costs. The scheme reduces the information cost of
the urban moneylender as well as the risk of default and
collection costs.
r7 Adoption _ofan innovation which arises from integrating
markets known as the palay deposit scheme reported by
big rice miller-palay traders in Bulacan. Under the
scheme, borrowers are allowed to deposit their newly-
harvested palay in the miller's warehouse at no cost to
the farmer. He can postponecollecting the proceedsfrom
the rice miller until prices of palay are high. Moreover,
he can "withdraw" his palay deposit in the form of cash,
milled rice or the same variety of palay and he can bor-
row from the miller an amount larger than the value of
his palay deposit. On the miller's side, he cansell the pa-
lay deposit and therefore increasehis volume of transac-
tions without impinging on his cashresourcesat a time
(i.e., harvest time) when he needsit most to generatea
largervolume of transactions.
[] Capacity of moneylenders to provide credit to their bor-
rowers at an average interest rate of 15 percent per an-
num because their operations in the informal credit were
closely integrated with those in the formal credit market.
The casescited are 2 input dealerswho are alsoowners of
rural bank and 1 rice miller who also owns a local bank.
In 1978, their banks reportedly granted a total of P13.24
million in loans, while they themselves granted a total of
P489,000 to 287 informal borrowers in the same year
. .. When farmers do not qualify for a loan in the bank
or when they need smaller amounts urgently, they go to
the entrepreneur-moneylender. One of the innovations
that emerge from this type of interaction is the legaltype
of an informal credit arrangement.
Accessibility to low-cost funds is a factor that works
favorably for the types of moneylenders cited above. In
1978, two of the banks owned by the said moneylenders
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were able to obtain more than _'6 million in rediscounts
from the Central Bank. In addition, one of the input
dealer-moneylenders obtained a P200,000 credit from
Planter's Product Inc. while the rice miller-moneylender
obtained a 17100,000 credit from a commercial bank.
[] Researchareas to further explore
In a review of credit, cooperatives and other organiza-
tional componentsof rice production, Castillo made the fol-
lowing observationswhich are rarely paid attention to in the
researchand literature on the subject;
[] Although the typical image of a rice farmer is that of a
perpetual debtor, some of them are creditors, not
debtors. In certain instances,the farmer is both a bor-
rower _nd a lender, perhaps not simultaneously but at
different points in time. if a farmer playsthe role of bor-
rower and/or lender instead of borrower all the time,
there is some opportunity to even up the score,although
admittedly, some will be net borrowers and some net
lenders. There are evidencesthat farmer-cred/tors lent
predominantly to non-kinsmenwhich could suggestthat
it is really a "business" lending rather than a family obli-
gation. The TBAC study presented in this section sup-
ports this finding in the emergenceof a category of far.
mer-moneFlender rural entrepreneur. An in-depth analy-
sisof how such farmers made it could provide useful in-
sightson farmer upward mobility particularly thosewho
were small farmersand had little education to beginwith.
[] All the writings and studies on credit underscoresthe
usuriousinterest ratesfarmersare subjectedto and,there-
fore, moneylendersare regardedas socialevilsto be done
away with. This preoccupation with usury has givenusa
lopsidedpicture of credit which needsto be balancedby
a discussionof interest-free loans. Several studiesreport !
from 12 to 49 percent of loans made as being interest-
free. A significantproportion alsoreport legalrates.What
we know little about are the dynamics and motivations
for free lending in cash and kind. There are evidencesto
show that landlords lend free to both lesseesand share
tenants whether they are kinsmen or not. Evennon-land-
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lords and non-kinsmen also practice this type of lending.
Predictably, however, kinsmen, even if non-landlords,
havea greater inclination toward this practice.
I-I Equally important as borrowing behavior is the phenom-
enon of non.borrowing. Previousstudies have reported
farmerswho had no indebtednessof any kind, regardless
of tenure status. Can we assume that these are the self-
financing farmerswho do not need to borrow? Are they
the traditional conservativefarmerswho,do not usepur-
chased inputs or are they the very progressivefarmers
who are able to realizesufficient profit from rice-farming
as to enable them to be self-financing?27 Findingsfrom
the TBAC study underscore the need to examine this
phenomenon more thoroughly because 13 percent of
those who haveinformal sourcesof production credit did
not borrow and 20 percent of those who have such a
source for consumptioncredit also did not borrow. The
question of why and how they get along remainsunan-
swered. On the other hand, 24 percent of respondents
had no informal source of production credit. What hap-
pens to them in terms of productivity? What is more dis-
turbing is the 48 Percent of farmer-respondentswho indi-
cated that they have no informal sourcesfor consump-
tion credit.28 Does this suggesthat the shift of emphasis
to production credit means lessavailability of consump-
tion credit? How do farmer-householdsmeet this need? It
has always been said that the Filipino, particularly the
poor Filipino, is "resilient" and is armed with socialme-
chanisms for coping with poverty. Is he better able to
cope now than before or is the "coping mechanism" be-
ginning to wear out? We have no real answersto these
questionsat the moment but we need to find out.
E. Who Benefits from M99?
As mentioned earlier, from the point of view of government,the
most significant pay-off from the M99 program is the attainment of
rice self-sufficiency, and the relative stability of rice pricesthus bene-
fitting the rice consumersand savingforeign exchange.Becausethe
program is not an inexpensive one and it involvesmany groupsof
people and institutions, there are other beneficiariesbesidesfarmers
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and rice consumers.This section examines relative benefitsto credit
institutions and farmers. We will likewiseexplore other possible,but
lessobvious beneficiaries, such as farm managementtechniciansand
landlesslaborersand will look into the M99 loan default problem in
the light of other "national default problems."
[] Credit institutions and farmers
Basedon estimates,M99 program costsin nominal .termsamount
to about l_l.2billion. This includes•credit subsidy (P214 million),
subsidyto educational and advisory services(1_69million) and ferti-
lizer subsidy (P868 million).• Taking into account the scarcity of
value resourcesusedand the impact of •inflation, the real subsidyas
the economic costsof the program is placedat aroundP1.4 billion,
broken .down into 1_862.3 •million for.credit subsidy;1_462.4million
for. fertilizer subsidy; and 1_34.8•million for subsidyto educational
and advisory services..Each.additional ton of palay output due to
M99costs the government.around1_257. In nominal terms, the ferti-
lizer subsidymakesup 75 percent of program•costsbut in real terms,
it is the credit subsidywhich comesout asthe major cost which is
estimatedto be 63 percent.29
The credit subsidyrelates to the incentivesgiventothe participat-
ing rural banks in order to encourage them to lend without colla-
terals. These incentivestake the form of rediscountingprivilegewith
the Central Bank and loan repayment guarantee.Rural bankscan re-
discount at 100 percent all eligible papersunderthe supervisedcredit
schemeat a preferential rate of not more than I percent per annum.
Funds.generated are lent at ! percent per month. Rural banks can
also participate in a loan repayment•guaranteeschemebeing admi-
nistered bythe Land Bank of the Philippines. For a non-refundable
guaranteefee of 1 percent ofthe amount of supervisedcrop produc-
tion loans granted•to farmers, the Land Bank guaranteesthe repay-
ment of,at most, 85 percent of the outstandingbalanceof the loan
exclusiveof interest or 85 percent of the production loss,whichever
is lower in caseof default of the supervisedcredit borrowers.For the
guaranteetobe made effective, however, a rural bank suffering low
repayments has to prove that it hasexhaustedall meansof collecting
from the borrowers.3°` .
Esguerradivides the Credit subsidyinto the intended and the un-
intended subsidy:
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The intended subsidy to M99 borrowers is the interest rate subsidy on
their/oan_ Sincethis subsidyto farmerswouldnot be possiblewithout the
governmentsubsidyto lending institutionsin termsof low-costfunds,then
it could be argued that the subsidygranted to M99 borrowersactually
comes from the government,while the institutional sourcesof M99 loans
merely perform an intermediaryfunction with respectto the subsidy. In
other words, the intendedsubsidyfor M99 borrowersiswhat is passedon to
them by the credit institutionsout of the credit subsidythat the govern-
ment hasgrantedthese institutions. The total credit subsidygrantedcredit
institutionswas estimated to be P1,061 million in PhasesI-XlV. Over the
sameperiod, however, intendedcredit subsidyto M99 borrowersamounted
to only P'359.1 million. Thus, the lendingbanks under M99 were able to
capturethe restof the subsidyamountingto _701.9 million.
The credit subsidyaccruingto credit agenciesis 66 percentwhile that
which went to farmer-borrowersisonly 34 percent.31
Furthermore, Esguerra cites the Clemente and Sevilla study 32
which revealed that total rediscount availments by rural banks under
the M99 Program in fact exceeded loans granted to farmers. The
availments amounted to P'1,349 million for Phases I-VI while the
total loans granted for the same period out of which such rediscounts
could have arisen totalled only lPl,250 million. The excess of redis-
count availments over loans which is P99.3 million could have been
used for purposes other than for lending to M99 borrowers. This dif-
ference represents 24 percent of total outstanding M99 rediscounting
valued at P413 million. The researchers therefore raise the question
regarding the possibility of rural banks losing and failing to pay the
Central Bank not so much because of farmers' default but because of
funds mismanagement.
This question raised by the study seems to find some supportive
answers in several news items such as the following: "14 rural bank
execs face raps for Masagana 99 loan anomalies. " The news report
said that "the Ministry of Justice approved the filing of criminal
charges against the owners and 14 officials of two rural banks in IIo-
ilo in connection with the allegedly anomalous grants of M99 loans
amounting to millions of pesos to fictitious borrowers... The State
Prosecutor said that two of the accused were the majority stock-
holders who allegedly connived with the officers of the two rural
banks in appropriating for themselves various amounts granted to
supposed loan borrowers by forging and falsifying documents such
as promissory notes, chattel (assurance for payment of loans) mort-
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CHAPTER V
CHANGING LAND AND LABOR RELATIONS
IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION
Institutions which revolve around man-land and man-man rela-
tions with respect to the use of land and the relationsamongpeople
regardingthe useof labor and the rewards thereto are the most sig-
nificant institutions in agricultural production. Population pressure
on land, migration, the advent-of new productive technologies
(whether land augmenting or labor-saving);government policies and
development programs such as agrarian reform, agricultural exten-
sion, credit, irrigation, farmers' associations, road construction,
transportation etc. have had their inevitable impact on different as-
pects of these institutions particularly the tenure system,wagerates,
and the nature of land and labor relations. While changesin these
two major rural institutions are sought to restructure society in the
interest of greater equity, employment and better productivity in-
centives, many are those who nostalgically invoke the traditional
spirit of bayanihan (mutual assistanceand exchangeof labor) asthe
foundation of cooperativesdevelopment and farmer organization:
"Cooperation is as old as its culture. Bayanihan is the native
word for the centuries old natural in-born trait of the Filipino peo-
ple. Bayanihan isthat trait of cooperation, the voluntary gathering of
friends and neighborsto help a man-in-need. Bayanihan is the bond
that makes an individual adhere to a group for cohesivenessand
strength. The spirit of cooperation is the solid foundation of the
cooperative movement. It is the system to help the common tao put
together their limited resources for better economic returns and
imoroved socialstatus.''1
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Sacayaddsthat: "What we want farmers to realize is that bayani.
han does not stop with helping a neighbormove his housefrom one
place to another. In the SamahangNayon, the Filipino value ofbaya_.
nihan enlargesits scope, takes on a deeper meaning and realizes its
original concept:a way of life. After all, whatis a cooperative, but
bayanihan?''2
So far, bayanihan as a basisfor the cooperatives•movementhas
always been assumed.No one hasbothered to analyze how relevant
and appropriate this tradition isfor modern day institutionsdesigned
to achievedevelopmentgoals,perform economicand other functions
through groupaction.
• Inthis chapterwe presentthe following:
a. Inventory of traditional forms of Cooperation in agricultural
production as practiced in different parts of the country;
b. The survivaland erosionof suchtraditional institutions;
c. Changes in labor arrangements for agricultural production
suchas harvesting,threshinganduse of hired labor;
d. Different interpretations of the emerging relations between
•farmer and landless;and
e. Some identifiable tenure patternspost land reform.
A. •Traditional Forms of Cooperation in Agricultural Production
What are these traditional forms of cooperation whose virtues
we are calling forth to lead us to the design and implementation of
"socially and culturally compatible" structures for development
purposes?So that we can havea frame of referencefor assessingthe
changingscenarioand the likely continuing relevanceof its features
for what wewanttoachieve today and in the near future,• Cosico's
attempt to inventory•the •variousforms which have been studied by
different authors is reproducedhere in abbreviatedfashion.3
Among the Kalingas .of Mountain Province,close kins and their
neighborshunt for food and their catch isdivided equally amongthe
.hunting party in a-practice called "Anop': Similarly "Sopnak" is
held when the Kalingasfish in their rivers•and the catch is divided
equally, among theparticipants. For planting and harvesting, they
practice Kil'lo'ong (their term for reciprocalexchangeof labor).
In like manner, the Malitbogsand Aklanons havehilo-hilo mostly
for plowing, harrowing, transplanting and harvesting. SimilarlY, the
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Bicolano farmers sponsorthe Ioyohan which operates in the same
way. The Ilocano farmers adopt the Ammuyo as their own version
of reciprocal exchangeof farm labor.
Among Lagunafarmers - the tornohan (which is a cyclical recip-
rocal labor arrangement especially for plowing and harvesting) ob-
ligesany participant member to reciprocate the favor extended to
him by doing equivalent labor in due time for those who helped
him. Since one day is normally spent in doing the farm activity, in
a tornohan, he would be working in other farms as many days as
there are membersof the group. If for some reason, he is unableto
help others, he is expected to send a substitute or to pay the fellow
whp is a "labor-recipient" the corresponding amount for a day's
work. In this type of labor arrangement,only thosewho own a _ra-
bao and the necessary tools are accepted for membership. In the
event that one member does not have a farm of his own, he hasthe
right to contract a harrowing or a plowing job with a farmer who
needs help. He then gets the wage equivalent of the labor of all the
tornohan membersfor one day all to himself.
In hilo-hilo, the farmer initiator of group work is traditionally
required to reciprocate the servicesof another who hasdone him a
favor. This is a strictly followed rule.
Among the Ilocanos, the mechanicsof exchange labor goes this
•way: the extra labor needed to work the two and three acr_sized
rice paddies is normally obtained through the ammuyo; essentiallya
one-for-one, hour-for-hour exchangeof work. It is at the sametime,
a relationship which normally persistsfrom one year to the next
involving the same individuals in the sametask and in the samefield.
When, as it sometimes happens, an exchange imbalance arises as a
result of unequal landholdingsize, the difference will be madeup in
money, rice, or by additional personswho will be hired on what is
essentially the commercial contractual arrangementcalledpakiawan.
(This means 2 or more personspool their efforts to clear, plow, her-
vest or weed the field of another for a certain amount of money).
The number of people involvedin an ammuyo group is related to the
size of the field to be worked on. Ten to twenty peopleare utilized
on a hectare field.
There is a derivative relationshipof the ammuyo pact, called the
Ilocano bataris which indicatesthat the balanceis not strict (though
there is the assumption of eventual equivalent). Bataris is a sort of
--I
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cumulative, socio-economic "interest" which builds up between
ammuyo partners. An emergency may arise (e.g. draft animal unable
to work, sicknessin the family, the needto replant a storm-damaged
field) which requires additional help and for which it is impossible
to reciprocate directly through the ammuyo tie. In such circum-
stances,an individual will ask his ammuyo partners for bataris help
and they have the moral obligation to assist.Under similar circum-
stancesand emergencies,they would expect as much. Bataris is not
basedupon an immediate, equivalent return; it is extra to the normal
exchange of ammuyo labor, extra in the senseof involving unfore-
seen circumstances,emergencieswhich cannot be calculated in the
normal hour-for-hour exchange. It is a reciprocal, moral obligation
developing out of the ammuyo relationship and based on the con-
tinuing mutual exchangeof services.
In the reciprocal exchangeof labor discussed(tornohan, Kil'lo'-
ong, hilo-hilo, Ioyohan, ammuyo) the participants are providedwith
lunch, morning and afternoon snacks.The food which are served
most frequently for lunch are rice, vegetables,fish, and/or meat
depending on the financial statusof the sponsor. Cigarettesare also
offered. Snacksconsistof bread,or ricecakes,and soft drinks.
The general term used to describeexchange labor in farming is
bayanihan among the Tagalogs:Hunglos among the Visayansor Cay-
yayyannan among the Ivatan¢ Reciprocity for labor extended to a
farmer is the major characteristic. However, the exchangeof labor
maybe immediate for the same type of work extended within the
same cropping seasonor that reciprocation may be done at some
future time doing a similar or a different type of job. As described
earlier, different ethnic groupspractice somevariation of the general
pattern.
In the farm labor exchangearrangement which does not require
immediate reciprocation, the immediate concern seemsto be the de-
sire to help other farmerswho are urgently in need of extra help to
complete farm work. For instance, the Pango of the Kalingas is
undertaken for someone who is behind in his work and therefore.
needsto hurriedly finish hisfarm work to enablehim to keep in time
with the seasons.As such, it is normally done during the final phase
of planting and harvesting. Moreover, if assistancecomesduring the
usual farming period, the practice is called ab,abJ_o-yog. In either
case,whatever help a farmer extends to another will be reciprocated
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later. In Kaingin making, the Malitbogs resort to patawili, which
refers to their cooperative activity in cutting of trees, and patabang
which refers to their practice in the cooperativeplantingof crops.
Among the lowlanders, the more common forms of share labor
are: the dagyaw of the Viseyans and the palusong of the Tagalogs.
Dagyaw is a type of cooperative labor in which the initiator is not
morally required to return the servicesof other people, although he
may do so if he likes. While he is thus exempted, the man who calls
for the dagyaw usually returns the servicesof thosewho havehelped
him, because if he does not reciprocate they may not come again
when he needsassistance.In palusong, when a farmer needshelp in
planting his ricefield, he may invite other farmers to help. He need
not bother about paying them wagesbecausewhen others seek his
help, he too gives his services freely. This cooperative undertaking
may include moving houses,building fences, dikes or irrigation ca-
nals, clearing lands, eradicating pests, and other activities. In Cen-
tral Luzon and among the Tagalogs,this practice is known aspalu-
song sa pagbuhat ng bahay or palipat in caseof house moving and
palu$ong sa pag_araro ng bukid in caseof plowingthe field or other
activities.
In Zamboanga del Norte, the activities of greatestimportance to
the natives are those concerned with swidden preparation and culti-
vation. The swidden unit, equivalent to the household and family,
occasionallyuses non-family labor. Such unit fulfills most of their
needs for extra labor from fellow community members whose
servicescan be solicited by exchangearrangement (Saud), by feasting
(pesilut) or by kinship obligation (manul). It was further explained
that exchange labor is one of the diagnosticsof community inter-
action, for only community members participate. This principle
holds for equivalent and non_=quivalentexchanges. Except during
planting, when the entire community takes part, exchangesare ar-
ranged between households or groups of households within the
community without regard for kinship ties. The arrangements are
informal, no feast or compensationother than reciprocity which is
deemed necessary.
Among Ilocano farmers, on certain occasionsneighborsare called
upon for special work, well over and above the regular favors and
padigo exchange which involves the cooperative effort of several
individuals working tOgether. Such cooperative assistanceis called
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tagnawa. The work group is by no meanscomposedonly of neigh-
bors. The host provides food and drink for such occasionsand
there is greatstressupon sociability.
It has also been reported that tagnawa is a form of cooperation
given to a leader, or "Cabeza de Barangay" or "teniente del barrio"
or to a worthy neighbor in the land preparation of a farm, in plant-
ing or in harvesting,in the repair of a house,or in somebig projects
where plenty of labor is needed. The farmer-leader assignsa day in
advance and announcesto his constituents his work project. In this
system of cooperation, the farmers give their labor free to their
leader. Wivesals0 lend their labor in the preparation and serving of
mealsto the laborerswhich they carry to the farm at noontime.
The difference between the tagnawa and the ammuyo is that in
the former, the labor given by the farmer is free, without expecting
remuneration either in the form of labor or monetarybenefits. In
the ammuyo, on the other hand, exists a mutual exchangeof labor
between and among farmers. One helps another and expects the
sameto be returned, not in money but in kind (labor).
Another traditional cooperative institution among the Ilocanos
is the so-called equ/do system. It is a communal enterpriseamong
members of a homogeneousgroup called barangay. Under the sys-
tem, a parcel of public land is leased or purchasedcollectively by
the group from the government. The arable portion is cleared, le-
velled, parcelled and divided equally among the members. One-
tenth of this arable portion is usually set aside asa communal prop-
erty where the produce is kept in a communal barn for use by
membersof the equido during their cooperativework projects.Mem-
berswork freely by turn on this communal property. Sometimesall
of the arable portion are divided among memberswithout leavinga
communal parcel, but every member agrees to turn over to the
treasury the equivalent of one-tenth of his harvest,which is kept in
the communal barn to be usedfor the same purposeas above.The
upland or rolling portion of the land, which is not suitable for
farming, is enclosed and used as a communal grazing ground. Each
member puts into the enclosurehis cattle, carabaosor horses.Again,
some carabaosor cattle are owned collectively by the group. A
surplusof the stored rice is sold and part of the proceeds isusedto
purchasea pair of cattle or carabaosto be cooperatively owned.
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Another form of cooperativelabor ispakyaw which isan arrange-
ment whereby two or more men pool their efforts and resourcesto
clear, plow, harvestor weedthe field of another for a certain amount
of money. This requirespayment in cashor in kind either in advance
or immediately after the job isdone.
Traditional institutions of cooperationfor non-farm activitiesare
varied. Sometimes, the practice of cooperation as exhibited in farm
activities are likewise applied to non-farm activities maintaining the
use of the same terminologies.For example,bayanihan isadopted in
the moving of a house, digging of canals, building of feeder road,
making of fences or celebrating birthday;, weddings etc. The hi o-
hi Ioyohan; tagnawa, andpalusong for non-farm activities include
carpentry, nipa thatch making, housemoving, buildingfencesetc.
In some cases,specific colloquial terms are used to describethe
particular institutions of cooperation in non-farm activities. For
example, in the Ilocano region, the practice of bir-biris is prevalent.
It is a form of cooperation by friends and neighborsto finance a
wedding feast_People contribute rice, chickens,a jar of wine, bundle
of wood, somecentavos,etc. to the fund.
Another form of cooperation widely practiced is the arayat
which refers to aid contributed toward the burial of a deceased
family member, neighbor or friend. Arayat may also be given by
friends and relativesto help a candidate for public office or to some-
onestrugglingfor an education or makinga trip to a distant country.
Ilocanos havea practicecalled in.namongand amongTagalogs,it
is known aspaluwagan. Under this system, a group of friends or co-
workers agree to contribute equal amounts each week as the case
may be for as many months or weeks as there are members of the
group. One member gets the contribution of the entire group when
his turn to be a recipient comes. Sometimes a raffle is made among
members to determine their individual schedules.Sometimes the
schedule is adjusted according to the members' needs. In this man-
ner, the contributions help meet their individual needs.4
Cosico's review of these different traditional forms of coopera-
tion revealsthe following characteristics:
(1) The norms of reciprocity in traditional forms of cooperation
in farm labor are of two types:
(a) Those which require "equivalence" in work reciprocation
which is rendered in an obligatory manner within a specified
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period such as in Kil'lo'ong, tornohan or ammuyo. A group en-
gagedin the practice hasmore definite membership.
(b) Those which do not demand immediate and specified
reciprocation, activity open to the community and number of
participants is undetermined. Furthermore, the participant is
not obliged to return the sametype of favor extendedtO him. He
may reciprocateby doinganother type of job. There isno regular
pattern and no fixed obligations.
(2) Participation in traditional exchange labor arrangementsis
usually amongclosekins, friends or neighbors.
(3) The sponsorfor traditional cooperativelabor activitiesusually
provide a meal, merienda, and/or drinks. This is the "socializing",
built-in "have.fun" portion of their work.
(4) Most of the actual labor rendered in the exchangeis carried
out in one day. Although the cycle in something like tornohan may
last longer depending on the number of participants in the group,
each member receivesthe entire group's labor contribution for one
day.
(5) The taskscarried out in the farm labor exchangeare very
cific to plowing, harrowing, planting,weeding,harvestingetc.
(6} Traditional cooperation in labor is in reality a pooling to-
gether of farmers' labor in order to meet farming requirements in
time. Each participating farmer takes his turn in receivingthis "pool
of labor" when he needsit.
(7) These traditional practicestake place mainly among equals,
i.e. among farmers. After all, what is involvedis anexchange,a recip-
rocal relationship. The agriculturally landlessare not part of this tra-
ditional exchangerelationshipbecausethey have no farms on which
the labor contributions can be applied. However, the pakyawan sys-
tem can bea contractual arrangement between the farmer and a
group of landlesshired laborerswho can pool their efforts to accom-
plish a specifiedtaskfor a certain payment in cashor kind.
Traditional practice of cooperation is not a transfer of resources
from "haves" to "have-nots". It is cooperation for "equivalent" gain
from the exchange relationship, although the reciprocation may not
be specifiedin time and type. This iswhere someparticipantsmay be
helped more than others when suchassistanceis needed.
Given these major features of traditional forms of cooperation
generically referred to asbayanihan, it isdifficult to understandhow
LandandLaborRelations 277
this can be the underlyinQbasisfor the Samahang Nayon, coopera-
tives development, seldasetc. Bayanihan and its variationsis neither
a joint liability nor a joint borrowing group; it is not group action to
obtain better pricesfor inputs and produce; it is not an organization
for technology transfer: it isnot organizedto do business.
All these years we have tended to endow bayanihan, with more
virtues than it is capable of respondingto. We haveextrapolated too
much on what it can do. It is not "a systemto help the common tao
put together their limited resourcesfor better economicreturns and
improved social status."5 The purposeand operation of bayanihan is
much, much simpler than the SamahangNayon design.Bayanihan as
it appliesto farm labor isusually a one-day, task-specificexchangeof
labor among close kin, neighbors, and friends. Exchange relations
are internal among participating members. Traditional bayanihan is
not a group lobby; it is not an attempt to do away with the middle-
man and his "excessive margins"; it isnot evena "distant cousin" of
Samahang Nayon. It is or was a significant institution for very spe-
cified functions which neededto be performed.
Barrameda looks at group cooperation not in terms of the tradi-
tional and the new ways but rather in terms of two clearly different
modes: pakikiiba and pa/dkidamay. The first is for official commu-
nity or organizationa/ undertakings directed by a formal leader; the
second is for activities in which an individual's social allies assist him
in meeting some household or family need or crisis. Table 5.1 sum-
rnarizesthe main features of these two modesof group cooperation,
One obvious conclusion is that: "pakikidamay promotes infinitely
more personal involvement and fulfillment than doespakikiiba...
The first must start with the recognition of a need felt by a close
friend and achievesits goal by a voluntary wholehearted responseto
it, the secondrequiresonly external compliance and token participa-
tion. The first is warm, the other cool; the first is invariabl'/a mean-
ingful experience for those who share it; the secondis more likely
seen as a forceful interruption of more important, more satisfying
activities,"
On the basisof these conclusions,some suggestionswere made:
"Where cooperative work must bedone for the community or a sub-
committee within it, consider this alternative: organization by al.
liance groupings rather than by geographical units .... and identifi-
cation of the various alliance-grouping/eaders will be accomplished
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empir/cal/y. They are not to be appointed, but found... Coopera-
tion between and among alliancegroupingsis to be fostered and en-
couraged, in the hope that it may lead to genuine community-wide
cooperation. The existence of the latter phenomenon is not to be
assumed, however,but proved or disproved empirically, "
Barrameda likewise calls attention to bayanihan as a "working
bee in favor of one person,family or household.Community-mind-
ednessand civic spirit have little or nothing to do with it. ''e Bayani-
ban, therefore, is not synonymouswith community spirit.
B. Erosion of Traditional Exchange Labor in Farming
One of the problems we face in objectively assessingthe viability
of traditional institutions isthe dearth of studiesexamining what has
happened with the onslaughtof development programs,population
pressure,and modernizing forces which impinge on them. In the
absence of empirical evidences, it is easy to "romanticize" their
continuing existence as the "soul", the "in-born trait", or even the
"way of life" of the Filipino.
Sometimes, accounts describing the workings of these different
practices fail to indicate how much of what is being describedstill
operatesand how much of it is simply historical - a story of how it
wasa long time ago.
1. Bicol and Aklan casestudies
Cosico, in a 1979 study of two barangays,one in Bicol (Baran-
gay San Isidro, Libon, Albay) and one in West Visayas (Barangay
Dongon West, Numancia Aklan), chroniclesthe "erosion" of tradi-
tional practices in cooperation. These two barangayswere chosen
precisely because they represented communities where these tradi-
tions were most extensivelypracticed in the past. Briefly, the follow-
ing hastaken place.
[] In San Isidro (Bicol), Loyohan was the exchange labor prac-
ticed in plowing, harrowing, and making of farm ridges.At
present, /oyohan is rarely practiced for these three farming
operations. Plowing and harrowing have become more
mechanized and done either by family members or hired
labor. Making of farm ridges is a fading skill. Only the older
farmers are skillful in it so the younger farmers are hiring
them at P20.00 a day to do the job with free meals. Such
skills are not likely to stay on much longer because the
younger farmersare not being trained for it.
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[] Hilohan or hilo is the Aklanon counterpart of the Ioyohan
or Ioyo in Bicol. In Dongon West, hilo was applied in farm
clearing, plowing, harrowing, transplanting, farm.ridges
preparation and harvesting. Farmers recalled that hilo was
practiced in Dongon West as far back as when the first wave
of migrantssettled in the area.
[] Hilo in farm clearing - When farming was first explored in
Dongon West, the abundanceof Dongon trees as well as tall
grassesmade farm clearing an arduous task for individual
farmers. Trees hadto be cut, rolling terrain had to be levelled
and tall grassesand bushestotally removedprior to the initial
digging of the soil. At that time, farming was done kaingin-
style and to facilitate the speedycompletion of preparingthe
land, farmers worked together in clearingeach farm until all
farms had been cleared. Eventually, however,the yearly cul-
tivation of the soil made easierthe task of farm clearing be-
fore the planting seasoncame. Individual farmers managed
to do farm clearing themselves.Only in very few occasions
in the recent past had a farm been cleared through coopera-
tive efforts. This happened, for example, when a farmer
abandoned his farm because of a more promising job else-
where. When he returned, a failure and a little more impo-
verished than before, he had to ask other farmers to help
him clear his farm.
[] Hilo in plowing - When kaingin farms becamemore inten-
sively cultivated, farmers began to plow their fields. How-
ever, the fields remain rainfed for sometime. This depend-
ence on rain water meant that farmers had to start plowing
after the initial rains came in order to prepare for immediate
planting with the coming of more rains later. Otherwise, the
fields became dry and had to be plowed once more and
farmers had to wait again for the rain before any planting
was made. This need to catch up with the rain had brought
about the hilo in farm plowingamongneighbors,friendsand
relatives in order to ensure that every farmer was able to
plant when farms had sufficient water. Hilo was a prevalent
practice before the war in 1940 until about 1970 when an
irrigation systemwas constructed in the barangay.The avail-
ability of two tractors for rent in the barangay, as well as
LandandLaborRelations 281
the emergenceof hired labor and the declining number of
work animals had made hilohan in plowing lessand lesspo-
pular.
[] Hiio in rice planting/transplanting - The plantingof ricewas
mostly a communal activity of farmerswhen keingin-making
was the practice. The fields were planted by the samegroup
of farmers who clearedthem, this time usingeither a pointed
wood stick or a pieceof bamboo with a metal blade attached
at oneend for diggingthe ground.
Later on, when farms were plowed, rice plantingbecame
a family activity usingthe broadcastmethod.
The construction of an irrigation system in DongonWest
had somehowrevolutionalized farming operationsin the area.
Not only were farmers able to plant twice a year, but they
also adopted new farming methods. Farmers started to use
new seeds, applied more fertilizer and sprayed their crops
with farm chemicals. Rice seedlingshad to be transplanted
after growingthem in seedbeds.Transplanting rice in a syste-
matic manner, observingspecifieddistancesbetween rows and
hills required the cooperative efforts of farmers that went
beyond the immediate family circle. Nonetheless,only close
kins were oftentimes invited to help. Eventually, transplant-
ing was done by hired laborers from the adjacent seashore
barangayswho were paid one ganta of rice daily. They were
provided a free meal while transplanting and were given the
first preferenceto harvestthe crop later.
[3 Hilo in making farm ridges - Rainfed farms had to retain
as much rainwater as the fields could sufficiently hold at cer-
tain farming periods. For instance, to make plowing easy,the
soil had to be soft and if at all possible the farms had to be
submerged in water for sometime before plowing was done.
Thus, the farmers of Dongon West had to construct their
farm ridges higher than what may be ordinarily required if
the farms were serviced by an irrigation system. Since higher
farm ridges retained more rainwater, they were constructed
about two feet in height. The making of farm ridgesbecame
essentially laborious and demanded more hands to do the
job. The farmer, therefore, turned to other farmers whose
lands were contiguously located for the needed help. As
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farms became irrigated, the height of the ridges was lowered
to one foot, which only required minor repairs at the start
of each cropping season.The hi/o in making farm ridges be-
came virtually nonexistent.
[] Hilo in harvesting - Farmersduring the early settlement days
helped each other out in harvesting their crops until the
activity was completed for all the resident-farmers.Harvest
time was the start of a long period of merriment with the
host farmers being generous in offering a sumptuouslunch
on the day of harvestin hisfarm.
- As more people migrated into the area and more farm
labor becameavailable,harvestingwascarriedout by otherson
a sharing basis. The sharing arrangement varied depending
upon the relationship between the farmer and the harvester
and whether or not the one who harvestedwas hired e_rlier
to do the transplanting.
- The new harvest/ng arrangement - Ilay is a verbally
contracted arrangement which starts from weeding wherein
the person who weeded a farm does not have to be paid in
money but is only provided two mealswhile weedingin that
farm. Moreover, during the harvest season,if he harveststhe
crop, he would get one can share for every 10 cansof palay
harvested. In barangay San Isidro, about 80 percent of the
farmswere beingweededand harvestedunder the Haysystem
which was started in 1975 by migrant workers from another
town. Those who engagedin these new harvesting arrange-
ments are mostly landlessfarm laborers.When not weeding
or harvesting, they are hired in plowing or harrowing. For
plowing, a laborer was paid P6.00 a day plus a free meal.
If no meal was provided, the wage was P8.00 per day.
The laborers may even settle for lower wages for plowing
provided they are giventhe privilegeof harvestinglater.
In order to probe deeper into traditional exchange labor
practices,a total of 137 farmers from San Isidroand Dongon
West were interviewed. Two-thirds of them had practiced
hilo/loyohan in the past. The other one-third had neverbeen
involved in it. More than half of those who participated be-
longed to a permanen.tgroup while 45 percentwere grouped
on an ad hoc basis. Majority of the hilo/Ioyohan members
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were close kins. Relatives were actually preferred to work
with. The most commonly observed norms were reciprocity
in labor exchange and provision of food (mealsand drink).
Lessthan half indicated definite schedule of working time.
It was noted that farmers seldom took action against those
who failed to comply with the norms. Among those who
did the usual recoursewasa repayment scheme- in the form
of cash, reciprocation of labor in the next croppingseasonor
sending a substitute to take his place. Almost 60 percent of
the respondents said that there was no leader in the hilo/
Ioyo. Those who mentioned the existence of a leader, indi-
cated that whoever sponsoredthe Ioyo/hilo was the leader.
Two most frequently mentioned reasonsfor engagingin
exchange labor are: (1) farm activitieswere easilycompleted
within a shorter period of time especiallywhen tractors were
not yet available; (2) farmers did not have money to pay
laborers, thus they saved on farm expenses.Other reasons
included companionshipand fun of workin together; kinship;
tradition; and assuranceof help when needed. All of these,
however, seem to be in the past. For most of them the last
Ioyo/hilo they everjoined was severalyearsago.
Ninety-three percent of the respondents affirmed that
changesin cooperative farm activities have occurred asindi-
cated by the following: Hilo/Ioyo is rarely done nowadays.
Farm activities have become more of individual or family
undertakings. The hand tractor is used insteed of the plow
and carabao. Reasonscited for the decline of hilo/loyo were:
ownership of mechanized farm equipment; fewer carabaos
due to death or sale of the animal; availability of hired farm
labor,tractors for rent, and irrigation water most of the time.
The use of hand tractors instead of carabao and plow is
attributed to: desire to facilitate earlier completion of land
preparation; farm work becomes easier; death of carabaos
due to use of farm chemicals; hiring tractors is an easier
arrangement; and no more pasture for carabaos is available
becausepasture lands had been converted to rice fields. Fur-
thermore, the useof farm machineryenablesfarmers to work
individually in their fields and avoids obligations to assist
others. About a third likewise mentioned that with the pre-
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sent high prices of commodities, they cannot afford to
sponsorIoyo/hilo.
The objection to Ioyo/hilo as an expensivepractice was
explored by Cosico. He compared the possibleexpenditures
in sponsoringsuch practicesto the cost of hiring labor. The
amount spent for hilo_oyo in terms of food, drinks, ciga-
rettes etc. was estimated. This was estimated to be only a
third of what it would cost to pay hired laborers.The latter
were not only paid for their services,they were also, as a
matter of practice, provideda free mealduring lunch (usually
rice, vegetablesand dried fish). If lunch was not provided,
then the farm wage was higher. However, in estimating the
cost of hilo_oyo, Cosico failed to take into account the time
and energy invested by the farmer in performing the ex-
change labor required, in working in other farmers' fields.
This could add quite a bit to the cost of exchangelabor. At
any rate, Cosico looked into the preference of farmersasfar
asworking arrangementsare concerned.
Table 5.2 shows that plowing and making ridgesindivid-
ually by the farmer himself is most preferred. Using hired
farm labor is a far second choice; with work by family
members coming next. Working cooperatively with other
farmers is least preferred. Reasonsfor preferring to work
individually are: better quality work if done alone and by
himself; savecost of hiring labor; tractor/carabao isavailable;
have the time and ability to do the job. They haveno obliga-
tion to help other farmers later. This reason was also cited
for wanting to hire labor for plowing. Hired labor isalso pre-
ferred by those who are unable to do plowing by themselves
or have no accessto carabao or hand tractor. Hiring labor
is also regardedas an easierarrangement. The few who opt
for cooperative plowing mentioned early completion of
work; morework accomplishedand enjoyment of work with
othersasadvantagesof plowing field cooperatively.
Farmers prefer making farm ridgesby themselvesand/or
with family members becausethey have the ability and time
to do it in addition to savingexpenseson hiring labor. Fur-
thermore, they believe work is of better quality. Those who
use hired labor do sobecausethey are unable to do the work
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TABLE 5.2
PREFERRED WORKING ARRANGEMENTS IN PLOWING AND
MAKING FARM RIDGES.
Making Farm
P/owin! Ridges
N= 137
- Percent-
Workingindividuallyby
farmeronly 44 67
Workingcooperativelywith
other farmers 9 4
Usinghired farm labor 28 23
Work by family members 19
100 100
Source: ArsenioCosioo, "Changesin Traditional Forms of Cooperationin Two
Barangays"(UnpublishedPh.D. Dissertation),UPLB, 1981.
Study wasdone in San Isidro, Libon Albay andDongonWest,NumanciaAklan
in 1979.
themselves or they are too busy with other farm and non-
farm activities. Hi(ing labor also avoids the obligation to help
other farmers later which is required under the hilo,floyo sy_
tern. 7
All these trends add up to a verdict that traditional ex-
change labor is on its way out even in communities where
they have been observed to be prevalent before. It is interest*
ing to note, however, that in these places, a third of the
farmers said they have never been engaged in exchange labor
even in the past.
2. Laguna Case Study
Another account of declining exchange labor in farming is pro-
vided by del Rosario. Her study reported that before 1965, almost all
the farmers interviewed in Pinagbayanan, Pila, Leguna were involved
in land preparation and accompanying activities which were carried
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out in the bayanihan, palusong or lusungan way. Farmerswith conti-
guous rice farms usually belonged to a lusungan group. When the
rains started, these farmers talked amongthemselvesand anyone in
their group could start the rotation of work. Other farmerswho were
not permanent membersof a •particular/usungan groupwere ordina-
rily invited to join so that when a "rotation" was due, word was
passedaround about the coming activity. There were caseswhen the
field was small in which casesthe group was divided to be able to
help another farmer. This •happenedwhen there were simultaneous
work periods, There were no permanent leaders but the farmer
whose field wasbeingworked on becamethe leader for that day. Job
assignmentswere not given becauseeach participant already knows
what to do. The few farmerswho owned no carabaoseither repaired
dikes, hauled seedlingsor passedlambanog (alcoholic liquor from
coconuts) around. There were times •whenfarmers got drunk before
finishing their task. Since invitation was open to everybody, some
who did not have anything to do with the project stayedaround to
partake of food and lambanog. Resourceswerenot limited then.
The operations involved were plowing, harrowing, leveling,and
transplanting. The first field plowed would alsobe the first field har-
rowed, leveled and planted. Simultaneouswith the first stepsin land
preparationwas growingthe rice seedlings.
It was common practice to slaughter pigs for these occasions.
Food was abundant. This was not strictly men's activity for the
housewiveswere busy preparingtheir food. Relatives,neighbors,and
friends joined in cooking,delivering,servingfood and washingdishes.
Breakfast, lunch, two snacksand of course, lambanog were served.
Cigaretteswere passedaround too. To complete the day, someeven
had fireworks. The afternoon's snackwas heavier becauseafter the
day's work, farmers still grazedthe carabaos.Work usually stopped
at about four in the afternoon but farmers retired by around eight
in the eveningbecausethey had to tend to the work animals.
The number of people involved in a lusungan rangedfrom less
than 10 to about 30 and rotation work took about three months.
Farmers mentioned cases when a farmer was slack in working so
when his turn in the rotation came, fewwere available to help. He
was, not given priority. Only when the other farmers were free was
he joined in the work. On the other hand, hard-workingfarmerswere
enthusiastically joined by their contemporaries when their turn
• came,
Land.andLaborRelations 287
Pulling and bundling seedlingsand transplanting were done by
hired laborers who were paid daily wages. Harvestingand threshing
were commonly clone by landlesshired laborers.Only a few reported
joining these activities on a bayanihan basis.Harvestingwasdone by
cutting rice stalks_near the base. Thesewere then piled in a haystack
for drying. A date was set for threshing and this was a merry occa-
sion. On the threshingday, the tenant, his lusungan group, the bar-
vesters and the caretaker representing the landlord were all there.
Food was served as was the practice during land preparation and
planting days. Division of harvestfollowed. After givingthe one-sixth
hunut,an, (the share of the harvesters), the remaining palay was di-
vided between the tenant and the landlord. Weedingwas not com-
monly practiced for the varieties planted were tall and not threat-
ened by weeds. However, by 1965, a landlord-operator, the richest
of all, started hiring laborersto weed his farm.
Farmers usually helped in hauling palay especially for members
of his lusungan group. This included delivery of the landlord's share
to his house or to a ricemill for storage,Other personswho helped in
hauling were not farmers but were laborershired for weedingor har-
vesting.
In 1979, only one-sixth of those who reported participating in
bayanihan in 1965 continued to be involved in exchange labor for
land preparation. The frequency with which this was done coopera-
tively decreasedmarkedly and fewer people were involved in 1979.
Preparingthe seedlingsfor transplanting, repair and makingof dikes
and planting were no longer done cooperatively. Instead,hired labor
was used. Cooking for workers during planting, harvesting and
threshing, clearing and cleaning of ricefields before planting; and
weeding and hauling of palay were no longer done on an exchange
labor basis.
Although all the respondents indicated that other non-farm
activities were still done cooperatively even if lessfrequently and
fewer people taking part, what was commonly perceivedto havedi-
minished or disappeared in the village was the exchange labor in
farming. Sixty-seven percent observedthat there was no more baya-
nihan in the farming; 29 percent said it was practicedbut rarely and
only four percent perceivedthat i,twas_stillpresent
The decline or demiseof bayanihan in farming operationsisattri-
buted mainly to mechanization and practice of hiring laborersto do
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farm jobs. Other reasons given are: disappearanceof the carabao
either by theft, poisoning or simply sale of the animal in order to
buy hand tractors; and availability of governmentcredit to buy light
farm machinery. Still others regard the high cost of living as the
reason for people wanting to be paid for labor expended. Bayanihan
was consideredcostly becauseof food expenses.Furthermore, farm-
ersare ashamedto askhelp from others becausethey realizethe need
to earn for themselves,
When asked what working arrangement they preferred, 67 per-
cent chosethe bayamTtan before 1965 becauseit wasfun. They per-
ceived the past as happier times for life was not as difficult as the
present when they haveto work so hard.
Several respondentspointed out that it was lessexpensiveto feed
people, get the land prepared, planted and harvestedthe bayanihan
way than to hire laborers, machinesend buy expensivefarm inputs.
It costs lessto accomplishjobs by calling on friends and sharingfood
with them than to hire. It was possible to farm with little capital in
the pest.
Others mentioned that in the pre-1965 bayanihan, they were able
to help one another. It wasalso easier to requesthelp from them.
Peoplewere more united; relationshipswere closer in the past than at
present. Since everyone had becomesobusy earning,hiring help was
the next possible thing to do. The richest farmer in the village pre-
ferred the old bayanihan becausefarmers were hard-working then.
Now, he regretted that farmers, notably tenants, had taken it easy
and hired laborersto do the farming for them.
Those (24 percent) who preferredthe 1979 non.bayanihan work-
ing arrangement felt that this presentsystem enabled them to con-
centrate and accomplish more in their own farm jobs if they re-
frained from joining bayanihan groups. They felt it harder to earn
now than before 1965, Some noted that.it waslessexpensiveto farm '
by hiring machine and laborersthan to feed around 15 to 30 persons
to do the equivalent work. Others preferred to get paid for their la-
bor now rather than getting the reciprocal help in times of need.
Furthermore, repayinga debt of gratitude wasconsidereddifficult.
When askedwhether it was possibleto return to the old bayani-
hen system, consideringtheir expressedpreferencefor it, 80 percent
of respondentssaid it is not possible,sayingthat: At presentall farm
operations are hired; mechanization has taken over; there are few or
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no animals left; it is the current trend; farmers want convenience;
high farm expensesand high cost of living. All these, they felt mili-
tate againstthe return to the old practice.
The 17 percent who thought that it is possiblefor bayanihan to
make a comebackgavevery interesting basesfor their opinion such
as: the high price of gasoline;the high rate for hiring machinesand
laborers;if animal power will return and machineswould disappear.
Respondents perceived more disadvantagesthan advantagesin
the demise of bayanihan. For example, the hiring of labor to perform
farm operations was the most frequently cited effect on the com-
munity. Payment of wages has escalated production costsand has
undesirableconsequenceson farmers who do not have capital. High
interest charges on credit from money lenders and even the bank
have become burdensome. Hired laborers likewise lament the ex-
pensivefarming becausefarmersalso cut down on "hunusan" (share
of crop) paymentsto them for performingfarm jobs.a
3. Pangasinancasestudy
Anderson traces for us the context of use and rapid decline of
exchange labor in Sisya, Central Pangasinan. He regardsammoyo
(exchange of labor) as one of "a set of labor arrangementsto fit
their specific production requirements." For the peasant, "labor
arrangementsrepresent the principal factor in which they can exer-
cise some degreeof flexibility and choice, since lind and capital are
less accessible or less within their control to manipulate. Even
share-tenants have usually enjoyed the right to select and employ
whatever arrangement suited them without fear of landlord inter-
ference."
Anderson summarizesfor us the structure of conditions and pre-
ference for the use of exchange labor which enable usto comprehend
the dynamics of a labor arrangement like ammoyo which is an
equivalent and rotating exchange of labor in land preparation and
occasionally for transplanting and harvesting. These conditions are
the following:
[] A limited pool of availableagricultural labor during the high-
ly peaked periods of labor demands set by the cropping
system;
[] Cultivation of a singlerainfed crop of rice intended princi-
pally for consumption or sequential cropping (e.g. tobacco)
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which implies no severe restrictions on recycling time to
replant;
[] Absenceof strict time constraints in accomplishingthe par-
ticular agriculturaltask in question;
[] Shortage of cash in a particularly subsistence-orientedpro-
duction system which requires the use of "cash-saving"or
"cash substitution" tactics_
[] A land tenure system basedon a high proportion of.owner-
cultivators and owner-tenants and upon traditional landlord-
• tenant relations thus placing control for specificfarm man-
agement in the handsof cultivators themselves;
[] The existence of relatively small, scattered parcelsand mo-
derate sizedfarms;
[] The availability of work animals or hand tractors and the
unavailability of large tractors capable of doing contract
plowingat a reasonableprice in land preparation;
[] The tendency to regardfarming as an exclusiveoccupation,
thus engaging few other supplemental (and necessarily dis-
tracting) sidelines.
Besidesthese above-mentioned conditions which appear to be
associated with the viability of ammoyo, Anderson summarizes
characteristics•of ammoyo partnersasfollows:
[] Kin, neighbors, friends -- that is, intimates, who have exist-
ing relationships based on trust and who enjoy working
together;
[] Proximity of farms;
[] Roughlyequivalent farm size;
[] Roughly equivalent age;
[] •Roughlyequivalent socio-economicstatus;
L--I Biastoward malesasagainstfemales;
[] Low cashavailability;
[] Shortage of available household or wage labor at times of
greatestneed;
[] Relative geographicisolation; and
[] Relatively simple technology sharedby all partners.
There are additional constraints underlying the practice of am-
moyo which Andersonfurther specifies:
[] Ammoyo usually involvesactivities in which malecultivators
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normally participate (except transplanting of rice);
[] Since the contract rests on equivalence of input, the ten-
tency exists for the selection of work partners who are of
about the same age (that is of equal vigor) who haveabout
the same commitment to knowledge of and agreement on
sound agricultural practices;in general,they occupythe same
socio-economicstatus.
[] The assumption of equivalence also requires that partners
have farms or fields of about the same size, devoted to the
same crops, sharingabout the sameconditions (thatis about
the same difficulty factor in completion of the task in each
partner'scase)and about the sameneeds.
r-I There is an understandablepreference for houseneighborsor
field neighborswho are kinsmen, friends or trustedneighbors
who thus can be expected to uphold the contract fully and
with whom one enjoys the companionship of work and
afterward drinking, gossipingand story-telling.
[] The ammoyo contract quaranteesthat eachpartner is assured
the labor assistancethat he requires at the approximate
time that he requires it on his farm. The reciprocalof this is
that each partner placeshimself on call at any time set by his
partners.
This latter requirement of the ammoyo is perhaps the
most onerous of all. It requiresa "serious commitment and
a maior expenditure of time and energy. " Becauseammoyo
is a cash-savingcontract, "it deniesto the partnersthe useof
part of their time during which they might be earningneeded
cash. It requiresmembers to work together and to maintain
close personal relations with actual or potential work part-
hers."
In recent years, a number of circumstanceshave com-
bined to drastically reduce the advantagesand attractiveness
of ammoyo and appeared to haveall but contributed to the
demiseof the practice, These factorsare asfollows:
[] Although the number of householdersengagedin farming has
remained the same over the past 2 decadesdue to out-migra-
tion of young men and women in the area, the averageage
of farmers has risen from 41 to over 48 years, With the dif-
ficulty of feeding and caring for work animals,the rigors of
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hard field labor and the availability of "reasonably" priced
contract plowing these older farmers began seriously to re-
consider their time, energy and resourceallocation. More-
over many farmers can gain more by using their time in
income-producingactivities.
[] Increasingdifferentiation of cultivators and the reduction in
number of potential ammoyo usersconfoundsthe preference
for partnersof similaragewho haveneighboringfarms and/or
homes, who are kinsmen, and who are willing to undertake
the obligationsimposedby amrnoyo contracts.
I-I The present situation is vastly different from the period in
which ammoyo was the most prominent labor arrangement.
At that time, labor was still scarce. Cash to pay wages to
available laborers was short. Differences among cultivators
were minimal and farms were four or five times the size of
the averageSisya small farm of today.
I-1 Considerationsof time appear to be the main factor respon-
sible for the rapid demise of arnmoyo in Sisya. The increase
in the number of largetractors availableto do contract plow-
ing at reasonablecost has made this method of land prepara-
tion attractive. The destruction of the local irrigation system
after a typhoon and the resultingsiltation made immediate
transplanting after land preparation a must. This placedan
even greater premium on timing which strongly reinforced
the desirability of contract plowing which can be followed
immediately by hired transplanters.
I-1 The expansionof sugarproduction in the area which hashad
a long practiceof harvestingby wagelaborersbecameanother
contributory factor to the decline of exchangelabor.
[] A small swing back to arnmoyo has been observed in the
wake of rising fuel costs associatedwith tractors and other
equipment.
Anderson concludes that the combination of factors associated
with the use of ammoyo tend to locate this practice in "the more
traditional, marginaland labor short (perhapsdue to out-migration)
settingswith low monetization, low time constraints, that represent
a compromise between maximization and "community" orienta-
tions."
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Survival of Exchange Labor in Farming
Despite the preceding case studies which signal the demise of
bayanihan in farming, there are some placeswhere the practice has
either establishedfirm roots or managedto survivein somemanner.
Keeping in mind the previousdiscussionson conditionsand circums-
tances which have jointly contributed to the erosion of traditional
exchange labor, this section highlights the forces which enable the
practice to continue. Casestudiesfrom Laguna, Bukidnon, Palawan
and Isabela are presented to illustrate the phenomenon of institu-
tional adaptation and survival.
1. The Laguna Case
Although Laguna is very much within the orbit of Metropolitan
Manila and has been affected by all the attendant consequencesof
increasing urbanization, new technology, development programs,
infrastructure etc., Duhaylungsod reports the persistenceof tomo.
hen in San Buenaventura, Luisiana. Unlike Pinagbayanan,Pila, Lagu-
na which del Rosario described earlier as a place where exchange
labor appears to be going out of style. Luisiana is the last town of
Laguna located at the foot of Mt. Banahaw, while Pinagbayananis,
very accessiblefrom the highway and agriculture is mainly lowland,
and irrigated ricelands. San Buenaventura is categorized as upland.
Only jeepneysservice the Luisiana-SanBuenaventuraroute and on a
relatively lessregularbasis.
Basicto the apparent endurance of tornohan isthis physicalset-
ting. The total land area of Luisiana is about 7,500 hectares(about
1400 feet sea level) which are planted mainly with coconuts and
pandan (fiber plant whose leaves are used for weaving hats, mats,
basketsetc.) as intercrop. The major croppingpattern is rice-ricefor
the rainfed and vegetable-root crop for the kaingin area. Landfarms
are mainly rolling and undulating hills. Soils are regardedas proble-
matic with low acidity; texture is clayey becomingvery sticky when
wet and hard when dry. The nearby hinterlands on the Quezon
Province boundary offer possibleexpansion areasfor residentswho
are now seasonallyutilizing them as kaingin. Location of housesin
San Buenaventura generally follows the lineated form with farm
lands outlaying their cluster of dwellings. Electricity reached the
village only in mid-1980. Farming is the mainstay of economic life
supplementedbypandan weaving.
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Tornohan is described by Duhaylungsod as a practice which in-
volvesa group of persons(about 10) who collectively undertake an
activity. The membersof the group take turns in being recipient of
the collective labor. For example, if a memberneedslabor for clear-
ing a forest, his tornohan group of 10 will work together in oneday
to clear it. The basic principle is to facilitate what otherwisewould
havebeen difficult if one were alone. However, under the tornohan
arrangement, participation becomesobligatory, i.e., one isobliged to
render labor to each of the members of the group when his turn
comes. The scheduleof "tuPns" is usually arrived at by mutual agree-
ment or in some cases,by lottery. One's turn to receivethe pooled
labor is locally termed askabig. A leader, referred to asthe Kabisilya
is chosenor elected to overseethe arrangement.
San Buenaventura seems to be "culturally" characterized by
mutual help systemsas tornohan applies not only to exchangelabor
but also to pooling together or collective savingsof money, rice, o[
pandan.
[] Tornohan sa pera involves weekly or monthly deposits of
similar amounts of money by a group of persons.Thesede-
posits are kept by the Kabisi/ya until it istime for eachmem-
ber to get the kabig (the pooled amount for the week or
month). Members take turns in usingthe pooled money for
some big needs. It is viewed as a way of savingeven if no
interest is earnedfor the deposit. Successionof turns is deter-
mined by lottery. At least the memberscan have accessto a
largeramount of money when they need it without resorting
to borrowing.
E3 Girimyo involves pooling together rice-harvest which is
usually deposited in one cavan by each member. The pooled
cavansof rice are turned over to the member who getsthe
kabig and sells it. Since there areonly 2 harvestsin one year
in this village, only 2 memberscan draw their kabig in one
year hence the girimyo takes a longer rotation especially if
the membership is large. One problem with the girirnyo in
rice is the absenceof a fixed price for ricesothat a member
can be lucky or unlucky about the rice price when hiskabig
comes.
[] Tornohan sa pandan. The weaving industry in the area uses
pandan for making bags,hats, and mats. In this kind of to/'-
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nohan, membersagree to pool together the same number of
pandan strips. Included in the arrangement is to haveall the
members collectively weavethepandan and the onewho gets
the kabig takes care of marketing the products, proceeds
of which go to him. Every member gets his turn to receive
the kabig but salesof the product vary becauseof the fluc-
tuating price,
Although girimyo and tomohan sa pandan come close
to the concept of group marketing which is very advanta-
geous when rice and finished woven products come in small
quantities if sold individually, these two practicesare mini-
mally practiced at present. Tornohan sapera, however, is still
widely practiced.
[] Tornohan sa katawanan is an exchange labor arrangement
applied to any activity which any member wants. Usually,
the activities are in farming, kaingin or house-building.
Duhaylungsod focused her study on tornohan sa katawa-
nan becauseit is the most prevalent, the most intensivelypar-
ticipated in by members of the community and the most en-
during of the tornohan practices. The major features of this
type of exchange labor as practiced in San Buenaventuraare
as follows:
I-I The arrangement involves 10-15 farmer memberswho under-
take any farm activity indicated by the sponsor (may patur-
no) whose farm or house will be worked on. Traditionally
Mondays and Tuesdays have been designatedas torno days
or days set asidefor collective labor. The rest of the week are
devoted to individualwork in member'srespectivefarms.
17 Schedule of turns; number of days of collective labor for
each turn membership size; and other relevant features are
decided upon as soon as a group is formed. What is fixed,
aside from the specifictorno daysis the explicit obligation of
a farmer-member to render labor to each of the other group
members during the agreed upon period. Failure to comply
with this obligation means an "indebtedness" which he has
to pay, not to mention, the "shame" which automatically
accompaniesthis.
Normally it takes about 15 months to complete a rota-
tion. It may take longer or shorter depending on the size of
the group. As soon as the group finishes its rotation, a pasi-
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naya (some kind of festivity) isheld duringwhich decisionsto
renew membership and when to start again are made. In the
pasinaya, membersas well astheir familiesare included.
[] Tornohan started a long time agowith work focusingmainly
on pagbubulta (transforming an area with water source into
rice paddies) and slashand burn farming. Both of theseacti-
vities are associatedwith the upland nature of the area. How-
ever there is no exclusivefarm activities to which tornohan
is applied. Rice farming, for example, could involve land
preparation, planting, and weeding. For coconut farms, acti-
vities engagedin are weeding and plantingcoconut seedlings.
Since pandan is intercropped with coconuts, exchangelabor
can be used also for harvestingpandan leaves. However,
copra-making and rice harvestingare excludedfrom tornohan
becausethese jobs are regardedby farmers assourcesof in-
come for those who have smaller farm Iotsto till or have
nothing at all. This allocation of certain productivefunctions
for the smaller farmers and the landlessis an illustration of
the community's welfare concern for those who have less
accessto resources.
[] The norms which govern tornohan arrangementshave been
largely maintained through the years.Work starts strictly at
7:00 A.M. and ends at 4:00 P.M. This meansmembersare
expected to begin the torno on time regardlessof the dis-
tance from residenceto site of work. If the farm is far from
the village, torno members have to leaveearlier to reach the
work area at 7:00 A,M. However, in case of heavy rains,
working time is adjusted on equivalent terms. If such rains
occur during working hours, work is temporarily stopped
without repayment, unlessthe job on hand is runningagainst
time, as in rice planting. A day's turn is over at 4:00 P.M.
even with the task unfinished or earlier than that if the job is
done before that time. Hence, sometimesthe effective work-
ing time is lessthan 8 hoursa day.
•[] Each member is entitled to a one-month kabig which is equi-
valent to 8 working days. The rotation is flexible as long as
arrangementswith the group are made earlier. This means
that a member may opt to have his kab/g on a staggered
basis,e.g. 4 days at the first turn and the remaining4 days
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later. The minimum, however, is set at 2 days, i.e. no 2 kabigs
occur in one week.
17 If a member fails to attend a day's work, he is required to
send a substitute. A P5 a day fine is imposedfor beingab-
sent but the fine does not wipe out his accountability to the
member who missedhis labor contribution. Reasonableab-
sencesare excusedbut the obligation to render work remains.
Fines collected accrue to the expenses for the pasinaya. In
actual practice, however, absenteeism and poor work per-
formance seldom happen becausemembers are thoroughly
screened. Anyone who is consistently absent or inefficient
either drops out from the group voluntarily or the group
"drops" him in the next rotation, The latter is done simply
by withholding information about the next rotation from the
"unwanted" member. If he tries for membership in another
group his "credentials" are circulated and often he is givena
second chance on a provisional basis. Meanwhile he goes
through a "reeducation" process.
[3 One of the approachesto maintaining group discipline and
satisfactory work performance is to provide an opportunity
for the group to discussproblems and "evaluate" work done
through regularmeetings held every Tuesday after the day's
work. For example, the Kabisilya opens up by asking: "Did
you notice anything in our work today which may have
affected our operations?" The replies could be as critical
as these statements: "Brod Isko was so slow," or "Brod
Andres took so many breaks!" Such comments call for ex-
planations or apologies from the accused if the chargesare
valid. While negative behavior deservescensure,exceptional
contributions by members are duly recognized. Schedulesof
"turn" are likewise announced in these meetingsand regular
assessmentof tornohan activities is made.
I_ Another feature which contributes to the viability of the tor-
nohan are the differential skillswhich membersbring into the
group. There is specialization and divisionof labor and each
type of activity engagedin by the group calls for a different
leader. For example, if the day's work is house building, the
most experienced carpenter becomes the lead member al-
though the owner of the housestill "directs" the operations.
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Under thisarrangement,a member may alsolearn new,and/or
additional skills from other members. In other words, there
is an "apprenticeship" benefit to be derived from participa-
ting in the tornohan.
[] Duhaylungsodcharacterizesthe leadershipstyle of the Kabi-
silya in the tornohan asdemocraticcentralism, i.e., leadership
is collective, not centralized in one or two persons- asmani-
fested in group decision-makingandaction. During meetings,
the Kabisilya merely acts as the group's facilitator whose
viewsare taken assuggestionsnot impositions.Every member
has a chance to be chosen as a Kabisilya. Old age and long
tenure in the group are not necessarilyrequired for election
to the position. A nominated member may decline provided
there is an acceptable reason such as inability to write be-
causeone important function of the Kabisilya is to keep re-
cords of members' names,their scheduleof turns, and dues.
He hostsregular meetings and the pasinaya and acts as the
communication center of the group.
[] The seventornohan groupsstudied by Duhaylungsodshowed
a pattern in membership.The high income (relatively speak-
ing) farmers, mostly pioneer families tended to group to-
gether. There are 4 more such older groups.The low income
farmers such as tenants and hired farm laborers belong to
another younger group. Two groups are composed of high
school students who are children of mrnohan members.So-
cio-economic status, lengthof experience in tornohan, age,
kin relations besides physical distance from each other in-
fluence the composition of tornohan groups.One group,e.g.
has the largestconcentration of cousinsregardlessof residen-
tial locations.
Becausetornohan has been in existence for a long, long
time, changesin its norms and operationshave taken place
apparently in responseto changingconditions. The following
are some of the modifications and adaptations which have
occurred:
[] Provisions of free lunch and two snacks for each working day
has been scrapped. Members bring their own lunch to work
or they go home to eat. The drinking spree and pasinaya
which used to be held at every turn hosted by the member
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who receivesthe kabig hasbeen reduced to only one festivity
at the end of the rotation. The whole group, instead of the
individual member, spendsfor this pasina)/a through contd-
butions. This changemeansa lot of savingsin the food and
drink expenses.
[] Although majority of the tornohan participants are farm
owner-operators_a few tenants and hired farm laborershave
been accommodated in the system. In the caseof the hired
worker, he sellshis turn (Kabig) to receivethe pooled labor
to a personwho needsand prefersa readily organizedgroup
of laborers, e.g. for house construction. The buyer of this
collective labor obtains theseservicesat a lower rate than the
regular laborer but such reduced rates apply only on Mon-
daysandTuesdayswhich are the tomohan days. For the hired
tornohan member, the advantage is the opportunity to re-
ceiveat one time the total wagesfor 12 or 15 personsfor two
days. For the rest of the week, he can work as a regular
laborer.
[] For the tenant, tornohan hasbecomean additional sourceof
cash income. As his kabig, he may employ the tornohan
group to weed a coconut farm where he is a tenant. The
owner payshim the equivalent of 12 man-days(dependingon
the size of the group). It has been observed,however, that
the group of tenantsandhired workers hasexhibited changing
membershipwhich suggestsomeinstability.
[] Reduction in group sizemakesit possibleto shorten the rota-
tion period and makes it more appropriate for existing farm
size.
Duhaylungeod's analysis of tornohan in San Buenaven-
tura shows us the following conditions which apparently
"conspire" to breathecontinuing life into the practice:
[] Unlike other exchange labor arrangements,tornohan sa kata-
wanan in San Buenaventura is not tied to narrowly.defined
specified farm activities. There ismore flexibility in the sense
that labor activities engaged in dependson the needsof the
members. The group has differential skills hencedivision of
labor and specialization is possibleand there is potential "ap-
prenticeship" benefit for new or additional skills for mem-
bers.
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[] Work arrangements are characterized by well-established
disciplinary rules. There is strict adherence to attendance
requirements,days and hours of work and quality of perfor-
mance. To enforce the requirements and assessperformance
and work progress,regularmeetingsare held.
[] Leadership is collective, and rotating rather than concen-
trated in one personfor a longtime.
[] Majority of tornohan participants are farm owner-operators.
Except for pandan weaving, alternative non-farm job oppor-
tunities are limited and agricultural landlessnessis not asyet
a major problem as kaing/n fields are still available.
[] There are no tractors in the area. The upland conditions and
nature of the terrain have not been favorableto farm mecha-
nization.
[] In responseto prevailing conditions, modifications in torn_
han operations have been made such as elimination of
lunches and snacks, reduction of frequency of pasinaya and
change from individual to group sponsorshipof the festivity
in order to minimize food expenses.
[] There are marginalefforts to build in welfare considerations
for the lessprivileged,thus, copra-makingand rice harvesting
are not activities for tornohan. These jobs are left for the
landlessand smaller farmers. P, member who hasa carabao
does not earn separate work credit for hisanimal. This is one
way of sharingresourceswith the "have-nots" or "have-less."
[] Tornohan is a dominant cultural feature of community life in
San Buenaventura. Becauseof the pervasivenessof the prac-
tice, non-participants in the system becomethe odd/ties. Who
are they? The "maykaya" well-off farmerswho can afford to
hire labor, the retirees and the physically able but "un-
wanted" by any of the groups are the outsidersto the sys-
tem. On Mondays and Tuesdays, there are few men they
could talk to since most every able-bodied male is out on a
tornohan assignment.
[] The significanceof tornohan becomes more evident in the
farmers' total endorsement of the practice as beneficial. No
one cited, any disadvantage.On the other hand, most, if not
all of them, enumerated the following benefits from torno-
ban: more work is accomplished faster, easier,and becomes
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more enjoyable. Different skills are contributed from the
members and enable them to learn new skills from others.
Pressurefrom the group compelsmembersto work and saves
them the expense of hired labor. Furthermore, they would
rather spendcash on most other things foremost of which is
children's education, The more personal terms in tornohan
are also preferred over hired labor althoughthis enablesthem
to choose the most skilled worker. When asked how they
would react to the abolition of the practice, the unanimous
responseis: "there is no reasonto abolish tornoham."
[] SamahangNayon in the village was short-livedbecausefarm-
ers found the organization so different in terms of too many
obligations, too many activities, and fees.One comment sums
up the difference in this statement: "SN is political. Torno-
han is merecooperation in work."1°
2. The Isabela Case
Four villages in the muncipelity of Luna, Central Isabela were
selected by Anderson, Cordova, Dozina, James and Roumasset to
study exchangelabor arrangementsin CagayanValley. Purok and La-
log I are the "far" or lessaccessiblevillageswhile Haranaand Mamba-
bangaare the "near" or accessibleone¢ Householdheadsin the far
barrios are all farm-owner-operators. Crops are tobacco, corn and
peanutswhich are all grown under upland conditionswithout irriga-
tion facilities. Land preparation is done mostly with the useof ani-
mal power. There is no availableoff-farm employment and residents
are almost purely agriculturalists.Landlesslaborersare largelyabsent
in these areas although farm sizes have decreased because of land
fragmentation arising from parents' giving pieces of land to their
children.
The near villages,Harana and Mambabanga, have irrigated farms
planted to rice twice a year. There are tractor owners who rent out
tractors for land preparation and landlessworkers who render their
servicesas hired laborers in transplanting and harvesting.Carabaos
are very few in these areas because of the outbreak of foot and
mouth disease in 1975. The irrigated areas were the most affected
by this animal disease. Unlike the far villages,Harana and Mamba-
banga, the near areas have a large pool of labor supply especially
during the latter years. The two sourcesof landless labor are: mi-
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grants and dispossessedtenants whose lands were taken back by
their landowners when land reform came.
Exchange labor arrangements in these four villages are described
as follows:
[] Lalog I and Puroc (the far villages)
Lalog I had a tobacco-based economy since the establishment of
the village in early 1930's. Since then Lalog I residents have em-
ployed exchange labor in land preparation, pulling and transplanting
of tobacco. The pool for ammoyo (exchange labor) was large during
the early period of the settlement. Through time the pool for ex-
change labor declined for two reasons: (a) Some of the farmers'
children want to study rather than stay in the farm. (b) Newly
formed households are usually given a piece of land to cultivate for
their own livelihood. This highly fragmented small farms could be
managed and operated by the operator himself during land prepara-
tion, hence some farmers no longer rely on reciprocal labor. How-
ever, there are still those who exchange labor for land preparation to
lighten the work andshorten the time.
Puroc had experienced rainfed rice farming where exchange la-
bor began. In 1936 a communal irrigation dam was constructed but
a strong flood in 1968 destroyed it. So from 1936 to 1968, farmers
produced rice. From 1968 onward, Puroc became an upland area
planted to tobacco and other upland crops.
Only one kind of exchange labor is found in the tobacco-based
communities - the land preparation and transplanting labor group.
In tobacco production, a large mass of labor is needed at one point
in time, i.e. during the pulling and transplanting of seedlingswhich
wilt easily if not planted on time. During this most critical period
of transplanting, 48 transplantees are needed to finish the work with-
in 2 hours for a one-hectare farm. And it is in this operation where
exchange labor is being employed. As a matter of fact, useof hired
labor in transplanting tobacco has not yet been resorted to by farm-
ers in these tobacco areas. The land preparation and transplanting
groups in these tobacco-based communities are loosely organized.
Membership in these groups is not exclusive but overlapping. In
other words, a person can belong to both land preparation and trans-
planting groups: Grouping is basedon a per operation basis and has
no rigid rules and regulations in repaying labor. If a farmer owes his
LandandLaborRelations 303
neighboroneday labor of only4 hours in plowing, he hasto repayhis
helper also a day's labor but not necessarilyof the same number of
hoursworked in the same field. It can be longer or shorter depend-
ing on the number of co-farmerswho arrived to help the host farm-
er. The namesof those who came to help him is listed in a note-
book by the host farmer to ensure labor repayment to them when
theseother farmerscall for hisservices.
L'-JMambabangaand Harana (near villages)
These two villages have a long history of rice production and
now they have even better irrigation facilities and more sufficient
water supply than before, In the past, local irrigation infrastructures
were operated and maintained by the communal irrigation organiza-
tions in which case,exchange labor was employed in cleaning the
canals. Nowadays,: irrigation control is done mostly by employees
of the National Irrigation Administration.
Originally, there were four tasks in rice production which em-
ployed exchange labor: land preparation (plowing and harrowing);
pulling and transplanting seedlings,irrigation and water control and
harvesting. In general, labor grouping in these 2 villagesis basedon
farm operations with due consideration to the farmers' resources
on hand. Membership tends to be exclusive to each group if they
agree that everyone is required to perform the sametask in all farms
owned by the members.Generally, farmers operate on an hour-for-
hour exchange labor. Imbalancesare paid in cash or kind basedon
the principle of hiring on a commercialcontractual arrangement.
In Harana, three types of exchangelabor groupswere identified:
the land preparation, the transplantinggroup, and the transplanting
and harvestinggroup. A unique transplantinggroupwas identified in
Mambabangacalled the arnmoyo-pakyaw group.
[] Land preparation group. A group of three farmerswho are in
their early 30s agreed in 1974 to exchangetheir labor only in land
preparation. Luckily, their carabaoswere not affected by the foot
and mouth disease in 1975 which killed many working animals in
the irrigated areas of Isabela. Land preparation includesplowing and
the first, secondand third harrowings. Additional work done by the
group is the pulling of seedlingswhich they can easily do. Besides
being compadresthese three farmers have adjacent farms. However,
their main consideration in forming an exclusivegroup amongthem-
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selvesis old age. It is hard tO match thework of the younger group.
Acquiring a hand tractor which means borrowing money from the
Rural Bank was not resorted to becauseof the additional financial
burden which it would entail.
[] Transplanting group. After exchanginglabor for transplanting
in their respectivefarms for quite sometime, in 1972 a group of 10
housewivesformally organized themselves into a group. They have
no specified guidelines and no designated leader but they worked
harmoniously. Defaulting is not a problem amongthemselvesbecause
the average labor reserve is 2-3 personsper family (of each group
member) composed mostly of women. Their farms are almost of the
same size. Most of them are relatives and neighborswith their farms
within one kilometer reach and mostly adjacent to each other. The
first one who needs the transplanting serviceinitiates the activation
of the group, So far, no one has left the group yet since it was or-
ganized.
[] Transplanting and harvesting group, This group which was
organized in 1968 involves17 regularmembers,mostly females,from
5 households.Absenteeism is not a problem. A member must hire a
substitute for her if she cannot make it on a particular day. At the
start, the group had no designatedleader. The first one who needs
the group's servicesbecomesthe leader for that particular season.
However in 1975, the group appointed a permanent leader and in
1977 they began entering into contractual hire arrangement for
transplantingservicesto non-membersof the group,
[] The ammoyo-pakyaw group
As the term implies, the group membersexchange labor among
themselvesand at the same time the group engagesin commercial
contract services.This group was organizedin 1972 by someonewho
was previously a member of another transplantinggroup for hire in
the village. He formed his own group by selecting10 boys aged 10-18
years. They are sons of farmers in the areawith an averagefarm size
of 1.5 hectares.The sizeof the group issufficient manpower to plant
•a hectare of rice in one day. Selection of memberswasbasedon farm
distances from each other. The group is strictly governed by rules
and regulations the members promulgated, Absenteeism and tardi-
nessare not tolerated. If one wants to be absent, he hasto find a
replacement who is also as skillful as himself in transplanting. A
member who is late in going to the field is fined. The money col-
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lected is used to buy liquor for the group's consumption in the
evening.
The group operates on the basisof some farm size to work on.
The membersagreed that eachone isprivilegedto receivethe group's
transplanting service only for one hectare, which is the minimum
farm size of the group members.Any area in excessof the one hec-
tare which is serviced by the group has to be paid in cash. Contract-
ual servicesfor transplanting are accepted by the group only for
farms which are within the 1.5 km. radius of the village. Beyond
that, the group does not operate, unlessthe farmer who needsthe
group'sservicesprovidesfree transportation.
The Current Status of ExchangeLabor Arrangement
The enumeration and description of the above-mentioned ex-
change labor groups does not mean that the practice is pervasive.
These groupsactually represent the total number of exchangelabor
groups in the two-rice-based areaswhich is about a third of all farm
households. On the other hand, in the tobacco-basedvillages, there
are many exchange labor groupswith overlapping rather than exclu-
sire membership for land preparation and transplanting. Despitethe
obvious advantageof exchange labor in terms of easingthe pressure
for cashto pay hired labor and the socializingaspectof working to-
gether, exchange labor is diminishing especially in the rice-growing
areas. In land preparation, the diminishing of exchange labor was
triggered by the foot and mouth diseaseof carabaosin 1975. Some
farmers obtained loans from the Rural Bank to acquire handtractors
and mechanization tended to push out exchange labor. A high per-
cent of landlessworkers brought by in-migration into theserice-areas
has resulted in a situation of more hired-labor than exchange labor
groups.As the authors said: "The tendency is for exchangelabor to
go out when landlesslaborerscome in.''11 However it mustbe noted
that the exchange labor groupsidentified in the riceareashavetaken
on'contractual hired labor functions on top of their exchange labor
activities. This looks like an adaptation to the existingcircumstances.
3. The Bukidnon Case
Malinao, municipality of Kalilangan,is the last village of Bukid.
non toward Lanao del Sur. Malinao was opened in 1958 through a
government resettlement program which brought settlers mainly
from the Batanes Islands, Visayas and Misamis Oriental. Paller-
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Santiago's study of this land settlement community reports that the
Ivatans (people from Batanes) stand out as the group that had come
into Malinao in batchescomposed of several families (20 persons at
first in 1956; 78 families, 1958; 46 families in 1958; 26 families in
1960; and 1962, 16 families). On the other hand, settlers from Visa-
yas, Misamis Oriental and Lanao Came as individual families or small
groups of families.
Practically all of the Ivatans came to the settlement in the com-
pany of immediate family members, relatives and friends. Majority
of the household heads and housewives interviewed said that they
were acquainted with members of their group and that they came
from the same place. Although residential areas and farm lots were
assigned to settlers by drawing lots, this method was applied within
pre-organized groups of identical, if not similar, ethnic origin. There
was a resulting pattern, therefore, of kins and acquaintances from
the place of origin to be located in the same neighborhood. This
"zoning" arrangement resulted in 3 groups: The Muslims, Ivatans,
and Visayans. The size of the farm lots ranged from 6 to 8 hectares
depending on the topography of the land; six hectares if the area is
plain; eight hectares if hilly or rolling. At present there are settlers
who have as much as 16 to 24 hectares, all of which are fully culti-
vated. This suggests that some land transactions have taken place
despite the prohibition against sale. Those who have farms smaller
than 6 hectares could mean that a portion has been sold or that the
lot is a share from parents who were the original allocatees. All the
farmers studied own plow, harrow, and carabaos. Only two reported
owning a tractor.
This background is necessary for a better appreciation of the role
which bayanihan plays in Malinao which was chosen as a SEATO
model village in 1974. As Paller-Santiago describes it:
Sticking it out as settlersunder pioneeringconditionsand holding on
till the present. ,. was madepossiblelargelyby somecultural practicesand
unwritten rulesthat operatedto greatadvantageintheir specificsetting.For
the settlers,the bayanihan becamea way of life; asa major mechanism,the
demand for cooperativefarm andnon-farm labor.The Ivatanterm for baya-
nihan is Cayyayyanan (for biggergroups)and pagijuan (for groupssmaller
than twelve). However, these terms are seldom used.Bayanihan is more
commonlyunderstoodby all.
Bayanihan is a farmer's labor investmentby working cooperativelyin
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another's farm with the expectation of collecting 'dividends' for it by
getting a larger number of people to work for his farm. Dependingon
the kind of activity or size of land to be worked on a farm owner con-
tactsat leastaday beforethe numberof peopleneededto getthe job done.
They may be relativesor non-relatives,male or female. One who joins a
bayanihan activity is called a bayeni. Work may rangefrom farm jobssuch
as land preparation,planting,weeding,andharvestingto non-farmactivities
suchas buildinga house,sawinglumberfrom logsand evenextendinginto
celebrationsof specialoccasionssuchas birthdays,weddingsand the like,
morecommonamongthe Ivatans.
Bayanihan in farm activities is of 2 kinds.- one with free labor and the
other with pay. Bayenihan with free laboris opted by farmerswho may not
havethe ready cashto pay for the work, or whojust practiceit asa matter
of preference.The bayani$ are providedwith lunch and morningandafter-
noon snacks.Work startsat 6:00 o'clock in the morningand endsat 5:30
or earlier, if the area is far from the barrio, to provideworkersenoughtime
to walk backto their homesbeforedark. Work may be a day to aweek.
All the bayeni$ in a particularbayanihan group areexpectedto bepre-
sent (or any of their representatives)when a member of the saidgroup
needsthe labor.The return of the "loaned" laborisnot immediate. It may
be in a week's or evena month's time dependingon when it is neededby
other members.The farm owner in one groupmay becomethe bayani in
anotherbayanihan activity.
One who participatesin a bayanihen in land preparation,weedingand
planting activitiesreceive "dividends" in labor, whereasthosewho partici.
pate in bayanihan in harvestingreceivesnot only "labor dividends"but also
shareof the harvest.For those who havehelped in farm activitiesprior to
harvestingthe sharingratio is one-fourthwhile for thosewho joined only
duringharvesttime, it isone-fifth.
If a bayeni will not be availableduring the scheduledharvest day, an
areawill be reservedfor him aslongashe hadparticipatedin the pre-harvest
farm activities. For householdsor familieswho hadprovidedmore members
in the pre-harvestbayanihen, an area for harvestcorrespondingto the num-
ber of memberswill be reservedfor them.
A very uncommon arrangement is the one where wagesare paid for
labor rendered. Thisbayanihan practicedoesnot obligatethe farm ownerto
work in the bayanihanof those whose wageshepaid for. This is opted by
farm ownerswho havethe moneyto pay for the wagesand by thosewho
preferto be morecontractual in their farm operations.
Although the wage perday is arbitrarilyfixed by the farm owner,some
arrangementsare observedto be common. If the farm ownerprovidesfood
for the bayanis the rate is 1_6.00 per day. Farm jobs other than weeding,
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planting or harvesting pay P8.00. Plowing pays P12 for one with a working
animal and P'10 for those without. If the work animal is cattle, the rate is
P2 higher, the reason given is that cattle can work for long hours without
interruptions, while carabaos have to be put in the shade and allowed to
wallow at few hour intervals.
Harvesting is 1P100 per hectare on contract basis. As claimed by a farm
owner, who usesthe practice, the arrangement is convenient because he is
savedfrom the cumbersome job of having to divide the harvest of each baya-
ni individually and giving them their shares.
The bayanihan practice in Ma/inao makes the farmer a full time farmer,
not on/]/ because he fully cultivates his farm but because he has to spend
several days working in other farms. The returns, however, are compensating,
What he and his family or his household have to do in a month can be ac-
complished in a few days or a week, thus, he is always in time for the sea-
sons.
The Malinao out-of*school youth especially among the Ivatans are not
necessarily school drop-outs due to financial difficulties but due to the ever-
pressingneed for farm help. These youths ranging from ages 12 to 21 are the
mainstays in the family's farm while the other members take their turn in
school. They also conduct bayanihan among their ou_-of-school peer groups,
using the same arrangements as that of their farmer parents. Most often
these youths are sent as representatives of their parents who cannot make
it to a scheduled bayanihan activity fo some undvoidable reason. These
youths look forward to the time when it will be their turn in school, which
may take a year or two or more. Sometimes, the waiting gets too long and
eventually the youth give up school in favor of farming or in some instances
of an early marriage....
Among the Ivatans, birthdays are celebrated by farm or non-farm baya-
nihan activities capped with a party. An invitation to a birthday party de-
notes not only merry-making but work to be done... According to the
nature of work scheduled to be done, the guests attend the party with the
necessary tools: farm tools and work animals or carpentry tools as the case
may be... In addition to the luncheon, guestsare given take-home packages
of cooked food or raw meat...
If one intends to build a house, all he needs to do is buy the materials
during each harvest season and at the same time raise a pigling or two for
fattening. When the materials are readY, he schedules the puttin_ up of the
skeletal portion of the house to coincide with the birthday of a household
member. Most, if not all, of the houses in Malinao were built in this manner.
Other socio-culturel features of this community and its residents,
particularly the Ivatans are worth mentioning here as valuable sup-
plementary information:
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I-I More than 90 percent of respondents said they always ex-
change farm favors such as planting, weedingand harvesting
with their neighbors.
[] More than three-fourth also indicated that they alwaysgo to
the farm together with neighbors. Community life revolves
around the farm... Except for children who go to school,
the other pre-schoolchildren are bundled in the family cart
and brought along to the farm, At day break, a caravanof
farmers on their carabaoswith cartsbehind loadedwith food
and water for the day includingsmall children and wivesline
the different road exits to their respective farm lots. They
come homeonly in the late afternoon or at dusk.
[] More than 60 percent of household heads said they never
take advantage of credit facilities to finance farm activities.
What is even more intriguing is that 92 percent said they
never borrow money from relatives and 78 percent never
lend money to them either. However, 92 percent aknowl-
edge that they always exchange farm or home favors with
relatives. The youths are never paid for work rendered in
their farm and 40 percent never engage in paid labor acti-
vities outside their own farm. A third are always absent
from class during the "peak" time in the farm. The rest
are absentsometimes.
[] Almost 70 percent of the respondentsdescribedthemselves
asone who "works best in a group."
l-1 More than three-fourth regard their community as a place
where "people can get together easily for cooperative ac-
tion;" people are so concerned with their civic duties; and
90 percent think their community leadersare capable and
concerned about community welfare. All these are indeed
very positiveattitudes toward their community.
Being a frontier-land setdemnt community, Malinao is "land-
rich" compared to other placesand farmers have a unique but com-
mon land use practice called borrow lot. Ambng Malinao farmers,
borrow lot is a "mutually agreed upon arrangement for the tempo-
rary use of a vacant parcel of land... The practiceascurrently done
preservesthe concept of the land as being 'borrowed' and although
the system resembles tenancy, the difference lies in the fact that
the arrangement can be terminated anytime the owner needs the
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land and is in a position to cultivate it himself. The borrower is al-
lowed to harvest standingcrops or is givenearlier notice before the
arrangementis terminated,
"Borrow lot" operatesbetween friends, relativesand membersof
the nuclear family. A farmer who does not have land or whose land
is not enough may arrangewith another farmer to borrow and culti-
vate the unused portion of his farm. Or a farmer who cannot cope
with the cultivation of his land andwho may not havethe necessary
farm inputs to fully cultivate it may offer the parcel for borrow lot.
Sharing agreement may vary from 30:70 to ,25:75 in favor of the
borrower who shouldersall farm expenses. Some sharingarrange-
merits between kinsmen ape quite generousin favor of the lesspri-
vileged kin.
In early settlement days, "borrow lot" wasalsopracticed to make
land clearing lesstedious for the settler allocatee. A settler whose
area needed clearing would offer it as a borrow lot. The borrower
would clear the area and use it for a stipulated time between 3 to 5
yearswithout givingany shareto the owner,
The arrangement is peculiar since the owner of the lot does not
think of himself asa landlord nor doesthe borrower think of himself
as a tenant. Borrow lot areas are adjacent or parts of the land the
owner is actually cutlivating. Residentsclaimed that there had not
been any incidence of exploitation or cheating between lenderand
borrower as is common in the landlord-tenant relationship.
A farmer can borrow as wide an area as he could tackle from as
many farmers as would allow him, without jeopardizing the interests
of any of the owners. He can also plant any crop he wishesto raise
without the owner's interference. The sustainingfactor to this rela-
tionship is that the borrower usesan idle land the owner preventsa
parcel of his land from laying idle with both partiesbenefiting from
the arrangement.
"Borrow lot" has also been used to increase hectarage. Farmers
with 8 hectares(regulatedallocation for eachsettler family) may still
add several hectaresfor cultivation throughborrow lot, The practice
servesthe Malinao farmer in three ways, namely: (1) it providesthe
use of land to one who does not have; (2) it increaseshectaragefor
those who can provide the necessaryfarm inputs and (3) it prevents
parcelsof land from staying idle.12
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4. The Palawan Case
As part of a broader study of the economicsof migration and
settlement of public lands in the Philippines, James examined the
role of exchange labor in the frontier province of Palawan.13 Fifty
self-financialsettlers and 50 who were moved to Palawanand estab-
lishedas settlers by the government resettlement bureau were inter-
viewed. For comparison,a survey of 30 householdswas alsocarried
out in Tayug, Pangasinan,which is an out-migrationarea with condi-
tions drastically different from Palawan in terms of population pres-
sure, rice farming technology, and relative factor prices. Land rents
are substantially higher in Pangasinanthan in Palawanif cashiscon-
verted to its rice equivalent.
Empirical findingsfrom James'analysisrevealedthese trends:
[] Exchangelabor was more prevalentin Palawanthan in Panga-
sinan both in terms of the proportion of users among the
farmers interviewed (52 percent in Palawan, 36 percent in
Pangasinan)and the degreeof use relative to total farm labor
requirements in rice production (almost 15 percent in Pala-
wan, under 4 percent in Pangasinan).
[] Exchange labor in Palawan is most common in very recently
cleared areas,Most settlers' first crop on their newly cleared
lots is under the /<aingin or slash-and-burnsystem of agricul*
ture, In clearing the land for a first crop, 47 percent of the
settlers used exchange labor groups. In most cases,the kai-
ingin system isonly a temporary expedienceuntil the recently
cleared areas can be converted into lowland rice paddies,
which can then be transplantedor direct seeded(broadcast).
[] Table 5.3 shows that the exchangelabor component in kai-
ngin agriculture is substantially higher than for transplanting
and broadcasting. Farmers who adopted the direct seeding
method in Palawan made little use of exchange labor. It is
only for transplanting that 20 percent of the man-daysper
hectare was contributed by exchange labor. There was a
larger component of hired labor than family or exchange
labor even in transplantingand direct-seeding.
D Table 5.4 shows that even after kaingin fields have been
converted to lowland transplanted rice fields,exchange labor
has remained more prevalent in Patawanthan in Pangasinan
where the practice hasvirtually disappearedexcept minimally
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TABLE 5.3
LABOR INPUT FOR HECTARE BY TECHNIQUES AND SOURCE OF
LABOR IN PALAWAN STUDY AREA (1977-78 CROP YEAR)
Planting Techniques and Labor Source Man-days per Hectare
1. Transplanted rice 75.0
a. Family labor 25.6
b. Exchange labor 15.4
c. Hired labor 34,0
2. Direct seeded rice 60.8
a. Family labor 19.4
b. Exchange labor 0.7
c. Hired labor 40.8
3, Kaingin rice 58.4
a. Family labor 19.7
b. Exchange labor 23.9
c. Hired labor 14.8
TABLE 5.4
PERCENTAGE OF EXCHANGE LABOR USED ON AVERAGE FOR
VARIOUS TASKS FOR TRANSPLANTED RICE IN PALAWAN AND
PANGASINAN STUDY AREAS (1977-78 CROP YEAR)
Tasks Percentage Use of Exchange Labor
Palawan Pangesinan
1. Land preparation 22 2
2. Planting 25 8
3. Care of plants 2 0
4. Harvest and post harvest 13 5
Source: James Anderson, Violeta Cordova, Geronimo Dozina, Jr., Ted
James and James Roumasset, "Exchange Labor and Its Demise in the
Philippines." (Paper presented at the A/D/C Seminar on Social Organiza-
tion of Agricutural Production, held at the Club Solviento, Los Ba_os,
Laguna, Jan. 25-27, 1979).
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for planting and harvesting, in Palawan,exchange labor has
remained in use for planting, land preparation and harvesting
although more for the first two than the latter task.
[] The study concludes that exchange labor seemspopular in
frontier areaswhere there is a scarcity of labor, where farm-
ers lack great cash assets,and where farming is extensive in
that farm sizeis fairly largeand modern inputs are not widely
used. In particular, exchange labor is associatedwith slash-
and-burn rice farming and declinesas fields are convertedin-
to lowland rice paddies. In the Palawan sample, most of tl_e
farms were rainfed and covered single contiguous parcelS.
Lessthan 40 percent of the farm area of the sampledsettlers
was planted to high yielding rice varieties. The use of ex-
change farm labor has advantagesin isolated villageswhere
seasonallypeak demandsfor labor (e.g., planting and harvest-
ing) are difficult to meet By usingexchangelabor groupsthe
sequential accomplishment of land preparation and planting
naturally leadsto a staggeredpattern of harvestingwhich re-
duces the strain on available labor, provided similar seed
varietiesare used.Jameslikewise points out that "in Palawan,
government resettlement projects which draw individuals
from many regions of the country are not conducive to ex-
change labor arrangements.Exchange labor is popular, how-
ever, in voluntary settlement areas where settlers tend to
come from the same towns or at least speak the same dia-
lect.,,t 4
In Pangasinan,small farm size (1.5 hectareson average)
fragmentation of landholdings; the ready availability of a
landlesslabor force, and the adoption of modern inputs and
irrigation haveled to the reduction of exchange labor,is
What ought to be emphasized here is that even in Palawan, the
frontier settlement, exchange labor has ceasedto be the dominant,
not even the major, labor source even for kaingin rice production.
Hired labor appears to be taking over as the "frontier" becomesa
more established settlement and increasingpopulation leads to the
usualconsequences.
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C. Changes in Labor Arrangement for Agricultural Production
1. Patterns of Rice Harvesting Arrangements
More than any other aspect of agricultural production particu-
larly rice production, harvesting arrangements tend to embody the
connections between land tenure, labor relations, and technology.
As Kikuchi et al describe it:
Harvestingand threshing are the tasksthat normally require the largest
shareof labor for rice production in the Philippines as well'as other rice
producing countries in Asia. Typically, labor required for harvesting and
threshing is nearly 30 percent of total labor and 50 percent of hired labor
employed in rice production. The share in hired labor for harvesting and
threshing is especially large becausethe time interval adequate for harvest-
ing is sharply limited. As a result, the harvestingand threshing represent a
major employment opportunity for landlessagricultural workers and small
farmers whose incomes from own farming are insufficient to meet their
subsistenceneed.Therefore the choice of technology and contractual ar-
rangementswith respect to the use of labor and capital for rice harvesting
and threshing is a critical determinant of the income and well-being of the
rural poor.
In the Philippines, both the technology and the contractual arrange-
ments for rice harvesting have been experiencing a dramatic change.., in
responseto growing population pressure,land-reform operations, improve-
ments in irrigation system,and the introduction of modern ricevarieties.16
Using historical data from previous studies and loop surveys con-
ducted repeatedly from 1966 to 1978, Kikuchi et al captured signifi-
cant trends in these changes occurring in 6 provinces roughly classi-
fied as two sub-regions called, "Central Region" (Laguna southern
parts of Bulacan and Pampanga and the northern part of Pangasinan)
and "Inner Central Luzon" (Nueva Ecija, Tarlac, the rest of Pam-
panga, Bulacan and Pangasinan which are landlocked):
(a) Land Tenure and Harvesting Arrangements
Although these two regions are characterized by pervasive land-
Iordism, land ownership patterns are different. In the Coastal Region,
landholdings are relatively small and scattered typically in a range
from 10 to 20 hectares. Land tenure arrangement was a form of
share tenancy called Kasamahan meaning partnership. In general,
output and production costs were shared equally between the land-
lord and the tenant. The relation between landlord and tenant was
paternalistic with the former advancing credit and utilizing his con-
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nection and social influence in exchange for the loyalty of thete-
nant. In Inner Central Luzon, there were largehaciendaswith several
hundreds and thousands of hectaresand tenants. Typically, the ha-
cienda owners lived in Manila and the managementwas carried out
by encargado (farm manager)and a number of Katiwa/a (overseers).
The tenure contract was gearedmore strictly to economicconsidera-
tions, and it was enforced more strongly by legalmeansthan by the
senseof obligation basedon patron-client relationship.
Differences in landlord-tenant relationsbetween the Coastal Re-
gion and the Inner Central Luzon hadprofound effects on the choice
of harvesting arrangements. Simultaneously, technological develop-
ments in harvestingand threshing had influenced the choiceof land
tenure system. Historically, two different types of harvestingand
threshingarrangementsevolved:
(1) the hunusan system in the CoastalRegionwhere a farmer spe-
cifies a day of harvesting when anyone can participate in
harvesting and threshing (by hand beating on wooden or
bamboo plates) and the harvestersreceive a certain shareof
output (sharerangesfrom one-fourth to one-eighthbut most
Commonlyone-sixth). In caseswherehunusan harvestersused
mechanicalthreshers,they paid for the machine rental from
their share of output. The typical land tenure arrangement
was to divide output into half and half between landlords
and tenants after the share of harvesterswasdeducted. In
effect, the cost of harvestingas well as other costssuch as
seeds,fertilizers, and transplantingare commonly sharedhalf
and half by tenants and landlords.
(2) the tilyadora system employed harvesters at a fixed-wage
rate, or pat¢yaw, fixed payment per certain area harvested)
with the use of t//yadora (McCormick-Deering design big
thresher). The threshing is done in one central location in a
farm where unthreshed crops are hauled and stored in large
stacks called manda/a (haystack) until the tilyadora arrives.
The cost of harvesting was shouldered by tenants and the
threshing fee by ti/yadora at a rate from 4 to 6 percent of
output was deducted before the output was sharedbetween
landlordsand tenants. Transplantingcost is paid by landlords
while the other costsare sharedhalf and half.
The hunusan system is regardedasbasedon the principle
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of mutual help and income sharingwithin the village com-
munity. Where paternalistic relations were developed be-
tween landlord and tenants, the landlordscould largelytrust
the honesty of tenants in their report on the crop harvested.
This condition of "trust'; however,did not exist in the large
haciendasin the Inner Central Luzon. In order to managethe
sharecroppingsystem in the haciendas,it was important, to
developa method of ascertainingoutputsin a largenumber of
tenant Tarms.The tilyadora wasthe answer. In the haciendas,
the tenants were requestedto store their harvestedcrops in
certain locations. Tilyadoras owned or contracted by the ha-
ciendaswent around these locationsfor threshingoperations
underthe supervisionof overseers.No chance of cheating was
left for the tenants. In fact, Kikuchi et al pointed out that
the tilyadora can be identified as the factor underlying the
emergence of the Share cropping system in the haciendas.
Without the tilyadora, the sharecropping system could not
beadopted in the haciendas.
(b) ChangingPatternsin HarvestingArrangements
(1) From ti/yadora to hand threshing
Over the past 10 years, major changesin harvestingarrangements
occurred in Central Luzon and Laguna. From 1968 to 1978 the most
dramatic changewas a shift from the fixed-wage labor for harvesting
to the output-sharing contract (hunusan) for both harvesting and
threshing. Together with this shift, the mechanicalthreshing by use
of tilyadora was replacedby the hand beating method. In 1968, 96
percent of sample farmers in Inner Central Luzon usedthe tilyadora
system; the percentagedeclined sharply to 33 percent in 1978. Ma-
jority of the farmers shifted completely to the hunusan systemwith
hand threshing for both wet and dry seasonsor adopted the new
system partially for wet seasonwhile using the traditional (tilyadora]
system for the dry season.
The shift from the tilyadora system to the hunusan was not uni-
form within Inner Central Luzon. The most basic condition under-
lying the shift in haTvestingarrangementswasthe rand reform opera-
tions based on the Agricultural Land Reform Code of 1963 and
enforced by Presidential Decree No. 27 after the declaration of Mar-
tial Law. The land reform program resulted in the demise of rice ha-
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ciendasand share tenants becameleaseholdersor amortizing owner¢
With the land tenure reform, the critical role of the tilyadora for
hacienda management as a deviceto ascertaintenants' outputs and
to collect right amounts of cropsharesas rentswas lost. The tenants
became free to choose and decide on the harvestingmethod. The
emancipatedfarmers,especiallythose in northern Bulacanand south-
central Nueva Ecija where the largerice haciendaswere mostwidely
developed, were quick to abandon the use of the tilyadora and to
adopt the hunusan. This shift occurred as soon as their tenure
changed. Interviews of those who adopted the hunusan system indi-
cated that the concept that diffused in Inner Central Luzon during
the past decade came from Lagunaand Southern Bulacan.The diffu-
sionof the concept came primarily throughseasonalmigrantworker¢
Most farmers sai(_that workers from the southwho migratedto their
farms at harvesting seasonsor workers in their villageswho re-
turned from harvestingwork in the south askedthe farmers to adopt
the hunusan system. The speedwith which farmers in Bulacanand
Nueve Ecija shifted from the tilyadora to the hunusan system after
the land tenure change may partly be explained by their repulsion
against the tilyadora as a symbol of the exploitation system of the
hacienda.
It must be recognizedhowever that two technologicaldevelop-
ments in rice production had made the useof the tilyadora lesseffi-
cient evenbefore the land tenure reform - the expansion of irrigated
areas especially in Nueva Ecija and the rapid diffusion of the new
rice varieties with short-maturing and non-photosensitivecharacteris-
tics. These two developments made the double cropping of rice a
common practice and in combination with tenure change, contri-
buted to the shift from tilyadora to hunusan in the following manner
describedby Kikuchi et al:
"In the traditional single-croppingsystemwith traditional photo-
sensitive varieties, the rice crops become matured after November
when the day length becomes shorter and the rainy seasonis over.
Because the weather is dry, harvestedcrops can be stored in the
fields without the dangerof spoilageuntil tilyadoras arrive. However,
in the double-cropping system, the new varieties become matured
before the rainy seasonis finished. Since heavy ti/yadoras cannot
enter into wet fields, the harvested crops must be hauled to long
distance or to dry spots.The riskof crop damageis also largedue to
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a possible delay in the arrival of the t//yadora. Despite such condi-
tions, the farmers were not able to abandon the tilyadora system
becauseof the regulationsof the haciendas." Kikuchi et al hypothe-
size that the accumulated frustration of farmers resulted in an over-
night switch to hand threshing when they were emancipatedby the
land reform program. The resultsof the test of hypothesisshowed
• that the longer the time interval between the tenure changeand the
introduction of double cropping,the more clearly farmerscan recog-
nize the inefficiency of the t//yadora systemand thereby the shorter
the time lag between the tenure changeand the shi_t in the harvest-
ing arrangement.
(2) From hunusan to gama
Another major change in harvestingarrangements was the rapid
diffusion of a new contractual arrangement calledgama in the Coas-
tal Region. Gama comes from a Tagalog word gama$ meaning
"weeds" and the systemoriginated from Laguna.Gama isan output-
sharingarrangement similar to hunusan except that the employment
for harvesting and threshing is limited to the workers who did the
weeding of the field without receivingwages;in other words, in the
gama system, the weeding labor is a free serviceof workers to estab-
lish a right to participate in harvestingandthreshingand to receivea
certain share, usually one-sixth of the harvest. While the hunusan
system has been newly adopted in Inner Central Luzon, it has been
replacedrapidly by the gama systemin the Coastal Region.
Economists explain the gama as an institutional innovation to
reduce a wage rate (one-sixthof output) under the traditional system
when yield per hectare was low and labor was scarce.As •yield per
hectare increasedand labor supply became more abundant, the one-
sixth sharewould havebecomesubstantiallyhigherthan the marginal
productivity of labor. Although farmerscould•increasetheir incomes
by replacing the hunusan by daily wage labor-(upahan) changing
from a long-establishedpractice of one-sixthSharewould mean subs-
tantial frictions in the community. Furthermore, even if labor is
•normally abundant, there is a risk that an individual farmer Who
violates the establishedpractice may not find the sufficient number
of daily wageworkers at the right time.
In reality, the gama system reducesthe wage rate without alter-
ing the one-sixth sharebecausethis coversthe cost of both weeding
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and harvesting.Also, by contract, the availability of labor isguaran-
teed at harvest time. For the harvester,the gama assureshim of the
right to harvest. In Laguna,the shift to the gama systemhasalready
been completed by 1978. In southern Bulacanand Pampanga,gama
isstill in an early stageof diffusion.17
(c) Rural Income Distribution Implications of Harvesting Ar-
rangements
Kikuchi et al •arguesthat sinceharvestingand threshingrepresent
the major sourceof employment in rice growingareas,the choiceof
technology and contract for these taskshascritical effects on income
distribution in the rural sector.They likewise observethat a certain
system waschosennot simplybecauseit waseconomically profitable
for individual farmers but also becauseit was acceptablein terms of
the social and institutional environments of the villagecommunities
Their• hypothesis is that changesin harvesting arrangementsfor the
past decadehavebeen based,to a largeextent, on the senseof obliga-
tion of the new, small elites (lesseesand amortizing owners) in the
rural communities to increase labor employment in order to main-
tain the income of the poor. This is based partly on altrusim but
perhaps more on a strong motivation for village elites to promote
and protect their own statusin a patron-client relation with the poor
(landless). Comparing the costs of the three systemsfor harvesting
and threshing,the Kikuchi et al study found the following:
[] In the tilyadora system, about 30 percentof total harvesting
and threshing cost is paid to capital (machine) and about 70
percent to labor. With the choice of the hunusan system for
dry seasonalone, the share of labor increasesto more than 80
percent; with the complete adoption for two seasons,the
share goesup to 100 percent.
[-1 An equally important effect isthe change in the composition
of labor's share, In the tilyadora system,family labor is com-
monly usedfor bundling and haystack making and machine
operator's labor is also required; only 40 percent of the total
cost becomes the earning of hired workers. In contrast, the
whole cost becomes the earning of hired harvestersin the
hunusan system. Since most harvestersbelongto the landless
class,the lowest-incomeclassin the village, the shift from the
tilyadora to hunusan systemwould havean income redistri-
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bution effect. A case was reported about a meeting of village
heads in a municipality in Nueva Ecija which made a resolu-
tion to abandon the use of the tilyadora in order to increase
the employment and income of landless workers.
[] The adoption of the game had lowered hired wage rates for
farmer-employers without involving social frictions and at the
same time promoting patron-client relations with landless
workers.
[] Despite all the criticisms on the shortcomings of the land re-
form program, the dissolution of haciendas and the conver-
sion of Kasama sharecroppers into lessees and amortizing
owners have also indirectly benefited landless workers
through the shift in harvesting arrangements. Irrigation im-
provements and the diffusion of new rice varieties provided
the technical conditions for the change, is
The "welfare" considerations in the choice of harvesting arrange-
ments are likewise reported by de Vries in his study of a Central Lu-
zon barrio:
Amongthe farmers,there isaconsciousnessthat the landlessaremainly
dependentonwagespaidto them by farmers.In particular,the villageheads
seethe dangerthat if the numberof thelandlessincrease,farmersmay decide
to reduce harvestshares.Although a feelingof responsibilitytoward the
poor of the villageexists,severalfarmersareurgingfor a reductionof huno$
sharefrom one*seventhto one-eight.This is particularlytrue amongfarmers
who have no landlessrelativesand amongsmallfarmerswho have low in-
come.Their reasonis highinputcostsandother expenses.Despitethe desire
for reductionof hunos, it doesnot happenbecauseof the villageleaders'
influence.During the main crop harvest in 1975, one farmer tried to pay
his laborers,one*eight.The villageheadcalled this farmerandtold him not
to do so,otherwiserepercussionswill follow. The farmer heededand paid
one*seventh.Beforethe startof every harvestseason,a meetingof farmers
is held to discussthe hunos rate. In thesemeetingsthe villageheadpleads
for the maintenanceof the hunos rate. Few farmersdareor want to object
so each year the same decisionis taken. One of the reasonswhy village
headsobject to further reductionof hunos isthat they are all ratherwealth-
ier farmersand someof them havelandlessrelatives.Howevermanyof the
small farmers with low yields find the hunos too heavy a burden for
them.19
2. Changes in Patterns of Labor Utilization
One problem which concerns both land reform and employment
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is the question of the relationship between tenure status and the
farmer's utilization of his own and his family's labor in the farm. It
has been argued that becauseof disincentivesin the sharingsystem,
the tenant will not be very inclined to invest muchof his own labor
in the farm. Basedon the model of terancy, Mangahaset al saidthat
"share tenants would tend to apply lessof their available labor to
their farms than would lessees,hence spendingmore time at other
work. ''2° If this were so, a change in tenure status from share te-
nancy to leaseholdor amortizing ownership or beingan owner would
increasethe application of the farmer's labor in his own farm anda
decline in time engagedin off-farm work. As Sacaystate(J in his justi-
fication for land reform, "Share tenancy does not lend itself to pro-
viding the incentives so necessaryfor increasedproduction. If the
farmer has to sharethe increment in production with the landowner,
he has little incentive to work harder... In a leaseholdsystem, rental
for the use of land is fixed and, therefore, increasedproduction
through better, management, hardwork, and larger capital invest-
ment entirely accruesto the farmer.''_t
The land-to-the-tiller philosophy of the land reform program is
basedon this assumptionthat farmerswill work harder if they own
the land or will benefit more from it than under the share tenancy
arrangement. In a review of several studies conducted in different
parts of the country by different researchers,Castillo m.adethe fol-
lowing observations:
(a) The use of hired rather than operator or family labor has
increasedconsiderably and exchange labor is only minimally prac-
ticed. In other words, rice farmers are in the processof becoming
farm managers/supervisorsrather than actual tillers of the soil. As
one researcherobserved: "If the farmer can afford it; he will limit
his farming activities to supervising,watching his carabao and water
control."
(b} Farmers from different tenure groupsdo not differ much in
proportion engagedin off-farm work. They also do not differ much
inamount of hired labor input used. As a matter of fact there are
some evidencesthat sharetenants usea bit more of family than hired
labor. But regardlessof tenure status andfarm size,all the evidences
show there is more hired than family labor usedand the proportion
of hired to total labor has increased. Owner-operators and lease-
holders usedas much as 80 percent hired labor. Amortizing owners
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used more I_ired labor after land reform and credit hashad.a positive
effect.on hired labor.
(c) There are evidencestl,at regardlessof croppingpattern (single,
double, multiple-cropping) the percent of production cost spent .on
hired labor is greaterthan for unpaid labor.. For every cropping,pat-
tern and every tenure status except for owner-administered farms,
_thepercent of production cost spenton hired labor is higher than the
total percentagepaid out to material inputs such asseeds,fertilizer
and chemicals.22
Smith and Gascon in their study of the new rice..technology's
effect on family labor .utilization in Laguna attribute the increasing
replacementof family labor by hired labor to the following:
[] "wi-th the new technology, operations that required hired la-
bor contribute more toward increasingrice production than
operations handledby the family alone.
•D The productivity of managementtime hasgoneup.
l-I The cropping pattern hasbeen diversified to include water-
melon -- a highly labor-intensivebut profitable crop.
[] •The greater availability of factory work has increasedearn-
ings foregoneby usingfamily labor on the farm.
I-I. Increasingfamily income.has increasedthe farmer's capacity
to pay for hired labor.''23
"Becausethe area which Smith and .Gasconstudied is veryclose
to Manila, it is typical and therefore their explanationsfor the shift-
ing trend from family to hired labor need to be tested in other set-
tings.
• "Castillo, on the other hand,, offers four possibleexplanations
for the observed lack of relationship between tenure status and use.
of hired labor:
(a) To hire labor, accessto capital to pay labor servicesis.e.ssen-
tial. Tenure status is related to hiring capacity. only to the
extent that it contributesto ability to pay labor. In ;i_ecase
of owner-operator, their output is.wholly theirs hencethey
have more capital. For lessees,becauseof land reform, they.
have reduced leaserentalsand greater accessto credit hence
they can afford to hire labor. Irt general, aCCeSSto credit
enables farmers to hire labor,regardlessof tenure status. Be-
cause there are evidences that farmers used institutional
credit (Masagana99 loans) regardlessof capacity to repay,
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then one suspectsthat perhaps they also use hired "labor
regardlessof actual capacity to pay for it.
(b) The demands of rice production are such that the available
labor from the farmer and his family are unableto cope with
peaksof labor activity when certain tasks haveto beaccom-
plished within a short period. However the previousobserva-
tion that evenfarmersengagedin singlecroppingalso applied
more hired-than family labor doesnot support this particular
explanation.
In general, however, the situation of the farm family vis-
_-vis the labor situation is worth looking into because we
havea dilemma of largefamily size but limited labor poten-
tial at the individual farm household level. As the 1973 Na-
tional D_mographicSurvey indicates: If the mean numberof
children at the end of the reproductive period is 5.89, the
mean family size shouldat least be 8.0 personsbut the data
yielded a mean household size of only 6.08 because 1.94
membershave already left the household permanently. Of
the 6 remaining members, 1.04 are 4 yearsor youngers;1.92
are 5-14 years and are mostly likely in school. Only 3.14
are 15 years and older. This meansroughly father, mother,
and one child of working age. In Hayami et al's village level
study of labor utilization, the average household size was
6.3 personsof which 3.5 are 15-65 years of age but only 2.1
personsare actually working on the farm.24 The motheris
most likely unable to participate in farm labor in a major
way because of younger children and pressureof household
chores.
(c) IT is possible that rice farming is such a physically demand-
ing processthat a farmer would only be too glad to be re-
lieved of the hard manual work as soon asthe opportunity
arises for him to use an alternative to applying his own
labor or even that of his family. It is not necessarilya low
regard for manual work but a welcome relief from it espe-
cially because our farmers are not really in possessionof
excellent health, adequate nutrition and lots of energy.
To all these, we might add the problem of work ethic. How
much does this factor contribute to the changefrom family
to hired labor?
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(d) Social pressuresfrom the communiW make it unacceptable
for a farmer and his family to perform allthe labor in rice
production becauseother members of the community, par-
ticularly the landless, would be denied their chance to
share in the resourcesand therefore their chanceto survive.25
All of these explanationswould be merely hypothetical because
the reviewsof availablestudieshavenot really dealt with these issues
directly. They were mostly offered as post-factum interpretations
of observedtrends. This representsa fertile, barely explored research
area.
D. Different Interpretations of the Emerging Relationships Between
Farmer and Landless
1. Vii institutions change in response to changes in resource
endowments, technology and government po/icies.
Kikuchi and Hayami said that "the village institutions with res-
pect to the use of labor, land, and other inputs, are the critical
media through which population pressureand technologicalchange
influence production and income distribution in the rural sector.
They are alsothe media through which governmentpolicies,suchas
the land reform and the irrigation development programs,affect the
welfare of rural people."
In an intensive analysis of a Laguna rice-growingvillage using
data from 1966-76, it was found that the village has been able to
"escape from the Ricardian trap through the improvement in irriga-
tion systems and the introduction of new rice technology. (The
classicaleconomist David Ricardo postulated that population pres-
sure on limited land area would result in the higher shareof income
accruing to laborers). The land reform program was successfulin
retaining major gainsfrom yield increasesin the hands of tenants in
this Laguna village. The increased income of tenant farmers spilled
over to landless workers in the form of increasedemployment
opportunities through the incomeeffect to substitutehired labor for
family labor." However, the authors pointed out an institutional
innovation which has emerged in responseto changes in relative
factor endowments and technology. In the traditional system in
Laguna called hunusan, everybody in the village was allowed to
participate in rice harvesting and the harvesterswere entitled to
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receiveone-sixth of the output. The systemhasbeen rapidly replaced
by the practice of gama in which only those who weeded the rice
fields for free were employed in harvesting for the same share of
output. But 1976, more than 80 percent of the farmers haveadopted
the system. Kikuchi and Hayami regardthe gama systemasan insti-
tutional innovation for the employer farmers to reduce the wage
rates for harvesting to a level equal to the market wage razes. In
earlier days, when labor was scarcer and the rice yield was lower,
the one-sixth shareof output under the traditional hunusan system
might have been equivalent to the market wage rate close to the
marginal product of harvesters'labor. However, as the labor supply
became more abundant and the rice yield increased,one-sixth of
the output would have becomesubstantially larger than the market
wage rate.
Actually, farmers could increasetheir income undersuchcircum-
stancesby replacingthe hunusan systemwith payment of daily wage
or by reducing the harvesters'share. Either of thesetwo ways would
encounter resistancefrom the community which operateson patron-
client relationscharacterized by multi-stranded ties. It would involve
lesssocial frictions to add some additional obligations while main-
taining the same sharerate. Gama system therefore entails the least
cost to reducingharvesters'share.of output in line with the market
wage rates. In absolute amounts, the one-sixth output share of har-
vestersnow can be larger than the one-sixth share in 1960 because
yields are higher now. Kikuchi and Hayami therefore reject the
hypothesis on the trade-off between growth and equity. They argue
that unless the source of income has been enlarged by modern
technology and irrigation, the income distribution in this Laguna
village would have worsened. Even though the land reform program
was effective in fixing rent, no major gain would have been pro-
duced for tenants and laborers unlesssignificant yield gainswere
realized. To overcome the decreasingreturn to labor due to growing
population pressureon land, efforts to improve land infrastructure
and to develop land-saving and labor-using technology must be
made26
2. Shared poverty or increasing stratification
Ledesma presents two possible interpretations of the emerging
and current relationships between farmer and landless workers:
shared poverty or stratification. With continuing population pressure
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on declining size of farm •holdings,the labor absorptive••capacity of
the small farm becomesvery crucial. This labor absorption means"a
•sharing of work and income opportunities not only among members
of the small farmers' householdbut also with landlessworkers." In
this sense,labor•absorption can alsobe an indication of "agr/cu/tura/
involution." (A concept proposed by Geertz which describes the
involutionary process in Java is as follows: "Wet-rice cultivation,•
with its extraordinary ability to maintain levels of marginal •labor
productivity by always managingto work one more man in without
a serious fall in per capita income, soaked up almost the whole of
the additional population that Western intrusion created at least
indirectly").
Agricultural involution impliesan ethic of sharingand reciprocity
which expressesthat all members of a community have a "pre-
sumptive right to a living so far as local resourceswill allow," This
meansa willingness to share limited resourcesand work opportuni-
ties among all householdsin the community. To the extent that vil-
laye resourcesbecome more limited in relation to the growing pop-
ulation, thecontinuing interaction amongrural households•regardless
of tenure manifestsa form of "'sharedpovertv.'"
This shared poverty manifests itself in a number of ways someof
which according to Ledesmahave/ongbeen practiced even prior to
agrarianreform and the new rice technology. Examplesof suchprac-
tices are: entry of an unlimited numberof reapersinto a field at har_
vest time; the sharingof "cost-free" exchange labor;credit practices
involving interest-free loans; gleaners' rights to what is left in the
fields or on the threshing floor; the progressivefragmentation of
tenan'_d ricelands among heirs;and even the further fragmentation
of sagod plots and sub-plots among landlessworkers and other mar-
ginal small farmers. Further evidencesof shared•povertypractices in-
clude such things as: share to weeder-harvestersunder•the sagod sys-
tem is usually heaped over rather than levelled in the measuringcon-
tainer (some farmers,•however, are more generousthan others); the
web of credit relationshipsprovidea measureof security•and interde-
pendenceamong landlessand rice farmersasillustrated in short-term
borrowing even in terms of liters of rice particularly during the loan
period when planting is over and harvestinghasnot begun;for those
who have a sagod arrangement, it can function as a form of "colla-
teral" which enables them to borrow for consumption needssince
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creditors know that there is some rice forthcoming around harvest
time; some landlessworkers are able to borrow from institutional
sourcesvia relatives (usually farmers) who haveaccessto such loans.
Even the allocation of plots for sagod arrangementsisa sharingpro-
cessalthough it is at the same time, another patron-client relation-
ship which was the usual characteristicof the sharetenancy system
which land reform soughtto do away with.
Although these practicesmay be viewed asan involutionary pro-
cess, Ledesma considersthe possiblebeginningof "a counter-move-
ment of stratification and the breaking up of a homogeneous village
community." In other words, even "shared poverty" may no longer
be continuously shared. For example, under the sagod system,"with
the prior claims onparticular plots by sagod weeders,the harvest is
no longer left open to an unlimited number of harvesters.The fur-
ther effect of preventing outside villagers from coming in as har-
vesterscould also be a form of isolatingand differentiating one vil-
lage from another."
According to Ledesma, "under these circumstances,stratification
beginsto take placewith identifiable subclassesamongthe peasantry
being formed based on several factors: (1) land or labor tenure;
(2) more distinct roles in the rice production process;and (3) differ-
ent income expectations. Ultimately, stratification connotesthe for-
mation of divergent interestsamong peasantsubclasses.., e.g. land-
lessworkers vying for higher wages or a bigger share in the harvest;
tenants trying to reduce production costslike hired labor; and per-
manent lesseescomparing their fixed rentalswith the amortization
paymentsof CLT (Certificate of Land Transfer) recipients.Stratifica-
tion thus implies a hierarchy of rolesand interestsamonghouseholds
•within a heterogeneousvillage setting.
Paradoxically, instead of blotting out once and for all the tradi-
tional lines of stratification between landlords and share tenants,
agrarian reform has brought about more levelsof stratification that
now include small landlords, owner-cultivators, amortizing owners,
permanent lessees,share tenantsand landlessworkers.''27
_erhaps we cannot expect "shared poverty" in a "homogeneous"
community to continue indefinitely - especiallyunder conditions of
increasingpopulation pressureon land. Agrarian reform by the very
nature of its intent is bound to lead to greater division of labor and
institutional specializationbecausethe traditional functions perform-
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ed by the landlord are taken over by a variety of government institu-
tions and government-sponsored organizations. Furthermore, as
agriculture modernized many new tasks emerge which have to be
assignedto different functionaries. Perhapsthis increasingspecializa-
tion and division of labor inevitably results in greaterstratification,
or at least finer gradationsor levelsin the stratification system. Whil_
before, the major hierarchiesare landlord and tenant, r,ow there are
many others which come above the landlord, in between and below
the tenant. For example, the Land Bank, the Ministry of Agrarian
Reform, the land reform technicians, the farm management techni-
cian, the rural bank, National Food Authority (official purchaserof
rice), Samahang Nayon organizersand officers, the people who work
for the farmers, etc. Furthermore, "homogeneity" of the community
is bound to breakdown with the influx of in-migrantsparticularly in
areasregardedasgood farming areas.
Furthermore, to concentrate analysison the increasingstratifica-
tion among peasantsub-classeswithin the sameIo(;ality is to empha-
size the inequality between poor and lesspoor and to leaveuntouch-
ed the issueof super-rich,rich, poor and very poor which is the bane
of our society. Peasantsub-classesfocuson the increasingdifferentia-
tion at the bottom of the pyramid which can becharacterizedasthe
"fallinpbottom'; the downward escalator which really meansthe
process of impoverization intofiner gradations. The opposite and
more insidiousprocessof escalating enrichment or the elongating tip
of the pyramid escapesscrutiny becausethe "villain" in peasantsub-
classestends to be the farmer whether tenant, lessee,or amortizing
owner. Perhaps we should look for the villains somewherehigher in
the rung of the stratification system. This is not to diminish Ledes-
ma's valuable documentations of the underlying processesat the
lower rungs. These commentsare intended t6 remind usthat there is
a lesspermeable aspectof the stratification system at the top. As a
matter of fact, part of the reasonwhy we do not dealwith the "rich
peasant villages" is becausethey are not susceptibleto researchin the
same mannerasthe poor peasants.
3. The Agricultural Ladder/Escalator
Unlike other authors who describe the transition from reliance
on family labor to increasing importance of hired labor and the
growth of a classof workers who hired out their labor as the emer-
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genceof the rural proletariat. Roumassetand Smith reintroducesthe
concept of agricultural ladder. The interpretation of the phenom-
enon isasfollows:
"As population expands more rapidly than shrinking from size
and the dwindling frontier can accommodate new farm families, a
classof landlessworkers beginsto emerge.The agricultural ladder is
described as the processby which workers advance into higher in-
come occupationsas they acquire physicaland humancapital. In the
American South, 'rungs' on the ladder were wage laborer,shareten-
ant, lessee,and owner-operator. As the worker movesup the ladder,
he usesmore and more human capital in management and more capi-
tal for investment in farm improvements, implements,machinesand
production inputs.
Population pressuretends to cause intensification of agricultural
production and land-savingtechnologicalchangevia the mechanism
of induced innovation. The combination of intensification and eco-
nomiesof scale further leadsto specializationin agricultural produc-
tion. Landlessor near landlessbecome hired workers, while those
with cultivation •rightsclimb the agricultural ladder.
Implicit in the notion of the agricultural ladder as usuallypre-
sented is that the Worker climbsthe ladderby savingand investingin
physicalcapital and in his family's human capital. In this view, it is
the thrifty and the industriouswho manage to struggleup the ladder.
The more complacent are left on the bottom rung.What we wish to
add to this story is that workersare sometimespushedup the ladder
by external factor."
Roumassetand Smith illustrate how this works by citing the de-
velopments in 3 places in Laguna where "land-saving technological
changevia the IRRI rice varieties hadtaken place between 1965 and
1975 to 1978, total labordeclined following an increasein real wages,
primary labor force while total labor increasedby 60 percent, From
1975 to 1978, total labor declined following an increasein ral wages,
a decline in the relative price of herbicide, and a continuing trend
towards mechanization.
From households, enjoying rising value of equity in land, both
from rising land valuesand land reform (not only the salesvalue of
land but also the cost of tenancy or cultivation right hasbeenconsi-
derably and continues to do so) were pushedup the agricultural lad-
der (suggestingescalator as a more appropriate metaphor). The
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higher wealth and income of sample• families studied induced them
to invest more in humancapital, physicalcapital andconsumerdura-
b|es.Correspondingly,rapid gainsin incomewereearned from skilled
labor, especially b'/ the operatorsi family members working off the
farm." (From 1965 to 1978, there was an increasein averageyearsof
education and percent of householdmembersattending school).
•"As rents rise relative to wages", thosewith equity in land enjoy
an increasein wealth (or at least in one component of their wealth).
Owner-operators of previously mai;ginal land find themselveswith
land capable of producinga surplusvalue. Eventenants with security
of tenure have someequity in the land they till. As the value of equi-
ty in land increases, rental income from that equity increases. In
addition, the higher equity enhances the ability to borrow larger
amounts at lower interest rates.The higherincome and the improved
ability to borrow enhancean individual'scapacity to invest.
Thus, it is not only through thrift and industry that a worker
may advance.To the extent that he owns land or hassomeclaim to
work the land, his wealth position may improve as factor prices
change, individuals with substantial equity in land will find them-
selves in a position to finance investmentseven without changing
their consumption habits. Since someworkers are therefore partially
pushedup to better positions,the metaphor of an agricultura/ladder
is not totally adequate. The processis better describedas an escala-
tor. That is, while the worker is partially pushedto thehigher levels,
he retains some mobility, via industry and thrift, to move up at a
faster rate."2s .
A number of comments may be made on Roumassetand Smith's
agricultural ladder/escalator:
(a) If there is a tendency to be pushedup the ladder in an esca-
lator-like fashion, without necessarilybeing industriousand
thrifty but due to the population pressureand changingfac-
tor prices, there is also a tendency tobe pusheddown not
becauseone is lazy and complacent but becauseland hasbe_
come very scarce and accessto it has become Prohibitive.
Escalatorshaveseparatedownward and upward-movingtrans-
missions.Some farmers are pushed upward while others are
pushed downward. For example, Kikuchi et al reports that
.from 1976 to 1980, 20 percent (10) of farmers they studied
lost their t_enancyrightswhile only 3 landlessworkers climb-
LandandLaborRelations 331
ed up the social ladderby acquiringland through inheritance
or sub-renting . . . Farmer householdsdecreasedby 6 and
landlessworker households increasedby 18, with the result
of a net increasein the numberof all householdsin the barrio
by 12.29
(b) From the data analyzed by the authors, it appearsthat the
way to climb the social ladder isto get off the agricultural or
farm ladder and to get into the non-agricultural ladder via
formal education of householdmembersor as the economists
say, by investingin the human capitalwhich enablesthem to
find non-farm employment. So there is a shift of ladders.
(c) In many instances,householdstry to useboth channels,agri-
cultural and non.agricultural, in climbing the social ladder.
The familY continues to operate the farm us;nghired labor
while the children get educatedand engagein non-farm occu-
pations. In this way, householdscan utilize two channelsto
move up the social ladder. Several studies have shown that
farmers do not want their children to become farmers and
their children are not interestedin becomingfarmers.
(d) Although the authors acknowledge that the "agricultural
ladder is not merely an independent result of industry and
thrift," it is difficult to assesshow much of the upward
movement can be explained by industry and thrift and how
much by population pressureand changingfactor prices.
(e) Another question which arises is whether tenants actually
moved up the ladder or they happen to be higher up the lad-
der only because lower rungsin the ladder (the landless)sur-
faced due to increasingpopulation pressureon land.
E. Identifiable Tenure Patterns Post Land Reform
1. General changes in tenure status
Tenure status is not static and land reform, despite all the criti-
cisms labelled against it as a program has made tenure status even
more mobile. Table 5.5 from Pua-BaskiSas3° study showsthe follow-
ingchangesin tenure statusover a ten-year period 1963-1973.
(a) Share tenancy has been considerably reduced but not abo-
lished. All other recent studies have indicated that share
tenancy might be "officially dead" but it is still "functional-
ly alive."
332 Land and LaborRelations
TABLE 5.5
CHANGES IN TENURE STATUS 1963, 1968, 1968, 1973 OF 418 FARMERS
PLANTING LOWLAND RICE IN 27 VILLAGES
A=qD7 MUNICIPALITIES IN LACUNA
I. ChangesinTenureStatusof Total Sample of 418 Farmers
1963 1968 1973
- Percent-
Owner-operator 4 4 5
Part-owner 11 13 7
Lessee 9 22 49
Share-lessee 7 6 7
Sharetenant 69 55 27
Landless - - 5
Total 100 100 100
2. ChangesinTenureStatusof 287 Share-tenants
1963 1968 1973
- Percent-
Sharetenant 100 74 37
Part-owner 7 5
Owner-operator 2 1
Lessee 13 46
Lesseeshare 4 7
Landless - 4
Total 100 100 100
3. Changesin TenureStatusof 38 Lessees
1963 1968 1973
- Percent-
Lessee 100 68 89
Owner-operator 3 -
Part-owner 6 -
Lessee-share 13 5
Sharetenant 10 3
Landless - 3
Total 100 100 100
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TABLE 5.5
CHANGES IN TENURE STATUS 1963, 1968, 1968, 1973 OF 418 FARMERS
PLANTING LOWLAND RICE IN 27 VILLAGES
AND 7 MUNICIPALITIES IN LAGUNA
4. Changesin TenureStatusof 28 Leuee.share tenan_
1963 1968 1973
- Percent-
Lessee-share 100 25 11
Part-owner 14 7
Owner-operator - 7
Lessee 54 64
Sharetenant 7 7
Landless - 4
Total 100 100 100
5. Changesin TenureStatusof 46 Pan-Owners
1963 1968 1973
- Percent-
Part-owner 100 50 33
Owner-operator 4 13
Lesseeshare 2 4
Lessee 24 35
Sharetenant 20 9
Landless - 6
Total 100 100 100
6. ChangesinTenureStatusof 19owner-operators
1963 1968 1973
- Percent-
Owner_perator 100 47 58
Part-owner 38 26
Lessee - -
Share-Lessee 5 -
,Sharetenant 10 16
Landless - -
Total 100 100 100
Source:Juanita P. Baskii_as,"Motivations BehindLandTenureChanges,"A Phil.
ippineCase", UnpublishedM.S. Thesis,UPLB, November,1976.
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(b) Reasons•for not shifting from share tenancy include such
things as: good landlord-tenant relations; sharing system is
better than leaseholding;landlord does not agree,etc.
(c) Share-tenants, lessees, lessee-sharetenants, and even part-
owners can become landlessbut none of the owner-operators
had lost their land overa ten-year period:
(d) Lossof land has been due.to: •successivecrop failures; incur-
ring.heavy debts; family membersgetting sick; landlordsget-
ting another person to work on the farm; deteriorating peace
and order; landlord's offer of a good paying job; too old to
farm; unable to get mortgagedfarm; farm wastaken by rela-
tives. Only one mentioned that he gaveup the farm because
he has been able to find a good-payingjob. In other words, a
farmer - whether owner-operator, part-owner, lessee, or
share tenant-parts with the land he owns or he cultivates,
only becausehe hasto and rarely becausehe wants to.
. 2. Mixed tenure farmers and "revertees':
The category part-owner among different tenure statuses has
often been ignored• or lumped together as "others" because the
cases reported are too. few to be statistically significant to bother
about.• Recent studieshowever, suggestthat mixed-tenurecategories
such as lessee/owner-operator;lessee-share;amortizingowner-lessee-
share tenant-owner-operator; amortizing owner/lessee-owner-opera-
tor;. etc. deserve closer scrutiny-•becausethey tend. to have larger
farms; they are more prone to use modern•farm inputs; have higher
income and expenditures:These trends are discernible in data from
studiesdone by Ocampo and Villamejor and Kikuchi et a/31 although
the researchersthemselvesdid not make :thisobservation. From now
on, mixed-tenure farmers should not be regarded-as a residual ca-
tegory but as a district group which should be examined in depth
becausethey. may havethe "best" of all worlds in their •combination
tenures. It is alsopossible that such mixed tenures are a by-product
of greater entrepreneurship. At any rate, we need to find out more
about them. ' ..
• Just asthere are shiftees,there arealso revertees,.i.e., farmers who
went from share tenant to lesseeor amortizing owner and thenback
to share tenant. Needlessto say, reverteesshould be more intriguing
subject than shiftees.
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3. A variety of co-existing tenure arrangements
Filomena Javier's1980 study of a rice-farmingvillageattempted
to identify existing production arrangements. It is important to
document such practiceseven if only a few individualsare currently
engagedin a particular arrangement becausetheserepresentpeople's
responsesto the changing environmental circumstances including
land reform. These new responsesare portents of things to come.
Although in-d_th village level studiesprovide usa great deal of
insighton what is happening or not happening in a place,the obser-
vations are mainly indicative of trends and emerging patterns but
they are not definitive with respectto magnitude andgeneralizability
of the trend. This remainsa tremendous researchtask for the future.
Javier's initial efforts to look for different production arrangements
haveyielded the following:
(1) Tenacity not only of share tenancy but of the hacienda system
in the village of Amihan (a pseudonym), the first farmer-tiller
shifted to leaseholdas early as 1962 but as of 1980, 35 of the 61
farmer-tiller respondentsor 58 percent of them were yet to become
lessees.Part of the village is a haciendaof about 142 hectaresof rice
and 48 hectares of coconut land which is run pretty much like the
haciendaof the olden days with a resident overseerand an absentee
landowner. Except for a few, the housesof the haciendafarmer-til-
lers were located in the coconut land of the hacienda.This "house-
lot privilege" is an important hold of the hacienda over the farmers
who otherwise haveno land to build their houseon.
Typical of the old haciendasystem, farmers must procure farm
inputs from the stock of the Hacienda, even if they might have the
money to buy from agricultural dealersof farm chemicals in town.
Although the prices of farm inputs was higher than in other stores,
farmers had to procure them from the Hacienda'sstock; otherwise
their shareof the expenseswould not be reimbursedat harvesttime.
A contract planting group which was created by the overseeris
prohibited from contracting jobs in other farms until all the planting
insidethe Haciendawasdone.
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(2) Seasonal tenurial arrangements
Farmer-tillers agreed to pay rental during the wet cropping sea-
sonwhen chancesof harvest were good, but sharethe expensesand
the produce with the landowner during the dry seasonwhen water
for irrigation becamescarce.
(3) Water as a determinant of work arrangements
Water availability, rather than tenure, becam_a determinant of
whether seedswould be broadcastor seedlingswould be planted in
straight rows, whether mongo, tomatoes or other substitute crops
would be planted insteadof rice or whether the field would be fol-
lowed for the season.Any one decision had repercussionson the
work arrangementsbetween farmer-tillersand their permanentweed-
er-harvesters.For example, of the seedsbroadcast, the weeder-har-
vesterswere required to perform the task of driving the birds away
when the seedsbeginto ripen weeksbefore harvest time.
(4) Kapatan (sub-tenancy) arrangements
Kapatan was an agreement between the farmer-tiller and another
person (farm-laborer) to divide between them the expensesand the
harvest shareaccruingto the farmer-tiller. There are 2 types of Ka-
patan arrangements:(1) the farmer-tiller relegatesthe actual tilling of
the farm to the farm laborer without surrendering in any way his
tenurial right to the land. To "secure" his tenure, the farmer-tiller
usually choosesa trusted relative as Kapatan farm laborer. (2) the
farmer=tiller surrenderswholly or partially his tenurial right to the
land by saleor mortgageto another personbut continuesto cultivate
the land and sharea fourth of the farm expensesand harvests,but
now asa sub.tenant.
(5) Farm laborers hired by farmer-tillers.
Farmer-tillers might decide to hire farm-laborersto work on his
farm either on contract or daily wagebasis.
(6) Weeder-harvesting by farm-laborers
If the rice seedlingswere planted in straight rows, weedingis re-
quired 12 days after planting.After 2 more weeks,a secondweeding
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is done. First weeding is done using a mechanical rotary weeder
while the second weeding is done manually. The performance of
these tasks has customarily devolved on landless-laborerswho want
rice fields to harvest. Other farm operations harvestersare required
to perform are reaping, gathering the harvest in stacks,threshing,
winnowing and hauling the sacksof rice to the landowner's store-
houseor to the edgeof the ricefield. The harvestersare compensated
by a shareof the grossharvest which rangesfrom onesixth, levelled
on the measuring_ontainer to one-fifth packed and heaping on the
container.
The assignmentof harvestareasto farm laborersbecomesperma-
nent as long as they perform their tasks satisfactorily. The job may
even be passedon to membersof the farm-laborer'sfamily. Weeder-
harvesters of lesseefarmers have agitated for an increase in their
shareof the harvesthencethe existenceof varying rates.
(7) Weeder-harvestershiring other laborers
Not only farmer-tillers but evenweeder-harvestershired others to
help them accomplish the job. Harvesters hired others to weed for
them on a daily wage basis.During harvesttime, thresherand blower
operatorsare hired. They are paid a fixed shareof the harvestwhich
rangesfrom one ganta of palay per cavan to one-sixth or one-fifth
per cavan of harvester'sshare for threshing and blowing. In cases
when the machine operator is not the same as the owner of the
equipment, the operator earned one-half of what wasdue the owner
of the thresherand the blower.
(8) Exchange labor arrangement is avoided,
The farmer-tiller, should he need extra hands,would gladly hire
farm laborersrather than call on relatives,friends and neighborsin an
exchange labor arrangement. The compounding of obligations in-
volved in the latter arrangement makes it an unpreferredalternative.
(9) The gleaners
There are farmer-tillers who still allowed gleanersto pick the left-
over grains in their field after everyone has taken their shareof the
harvest.
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( 1O) Officially registered owner-cultivators
Included in this category are women non-tillers and absentee
ownerswhose farms are administered by relativeswho in turn hire
farm laborers. To prevent tenancy from getting a foothold on the
farm, work is done alternately by a cousin and the original farmer-
tiller from whom the tenancy right was bought. Another owner-cul-
tivator is Simultaneouslya lesseeon another parcel. He cultivatesthe
latter farm while allowing his brother to work the farm parcel he
ownson a Kapatan arrangement.32
4. Hornelot Tenure
The 1968 National DemographicSurvey showedthat only half of
Filipino families owned their homelots (Table 5.6). In Manila, only
one-fourth did. The highest proportion of homelot owners are in
Ilocos and Cagayan with 80 and 75 percent, respectively. Occu-
pancy of rent-free lots is highest in Western Visayas followed by
Northern Mindanao; Bicol and Central Luzon. This meansthat the
phenomenonof squatting on land that is not theirs is not a peculiar-
ity of city residents. Even in "land-rich" areas like Mindanao, the
proportion who=do not own their homelots is quite high. Again, we
have to understand the plight of many poor rural families living in
small temporary houses built on "borrowed" land. Perhapsthere is
nothing more aggravatingto a family than to face the prospectof
being asked sometime to "remove" their home from its moorings.
Security of tenure therefore, pertainsnot only to jobs and farm land
but also to "where one sleeps". Again, it must be rememberedthat
this problem concernsthe rural asmuch asthe urbanfamily although
the urban squatter problem always looks more urgent and more de-
pressingthan the makeshift huts which dot the countryside, Consi-
dering population growth, and risingland prices,we can only predict
a worseningrather than an improvement in the future.
Ledesma's 1980 study of two villages, one in Nueva Ecija and
one in Iloilo already confirms this prediction (Table 5.7) and de-
scribesthe situationasfollows:
Onereasonfor the preponderanceof temporarydwellingsis the lack
of ownershipof homelots.Onlyabouta tenthofall householdsowntheir
homelotsinAbangay,whilepracticallynohouseholdinRajalSurholdstitle
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TABLE 5.7
TENURE OF HOMELOT BY TENURE STATUS ABANGA¥, ILOILO
AND RAJAL SUR, NUEVA ECIJA 1977
Abangay Rajal Sur
Amortiz- Perma- Land- Amortiz- Perma- Land-
ing nent less ing nent less
owner Lessee Workers owner Lessee Worker
Percent
(a) Owned 10 11 7 - 3 -
(b) Rented 5 7 17 21 13 18
(c) Occupied without
rental 85 82 76 79 84 82
100 100 100 100 100 100
Type of house by tenure status
(a) Permanent 8 14 2 41 15 7
(b) Semi-permanent 39 25 11 31 41 7
(c) Temporary 53 61 87 28 44 86
100 100 100 1O0 100 100
Source: Antonio J. Ledesma, "Landless Workers and Rice Farmers: Peasant Sub-
classesUnder Agrarian Refom in Two Philippine Villages," (Unpublished Ph.D.
Dissertation) University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1980.
to a homelot - an indication of the more widespread hacienda type of set-
dement in the Nueva Ecija locality. The vast majority of rural households
either rent their homelots or occupy them without paying any rental but
with at least the tacit permission of the landlord. Most tenants consider
their homelots as part of the traditional share tenancy arrangements with
their landlords. With the fixing of rentals based on farm productivity, how-
ever, the issue of homelots has become a separate and thorny question.
Some landlords have started to charge nominal rents for the use of home=
lots, if only to stress their continued claim to these residential areasdespite
land reform on farm lands. Since 1978 homelots have been included within
the scope of Operation Land Transfer and Operation Leasehold. Landless
workers however, have no similar security of tenure, As the Table indicates,
almost a fifth of landless workers are already paying rentals for their home-
lots; and the rest who may still be occupying their homelots "for free" may
soon be asked to pay rentals - either to present landlords or to the new
33
amortizing owners.
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Another situation regarding the relation between land reform and
home lot tenure is described by Javier in her study in Quezon prov-
ince:
Except for 3 farmersandone hired laborer who own their houselots
andthe tenantsof the coconut land where their housesare located, every-
one else of the farmersand laborerswere permitted to locatetheir houses
on the coconut land becauseof somekinshipor acquaintancewith either
• the landowneror their tenant.
Agrarianreform on the riceland renderedinsecurethe farmerswhose
housesare on the coconutland of the ownerof the ricelandthey cultivated
evenif they happento be alsotheir coconuttenants.An evengreaterinsecu-
rity is felt by farmersandlaborerswhosehousesare locatedon the coconut
land simply becauseof some kin relation or acquaintancewith the land-
owneror the tenant,34
5. "Tenured labor"
Unlike Kikuchi and Hayami, who regard the gama system as
an institutional innovation which "entail the least cost to reducing
harvesters' share of output in line with the market wage rates",
Ledesma regards the sagod system (the Ilongo version of the gama)
as a form of "tenured labor': Under this labor arrangement, landless
workers or other small farmers contract to do the weeding on desig-
nated plots without immediate remuneration provided they are given
the exclusive right to harvest the crop on their weeded portions for a
percentage share of the harvest. Although theoretically a landless
family might want to contract as many plots as possible, there are
constraining factors such as: (a) working capacity of the landless
worker and his household. The size and number of the contracted
plots must not go beyond this working capacity. As workers say:
"Only what our bodies can endure." (b) the plot should not be too
far from the landless worker's home so that his household can keep
an effective watch against weeds and pests that may affect the stand-
ing rice crop; (c) the various plots should have different schedules for
weeding and harvesting operations; otherwise, the landless worker
and his family may not be able to finish the work on time.
The "sagod contractors" must maintain some acceptable level of
quality in their weeding and harvesting operations. Otherwise, the
farmer employer could rescind the contract. Ledesma regards sagod
as a form of land fragmentation which may be viewed in terms of
either "physical subdivision of a farm area or the allocation of patti-
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cular farming operations on specified plots amongvariousworkers.';
To illustrate the phenomenon, he cites the caseof a tenant-farmer's
two-hectare farm which has 12 plots. Twenty-four subdivisions
have been made to accommodate 18 personswith various kinds of
relationshipsto the tenant farmer under the sagod system. Ledesma
explains that "although tecnically, under agrarian reform, the entire
farm area has been designatedto one tenant-farmer, many other par-
ties have been involved in farming operations and have laid claim to
a share in the harvest under the sagodsystem - a form of further
land fragmentation for specificfarming operations."
Becauseof the contractual and exclusiveessenceof the right to
harvest over specified plots involved in sagod, it is actually a form of
"tenured labor". Landlessworkers have mixed feelings about the
practice, becausewhile they value the security or assuranceof har-
vesting right in the presence of competing landlessworkers, at the
same time, they have to renderfree weedingservicesin exchangefor
this right. Furthermore, some of them face reducing sharesof the
harvest.
Consideringthe nature of the "tenure" and sharingarrangements
in sagod plus the patron-client relationshipwhich inevitably accom-
paniesthe system, sagod couldbe a "reincarnation" of share tenancy,
only it occurs between tenant-lessee.farmer and landless worker
rather than between landlord and tenant.
One feature Ledesma noted in his study is the "inverse associa-
tion. between share tenants and landlessworkers. Where land tenure
reform has considerably reduced share tenancy as has happened in
five of six villages in Laguna, Iloilo, Nueva Ecija and Zambales, there
is also a sizeable percentageof landlessworkers rangingfrom 13 to
51 percent of the village population. And where sharetenancy isstill
pronounced as in the village in Zambales, the presenceof landless
workers is negligible (3 percent). On the other hand, several sub-
tenancy arrangementshave been recordedin the La_qunaVillage with
the highestpercentageof landlessworkers". 35
We wonder at thispoint whether this observedinverseassociation
between share tenants and landlessworkers after land tenure reform
is due to the "hardening of the claims" to land ownership or to culti-
vation rights as a consequenceof the legalpressuresaccompanying
the agrarian reform program. No one wants to be left with a "soft"
hold on either ownership or cultivation rights lessone losescontrol.
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Before the official land reform declaration, tenure and ownership
arrangementswere "softer" and more casualand informal.
6. Emerging Land-Labor Tenure Configurations
A long time ago, the land tenure situation was simply described
as landlord-tenant relations. With land reform, population pressure
on land and lack of non-farm employment in the rural areas, land
and labor relations have become much more complex and stratified,
someof which are beyond the law, abovethe law, or evenunlawful.
But nevertheless,they are facts of life which can neither be denied
nor decreed away. The following land-labor tenure configurations
can be identified from variousstudies:
(a) Landlord-tenant. In the light of land reform, we can refer to
the durable landlordand the persistentsharetenant.
(b) Lessees can be pre-emancipation lessees(before agrarianre-
form). Agrarian reform lesseesor permanent lessees(those
who were working as sharetenants on land lessthan 7 hec-
taresand therefore,not subjectto Operation Land Transfer.
(c) Amortizing owners on the roadto ownershipof their land.
(d) Owner.operator who actually tills the farm he owns.
(e) Revertees are returnees to share tenancy after leaseholdor
amortizin_ ownership.
(f) Registered owner.operator but non-cultivator in practice;
hiresfarm labor.
(g) Absentee owner-cultivator non-tiller farms via remote control
through an overseerwho in turn useshired labor.
(h) Mixed tenure farmers may be share tenants in one parcel,
owner-operators in another, and lesseesin still another parcel.
(i) Weeder-harvester as"tenured" labor.
(j) Landless and "unt_nured" workers are hired by weeder-hat-
vesterson a shareor cashwage.
(k) Landless farm workers are employedona regular,more or less
permanent basispaid in cash or kind. His "tenancy" statusis
carefully avoided in order to prevent him from claiming
tenancy rights.
(li Sub-tenants are workers for a lessee, a share tenant or an
owner-operator but who cannot claim to bea tenant.
(re)Occasionally, hired landless farm workers have no tenure
whatsoever,not even "tenured" labor.
344 LandandLaborRelations
There are probably many more configurations which have not
been included in this list which would eventually emerge as social
realitiesto deal with despite the law.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Population pressureon land, migration, new technology,govern-
ment policies and development programs have had their inevitable
impact on the nature of land and labor relations. Meantime, the tra-
ditional spirit of bayanihan (mutual help and exchange labor) con-
tinued to be invoked as the foundation of cooperatiVesdevelopment
and farmer organization. In this Chapter, the following were present-
ed: Inventory of traditional formsof cooperation in agricultural pro-
duction as practiced in different parts of the country; the survival
and erosion of such traditional institutions; changesin labor arrange-
ments for agricultural production such as harvesting,threshing and
use of hired labor; different interpretations of the emergingrelations
between farmer and landless; and some identifiable tenure patterns
post land reform.
Traditional Forms of Cooperation in Agricultural Production
The different forms of cooperation traditionally practiced in
farming include Kil'lo'ong among the Kalingas;hilo-hilo among the
Aklanons; Ioyohan for the Bicolanos;ammuyo among Ilocanos;and
tornohan in Lagt_na;and bayanihan among Tagalogs.These tradi-
tional forms of cooperation were found to have the following cha-
racteristics: Norms of reciprocity were of two types: those which
required equivalence in reciprocation and definite membership and
those which did not demand immediate and specified reciprocatlon;
participation was usually among close kins, friends or neighbors; the
sponsor for the exchange labor activity usually provided food and
drinks as the "socializing" part; most of the actual labor rendered
was carried out in one day; the tasks involved in the exchange were
very specific; exchange labor took place mainly among equals, i.e.
among farmers. Given these features of bayanihan, it is difficult to
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understand how the concept could be the underlying basis for
cooperativesdevelopment.
One of the studiesreviewed looked at group cooperation in terms
of two different modes: pakikiiba andpakikidamay. The former was
official, formally organized while the latter was characterizedby so-
cial alliesassistingan individual in meetingfamily needor crises.This
samestudy called attention to bayanihan asa working bee in favor of
one family or person and pointed out that community-mindedness
had little or nothing to do with it. Bayanihan is not synonymous
with community spirit.
Erosion of Traditional Exchange Labor in Farming
Casestudiesdone in Bicol, Aklan, Pila, Laguna,and Pangasinan
exhibited trends which led to a verdict of traditional exchangelabor
which is rarely practiced at present even in communities where they
had been observedto be prevalentbefore.This erosionwasattributed
to the advent of mechanization; useof hired labor; declining number
of work animals; more farm labor available; presenceof irrigation,
anddesire to avoid the obligationto help other farmers later. Others
cited the high cost of livingwhich madepeople want to be paid for
labor expended. The greater premium on timing in land preparation
and the emergence of alternative employment opportunities had
likewise contributed to the decline in the practice of exchangelabor.
Survival of Exchange Labor in Farming
Despite the casestudieswhich signalledthe demise of bayanihan
in farming there were placeswhere the practice had managedto sur-
vive. In Luisiana, Laguna, for example, tornohan remains the domi-
nant cultural feature of community life in the village of San Buena-
ventura. The continuing life of tornohan was attributed by the re-
searcher to such conditions as: the exchange labor was not tied to
narrowly-defined specified farm activities; no tractors existed in the
area due to upland farm conditions; majority of participants were
farm owner-operators; agricultural landlessnesswas not yet a prob-
lem; there were well-established disciplinary rules; some marginal
efforts to include welfare considerations for less privileged were.
present; modifications in the provisionof food to minimize expenses
were made; and there was limited non-farm employment. Because
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of the pervasivenessof the practice, non-participants in tornohan
were regarded as the oddities. All farmers totally endorsed the
practice as beneficial. No one cited any disadvantage.On the con-
trary, they enumerated the benefits from tornohan as: more work
accomplishedfaster, and more enjoyable;different skillscontributed
by different members thus enabling them to learn new skillsfrom
others; pressure from the group compelled members to work and
•savedthem the expenseof hired labor.
In Isabela, the 2 lessaccessibleof 4 _illagesstudied had one kind
of exchange labor which had endured - the land preparation and
transplanting group. In tobacco production, a largemassof laborwas
always needed during the pulling and transplantingof seedlingsbe-
causethey wilt easily if not planted on time. It isalsosignificantto
note that in these villages, all household headswere farmer owner-
operators. Landlesslaborerswere largelyabsent;cropswere tobacco,
corn and peanuts which were grown under upland conditions with-
out irrigation. Land preparationwasdone mostly with animal power
and there wasno availableoff-farm employment.
In the two more accessiblerice-growingvillages,exchangelabor
was diminishing. In land preparation, tractors had taken the place
of carabaosdue to the foot and mouth disease.A high percent of
landlessworkers had come asin-migrantsand hired labor hadtended
to replaceexchangelabor.
The community of Malinao in Kalilangan, Bukidnon was identi-
fied as a special frontier-land settlement where settlers.camemainly
from the Batanesislandsin batchesof severalfamilies, For these set-
tiers, bayanihan was a way of life which enabledthem to stick it out
under pioneering•conditions,whether for farm or non-farm work.
The bayanihan practice made the Malinao farmer a full-time farmer
not only becauseof his farm but becausehe had to spendseveral
days working in other farms. Community life revolyed around the
farm and most farmerswent to their farms at daybreaktogether with
neighborscoming home only in the late afternoon. Besidesbayani-
han; Malinao alsohad a unique practicecalledborrow lot which isan
agreementfor the temporary useof a vacantparcel of land.
In Palawan, the.study concluded that exchange labor seemed
popular in frontier areas where there was scarcity of labor,•where
farmers lacked great cash assets;and where farms were fairly large
and modern inputs were not widely used. In particular, exchangela-
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bor was associatedwith slash-and-burnrice farming. As fields were
converted to lowland ricepaddies,exchangelabor declined and hired
labor tended to take ,over.
Changesin Labor Arrangement for Agricultural Production
Land Tenure and Harvesting Arrangements
Studies using historical data and loop surveysrevealedtwo dif-
ferent trends in two sub-regionswith respect to rice harvestingar-
rengements. Where landholdings were relatively smell, the land
tenure arrangement was kasamahan wherein output and production
costs were shared equally by landlord and tenant. In the large ha-
ciendas with thousands of hectaresand tenants, management was
carried out by a farm managerand several overseers.In the kasama
system, harvestersreceiveda shareof the output in an arrangement
calledhunusan where threshingwasdone manually. Becauseof pater-
nalistic relations and smallerfarms, landlordscould largely trust the
honesty of tenants to report on crop harvested.
In the haciendas, the t//yadora (large thresher) owned or con-
tracted by the hacienda wasthe device usedto ascertainoutputs in
large numbers of tenant farms becauseall the harvested rice ware
brought in a central place for threshing under the supervisionof over-
seers. No chance of cheating was left for the tenants. The ti/yadora
therefore was the factor which enabled the practiceof a sharecrop-
ping arrangement under the hacienda system. It was a meansfor
controlling in one central location the determination of the output
which was the basis of sharing. Harvesters were paid a fixed wage
rate or a fixed payment for area harvested while in the hunusan
system, harvesters ware paid in kind through a shareof the harvest.
Changing Patterns in Harvesting Arrangements
From tflyadora to hunusan was the first identifiable shift in har-
vestingarrangements.Three factors contributed to thischange:land
reform which 9avethe farmers freedom to chooseharvestingarrange-
merits; expansionof irrigated areasand new rice varietieswhich made
double cropping predominant. Short-maturing varieties matured be-
fore rainy seasonwas over but tilyadoras could not enter wet fields
to do the threshing hence the delay led to cropdamage.With libera-
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tion from the landlord, farmers were no longer obliged to use the
tilyadora. They shiftedto hunusan system.
The secondmajor changein harvestingarrangementwasthe rapid
diffusion of the new contractual arrangement calledgama which is
similar to hunusan except that harvesters were required to do
weeding for free in order to gain the right to do the harvestingand
threshing for a shareof the harvest, usually one-sixth.Gama assured
the worker theright to harvestand assuredthe farmei- also of har-
vestersduring harvesttime. It meant, however, a 'reduction in wage
rate becauseweedingwasfree. The welfare and income redistribution
implications of these different harvesting arrangementswere alsoex-
plored by the researchers.
Changesin Patterns of Labor Utilization
One of the arguments for land reform was the expectation of
increased incentive for a farmer to invest more of his time and
energy if he owned the land. Contrary to this expectation, useof
hired labor had increasedconsiderably regardlessof tenure status.
Family labor had declined and exchangelabor had practically fa_,,_d
out. The explanation for this shift in labor utilization patterns re-
mainselusivealthough severalhypotheseshad been offered.
Different Interpretations of the Emerging Relationships
Between Farmer and Landless
Emerging relationships between farmer and landless had been
variously interpreted by different authors in the followng manner:
(1) Village institutions changein responseto changesin resourceen-
dowments, technology and government policies;(2) With continuing
population pressureon declining size of farm holdings,the labor ab-
sorptivecapacity of the small farm becomesvery crucial. This means
shared poverty manifested in many ways. At the sametime, a coun-
ter-movement of stratification with identifiable subclassesamongthe
peasantry is beginning;(3) The concept of agricultural ladder/escala-
tor is reintroduced with owner-operators,at a higher rungof the lad-
der followed by farmers with cultivation rights, and landlessemerg-
ingashired labor.
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Identifiable Tenure Patterns Post Land Reform
The following tenure categorieswere identified despite land re-
form: share tenancy; hacienda system; mixed-tenure farmers; "re-
vertees" to share tenancy; seasonal tenurial-arrangements; sub-
tenancy; hired farm labor; weeder harvesteras "tenured labor"; la-
borers hired by weeder-harvesters; gleaners; officially registered
owner-cultivators who were actually absentee landlo[ds employing
hired labor; and "homelot tenure':
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PART II
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Participatory Development
Concept And Practice
CHAPTER VI
INTEGRATED RURAL DEVELOPMENT AND PHILIPPINE
VERSIONS OF INTEGRATION
In our searchfor the magicformula which would put an end to,
or at least reduce povertY, hunger, unemployment, and inequality,
we have experimentedwith a whole rangeof strategiesand models(if
you will) exhibiting varying stylesof operation, harvestingboth anti-
cipated and unanticipatedconsequencesregardedassuccessor failure
depending upon who is looking. For example, the community deve-
lopment era of 2 decadesagowas characterized as rich in organiza-
tional prescriptionsand institutional innovationsbut wanting in pro-
ductive technologies.As Ruttan puts it, "... rural developmentcan
be described,perhapsnot too inaccuratelyasan ideology in searchof
a methodology or a technology." In the early 1950s, we thought
community development should take a holistic approach and so we
had fourfold or manifold programsand multi-purposeworkers. But
then at some point, there was disillusionmentwith all these, hence,
we went to the other extreme of embarking on singlecommodity
production programssuch as rice, corn, wheat, etc. Now we have re-
discoveredthe interrelatednessof factors. So we are all wrapped up
in integrated rural.development. We have gone full circle. As Ruttan
explains: "This concern with integrated rural development in the
developing world represents, in part, a reaction against the distor-
tions produced by the production-oriented (Green Revolution) rural
development efforts of the 1960s, which were in turn, a reaction
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against the economic failures of rural development efforts of an
earlier vintage. They had been based on the assumption that the
mobilization and developmentof community resources- human and
physical - motivated by the multi-purposevillage worker and sup-
plemented by credit and limited grantsof materialswould lead to the
modernization of rural society. The community development pro-
grams of the 1950s were least successfulin efforts designedto ex-
pand the economic base needed to support rural development-
efforts to introduce changes in farming practices that were capable
of increasing agricultural productivity, or to generate employment
and income through expansion of village industries.''1
• Ruttan further generalizes that "rural development program
activities must be organized around activities and servicesthat have
relatively well-defined technologies or methodologies and objec
tives." Perhapsit is fair to say that commodity-oriented programs
have been more successful(and not uniformly so) in increasingpro-
duction but rather ineffective or even retrogressive in achieving
equity goalsand "spotty" with respectto employment. With all our
technologies including modern irrigation, roads,new seeds,fertilizer,
farm machinery, insecticides, credit, price support, etc. packaged
with extension methodologies, we should have been a great deal
more successfuleven on the production side. Village industries have
certainly not expanded even in placeswhere they were supposedto.
On the other hand, from all accounts,the Chineseexperiencein rural
mobilization which is regardedas a "successStory" seemedto have
been premised on a very strong ideologicalthrust and not muchof a
technological base. In this case, Ruttan's critique of rural develop-
ment in the 1950s as "an ideology in searchof a methodology or a
technology" does not seem to apply. Perhapsthe strength of the
Chinese ideology as a pervasive institutional underpinning made it
possiblefor them to "succeed" in the eyesof the outside world even
with the application of low-level technology. A naive interpretation
of the Chineserural mobilization experience might be that "ideology
has partly substituted for the technology." A counter situation we
seem to suffer from at the moment is "'technology without an ideo-
logy" thus the original objectives which brought about the instltu-
tional and technological innovations are subverted and then every-
one wonderswhy we could not be like the Chinese.Perhapsthe goals
of equity and employment requiremore ideology than the task of in-
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creasing production. Otherwise, tecl_nology can become an instru-
ment for aggravating inequiW and unemployment especially if both
the traditional and newlyCreated institutional arrangements are
supportive in this direction.,
It is curious that when technology fails to "deliver", institutions
take the blame but when technology produces, institutions purpor-
tedly do not matter. As a matter of fact, in the Second Asian Agri-
cultural Survey, the proposed comprehensive strategy for agricultural
nrowth and rural development placed emphasis on:
• , . the need to realigninstitutions with the technologiesavailablein
rural areas,or to createnew _nstitutionswhere necessary,in orderto facili-
tate rapid increasesin productiveemploymentopportunitiesand to reduce
poverty. The misalignmentof institutions has in the past led to pervasive
market imperfections,constraintson the mobilization of resources,natural
and investible (includinglabor) limitationson the creationof effective de-
mand and obstaclesin the way of providingmore employment. [In their
view,] a rural development program shouldhave two essentialobjectives:
to increasethe DroductiviWof the rural poor, and to ensuretheir full
participationin planningandexecutingthe program.2
Note that the burdefl of realignment is placed on the institutions,
and not on the technology. In the meantime, every agricultural and
rural development project tinkers with institutions and organizations.
They either create new structures or restructure existing ones. With
the growing interest in, or at least the growing rhetoric on the land-
less, the small farmer and the rural poor, in the international develop-
ment communiW, integrated rural development or IRD has become
the "sexy thing" to do. The Philippines is no exception to this.
This paper is a modest attempt to do three things:
1) To look briefly at the concept of integrated rural develop-
ment.
2) To review the Philippine versions of integration in rural deve-
lopment.
3) To analyze the dynamics of integration and coordination.
A. The Concept of Integrated Rural Development
It has been said that the new international consensus on rural
development that has evolved since the early 1970s is a "more inte.
grated and community-based approach" "This appealing rhetoric has
now been adopted and is being actively promoted by virtually all
358 Rural Developmentand Integration
United Nations and bilateral development agencies, by various volun-
tary organizations, and by top policymakers in a growing number of
developing countries. ''3 Even the World Bank, the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, and International Fund for Agricultural Development
for that matter have been •touched by this new international • con-
•census. Since FAO spent quite a bit of time reviving the concept, we
have .chosen to focus on-significant excerpts from their series of con-
sultations on the subject. Some elements of this conceptare em-
bodied in the following statements: 4
•1) The conceptof IRD is comparativelyof recentoriginand isstill in the
processof evolution. Hence,.it is advisablenot. to conceiveIRD in.a
very rigid manner.At the sametime, it isnecessarythat the conceptis
reasonabl_/clear•so that IRD is properly distinguished from other pro-
grammessuch as the community developmentprogramme.
2) I RD is a Pragmaticconcept, in fact, in practical terms,•an ideology
which carriesimplied Criticism of existing institutions andpolicies, so
far follpwed for socio-economic:changesin the-developingcountriesin
the last2 decades.It ismulti-disciplinary in approach andmu/ti.sectoral
• in operation.
:3) The•concept Of IRD providesa more Sociallysensitiveframework for
planningchangesin the rural sector.Central in its orientation is the
sharpfocus on the rural people, who, while constitutingthe greatma-
jority of. the people•in developingcountries,havesofar beenby-passed
in the processof economicgrowth and left out from the shareof its
gains. It adopts a total "systemsapproach" to development,which is
viewed•asa single'andunified processandof which economicgrowth is
a part, Its variousaspects,viz., political,social,economic,andtechnical
must be interrelated andmutually reinforcing.
4), The twin major objectivesof an IRD programme•are: a) accelerated
' economicgrowthwith b) wider participationandmostequitabledistri-
bution of its gains.The •stageof the economyand the factor endow-
mentswOulddeterminewhich sectorw(_uldbethe prime mover. Thus,
agriculture•generally•becomesthe logicalchoice and=basefor I RD in
most of_the poor countriesof Asia. Its modernization•requiresrheim-
provementof a multitudeof components- technological,institutional,
economicandpolitical.• :
5) Rural development.requiresnot only•changesin the existing institutions
and valuesheld by the targetgroup poPUlationbut aisocorresPonding
modificatiohson the Part of the "change system" includingpolicy-
• makers, politicians, administrators and professionalagentsworking at
• variouslevelsOfthe governmenthierarchy.
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6) Basic to an operational strategy of an I RD programme is the increasing
capacity and commitment of the people to be involved in the develop-
ment process. The rural massneeds to be encouraged to take part in the
decision-making for rural development.
7) I RD has to be implemented to a large extent in e deflnedgeogrephical
area and implies a package program for increasingagricultural and non-
agricultural output of the selected region. Due to several factors, name-
ly, resources and trained manpower, an IRD program has to be impl_
mented in a country in phase_ A reconnaissance study of the country
to find areas•with potential for its implementation is necessary. In such
a study, the following factors may be covered leading to the selection
of the areas.
a) Farmers are organized in a social system such as a cooperative,
village council, farm corporation, etc.
b) Farmers" organizations in the area agree with the concept of
IRD and agree to collaborate.
c) The. area has some growth potential. However, farmers, be-
cause of lack of funds, knowledge of techniques, infrastruc-
ture, and supporting facilities are not able to exploit the po-
tentlal.
d) The region, where the select_l area is located, is able to pro.
vide supporting setwces to someextent and has a minimum of
the related infrastructure.
e) There is no great variation in the size of landholdings and the
land tenure system,will permit development.
f) Heavy investment and a long gestation period will not be
necessary to achieve the first round of result& It is true that to
attain the ultimate objectives of the program, long term invest-
ment will be necessary especially in water resources develop-
ment, communication, power, storage and marketing. But the
program has to have a potentiality to show some tangible r_
suits within a few years from the beginning of the operation_
g) The area, besides having the potentiality to realize the objec-
tives of IRD, may also have one or several other social, econ-
omic or political considerations such as reconstruction of a
region damaged by earthquake, floods, etc.
The size and boundary of an area to form an operation unit has to
be carefully determined. The size of such an area has to be sufficienffy
large to permit economic viability and justification for investment in
agro-based industries employing adequate level of technical personnel,
etc., but not too extensive so that it becomes difficult and bulky to ad-
minister the program, s
360 RuralDevelopmentandintegration
Calamity_ridden parts of Asia regions damaged by earthquakes,
floods, etc., are not hard to find but all the other factors which have
been enumerated as factors to consider in selecting an area for IRD
are more intractable. If they did all exist in a particular area, chances
are that the place probably would have no need for IRD. In other
words, it is precisely because these ideal conditions are not present
that we turned to I R D. Can I RD help create such conditions?
It is also rather ironic that IRD should strongly and actively be
promoted by the United Nations and its bilateral development agen-
cies whose own development assistance efforts are somewhat less
than coordinated, let alone integrated. As a matter of fact, some of
our lack of integration and coordination in our development activi-
ties is a reflection of the slightly muddled international development
assistance scene,
In an accompanying document, the following sobering thoughts
on this rural development ideology have been outlined to provide a
lessthan oositive compelling view of the I RD concept.
1) Integratedrural development,almost by definition, is a difficult pro-
gramme to implement. It is essentiallyconceivedas havingmultiple
objectives such as more production, more employment, and more
equitable distribution of income, and finally, a better quality of life
particularly for the rural poor. A typical IRD programmeseeksto syn-
thesize economicgrowth and socialjustice.Suchsynthesisis not easy
to achieve.Unlike a single-objectiveprojectwhich isrelativelySimpleto
execute,an IRD project is invariablya complexaffair.
2) Another factor which tendsto adverselyaffect implementationof IRD
is that it is not easyto operationalizevariousobjectives,in terms of
concreteprogrammesand schemes.Those in chargeof IRD areseldom
aware of the manner in which their performancewill be evaluated.
There is no singlenorm for measuringthe successor otherwiseof IRD.
3) There has to be a firm andexplicitcommitmentat the highestpolitical
level.Absenceof a firm politicalcommitment isoften a reflectionof an
unfavourableagrariansituation. Inequitableland and incomedistribu-
tion can leadto a derailmentwhen the rural elite capturelocalinstitu-
tionsandthe strengthof the ruralelite isreinforced.
4) The normal processof publicadministrationisorientedtoward sectoral
and departmentaloperationsrather than area-orientedoperations.The
result is that an IRD project doesnot easilyfit into a normaladminis-
trative system, For peopletrainedto function ina departmentalhierar-
chy, working on an interdisciplinarybasis,which isa prerequisitefor
IRD, doesnot come naturallyto suchpersons.Furthermore,in a coun-
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try with a mono-partysystem,the party cadresmay providethe major
instrumentfor implementationof IRD. In other countries,usuallycha-
racterizedby mul_ti-partysystem,the mainbrunt hasto be borneby the
bureaucracy.6
Experiences around the world are probably enough to demon-
strate that the usual bureaucracy is not exactly the ideal institutional
arrangement to implement something as complex and as demanding
as iRD but in most countries, the bureaucracy is the only available
instrument for implementation.
Samonte, in his contribution, looks at IR D as an effort to
reexamineand redefinerural developmentand part of the continuing,
critical revisionof the conceptof developmentitself. Dueto a "disappoint-
ment or dissatisfactionwith action programsbasedon past orthodoxies,
I RD hasprogressivelyevolvedwith a new rationaleandmethod".
In Samonte'sview, the elementsof IRD are asfollows:
1) focuson the rural poor, 2) holistl¢or total systemsapproachcom-
plementedby area integration,3) increasedmotivationto developandmo-
bilize themselvesto cooperateor work togetherfor commongoals,4) in-
creasedcapacity to develop a greaterwill to work, greaterdevelopment
orientation,capacity to organizeand be self-rellant,5) commitmentto com-
munity and nation, 6) responsiveto basicneeds.The operationalobjectives
of I RD are increasedeconomicproductivity,greateremploymentopportu-
nities; more equitable distributionof wealth; effectivedeliverysystemfor
social services;increasedpolitical and admrnistrativecapacity and wider
popularparticipation. IRD must be basedon a multi-functionaland multi-
sectoral setof objectivesthat are in a continuous interaction and evolu-
tion,7
At this point, let us ask ourselves the question -- Do we really
need all these to improve the lives of rural people? Furthermore, is
this paradise of perfection in rural development implementable or is
IRD like a happy marriage which is said to be made in heaven? Sa-
monte himself acknowledges the intractability of the approach. As
he says:
The attainment of these objectives is easier 8aid than done. The realitiesof
developmentinclude the fact that available human and material resources
especiallyin developingcountriesare very limited. Thus,the simultaneous
pursuit of all the objectivesat the usually highlevelsof intensityandmag-
nitudeasproposedby varioussectoral,professional,anddisciplinarygroups,
cannotbe realisticallyandeffectivelymade.Priorities have to be se¢ Actual-
ly, the alternativescannotbe cast in termsof blackandwhite; they are not
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usuallysusceptible,exclusive,sequentialpatterns.What is neededis to
carefully as_e__e _pecificsituation - theconditions,resources,needsand
problemsof a givenp/ace at a particularstageof development.Onlythus
canonedetermine.theparticular"shadeof gray"or theblendingof inputs
andinteractionsthatwillmosteffectivelypropeldevelopment.8
Somethingasperfect and asall-embracingas IRD can never really
fail:• One of its multiple componentsis bound to work. But total suc-
cesscan never be achievedeither, simply because.therealworld is so
•complex that the probability of everything working out is rather
slim. Furthermore, the burden of. proof that .IRE) can do more than
the single sectors combined and that synergismactually occur, re-
mainsto beestablishedasa fact. At the moment, the promiseof IRD
is mostly an article of faith awaiting empirical realization in its glo-
rious "integratedness." . .-
TO produce the particular "shade of gray" in IRD which would
suit a particularset of conditions•designedtO propel development is
indeed a. challengingarena. Identifying and operationalizing the cri-.
tical elements under specific circumstances in a definite place is
tough enough. Putting them together.in a particular combination and
orchestrating theiractions in the planned and expected direction, of
•felt ••needswith people participation, etc., is certainly even much
more demanding.-Making_themwork sothat orchestrationwould re-
dound to .thebenefit of the rural poor isthe crucial test of all. At the
• moment, this remainslargelyanticipated.
Both the FAO and the Samonte conceptsof IRD saythat IRD is
different from past.concepts of CD but neither indicates how it is
different. Holdcroft,. in-his review of the community development
experience, indicates that.although the.sponsorsof. IRD themselves
would rather emphasize the differences, some CD. veterans believe
that there are•sufficient similaritiesto.uphold the revivalistViewthat
the new IRD isin fact a revival ofthe old CD..Onits shortcomings,
Holdcroft recallsthat CD was a product of the Cold War era and its
principles-were derived consciouslyor unconsciouslyfrom theories
directly opposedto •revolutionary doctrines. In thatperiod, CD was.
designedto remove the threat of subversion.However, the.strategy
of bringingpeople together, inviting them into harmonious commu-
nities, and mobilizing them for common endeavorsfailed, to achieve
permanent political .peace•nor quick economic growth. Politically,
CD was-not effective either becausebasic conflicts and structural
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problems such as distribution of land ownership, urban domination,
etc., were too seriousto be resolved simply by the persuasive efforts
of CD workers. The expected general consensus, reconciliation and
common participation for the sake of development occurred more as
an exception rather than as a rule. Economically, Holdcroft likewise
regards CD as a double weakness for it enlarged social services more
rapidly than the generation of rural incomes and failed to significant-
ly improve the condition of the rural poor. In other words, both
aspects of rural poverty, low production and unjust distribution were
not significantly changed by CD.
As a reaction to the so-called bias of CD and the green revolution
toward the better-off, the new IRD programs are concentrating on
the rural poor. They likewise acknowledge the presence of conflict of
interest and of class struggle, a point of view which was purportedly
avoided by CD. Despite this acknowledgement, finding ways of up-
lifting the underprivileged remains the challenge. In this regard, Hold-
croft is not terribly optimistic that IRD will perform better. He
points out that:
Perhapsfor identical reasons,the new IRD, like the old CD, doesnot
relish the prospect of highlightingpolitically sensitiveobstacles,and so
diplomatically shroudsthe suggestionsfor removingthem. Similarly, even
though CD's fondnessfor socialservicesend neglectof productionarenow
well known, the new developmentprogramsof the late 1970ssuchasba$/c
needs may fall into the sametrip. To strikea balancebetweendemandsfor
socialservicesandconditionsfor increasedproductionis, in any case,e very
difficult task.9
On the other hand, the South Korean Community-Based Inte-
grated Rural Development (CBIRD) project did not dwell on
CD-IRD differences. Instead, it was an attempt to combine the
strengths of traditional community development theory and method-
ology with the advantages of a large-scale systems-oriented, carefully
planned and integrated development strategy. The project has been
described as:
a mini-regional(small area) development managementmodel with an ulti-
mate goal, overa five-yearperiodof institutionalizingaprocessthat will im-
prove income, health, educationand community institutionsand services
for low-incomerural people.The unit of developmentor impactareacorn.
prises severalvillages,roughly correspondingto the lowest level of local
bureaucraticadministration...
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The CD approachhas traditionally beenpeople-oriented,with an em-
phasison changingvaluesand relationshipswithin a smallface-to-facecom-
munity in order to get thingsmoving.CD practitionersinsistthat develop-
ment efforts should be directed at the "felt needs" of a community, and
that this canonly be achievedby maximizinglocalparticipationin decision-
makingin the planninganddirection of projects.Self-helpthroughcoopera-
tive effort and the investmentof local resourcesis stressed,And finally,
there is usuallyan eplphasison egalitarianismand improvingthe quality of
community life, particularly with regardto the situationof the poor and
other deprivedgroups...
The rate and extent of local improvementsthat can be broughtabout
by an innovativerural interventionsuchasCBIRD alsodependsheavilyon
the developmentpotential of the particularruralareasto which it isapplied.
This potential isdetermined by a combinationof factorssuchastopography
and natural resources,socialcohesivenessor divisiveness,physicalaccessto
markets, the nature and strengthof local institutionsandtraditionsof coo-
peration,and the availabilityof dynamic localleadership.
The big problem everyone faces at this juncture, however,is how to
translate this popular rhetoric into effective actions This is proving to be
much more difficult than the rhetoric itseff suggestsandthan manypeople
hadsupposed.
It would be unrealisticto expect an interventionof this sort in a few
pilot areasto bringabout all by itself,a fundamentaltransformationof the
existingsocio-economicstructure, traditional valuesand pattern of human
relationshipsin these areas. If properly adapted_tolocally felt needs,pre.
ferencesand mores, aswell as to prevailinggovernmentpoliciesand pro-
grams,such an interventionasthe Community-Bar_=dIntegratedRural De-
velopment (CBIRD), experiencedemonstrates,can result in impressiveim-
provements.But a fundamental transformationof existingvillagestructure5
and behaviorpatternscanonly be broughtaboutby the broaderanddeeper
nationwideeconomic,political, andsocialchanges...10
Because IRD is invariably a complex affair, its entry or reentry
into the development scene has contributed to the emergence or re-
surgence of new fields in the development profession ... that of de-
velopment administration, rural development managment, commu-
nity organization, social soundness analysis, etc.
If in the productivity-oriented approach, the agricultural scien-
tist, the irrigation engineer, the economist and other technial expert_
are the technocratic "heroes", in I RD, development administration
experts and behavioral scientists have successfully ensconced them-
selves into what they regard as "valid and necessary" two-fold or
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more accurately three-fold approaches:
a) Development administration which is the study, designand
management of organizations responsible for constructing,
funding and implementing development plans. It focuseson
largerstructuresand formal procedures to facilitate develop-
ment. The target audienceis the policymaker.
b) Organization development which aims primarily at interper-
sonal obstaclesto implementation. It emphasizesthe proces-
ses of change in organizational relationshipsand focuseson
small units in a more informal way. In many ways, the pro-
cess consultant functions like the "psycho-analyst" in diag-
nosingproblemsof organizationdevelopment.
c) To cover any and every eventuality, development admi-
nistration experts have provided for a fool-proof professional
protection called the contingency approach. This assumes
that "it all depends" and the most important task is to dis-
cover "what it depends on". The idea that there can be a
singlebest organization designor leadershipstyle is rejected.
There is no universal/optimal mechanism to achievecertain
results.At the sametime, the idea that all situationsare total-
ly unique is also rejected. There are discernible patterns of
environmental contingenciesthat influence the relative effec-
tiveness of different interventions. These statementsare pro-
bably the safestand most incontrovertible generalizationsin
development, With such pronouncements, the development
administration expert can never go wrong.) The contingency
approach covers all contingenciesl ! !
The summary presentation of their approach, as stated below,
further speaksof its "indispensability."
a two-folddevelopmentadministration/organizationdevelopmentcontin-
gancystrategyispositedasa necessarycombinationfor improvingtheorga-
nization and implementationof IRD projects.Moreover,that strategy
shouldbecarriedout in a waythat providesruralvillagerswith a voicein
projectdecisions,Suchanapproachwill not eliminateallobstaclesto rural
development,but withoutit, thereislglreatdoubtthat IRD will leadeitherto integrationorto truedevelopment.
In the meantime, their contribution to the literature and to the
"development business"has multiplied as can be seen from the fol-
lowingtitles:
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Theory and Practice in Kenya, Chicago:Universityof ChicagoPress,1977.
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New York, Praeger,1979....
Development Alternatives, Inc. "The New Directions" Mandate:
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B. 'Philippine Versions of Integration in Rural Development
Our country maynot be the greatest in the world and we can be
criticized for many things but lack of creativity is not one of them.
In the field of rural development, we can honestly say "You name it,
we've done it; we're doing it or we plan tO do it".
• In this section, we present the legacy of the CD era and brief
descriptions of different versions of integration in Philippine rural de-
velopment.. This is not meant to be exhaustive.but rather illustrative
of the"experimentations" which characterize, our own efforts.
1. The Legacy of the CD Era
Unlike the proponents of the "new". IRD approach, we are not
preoccupied with the problem, of differentiating IRD from CD and
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unlike Ruttan, we are not preparedto write off the CD movement of
the 1950s particularly its ideologicaland institutional components.
Any attempt to distinguish IRD from CD is rather academic and of
marginal utility. It is impossibleto erase the influence of CD in pre-
sent-day rural development for the following reasons:
1) In the Philippines, the community developmentprogram was
the first significant, systematic,and national effort to reachand deli-
ver social servicesto the barrio while at the sametime trying to enlist
the barrio folks' participation. It was the first time the barrio had
been the main focus of national development. It was the first major
attempt to mobilize the barrio, to link it with the rest of the nation
as a development strategy rather than as a purely vote.getting gim-
mick.
2) The organization and development of the barrio council
(which was the heart of the CD program) as an institutionalized
channel for vertical and horizontal communication has doubtless
contributed to the growing political awareness,if not political savoir
faire of village leaders.This is not without repercussionsin terms of
rural people's increasingability to articulate and make demandson
the systemto a point where they can no longerbe ignored.
3) The CD programwasthe first major exposureof our national
leadership, our professionalsand politicians to the problemsof the
rural sector outside of the periodic election campaigns.It was the
first national program, besidesthe public elementary school system
which recruited college graduates, to serve the rural areas. It has
helped define service to the barriosas a respectablejob for profes-
sionals. It hasstarted a tradition for studentsand academicto be "in-
volved" in rural developmentboth personallyand professionally.
4) At the time (1950s), there was little or no productiveagricul-
tural technology around which rural developmentprogramscould be
organized. It is perhapsthis lack which hasled to the developmentof
national and international researchcentersdesignedpreciselyto pro-
duce such technology. At the moment, the frequent complaint is the
weaknessor absenceof the organizational and institutional frame-
work needed to support the introduction and continuing productivi-
ty of these technologies particularly in the interest of the rural poor.
Hence, we seem to be back to the old problem which stimulated the
CD programearlier.
5) The largecrew of personnelwho had been trained and fielded
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under the CD program are at presentmanning and leadingmany na-
tional development programssuch as cooperatives,agrarian reform,
nutrition, population, manpower and youth training, fisheries,forest
development, regional, provincial, municipal and village-leveldevel-
opment planning. Without their experienceand previousexposureto
rural problems,these programswould havehadto start from zero.
In general, the CD program helped establishthe primacy of the
village and the villager as both beneficiary and active participant in
national development. Policiesand action havenot alwaysbeen con-
sistent with this recognizedprimacy but neverthelessevery develop-
ment program attempts to devise a strategy for reachingthe village
although admittedly implemented with uneven degreesof commit-
ment and success.Evenwith the most cynical, it hasbecomefashion-
able to be positively identified with the goalsof rural development.
The CD movement laid the foundation for village-basedor at least,
village-orientedprograms'Doubtless, this hasalsocontributed to the
emergenceand institutionalization of a sizeabledeve/opmentprofe$.
sion which is not an inconsequentialbeneficiary of development.
2. The Human Settlements Approach
The most comprehensive of all integrations is_the Human Settle-
ments approach which is countrywide in scope, both urban and rural;
cuts across Ministries and brings together 11 basic needs such as:
power; water; food; shelter; clothing and cottage industry; economic
base; education, culture and technology; sports and recreation; med-
ical services; mobility; and ecological balance. At the village or dis-
trict level for the cities, there are auxiliary brigades which roughly
respond to the basic needs. National, provincial, and local govern-
ments provide support for their progams. To impart the ideology of
the New Society, its compassion, humanism, nationalism and culture,
a University of Life hasbeen established. Reflective of its integrative
ideology which embraces the physical, social, intellectual, and spiri-
tual are such slogansas:
- "Man is the center of national development."
- "Achievement is love made visible."
- "Let the mind feel and the heart think."
- "lseng Bansa, IsangDiwa" (One nation, one soul).
To implement something as comprehensive as Human Settle-
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ments requiresextraordinary powersof persuasionin resourcealloca-
tion and manpower commitment from the different Ministriesand
levels of government. The integrative force residesin a woman.
Their most well-known project is called BLISS (New Society Im-
provement of Sites and Services) which involves the creation of
model communities (212 havebeen developedin different regionsof
the country since 1979 and 235 new sites will be developed this
year). The emphasisof the first phaseof the programwason site de-
velopment, construction of new shelter units, and the development
of local industrieswithin the sites. The new thrust for 1980-81 will
beon propagationand radiation of the development conceptthrough
anacceleratedlivelihoodstrategy.
The new programincludesthe simplepropagationof homelotgardening
for homeconsumption,the establishmentof a chairinwhichpilotfamilies
bringclientfamiliesintothe programovertime,thesettingup of produc-
tion centerswherecommunalfarmingis engagedin andwhereexcess
domesticproduceisprocessedfor inter-municipalndinter-regionaltrading
andthe settingup of alternativeventuresfor thecommunitiesasidefrom
cropfarming,vegetable,fishor livestockproduction.12
The BLISS Project, in many ways, short circuits both the integra-
tion and the development processby creating model communities
which take care of basic needsincludingvertical and horizontal inte-
gration of the processingand production process.The fact that 212
such model communities havebeen establishedover a period of less
than a year testifies to the quick action of integration when vestedin
central authority.
3. The River Basin (Integrated Area Development Approach) 13
a. The Overall Program
The Bicol River Basin Development Program is described as a
"test case in the Philippine government'soverall rural development
strategy. The innovative, sub-regional integrated area development
(lAD) approach includes decentralized planningand implementation
of multi-sectoral projects in a defined geographicalarea of critical
need and high growth potential. Equally important to the successof
the Program has been the development of the organizational_struc-
ture and institutional capability to achieve an increasingdegreeof
regionaland local levelcoordination of developmentactivities."
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The Program has absorbed quite a bit of resourcesand will ab-
sorb evenmore. Asof December 1978, USAID loan obligationstotal-
led US$17.6 million for the Bicol Program. The Philippine govern-
ment commitments againstloan projects are estimated at $39.7 mil-
lion. With two loan projects and planned grant obligations through
1981, the total AID grant and loan contribution to the Bicol Pro-
gram would be $29,6 million. The total Philippine contribution is
estimated at $58.6 million in local currency. The combined total is
estimatedat $882 million in existing and proposedinputs,one third
by AID and two-thirds by the Philippines. Roughly, this means661
million pesos.
As a national strategyof rural mobilization and development,the
Bicol River BasinDevelopment Program(BRBDP) is an innovativeef-
fort to prioritiesand reducedevelopmentconstraintsin a phased,co-
ordinated, decentralized manner:
[] The BRBDP institution. This is itself designedto improve the
effectivenessof government entities to plan and implement
development programsand projects. Its integrated areadevel-
opment approach focuseson a delineated area of recognized
socio-economicneed with highgrowth potential to maximize
benefits. It directs an integrated, cross-sectoral,inter-agency
planningprocessto ensurecoordination. It decentralizesproj-
ect planningand management to maximize localgovernment
and popularparticipation.
[] Basic infrastructure. Its development demandshigh priority
to reduce costs of other activities and to best utilize natural
resources:drainageandflood control; irrigation facilities, wa-
tershed protection, roads,bridges,port facilities, the railroad,
geothermal power and rural electrician, intra-regional tele-
communications.
[] Land reform isdesignedto reduceincome inequality.
Agricultural development. Integrated area development
(lAD) component projects focus on full development of
water resourcesand provide supporting programsto increase
productivity of small-scalefarmers; upland watershed devel-
opment expands the focusto includeconservationof natural
resources.
[-_ Integrated health, nutrition and popular This project will
train and help rural residents to improveenvironmental sani-
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tation, reduce morbidity, malnutrition and population
growth.
[] Promotion of private sector investment. This is designedto
expand productive and employment-generatingcapital assets
and to stimulate technologicalimprovements.
The Bicol Region includes the 4 provincesof Camarines Norte,
CamarinesSur, Albay, Sorsogonand the two islandsprovincesof Ca-
tanduanes and Masbate. It has been said that in this Region, "the
classicaldevelopment problems are all present." The area is charac-
terized by: a high rate of population growth sideby sidewith a high
rate of out-migration; the lowest per capita production and income;
serious maldistribution of income; physical and economic isolation
from Manila and other markets due to bad roads, dilapidated rail-
road, and inadequate port and shipping facilities; lack of employ-
ment opportunities; inequitable land distribution; high level of mal-
• nutrition, disease,and infant-child mortality; low revenuecollection
to support development efforts; capital scarcity and hostile physical
environment (periodic typhoons, flooding, poor drainage, salinity
intrusion); and the cumulative effects of all these factors adversely
affecting production.
The two provincesof Camarines Sur and Albay constitute the
core of the economically depressedBicol Region and make up the
Bicol River Basin and its extended influence area. At present, the
Program area has been expanded to include Sorsogon,and the esti-
mated total land area is 706,000 with 1.6 million population.
The BRBDP was created on May 17, 1973 on the basisof find-
ings and recommendations of the BRBDP Comprehensive Frame-
work Plan. The goal of the Program is to improve socioeconomic
conditions and _e quality of life of the poor majority, which consti-
tute over 80 percent of the population. Overtime, this will be meas-
ured in terms of increased real incomes which are distributed more
equitably, as well as increased opportunities for people to partici-
pate in the development process.Increasein equity is to be achieved
in part through land reform, improved productivity of the small-
scale farmer, enlarged opportunities for farm and off-farm employ-
ment and better accessibilityto social servicesespeciallyin the rural
areas.The resultsof almost three yearsof initial studiesand planning
activity indicate that the Bicol River BasinArea hasimmediate devel.
opment potential, particularly for (1) irrigated riceland,and upland
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areasthat can be double-cropped, (2) privatesectorinvestmentespe-
cially agri-businessand rural manufacturing, and (3) basicinfrastruc-
ture highly complementaryto the above.Analysisof increasedhealth
and social servicessuggestthat in addition to improving the quality
of life, work productivity can also be increasedsignificantly.
In the recent past, there have been attempts to addressthe de-
velopment problems in Bicol, both on a sectoral basisand through
coordinated efforts prior to the BRBDP. Earlier coordinating orga-
nizations lacked adequate authorities, scope of coverage, and re-
sourcesto do the job. Accelerated growth has not occurred and in
real terms, the downward transitional trend hascontinued. Clearly,
a new development strategywas required in the Bicol area incorpo-
rating intensive investment in productive capital stock and human
skills, appropriate technological transfer and adaptability, an effec-
tive institutional planningframework and an action program.
The BRBDP representsan integrated area development (lAD)
approach to attack the above problems and constraints simulta-
neously and in a coordinated, decentralized manner. It is basedon
• the following precepts:
[] that developmentefforts targeted on the rural sector should
focus on delimited geographicareas of high growth poten-
tial and recognized socio-economicneed where incremental
investments in infrastructure, agriculture and social services
will yield maximum socialand economicbenefits.
[] that development planning within the defined geographic
areas of high growth potential should be integrated, cross-
sectoraland inter-agencyin nature.
[] that project planning and management should be decen-
tralized to the greatest extent possible in order to maxi-
mize participation from all sectors, especiallybeneficiaries,
in the developmentof the area.
The BRBDP development strategy is to build up the physical
infrastructure, improve essential services, land tenure arrangements,
increase agricultural productivity and encourage private investment
in agribusiness and rural-based industries. The strategy also takes in-
to account urban-rural linkages, spatial integration and urban func-
tions supportive of rural development. In operational terms, the stra-
tegy has been to undertake a comprehensive appraisal of Bicol River
Basin resources and how these resourcescan be fully developed. Stu-
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dies and planning to date have addressedthe area's physiography,
weather, land, water, human and institutional resources.To date,
water resourcesand transportation have been the most rigorously
analyzed areas. Private sector investment, social servicesand other
sectors are in the processof being analyzed. From this analysis,
projects are identified and subjectedto feasibility teststo determine
their technical, economic, financial, and social viability. The next
step is to packagethe viable projectsfor external donorsand govern-
ment financing and move into physical implementation at an acceler-
ated pace. The systemsapproachis utilized to interlink multi-sectoral
efforts toward the concentrated delivery of investments into well-
defined "critical areas" with high growth and developmentpotential.
Each program component is seen in terms of its interrelationships
with other programcomponents.
An important element in the development strategyisthe utiliza-
tion of spaceasa venuefor integration. Moreover, the entire program
area has been subdivided into 10 development areas, each charac-
terized by distinct hydrology and physiography, the boundariesof
which were delineated by the extent of major physicalinfrastructure
undertakingscritical to their transformation. These Integrated Devel-
opment Areas (IDA) serveasa basisfor identifying local institutions
for harnessinglocal participation in the development process.Such
institutional integration into the overall program is viewed asa criti-
cal link in making development plans meaningful to the peoplewho
are the ultimate beneficiariesof the BRBDP.
In terms of institutional arrangements,Presidential Decree 926
dated April 26, 1976 establishedthe BRBDP as a national program;
designatedthe Secretary of the Department of Public Works, Trans-
portation and Communication (now the Minister of PublicWorks) as
Cabinet coordinator and strengthenedthe decentralized BRBD Pro-
gram Office. The BRBDP mandate under the Decree is: (a) to inte-
grate national and local government programsand projectswithin its
jurisdiction; and (b) to decentralize the planningand implementation
of rural developmentprojects.
The BRBDP is being implementedthrough:
a) The BRB Coordinating Committee (SRBCC). This isthe sub-
regionalpolicy body. It is composedof 16 Regional Directors
of national line agencies,the Governors, of Camarines Sur,
Albay and Sorsogonand the Program Office Director. The
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BRBCC provides planning and management policies and
servesas forum to resolveproblemsof inter-agencycoordina-
tion. It has Sub-Committees for specific projectsand activi-
ties. The operational strategyis implemented throughthe use
of inter-agency Study/P/anning Groups for project planning
and development and inter-agency Proiect Management
Office for the implementation of multidisciplinary projects.
b) Private Advisory Committee (PAC). This provides guidance
and feedback from the private sector.
c) Area Development Teams (ADT). These are made up of
various line agency personnel operating at the level of the
Integrated Development Areas which are multi-municipality.
They are involved in the planning and implementation of
coordinated line agencyprograms.
d) Area Development Councils. These are made up of the local
political, civic,church and other leaders,businessmenandthe
supervisory level of line agencies.They are headedby elected
local mayors. They formulate policies, determine priorities
and articulate the development needswithin their communi-
ties and largerdevelopment areas.They also provide critical
feedback to the ADTs, provincial government and to the
BRBDP Office.
The BRBDP office which hasa budget of itsown hasthree major
operating departments: ProgramPlanning, ProgramManagement,Ad-
ministration and Finance. This office servesas a coordinating center
for inter-agency planning and management of Bicol •River Basin
Projects. It identifies rural development projects;preparesfeasibility
studies; monitors and evaluates progress and effects of projects;
maintains a feedback system with concerned national agencies;en-
couragesprivate enterprisesand governmentagenciesto developproj-
ects for the Basin;•receivesgrants and donations for the Program;
and callson other government instrumentalitiesfor assistance:
b. An Integrated Development Area of the Bicol River Basin
The Libmanan-CabusaoIntegrated Area Development (LCIAD)
Project of the Bicol River Basin Development ProgramTM is the first
attempt of the BRBDP to extend its development "percepts" to a
specific sub-Basin area. These percepts required a focus on geo-
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graphic areasof high-growthpotential and recognizedsocio-econom-
ic need; integrated, cross-sectoraland inter-agency planning and im-
plementation; and decentralized planning and management in order
to maximize the participation of all sectors in the project, including
local leadersand residents.In addition to the existing and potential
conditions in the areas, LCIAD plannershad specialreasonsfor em-
phasizingthe integratedapproachof the Project.
The Libmanan-Cabusaoarea, the plannersrecalled, had beenad-
versely affected before by unplanned and uncoordinated public and
private investments whose wider impact had not been analyzed.
Among these were the construction of flood control channelsalong
the Bicol River and the increaseduse of irrigation pumps upstream,
These activities put an existing irrigation pump in the Project area
out of operation and increasedsaline intrusion into the rice fields.
Another was the construction of a road through the areawithout the
provisionof adequatecross-channelfacilities.
The componentsof the project are are asfollows:
(a) Physical Component
Construction of irrigation and drainage system to serve
about 4,000 hectares of ricelands;flood control protection
dikes and 48 kilometers of service roads which are also to
serve as farm-to-market roads.There will be four big pumps
to draw irrigation water from the Libmanan River. When
completed, the irrigation system would consistof a 12.6 km.
long main canal and a network of lateral canals, main and
supplementary farm ditches, with the appropriate terminal
structures.
(b) Institutional Development
1) Land reform to shift share tenants to leaseholdand les-
seesto amortizing owners.
2) The irrigation network to serve as a basisfor organizing
farmers for water management purposes.They would be
organized into the following:
a) Rotation Unit (RU). Farmers at and within supple-
mentary ditch level of the irrigation system,cultivat-
ing contiguous irrigated areas of about 10 ha. and
normally also comprisingthe compact farm group of
the SamahangNayon.
b) Rotation Area (RA). Those farmers within the main
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farm ditch levelof the irrigation system.
c) Irrigation District lID). A legal corporate body made
of 15-18 RAs.
d) Irrigators Service Cooperative (iSC). The apex (fede-
rated) Irrigators Association.
The irrigation associationwill gradually take overwa-
ter management,maintenance, fee collection, and amorti-
zation of investments in irrigation facilities within a 3-5
year period.During the first year,theNational IrrigationAd!
!ministration(N IA) would directly administer the facilities
except thoseat the Rotation Area level, but turn overthe
main and lateral facilities during the second,and then let
the cooperative handle the pump facilities as well during
the third.
3) Organization of an Area Development Team and Area De-
velopment Council which would represent six national
line agencies (Irrigation, Agrarian Reform, Agricultural
Extension, Plant Industry, .Local Government and Com-
munity Development and Animal Industry), the munic-
ipal mayors and the BRBDP office itself for project plan-
ning and implementation, popular participation, and
coordination of government efforts in the Project area.
This inter-agency mechanism was to be "permanent, area
specific, decentralized management structure which by
virtue of its authority, present membership and mode of
operation would bring line agencies, local governments,
and residents of the area, working through this manage-
ment system."
4) Lead implementing agency concept with the National
Irrigation Administration (NIA) in direct charge of the
Project Management Office at the site because irrigation
is the largest component of the Project.
(c) Agricultural Development
Applied agricultural research and demonstration to raise
farm productivity.
This LCIAD project was started in mid-1975 to raiserice
production and productivity and thus improve the level and
distribution of income, employment and the quality of life
among the small farmers and other residents of the area.
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April 1978 estimates placedthe project area population at
11,808 (1,968 farm households). The Libmanan-Cabusao
towns used to be a rice-surplus area, the so-called rice bowl of
Bicol but they experienced economic decline due to the
intrusion of salt water into the ricefields. Much of the project
area was rainfed and subject to flooding; a small section had
been irrigated with small private pumps. There were also land
tenure problems then, that despite land reform efforts, may
still be a determinant of significant differentials in farm sizes,
production and income. In addition, internal and external ac-
cess was limited by the lack of feeder roads within the proj-
ect area and of a direct link to the new national highway. A
bridge providing such a link was built over the Libmanan
River only in 1978. Household incomes were low; underem-
ployment and unemployment rates high; yields were low 1.5
metric tons or 30 cav. per hectare and only one crop a year
could be grown. Furthermore, people in the Project Area had
a less optimistic outlook on the quality of their lives than the
Bicol River Basin population as a whole, which otherwise
shared bleak perceptions about food, health, jobs, incomes,
prices, informal group and organizational participation, ac-
cessto social services, position in life.
In its review and assessment of the status of the organiza-
tional, institutional, managerial and agricultural development
components of the project, the 1979 Evaluation Team has
addressed what it sees as two related but somewhat distinct
categories or levels of activities:
The first, to oversimplify,iscomprisedof activitiesdirectedprima-
rily to the establishmentof an effective, institutionalized project man-
agement capability; the second,the establishmentof an equallyeffec-
tive operational capability. The institutionalmechanianof the first is
the BRBCC/BRBDPO/NIA/PMO/ADT/ADC/ADCC* Complex; of the
second,the IrrigatorsAssociationwith RotationalUnits and Rotational
Areas,andthe SamahangNayonsubdividedinto compactfarms.
As the Project progressed,certainchangesor mutationsof the mo-
del took place. NIA as the leadand executingagencywithdrew man-
agementand implementationauthority from their regionaldirector in
favor of the NIA Office of SpecialProjects(NIA/OSP) at the national
level. Accordingto Honadle, this makesthe LCIAD a "national" proj*
ect within a localarea.The ADCC isa mechanismusedby NIA/OSP to
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coordinate the efforts of other agencies. It was established asan adjunct
to the PMO as a means of strengthening the accessof the Project Man-
ager, as ADCCchairman to the resources of ADT/ADC for utilization
in this particular project. Senior line-agency personnel, most serving
also on ADT/ADC, comprise the membership of ADCC, with the Head
of PMO's Institutional and Agricultural Division as acting chairman. In
this alignment, ADCC is designated the Composite Management Group
for the institutional/extension component of the project . . . The eva-
luation team shared the concerns expressed in prior evaluations, i.e.,
that NIA through its PMO/ADCC structure was working in parallel but
uncoordinated (and by implication, duplicative and inefficient) fashion
with (and in a sense,against the ADT/ADC) on the institutional devel.
opment aspects of the project. The ADCC exists; so, too, does the
ADT/ADC. Here was apparent evidence of what these evaluators saw as
a struggle between BRBDP forces, wtih their structural model, and the
forces of NIA, seeking to install its institutionalized model and thereby
gain greater control of project administration.
An encouraging development is the obvious awareness that success-
ful operation of the irrigation system depends not only on the engineer-
ing/construction components but also upon the completion of the insti-
tutional component and this is now given a much higher priority than
formerly on NIA's agenda. A policy decision has been taken by NIA/
OSP to fully test in LCIAD the feasibility of farmer ownership and
management.
Presumably as a further step in this direction, the NIA contracted
with the Economic Development Foundation (EDF) in September
1977 to take responsibility for (a) the organization of farmers, through
a series of subordinate groups into an irrigators association and (b) the
design and preparation of training modules for training of and use by
inter-agency extension personnel. The staff of the Asian Institute of
Management are participating in this effort to develop case study ma-
terials. All these plus the establishment of the Irrigator's Assistance
Department represent a relatively new commitment by N IA to prepare
to deal adequately with the institutional elements of its major projects
with Libmanan given high priority.
• On the organization of farmers groups, the 1979 Evaluation report
points to-the '_somewhat confusing organizational alignments" and
wonders what significance they have to the degree of attainment of
project purpose. For example, the Sarnahang Nayon system is organized
on a barrio boundary basiswhereas the irrigators groups are determined
• solely by irrigated areas - multiples or •portions of barrios. Given the
fragmentation of farmers' holdings, and the numerous and changing
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tenurial and operatingarrangements,a farmer can belongto morethan
one Rotation Area, compactfarm groupor SamahangNayon. But even
of greater significanceis the observationonthe existenceof quite large
landholdingsmaintained by a number of farmers in the projectarea.
Certain namesappearrepeatedly:hereasRotation Area (RA) Leader;
there as RA Secretary-Treasurer;againasboth andasthe only member
of one 32 ha.and another42 ha. Rotation Area. A three-memberRA
hasan averageholdingof 13 ha.with its RA Leaderalsolistedasleader
of a 13-member,41 ha. RA. Two adjacentRAswith a combinedtotal
of 106 ha. and 12m_mbers (averageholding8.8 ha.) are headedby the
sameLeaderand_ecretary-Treasurer,with the latter holdingthe same
post in two other RAs; thesewith a total of 67 ha. andfive members.
C. General Observations, Issues and Partial Assessments of
BRSDP
(1) The BRBDP is the development consultant's paradise, It
has all the classicial problems of development and, cor-
respondingly, all the modern, technocratic ideal-type re-
sponse to such problems. Relevant studies started asearly
as 1970. These studies include everything from Compre-
hensive Water Resources Development, salinity intrusion,
Computerized System for Feasible Agribusiness Develop-
ment Population Projections, international and National
Trends in Rice, computer simulation models, mathema-
tical model in flood control, intermodel transport study,
coastal engineering, health and nutrition, schistosomiasis,
biological impact of projects, watershed development,
ecological inventory, management information systems,
project feasibility tests, socio-economic profiles, social
soundness analysis, a Social Survey Research Unit which
served as the "voice of the people," and even studies on
what Bicolanos are happy or unhappy about. Perhaps it is
no exaggeration to say that the BRBDP is the most stu-
died, feasibility-tested and evaluated rural development
program in the country. Needless to say, this meant subs-
tantial inputs of high-level short term expertise in the
technical, managerial and social science fields, both inter-
national and domestic. Every consultant and every
evaluation report calls for even more expertise and makes
a case for more data. After a while, the absorption and
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utilization of such reports becomesa bottleneck for it
takes an expert to read, let alone evaluate, the expert's
report andthe wisdom of hisexpertise.
(2) There is a ComprehensiveFramework Planand eachpro-
gram component is seenin terms of its interrelationship
with other program components.The 1979 Bicol Biennial
Evaluation Team pointed to the success of the project
packaging system which includes: Proiect identification;
project development through feasibility analysis; project
promotion for funding, and project execution, including
construction and implementation. As their Report cited:
"the present system of articulating a set of related activi-
ties in an area, packaging them into a single proposal and
coordinating implementation activities had been success_
ful, in that projects have been funded and are underway
and others are proceeding to the stage where donors can
be engaged."is This seemsto be the most positiveaspect
of the entire exercise and could not be underestimated.
(3) The BRBDP isa combination of centralauthority by way
of a Cabinet GODFATHER (The Minister of Public
Works is the Cabinet Coordinator for the Program); re-
gionalcoordination through the Bicol River BasinCoordi-
•nating Council, local participation and foreign assistance.
When program participants were asked what advantages
accrue to the BRBDP as an integrated area development
(lAD) approach, their answerscenteredon the following:
a) Greater visibility and more pressurein favor of the
Program at the national level. In other words, the
BRBDP is perceivedasa "lobby" for the River Basin.
b) Innovativenessof the lAD. In mod language,it isthe
"in" thing in rural development nowadaysand there-
fore, attracts more attention from funding sources,
both foreign and local than the traditional sectoral
projects. For somereason,the "new" whether new or
renewed is more bankable than the "old" until the
new also becomesold and newer approachesare con-
ceived.
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C) Regional and local participation in the planning and
project identification process. Whether this can be
regarded as enough of "people participation" is an-
other matter• Lynch et al points out that the princi-
pal vehicle for people's participation is the Area De-
velopment Council (ADC) which is designed asan in-
ter-municipality institution that will "maximize and
facilitate popular participation in development plan-
ning and in evaluation of project implementation".
On this, the following comments have been made:
• . . we discoverthat "popular" refersdirectly to the incum-
bent headsof local political units andcurrent leadersof local
organizations;throughthem, the developmentprojectswill be
made meaningfulto the people who are the ultimate benefi-
ciaries of the BRBDP . . . the planning to be done by this
elite group•(the ADC) turns out to be policy-making and
evaluation.Planningisplacedin the handsof technicians,both
local, provincialand Basinwide.The situation is further con-
founded by the assumptionthat the (predictableupperclass)
membershipof the ADC will know the generalpublic's needs
and interestsbecausethey are drawn from various"callings".
This assumptionis exactly the opposite of the principle.. •
that "It is prudent (if impolite) to start project planningwith
the reversible assumptionthat the people's representativesare
unrepresentative.'16
(4) A very crucial organizational issue is whether the BRBDP
Office should be institutionalized into permanence. There
are at least four views regarding this matter, viz.
a) That the Program Office should be a temporary struct-
ure which should gradually phase out after compre-
hensive planning, project identification and feasibility
studies have been accomplished, that monitoring and
evaluation procedures have been instituted and inter-
agency collaboration has become a way of life, so to
speak among the agencies concerned. Project imple-
mentation and eventual operation should be left with
the respective line agencies and intended userssuch as
irrigation associations. Staff-members who have ac-
quired skills and expertise in all these taks could be
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absorbed as a unit in the Regional Development
Council (which exists anyway) or could be distri-
buted to the pertinent line agencies.The functions
have to continue but not necessarilyas the BRBDP
Office because these may be carried out in some
other manner. In other words, the integrative process
needs to be institutionalized, but not necessarilythe
"integrating office". It has been said that "the best
type of interdisciplinary thinking is one that takes
place in the same skull". The same thing might be
said of inter-agency, inter-sectoraland multi-sectoral
collaboration. The ultimate objective of the BRBDP
should be to develop an inter-sectoral mentality
among the line agenciesso that "integration" be-
comes part of everyday behavior. If this succeeds,the
lAD lead agency concept in project implementation
would not differ very much from the project imple-
mentation of a line agency which practices inter-
agencythinking.
b) That the BRBDP Office should be a permanent
structure at the moment, it hasits own solid concrete
building). In fact, it should be expanded to incorpo-
rate into its ranks someof the current personnelwho
are on contractual hire for specialprojects.Sincethis
restructuring is being initiated from the Office of the
Cabinet Coordinator at the national level, it could be
perceived as a recentra//zation rather than a decentra-
//zat/on process and this initiative could be inter-
preted as a takeover from the top rather than ascoor-
dinative or integrative at the regionalor Basin level.
The description mentioned earlier about being "a na-
t/ona/project at the/oca//eve/" might be a more ac-
curate picture. One likely outcome of an expanded
permanent structure is that BRBDP would be treated
asanother line agency,a compet/ng not an integrating
one, with vested interestsand a rationale for contin-
ued existence for its own sake. Given a permanent
structure, the temptation to move into actual project
implementation (which is the function of line agen-
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cies) "to get into the action" would be very great
indeed, The pressurefor this will increaseparticularly
when projects become problematic and BRBDP is
"placed on the hot seat". It is far easierto integrate
comprehensiveplanning, feasibility testing, etc., but
integration in project implementation and post opera-
tions where commitments of material and human
resource inputs are required to get a job done and
servicesand provided is somethingelse.The demands
from each agency, whether supplementary, comple-
mentary, collaborative or simultaneousare quite subs-
tantial. As a numberof officials haveremarked: "The
staff of the line agenciesare terribly stretched right
now because of project demands elsewhere in the
country." In the face of criticism for delayed or poor
quality performance, the BRBDP could conceivably
find it expedient to become directly involved in ma-
jor project implementation usingtheir own staff who
will be directly under the control of the ProgramOf-
fice. If this happens, then it becomesanother agency
whose activities need to be integrated with those of
other agencies. The problem arena for integration
therefore expands becausethe "integrator" hasto be
"integrated".
c) That contractual services be hired for the specific
functions being performed by the Program Office.
In this case,no one is permanently hired but perhaps
itsgreatestdisadvantagesliesin the fact that no one is
continuously held responsibleafter the contract pe-
riod expiresand the specifictask hasbeen completed.
Furthermore, someoneneedsto define the task or the
job to be done and to evaluate its worth. This takes
some expertise. Dependingupon who the contractor
is, learning about the project and its complexities
could be an onerous burden each time. There is too
much of the "flying in the flying out" type of techni-
cal assistance.
That technical and planning capabilitiesin the re-
gional colleges, universities, and development agen-
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cies be built, Because of their educational function, in-
vestment in academia offers the possibility of "repro-
ducing"_ multiplying or spreading the capabi[ity. On
the other hand, the staff of line agencies are engaged
in training and service delivery functions and they
could be brought into this scheme both as trainors
and trainees. Their advantage is being on-site and
could be residents or natives of the region. The
BRBDP has just started to tap this potential for a
more enduring resource within the region.
(5) The 1979 Evaluation of the Bicol Secondary and Feeder
Roads Project has the following observations with respect
to employment generation and benefits from the road
system:
a) The Projectwas highly optimistic in their estimatesof the lo-
cal employment impactof the project.It obviouslysawthisas
a labor-intensiveproject. However,all but 2 of the 25 con-
• tractorsare Manila-based,mostwith ampteheavyconstruction
equipment. When interviewed by the EvaluationTeam, they
acknowledgedthat they did not considertheseprojectsto be
labor-intensive.And, though consideredby the Government,
labor intensivemethods for this Project were rejectedas im-
practicalfor reasonsof cost,time andmanagement.
It would be fair to say that the 1,550 employeesnoted
for the •month of June will be the "peak". Factoringin the
rainy season,1,000 employeesper month averageis a con-
servative statement of averageemployment through 1980.
Employment was considerablylessfor 1978 and will be less
for 1981. Thus, the 4-year averagewould run closer to 700
employeesthan the 2,500 projected- the ProjectPaper.This
relatesto a total of 2,800 vs. 7,500 (3 years)asestimated in
the Project Paper. Again it would be fair to assumethat the
total averagelocal hire will be closeto 2/3 of the total. Thus
the total man yearsof local employment would be 1867 or
about 21% of the 9,000 man yearsestimated in the Project
Paper.
b) Thoughthe project is still far from complete,thereare indica-
tions that the rural poor in the zonesof influenceof the roads
will receivesignificantbenefitsfrom the project. In the small
barrio of BaliwagViejo at the end of the partly completed
and already useablePili-Mataorocsecondaryroad, the 3-hour
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walk (no road connectionexistedbefore} has been reduced
to 15-minute tricycle or jeepncy ride at a cost of P1.50
per passenger.A very substantialtraffic of about 50 tricycles
and 50 jeepneys per day has been generatedon this road.
Transport costs for shippinga sack of rice to the market
place have dropped from 1_3.00 per sack (by animal and
boat) to 1_1.50per sackby vehicle.Also,on the almostcom-
pletad San Isidro-Libmanan secondaryroad, the generated
traffic in jeepneysand mini-buseshas exceededthe original
estimatesand suggestsa substantialincrease in mobility of
the low.income categoryof the population. Confirmationof
these favorable trends will, however,have to wait for com-
pletion of the post-projectPanelandTraffic surveys.
c) Assuringadequatemaintenanceof the projectroads,however,
will be a most difficult 9oalto achieve.In general,noneof the
existing roads in the project area shows signsof preventive
maintenanceand very little of periodicmaintenance.Current
attitudes and practicesare to rehabilitate road sectionsonTy
after they have deteriorated to an almost impassablecondi-
tion. Maintenanceoperationsare small-scaleand widely scat-
teredandare inherentlydifficult to manage.
d) A more positiveassessmentof the employmentaspectwasob-
servedin the irrigationsystemconstruct. _.The 1979 Evalua-
tion of the Libmanan-CabuseolAD project reportsthe fol-
lowing:
The farm ditchesand drainsan some of the smaller la-
terals are being satisfactorilyconstructed by labor-intensive
"pakyao" contractsfor specificamount for work in specified
time.., One problem in the pastwasthat of laborersquitting
their jobs, probablystemmed from the practiceof contracting
for 'pakyao' labor with a labor contractor. In an unknown
numberof cases,the contractor reportedlykept a dispropor-
tionately largeshareof the contract paymentfor himself...
It is understoodthat attemptsare nowbeingmadeto contract
for labor with the local farmerscooperatives,and emerging
irrigatorsassociationgroups.
(6) In reading the volumes of documents of BRBDP, certain
problems are repeatedly mentioned s0ch as: difficulties
of coordination and getting cooperation and commitment
from other agencies; organizational redundancy; "pro-
jects may have been unnecessarily sophisticated"; "one
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should not overload projects with excess institutional
baggage". An Evaluation Report recommends that:
new componentprojectsshouldbedesignedandexistingplans
reviewedin accordancewith the principleof providingprojects
with the leastdisturbancetothe physical-social-economicenvi-
ronment in place. In construction, this means investigating
projectswith lower capital-intensity. In institutionaldesign,
this meansbuilding on the strengthof existingorganizations
•.. ratherthan replacingthem with fashionable,but unproven
systemsimportedfrom Manilaor other countries.
This recommendation underscores the relationship
between the Sophistication of the irrigation engineering
design and the complexity of the institutional design
•needed to operate and manage the system. However, one
cannot assume that existing organizations are effective or
that people have the traditional experience from which
they would know how to deal with the new infrastruct-
ures. For farmers who have never had irrigation, they
have no institutional experience to call upon.
(7) The BRBDP was created as an institutional mechanism to
facilitate improvement of socio-economic conditions in
the Bicol Region. It is not and shou/d not be an end in
itself/Therefore, even with an excellent report on the or-
ganizational structure and its concepts, the question
which remains is: To what •extent have the target benefi-
ciaries actually benefited? As the 1977 Evaluation Report
emphasized, the benefits are yet to come in the future.
The high growth potential is still a promise which remains
to be fulfilled. Thus far, the activities of BRBDP have
been largely technocratic and immediate benefits have
come by way of technical experts, professionals and aca-
demics. There is nothing inherently wrong in this state
of affairs provided that the outputs eventually translate
into projects which in turn affect the lives of River Basin
Bicolanos, even if much later. Right now, benefits to tar*
get beneficiaries are largely being awaited, except for
some roads which are already in place as mentioned
earlier.
The most immediate, visible and tangible outputs are
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blems be solved,but, even then, solutiona themselvescause
17
problems...
Although this is an organizational expert's bias, it is
particularly apropos to be reminded at this point that
I RD came as a reaction or a "solution" to the weak-
nesses of so-called narrow specialized programs. The I RD
so/ution, however, carried its own package of problems
which also require its own "integrated" solutions. Ironing
out these complexities takes time and a great deal of
expertise and has been referred to by some Bicolanos
as "propensity of bureaucrats to plan forever and never
to act". 18
An interesting question which has been raised in view
of people's expectations is: "When do you let them know
that some sort of project is in the works which would
affect them and their area? In the planning, before finan-
cing has been secured or when the project is already a
sure thing? Or later, when funding is solid, but planning
is finished." As one observer remarked: "This has be-
come an issue at the BASIN which wants to give the im-
pression that it is doing something and therefore tends to
overstate its accomplishments. At the same time; field
personnel must deal with increasingly frustrated and dis-
appointed farmers". At any rate, people seem to be either
pathologically patient or unbelieving. The earlier question
raised about when the Program should let people know,
finds a ready answer from advocates of people-centered
assistance programs:
in the wordsof the AID Handbook3, Part I Appendix5A
(1975), social soundnessdemandsthat participation of the
poor in the developmentprocessshouldmeannot only sharing
the economicbenefitsand contribution of resourcesbut also
involvementin the processof problemidentificationandsolu-
tion, sub,projectselectionanddesignimplementationand eva-
luation.
The remaining$64 question, however, Is: How do we
bringabout that kind of participation?
One concrete evidence of the Bicolano's patience and
faith in the long delayed project which was supposed to
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be completed in 1978 but was not in the following
inscription on a monument in front of the Libmanan
•Municipal Hall which has enshrined a piece of irrigation
pipe:
I believethat soonfrom seeminglyInsignificantstructures
like this shall flow the water that will quenchthe thirst of our
parchedlendsand make Libmananoncemorethe ricegranary
of the Bicolregion.
JoseM. Balaong,M.D.
MunicipalMayor
November29, 1978
By August, 1980, the irrigation system was inaugu-
rated by the Minister of Public Works and the Admin-
istration. Two days after the inauguration, part of the
concrete lining of the main canal collapsed rendering the
system non-functional until repairs have been made. Af-
ter five years of waiting, people will have to wait even
more before they benefit from an integrated project
which has been studied, planned, funded, managed,
decentralized, trained for, evaluated, talked about,
w_itten about and from the point of view Of intended
recipients - something which they will continue to only
dream about.
In fairness to the Project implementors, we cite one
evaluator's prognosis:
The scale and nature of systemfacilities at Libmanan
are sufficientlycomplex to challengethe managerialexpertise
evenof an experiencedoperationandmaintenancebrigade...
Whatever approach is adoptedfor carrying out 0 and M of
the irrigation project, it can be predicted that the systemas
a whole has a delicate balance poirrbibetweenirrigation ef-
feets and drainageeffects further compoundedby potential
floodingeffects.2
o
(9) The most cavalier assessment of the BRBDP comes from
an early architect of the Program who says that
The concept of integrated area development _ been
talked and written about, and was put to trial in Bkml. The
BRBDP is operational; it is gettingattention all around; and
it isdrawingin resourcesfor ruraldevelopment.21
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No one can argueabout this. There are volumesof re-
ports; lots of pressreleases;activities literally on the ground
•andamplefundsfrom foreignaswell asdomesticsources,
(10) As far as marginal farmers, kaingeros s and the rural poor
are concerned, the most significant although not the most
sophisticatedly designed, not the most heralded and cer-
tainly not the most dramatically visible projects are those
which focus on agro-forestation, watershed protection,
and upland development. Activities along these lines do
not have a neat pre-designed blueprint but follow a gene-
ral strategy of tailoring the specifics of each upland situa-
tion under Consideration. Perhaps this is one of the most
positive harvests from the integrated area development
approach. For example, it was pointed out that:
Landtenureproblemswould haveto be addresseddirectly
by the Philippine governmentin a manner that would fore-
stalldisplacementof tenantsasa result of projectactivitiesin
the Bic01. The rationale behind this position was that if te-
nantsare displaced,there would be a tendency for thesedis-
placed personsto movehigherup the mountain sideto slash
and burn whatever remaining forests still exist. Watershed
improvementson the lower slopeswould b_"cancelledout
by newdestructionon the higherslopes.
Among the activities in Buhi and similar areas are the
following:
a) Organizing a promotional committee, a local •
group• composed of the Municipal Development
Officer, the Parish Priest, the St. Bri_lget School
representative, 2 Barangay Captains, one baran-
gay school head teacher, and the Deputy Project
Manager. The committee will address the issue
of land tenure and other policy issues that may
come up from time to time.• Members were
brought to the project site and briefed on objec-
tives, the problems being encountered in imple-
mentation. Farmer leaders and farmer coope-
rators were among the resource persons. On the
question of whether they would be advisory or
implementing in their function, there was a con-
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sensus that "the committee would most likely
have to write its own terms of reference. It was
further recognized that the formation and the
activities of the committee represent a new and
untried initiative and that it would be up to the
committee tp decide how they could plan and
contribute their inputs in order that project im-
plementation would be promoted. The committee
agreed that their first task will be to advise the
community at large on what the project is all
about, and secure community cooperation and
involvement".
b) Demonstrating vegetative terracing, the planting
of vegetative barriers on horizontal contours
acrossmountain slopesin order to reduceerosion
and help convert otherwise unproductive moun-
tain sides into useful and productive land. The
are selectedfor this purpose is a denudedhillside
overgrown with cogon and talahib and having
slopesrangingbetween 30 and 100 percent.
c) Assessingwhat types of vegetativecontrols could
help reduce the risk of erosion on the highbanks
of the main Libmanan canal that carries water
to the irrigated area; surveying indigenousplants
in the area that could be introduced on the canal
banksto help hold the soil in place.
d) Observing Augustinian sisters, upland resettle-
ment scheme for the Agta tribal minorities and
their orphanage for Agta children where raising
cattle, goats, pigs, rabbits, chickens, geese, and
ducks is done on a cut-and-carry method of
feeding. The plan is to bring Buhi project staff
and some farmer cooperators to the orphanage
to observe the animal husbandry methods the
Sistersare using.
e) Developing fallow kaingins in the catchment
area by talahib and cogon control; preservation
of fuel tree species; interplanting of ipil-ipil
among existing trees; seedling nursery work;
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food production in areas of vegetable terraces;
reforestation for the dendrothermal plantation;
preventing further siltation of river so there will
be enoughwater for mini-hydros.
f) Planting of lumber species.
g) Encouraging the organized buying of ipil-ipil
leaves.
h) Studying the possibility of building accessroad
into proposed dendro-thermal plant by labor-
intensivemethods to employ a lot of people.
i) Developing mini-hydro power as a measure to
create local funding source of finance upland
development, an idea which was accepted by
the Bicol River Basin Program. The Bureau of
Forest Development's (BFD) forestry extension
capabilities will be tapped to rehabilitate and
preserve the watershed. Day-to-day project
implementation decisionswill be entrusted to a
project management group hired by BFD from
within the community.
j) Providing watershed occupants with training
seminars which include such subjectsas coopera-
tion, organization to address community pro-
blems, upland agricultural technology and lec-
tures designedto help each participant recognize
his potentials, increaseself-respect,and stimulate
concern for his neighbors and the community.
Participants organizedthemselvesinto Uplanders'
Associations.
k) Developinga seed farm to produce local supplies
of leguminouscovercropseedssothat thre will be
a local seed source. Legumesare important for
restoring fertility on degraded watershed lands
and helping eliminate cogon. Covercropseedpro-
duction may be a profitable enterprise for water-
shed farmers, giving them income while simulta-
neously restoring fertility to degradedlands. Lo-
cal farmers can also be paid to harvestcovercrop
seeds and keep the money in the community
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rather than buy from an outside source.A project
cooperator will lend free of chargea cogonalarea
for seedproduction.
I) Encouraging farmers to grow permanent crops.
Seedlingdispersalhastaken placeamongfarmers.
m) Concern for the larger population and environ-
mental issuesastheserelate to activitiesof upland
communities. The viability and sustainability of
lowland agriculture, irrigation system, hydro-
electric power dams and many other infrastruct-
ure investments are being threatened by rapid
denudation caused by kaingin farming. All these
conclusions are relevant in the context of on-
goingactivities in the Bicol River Basin.22
Several pageshad been devoted to the upland devel-
opment component of the BRBDP becausei_tillustrates
the meaning of integration in a problem-oriented func-
tional, situational, operational man'ner rather than in a
development management perspective. Among its many
attractive elementsare:
a) Thinking small and acting immediately if such
were possibleafter yearsof environmentalabuse;
b) Developing local capability to manage their own
projectsand organizingthemselves;
c) Respondingto marginal and problematic upland
situations in an opportunistic manner with
respect to bringing to bear on specific problems
the experiences gained elsewhere regarding
the treatment of comparable conditions of
denudation, watershederosion,etc., accompanied
by the need for food production, livelihood, as
well asfuel and energy.
d) Experimental in outlook because many of the
lessonson how to do it are yet to be learned.
e) Using indigenoustechnology and local manpower
wheneverpossibleto generatelocal employment.
f) By the very nature of the problems dealt with,
upland development activities are rehabilitative
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rather than ground- breaking like irrigation,
road-building etc.; preventive of further destruc-
tion and hopefully productive. Some activities
are of immediate benefit to target groups;others
of medium-term, and still some are of long range
significancelike the plantingof timber species.
g) There are no complex, elaborate studies before
anything getsdone, hence, many little bitsget on
the ground, by the locals.
h) Finally, upland development activities do not
suffer from overdesign and overplanning. They
start from field on-site diagnosis rather than from
a pre-determined blueprint. There are no big
promises; only small experimental steps to test
what would work in particular circumstances,
both in terms of the physical environment and
the human resource capability.
(11) In an integrated area development approach, the social
component acquires (at least in the rhetoric) a promi-
nence which is often lamented as absent or lacking in
single sector projects. At the moment, however, all
development projects; whether lAD or not, have a "re-
quired" social soundnessanalysis of some kindl Some-
times the pendulum swings too much to this side and a
balancing act has to be provided with rigorous technical
and environmental soundness analysis particularly for the
major •infrastructure projects. Social soundness must not
assumetechnical soundness.What isneeded isan iterative
process between physical planning experts and social
soundess analysts through the project development
process. Considering the original concept of a physical
•river basin and al! the ramifications in terms of irrigation,
flood • control, watershed management, salinity, soil ero-
sion and production possibilities, if the technical assump-
tions are faulty and technical expectations fail to mate-
rialize, the most elaborate institutional arrangements can
neither substitute nor make-up for the defects, and
social benefits would not be forthcoming.• As a matter
of fact, the net effect could be regressiveand destructive.
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An illustration of the physical balancing act (literally
speaking) in Libmanan-Cabusao is the June 1979 report
on the cut and cover portion of the construction:
Due to the start of the rainy seasonduring the middleof
this reporting period, scheduleof work wasshutdown ranging
from half day to two days and construction activities along
the cut and cover has taken the appearance of a rac_ It's a
race between excavation pretest /eying and _e side hi/Is
sliding down on the excavatedarea or on newly laid/or joined
precast.23
Sometimes lAD focuses too much on intersectoral
and inter-agency collaboration and perhaps intrasectoral
integration is taken for granted,
The 1981 Impact Evaluation of the Bicol River Basin
Development Program makes a very candid observation
regarding integration:
Coordination, rather than integration, is very marked in
terms of theprocessof Bicol Program implementation. CoordF
nation is achievedespeciallyat the regionaland district level
through the Bicol River Basin CoordinatingCouncil andthe
Area DevelopmentTeams. Integration,to be sure,is a relative
and elusiveconcept.For example, in the Bulaarea,wherethe
largest number of sectoralconcernshave been "integrated",
the project faces the greatestdifficulties. Instructionswere
issuedrecently to the Bula Project Office to focusprimary
attention on completionof the main irrigationinfrastructure,
postponing"integration" to the future.
... This suggeststhat integration isprobably more useful
as a planning device _an as an implementing procedure, In
planning, one can phasevariousinterventionsin accordance
with timelinessand administrative capacity to implement.
We suspect that "integrated implementation" is a larger bite
than most systemscan chew. Its difficultiesare illustratedby
BRBDP's practiceof payingspecial"incentive allowances"to
all who are detailed to cooperatewith other line agencieson
an integratedbasis.., a ratherdiscouragingphenomenon....
Another very important feature of BRBDP as an in-
tegrated area development model is the BRBDP Office
which in 1981 has a budget of #9 million with a 421-
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member staff (1.65 in the program staff and 256 in the
project staff). This constitutes "a high overhead cost even
for an integrated area development program, the size of
the Bicol River Basin undertaking. ''24 Perhaps this 'is
B R BDP's most successful employment-generation project.
4. Sub-Provincial Area Integrated Rural and Agricultural Devel-
opment (AIRAD)
After the Bicol River Basin Development Program got underway,
the University of the Philippinesat Los Ba6os initiated in 1977 a
sub-provincial area integrated rural and agricultural development pi-
lot project in cooperation with Quezon Province. The Tayabas Bay
Coast which includes the municipalities of Pagbilao, Padre Burgos,
Agdangan and Unisan with a population of 66,757 and a land area of
40,000 hectares was chosen for this exercise. Unlike the BRBDP, this
project covers a much smaller area and appears to be much less com-
plex. Its basic feature is the Framework Plan which offers:
an approachto a comprehensiveanalysisof the _reasituation. It views
the area as a unit of human settlement and examinesit in terms of its
spatial and resourcecharacteristics, its production system and produc_
tivity, its physical infrastructure and transport system, its ecosystem,
its socialand economicresourcemanagementand itseducationandtraining
statusand requirements.Themajor directions - are spelledout intermsof
objectives,targets and strategiesThese objectivesand strategiesare trans-
lated into generalprogramsand projectswhich are groupedon the basisof
their manifestedrelationshipand complementarity.. , it also providesa
section that specified the estimated requirements of the total AIRAD
program as well as the requirementsof eachcomponent. It alsoidentifies
the possiblesourcesof resourcesor inputsto carry out the program,Cate-
goriesof input sourcesare the local, the provincialand nationallineagency
and the UPLB directedAIRAD programstaff.
The document further describes the rationale and general ap-
proach as follows:
The integratedapproachto rural and agriculturaldevelopmentisbased
on the observationthat the problemsof development in a givenarea are
interrelated and not isolated from each'other. Being interrelated, solving
theseproblemsseparate|yor in isolationfrom eachother leadsto segmented
and unrelated efforts and minimal improvement. The other extreme is to
tackle those problems comprehensivelywhich is extremely expensive,
wasteful,andundesirable.
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The intagratedapproachviewsdevelopmentholistically but recognizes
the fact that In the interrelatednessof thoseproblemsin a givenarea,soma
are more basicand strategicthanothers.Therefore, the integratedruraland
agriculturaldevelopmentapproachnot only bringstogetherrelated inputs
or solutionsto rural andagriculturaldeveloPmentproblemsbut alsoapplies
them in the right proportion and in time sequence.This cannot be done
without an instrumentthat would showthe relationshipsof the problems
to be solved and the strategicsequencein which these problemscould be
solved,The Framework Plan isthat instrument
It providesan analysisof the potentialsand problemsin the area,spells
out the direction in which the problemswould be solvedand potentials
developed,and it linesup the programof solvingtheseproblemsanddevel-
oping potentials. Furthermore, it providesa guideon howthese problems
and projectscould be implemented/workedout, throughinter-agencyand
people'sparticipation in their right relationshipsand timing. The Frame-
work Plan is the overallguideof action by the different agenciesand people
who will be involvedin the overalldevelopmenteffort in the area..,
This Framework Plan for the First QuezonArea IntegratedRuraland
AgriculturalDevelopmentwasformulatedwith the following viewsin mind:
It must be implementable;technicallysoundandeconomicallyfeasible;
must meet the needsof the peoplein the area;must be acceptableto and
command support from implementingagencies;must be consistentwith
national,regional,andprovincialpolicies.
To achievethesevalues,a combinationof technocraticand democratic
approacheswas used. This combination is referred to asthe Technocratic-
Democratic Mix (T-D Mix). The T.D Mix approach involvesa technical
planninggroupthat providesthe technicalsubstanceof the plan, the parti-
cipation of the people in the area, the implementingsectors,,and the deci-
sion-makers.To make the participation of these different interestgroups
meaningfuland effective, they were not involvedthroughout the planning
work but during appropriate phasesof the planning process.The major
stepsin the planningprocessare:
1) Preparation for the Planning Workshop (data gatheringand devel-
opmentof areaprofile).
2) Planning Exercise Workshop to producethe FrameworkPlan.
3) Cros_sectoralPlanning Review by all appropriategovernmentand
privatesectors.
4) Horizontal and vertical consultation to complete the democratiza-
tion element in the planning processand to achievean overall
technical consistencyof the entire Framework Plan.This will be
participated in by representativeleadersfrom the area, officials
from the regionaland central office of NEDA (National Economic
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and Development Authority) and selectednational agenciesand
the lineagenciesandprivatesectorsin the province.
5) Legitimation Process- Submit the AreaFrameworkPlanto appro-
priatebodiesfor acceptanceandsupport.
The integratingthrust of the program is the improved capability and
well-being of people in the area via training and education, incre_ed pro-
duction an productivity, increasedincome, andeffective delivery of social
service¢ An integration map providesa common referencepoint of all con-
¢erned (Figure 6.1). This "map" indicatesthe Factorsof Integrationwhich
includeone (1) pointsof integration,(2) the integrationinstruments,(3) the
identified integrators.The Levelsof Integrationindicatewhere integration
is to take place,what integrationinstrumentsmay be usedandwho would
be the integrators.25
Some observations on AIRAD include:
1, In many ways, this sub.provincial project is a form of domes-
tic technical assistance with UPLB assuming the lead agency
role as explicitly stated in the integration.map. The Chancel-
lor of UPLB is a co-integrator at the highest level with the
Governor of Quezon.
2. The Framework Plan makes no great claims to community
and people participation and relies heavily on the technical
planning group in a so-called Technocratic-Democratic Mix. _
Participation of interest groups is provided during appro-
priate phases of the planning process. Perhaps this is a more
honest and a more realistic view than what much of the
rhetoric on participation calls for.
3, AIRAD has a training and education priority in its approach
as indicated in the integrating thrust of the program. "Peo-
ple's Capability and Well_Being Development is directly
influenced by (1) Training and Education, (2) Increased Pro.
duction and Productivity, (3) Increased Income, and (4) Ef.
fective Delivery of Social Services. All these four are inter-
related. Training infuences increasing production/produc-
tivity. Increasing production is one way of increasing income
and increased income contributes to more efficient social
services and vice versa" (underscoring supplied).
This observation is not a criticism but an acknowledgment that
perceptions of solutions to development problems are very much
influenced by the repertoire of skills, resources and experiences
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which the technical assistance agency possesses.Training and educa-
tion is also a virtuous priority approach because it can be scaled up
or down depending upon available resources and client response. But
more than that, training is more readily implementable than other
projects although its impact may not be as easily captured. Training
enables any Program to get underway immediately and gives parti-
cipants a sense that something is happening or is going to happen.
However, these "virtues" can become "drawbacks" when training is
overdone or is used as a "substitute" for something else which is
di.fficult or expensive to do such an infrastructure, credit, agency
reorganization, price policy, etc.
4. Although the Quezon AIRAD does not have a Program
Office like what the BRBDP has, UPLB plays a parallel
role in providing the technical planning expertise, essen-
tially as an "outsider" but exercising considerable influence
in program directions and in high-level decision-making.
5. The program has no specific rural poverty-oriented mandate
and although "meeting the needs of people in the area" is
one of the values in mind in the formulation of the Frame-
work Plan, thetechnocratic approach to situational analysis
is relied upon and not the "felt needs" approach. Again,
there is no criticism implied. This is simply a recognition of
the 0ominant program features which arise from the Frame-
work Plan as the integrating instrument.
5. Unified Training and Area Isolate Development (AID) 26
It has been said that the problems which have beset the effective
implementation of rural development programs have been related
principally with:
.... the difficultiesof achievingcomplementarityand harmony in the
operational activitiesof the variousagenciesinvolved in the conduct of
action programsin the ruralareas.As a result,agencyeffortsandresources
have been lessefficiently utilized while the developmentgoalshave also
been lesseffectively achieved. Effectivenessin achievingnationaldevelop-
ment goalsin the rural sectoris the concernof the ruraldevelopmentagen-
cies and institutions. It requiresa closer collaboration at the agencyor
institutional levelanda more deliberatecomplementationof programsand
projectsat the field level. The needto developmoreeffectivemulti-agency
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collaboration,strongercommuriity involvement,and morefunctional pro-
gram complementationat the field level led to the formal establishmentof
the PhilippineTraining'Centersfor Rural Development(PTC-RD) on May
30, 1977.
The PTC-FID has 5 major features, namely:
(1) Multi-agency collaboration including5 Ministries (Agriculture,Agrarian
Reform, Education and Culture, Local Government and Community
Development,and Natural Resources),5 Academic Institutions (Uni-
versiW of the Philippinesat Los Baflos, Isabela State University at
• Cabagan,Mountain State Agricultural College in Mountain Province,-
Visayas State Collegeof Agriculture in Leyta, and the University of
Southern Mindanao in Cotabato) and the Provincial Government
of Bulacan.
(2) A Federation of Training Cenmn for Rural Development includingone
National,5 regional,and5 FarmersTraining Centers.
(3) Multi-level training clientele including field-level supervisors,subject-
matter specialists,training managementspecialists,field technicians,
and farmer-leaderdemonstrators.
(4) Complementary Center projects suchas training curriculum develop-
ment, trainingcourseoperations,publicationdevelopmentand produc_
tion, training aids development, training related researchoperations,
andinstitutionalcapabilitydevelopment.
(5) The goal is acceleratedand su_aioad rural developmentat the individ-
ual, institution andarealevelsusingthreerural development strategie¢"
a) Critical manpower development which involves a continuous
processof preparingpeopleto fit the patternsof existingand/or
forthcoming jobs . . Indeed, the cultivation of desirablework
orientation, relevant productionand socialtechnologyexpertise,
and mutually reinforcingworking relationshipsamongrural devel-
opment workershavebecomethe principal concernsin the l_aining
of ruraldevelopmentworkers.A training programhasto beevolved
and conducted along the following basic operational policies:
clientele-centered,Iocallty-specificandprogram-based.There are in
existencemore than 51,500 field workers,mostly collegetrained,
involved in the deliveryof a variety of servicesin the rural areas.
More than 42 percentof them work with the 5 Ministriesinvolved
with the PTR.RD. One of the recommendationsto improve man-
power effectivenessis to establisha training systemto improvethe
performanceand develop more cohesiveworking relationshipsOf
extensionandother ruraldevelopmentworkers.
b) Viable institution development; Strong institutions have to be
developed at the barangay level becauseit is the basicunit for
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evolvingano implementingarea-basedprogramsandprojects.
C) Area isolate development (AID). The multiplicity of development
agenciesundertaking a variety of projects in a given area which
involvesmore frequently the samepeoplehashighlightedmanyof
the operational problems•in rural development.Theseproblems
have been evident in some overlappingfield operations. The
conceptof area i_olate development isto define a geographically
contiguous area where the critical development potentials and
servicesare ecologically interlinked while ensuringeconomicand
social viability. Hence, the AID Strategy utilizes a defined geo-
graphic area as the principalmechanism for inter-agencycollabora-
tion andprogramcomplementation.
In summary, PTC-RD•seeks to effect a unified training program
to develop the technical capabilities as well as the functional effec-
tiveness of the manpower involved in rural development. The aim is
to develop strong local capability and multi.sectoral support for
evoMng and implementing strong area.based development programs.
The strategy to achieve this is to implement multi-agency and multi-
level training programs involving multi-center participation funded
from multi-agency budgets. However, a particular training course-is
situation-oriented, area specific; program-based; and people-cen-
tered. A defined ecological zoneserves as basis for generating locality-
specific technology and for developing production systems institu-
tions and other community living support services.
In an attempt to rationalize the management of various rural
development efforts, the • following • operational adjustments were
proposed:
(a) Adoption of a common set of program and project classifi.
cation and common indicators.
(b) Adoption of a unified management system for area-based
complementary programs and projects and a unified devel-
opment.perspective and a continuing manpower training for
all rural development workers.
Some comments on the PTC-RD approach include:
(a) Unified training is the basic •integrating instrument with
efforts in the training process at "team building", • group
development across •agencies and deliberate •techniques to
break down organizational boundaries and level off status
differentials.
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(b) The location of regional training centers in regional agri-
cultural collegesis a much welcome strategy which is very
much in line with decentralization, strengtheningof regional
institutions, greater relevance of training to the local situa-
tion and the further substantiationof our agricultural univer-
sities' role in rural development in their respectiveareas.This
role likewise offers a real opportunity for bringing in closer
interactionbetween formal and non-formal education within
the functions of academe. The Federation of Training Cen-
ters institutionalizes collaboration, cross-fertilization and
sharing of experience, expertise, training materials, etc., ac-
rossregionswith different agro-ecologicalfeatures.
(c) The PTC-RD program is perhaps more profusely endowed
with a "captivating development vocabulary" which is easy
to articulate but more elusiveto operationalize. Examplesof
this are: "Training is a continuous re_nergizing processof
self.renewal';" "Training for self-propelling community
efforts toward self-fulfilling rural development goals"; "To
promote and accelerate rural development in particular and
to humanize, transform this development in particular",
"development as a processof perpetual state of completion
that has no fixed end-state", etc. However, the well-worn
concepts of poverty, equity, employment, etc., are conspi-
cuoslyabsent.
PTC.RD has also more unifying and "multi" attempts
than other integrated programs. Among these are: multi-
sectoral, multi-center, multi-level, multi-agency, multi-loca-
tion, and evena multi-agencybudget.
(d) As of April 1980, PTC-RD training outputs consistof 10,103
individuals, 55 percent of whom were farmer-leaders,28 per-
cent from the Ministry of Agriculture while only about 3
percent came from Agrarian Reform, from Local-Govern-
ment and Community Development, and from Natural
Resources.Other agenciessuchasNational Irrigation Admin-
istration, National Grains Authority, etc., contributed 7
percent of trainees. Considering the unifying and multi-
agency intent of the training, to what extent would this
very uneven distribution of participants contribute to the
attainment of the unifying objective?However, the inclusion
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of more than one-half of traineesfrom amongfarmer-leaders
can be viewed as its most positive output in the sensethat
it getsthe trained manpower into the community base.
(e) The proposed operational adjustments to rationalize the
management of various rural development efforts seem less
threatening to agency administrative territoriality and if
adopted could mean more effective monitoring and evalua-
tion of what is going on in a particular area through a com-
mon pool of data. However, the suggestionfor a unified
management system for area.based complementary programs
is less likely to be accepted because it involves relinquishing
some "territorial" boundaries. This might prove to be too
much to give up.
(f) Bringing together or unifying efforts of different develop-
ment agencies always seems to introduce infinitely more
complexity into something already as complex as rural
development even with one agency. Figure 6.2, which shows
the PTC-RD's framework for rural development, illustrates
this complexity. It is difficult to find the rural populace in
th is framework.
6. Agro-Forestry Development Projects (Environment.Oriented
Integration)
After years of continuous harvest from nature's bounty, we now
wake up with national concern for our environment. In the mean-
time, population pressure has pushed human settlements, food and
cashcrop production higher up the hills which have been laid practic-
ally bare by environmental abuse. Disappearing fuel and energy sour-
ces are bound to aggravate the already devastated state of our na-
tural resources. Nowhere is an integrated approach more called for
than in this new arena of environmental rehabilitation. De los
Angeles27 gives us a brief review of agro-forestry projects, includ-
ing their rationale, objectives and relavant issues.As her review
points out:
At least5.1 million hectaresof landor 17 percentof the country's
total land area are open land and brushlands.They are sub-marginally
productive and thus, may be consideredwasted land. Moreoverwater-
shedareasneedingreforestationcover at least1.4 million hectares.With
the continuing pressureto increasefood productionand improvewater
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supply systems, rehabilitating denuded uplands has become more urgent.
While deforestation is a result of a number of complex factors including
illegal and destructive •logging kaingin making, and ineffective forestry
and land policies, itsfuture solution depends partly on the possibility of
transforming erstwhile destructive and sub-marginal upland farming activ-
ities into ecologically sound and more productive ones. That is, "the rehabi-
litation of wasted uplands is primarily a socio-economic and an ecological
• need.''28 Thus agro-forestation or national land use through combined
•agricultural and forest management practices seeks to achieve the follow-
ing objectives:
(1) to create harmony between natural resource conservation and
production;
(2) to lessen the gap between food and water supply and demand;
(3) to implement a land use scheme based on ecological, socio.
economic and demographic considerations; and
(4) to prevent further forest destruction.
Agro-forestry or agrisilviculture, therefore, includes any of the follow-
ing systems:29
(1) raising of agriculture and forestry crops on the same land at the
same time or on a rotation basis;
(2) growing of agricultural crops or pasturing of animate in combina-
tion with certain forest trees on the same land at the same time;
(3) planting of perennial crops of both tree and agricultural speciesfor
food. fruits or oils; and
(4) the planting of forest trees cultivated during a relatively short
period of time (say 10 years).
In the Philippines, agrisilviculture was initially adopted by the Paper
Industries Corporation of the Philippines (PICOP) in 1968-70. PICOP
encouraged private landowners to develop marginal and sub*marginal por-
tions of their• land into tree farms• to, augment the company's pulp-wood
production. The PICOP experiment with• its well developed marketing
system was viewed as a feasible economic venture and agro-forestry was
advocated as an answer to the perennial kaingero a0d reforestation prob-
lems. The Bureau ofForest Development (BFD) of the Ministry of Natural
• Resources has no several agro-forestry demonstration plots being imple-
mented under its Forest Occupancy Management Program. Under• such
program, kaingero families are issuedtemporary forest occupancy permits
and contracted by BFD to reforest denuded hills where they are also
allowed to plant crops and raise livestock .....
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Agro-forestry include the following activities:
(1) establishment of the proper mix of agricultural and forestry crop=
in upland areas by hilly land farmers;
(2) provision of extension services for information on appropriate
• cropping systems, community organizations and marketing;
(3) provision of technical service for survey, research, mapping and
manpower development;
(4) building of accesstrails connecting upland farms to existing trans-
portetion networks;
(5) supply of inputs to production, including physical and financial
inputs;
• (6) provision of some assurance of mcurity of land tenure for farmer-
cooperators;
(7) establishment of adequate links to the proper marketing facilities;
and
(8) formation of community organizations.
As an improvement over the traditional farming technology used in
upland areas, agro-forestation is expected to produce the following out-
puts:
(1) increased forested area and wood production;
(2) increased production of agricultural crops and livestock;
(3) improved socio-economic level of the beneficiaries;
(4) stabilization of forest occupancy;
(5) acceptable, feasible, and sustainable agro-forestry cropping systems;
(6) accesstrails; and
(7) improved environment...
Two features which distinguish agro-forestation from other develop-
ment projects are (1) its experimental nature in the sense that while the
project is being implemented it has to be simultaneously evaluated in terms
of social, cultural, economic, and environmental acceptability and feasibility.
The project has to be continuously modified to suit the environmental and
social needs of the populace and environment where it is being implement-
ed. There are marked differences in the socio-economic environmental prob-
lems besetting project cooperators, and various technological and opera-
tional difficulties faced by project implementors. (2) Assurance of some
security of land tenure for those farmers participating in the project through
the issuance of forest occupancy management Dermits for one year, renew:
able every year, based upon BFD's assessmentof the co0perator's perform-
ance. Expectedly the processing and renewal of permits undergo the usual
time-consuming bureaucratic red tape. This arrangement seems to be over-
demanding for cooperators who definitely need time to prove their ability
to conduct time-intensive activities... 30
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Because available studies on agro-forestry systems have shown
that wood and food production goals as well as environmental pro-
tection are achieved through such systems, the basic argument for
agro-forestation is that "'since the system is a compromise for tradi-
tionally competing agricultural and forestry land uses, it preserves the
salient features of both agriculture and forestry. ,,31
This promising compromise between agriculture and forestry
is not without "other risks" in terms of consequences, hence some
caveats have been expressed on agro-forestation, viz.,
(1) Rigorousstudieson the environmentalfeasibility of variousagrisilvi-
cultureschemesare still in progressandwill generallyrequiremoretime
to be monitored before results could be adequately evaluated. For
example, anxiet;/ has been expressedon the use of tree monocultures
which resultswhen vastareasof denudedforest land are interplanted
with singletree speciesand agriculturalcropsespeciallyin the tropics
where the originalforestsaregenerallymulti-specifiedanduneven-aged
•.. Indeed,findingsof the UPLB upland Hydroecolog¥Programindi-
cate that ipil-ipil, widely used in reforestationand agro-forestation,
drainsthe soil of phosphorus.It must then be usedwith somemodif:-
cation.
(2) Making hillyland farming profitable and more economicallyattractive
through agro-forestrymight encouragemoreclearingof and migration
into forest land resulting in more forest destruction. Garmpin, for
instance,pointsout that:
Precautionarymeasuresshouldalso be madeto preventaggremive
speculatorsfrom cashingin on the agro-forestryconcept,The pur-
pose of agro-forestryis to provide stableand productiveagricul-
tural systemsfor the kaingero so that the economicbenefit that
will come from it will dissuadehim from enlarginghiskaingin. But
there is alsothe strongpossibilitythatthe oppositewill occur.The
increasedeconomic benefits from agro-forestrycan provide the
stimulatorY effect for the kaingero to enlargehis kaingin. The
situation may come to a point wherealmost everybodyfrom low-
land farmers,urbanentrepreneurs,Iogging.concessionnaires,would
also be attracted to carve out their own kaingin. In the competi-
tion that would result, the kaingero would most likely lose.32
De los Angeles further cites that:
While expandingkainginsby kaingero-cooperators isnot very prob-
able due to the fact that agro-forestationis quite labor-intensive,
kaingin-makingby non-cooperatorsandformerly non-kaingeros is
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a distinctpossibility.This issobecausethebuildingof trailsand
roadsto developmoreefficientmarketingsystems,amongothers,
wouldincreasemobilityto andfromuplands.Theimpactofagro-
forestationis thussignificantlylinkedwith the successof other
projectsandactivities,notablythoseof forestprotection,popula-
tioncontrol,increasingproductionandtheproductivityof.lowland
agricultureandemploymentgenerationi ruralareas.33
Some comments on agro-forestation:
1. By the very nature of the problems which agro-forestry is
attempting to address,the current trend is toward organic
integration, not simply administrative integration which is
the usual preoccupationof integratedrural developmentpro-
grams. Despite the relative recency of agro-forestry, program
leadersappear to havearrived at specific objectives,outputs
and expected impacts. This is quite unlike the ambiguous,
nebulous,utopian conceptscharacteristicof other programs.
Furthermore, agro-forestryacknowledgesthe "experimental"
nature of the "mix of technology and practices" applied to
any particular environmental situation. This is a tremendous
virtue given the complexities of the phenomena they work
with. One also wishes that such an experimental attitude
(which takes quite a bit of humility on the part of their
expertiseJ would be more generallycharacteristicof IRD pro-
gramswhich are often designedand pursuedwith blueprints
seeking instant institutionalization for procedureswhich are
asyet untried, let alone proven.
2. Benefits from agro-forestation (although not easy to mate-
rialize) tend to accrue more directly to project participants
becauseactivities are carried out in the.areasconcerned and
upland farmers are active participants in the action-research
processwhich is trying to evolveworkable combinations of
agro-forestrytechnologies.
3. Community organization is very much part of agro-forestry
projectswith marginal farmers. As one of the Upland Hydro-
ecology research leaders said, ,The concept of ecology
implies sharing in order to maintain the delicate balance in
nature and to distribute the benefitsfrom nature'sproducts."
Community organization is indispensable for collective
action, responsibility and welfare. In many ways, a strong
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organization of upland farmers could be the best assurance of
some security of land tenure by way of protecting their areas
from future encroachments. It likewise provides them with
an effective lobby for their continuing tenure especially if
urban entrepreneurs and others start getting interested in
exploiting the uplands for themselves.
4. Some of the agro-forestry projects-may have conflicting con-
sequences' as have been observed in the following instances
cited by de los Angeles:
The simultaneous implementation of the other projects in
the watershed area such as the RP-JapanReforestationProject,
the World Bank-financed Watershed Management and Erosion
Control Project and the Bureauof Forest DevelopmentCommu-
nal Tree Farm!rig Project posed•important questionson whether
Upland Hydroecologyproject cooperators(smal! upland marginal
farmers) wouldprematurely abandon their ownactivities (which
are time and labor-intensive•beforeearningscan be derivedfrom
the produce) in favor of wage labor opportunitiesin the other
project. Attraction •towardstemporary wage-earrting•activitiesin
theseundertakingsmight competewith the labor-intensiverequire-
ments of the small upland farmer-cooperators.In-migrationto
meet•the large demand for labor during the early stageof•the
World Bank project might only causemore pressureon the land
after the project hasbeencompleted.34
__,nother illustration of the conflict between short-term
and long-term goals or between individual and societal bene-
fits is as follows:
It issuspectedthat fireswhich occuron newly reforestedareas
of the RP-Japanproject are set by someof the laborersthemselves
since these would assurethem of continuity of employment in
refoi'estationwork. Such fires happenduringthe peak of the dry
seasonwhen the Bureauof Forest Developmentand the National
Irrigation Administration lay off casualworkersbecauseplanting
is not feasible,and duringthe time when the farmersare in most
needof other income=generatingactivities,35
5, Ecological happenings are continuing reaHife lessons in the
'integratedness" of the environment, The following illu_
.trates this point: .:
The summermonths•highlightedthe difficultiesfaced by the,
upland farmers of Pantabangan.Fires were frequent;water more
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scarce;and rat infestationwasso highthat the youngshootsof the
mangoand citrusseedlings,both agro-forestcrops,weredestroyed.
The farmer-cooperatorsof the Upland Hydroecologyprojectcoped
with suchdifficultiesin very innovativeways:firebreakswere built
through labor and time*savingmethods makingthe farms of such
farmersthe only ones left untouchedby summerfires, the farm-
ers are now more positiveabout the buildingof farm pondsstra.
tegically locatedamongtheir farms;and they are nowviewingthe
rat problem from a broaderperspective- that it is related to the
forestdestructionproblemand that diversificationof cropswould
helpminimize the damagedone.36
6. If agro-forestry projects succeed or even if they only pro-
raise to do so, people who are otherwise uninterested might
be interested to be active participants in a big way. The issue
therefore of who "owns' or who has control over these up-
lands and wastelands is a very salient one. The benefits could
very quickly shift to the rich and powerful and not to the
marginal upland farmers.
7. Integration Oriented Toward Health, Nutrition or Population
a. Health-oriented integration
Health as one of man's most basic needs becomes even more
basic because when a man is poor, landless, is little-educated and has
minimal skills, the only capital he has in life is his body. Precisely
because one is poor, quite often this body is not in the best condi-
tion to serve as "capital" in the pursuit of a better quality of life.
Furthermore, there are serious rural-urban and poor-rich access to
health services. All these years, however, our villages have not bean
entirely without "health services" of some kind. There are tradi-
tional herb doctors (herbolarios), and granny midwives (hilots) who
perform these functions and are always available at the village level.
On the other hand, our professionally trained health personnel such
as doctors, nurses, and midwives are either working in Metro Manila
and other urban centers. Given these circumstances, Guerrero 37
describes the emerging concept of health care delivery as designed
to meet the basic health needs of the most disadvantaged and un-
deserved population and emphasizes "'health by the people" using
simple, inexpensive and acceptable methods. Health workers are of
the community and are chosen by the people. They are trained and
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function aS parts of a "system" of existing health services. UNICEF
says that they constitute "the outer ring of the national system for
extending basic services into unserved or inadequately sewed com-
munities." This approach is based on a number of principles pointed
out by the UNICEF-WHO Joint Committee on Health Policy:
(1) the multiple and interdependent relationshipsof health and other
aspectsof development,necessitatingtherefore their proper integra-
tion;
(2) the provisionof adequatesupportfor communityhealtheffort_by the
nationalgovernment;
(3) community involvementin the planningand implementationof health
careprograms;
(4) full utilizationof availablecommunityresources;
(5) health care stressingpreventivemeasures,health and nutrition educa-
tion. meetinghealthcare needsof highrisk groups,andutilizingtradi-
tional and indigenousmedical and health technologyappropriate at
community levels;
(6) indigenousand trainedcommunity healthworkersto undertakehealth
interventions;
(7) provisionof technical, logistic,supervisoryand referral supportfrom
other echelonsof the healthcaresystem.....
Primary health care is premised on community participation and
collective action to solve community health problems. Promoting
health by the people also implies that the government provides the
essential institutional, financial and administrative support to com-
plement and strengthen the community's own efforts.
Guerrero describes one such program which is being implemented
in the Island of Panay.
The Panay Unified Services for Health (PUSH) is distinguished
from more traditional health programs for
(1) its efforts to provide depressedbarangayswith a unified set of health
services,(2) itsattempts to actualize and strengthenlocal potentials
to organizeand deliverhealth and other socialservicesthroughactive
involvement of the local governmentand promotion of community
initiatives and action. Its key personis the trained BarangayHealth
Worker (BHW) to be paid by the local government. Recruitedfrom
among the residents in the barangay,the BHW will be basedin the
barangayand will extend basicpreventive,educativeand health pro-
motiveservicesof the Rural Health Unit. The BHW therefore servesa=
the inmgrating or unifying factor in PUSH. Other PUSH outputs
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include improvedbarangayhouseholdwater supplyandwastedisposal
system, vaccinesand drugs, improvedhealth laboratoriesand health,
nutrition, and family planning commoditiesand services.It is envi-
sionedthat at the end of the project,the regionalhealthsystemwill be
strengthenedto suchdegreeasto provideintegratedhealthservicesand
that theseserviceswill be sustainedevenafter exterrialfinancialassist-
ancehasbeanterminated.38
b. Nutr/t/on=or/ented integration
Nutrition problems have been the subject of scientific studies for
more than half a century but it was only in 1974 that nutrition
achieved the status of a national program with high priority. Solon
described the major features as f0110ws:39
The Philippine Nutrition Program is a syst_netic integration of all
government and private nutrition efforts through an organizationalset-up
which ensureseffective deliveryand monitoring of servicesdown to the
villageandfamily levels.At the top isthe National Nutrition Council (NNC)
composedof headsof 6 governmentministries(Agriculture,Health, Social
Servicesand Development, Education and Culture, Local Government
and Community Development, National ScienceDevelopmentBoard)and
3 privateorganizations(Nutrition Centerot the Philippines,Nutrition Foun-
dation of the Philippinesand Philippine Medical Association).The NNC
policiesand decisionsare implementedby a secretariatheadedby the NNC
executivedirector.
On the premisethat the solution to malnutrition shouldbegin in the
home, the organizationaleffort startswith the policy maker closestto the
family. Since the municipal mayor is the only governmentofficial at the
local level closestto the programwho is vestedwith all three powers--
executive, legislative,and judicial - the municipality hasbeenpinpointed
asthe focal point of planningand implementationof the nutrition program.
Data obtained from Operation Timbeog (weight, height, agerelationships
taken asindicatorof nutrition status)areusedasbasisfor action.
The Municipal Nutrition Committee createsa planningstaff endinvites
representativesof different agenciesin the community to diseuseproblems
of malnutrition and shareexperiencesand information on their on-going
programs. Under the city municipal nutrition committee is the Barangay
(Village) Nutrition Committee which assumesth_ responsibilityfor imple-
menting and coordinatingthe program at the barangaylevel. It organizes
the BarangeyNetwork which is composedof a teeeher<:oordinetor,purok
(zone) and unit leadersand some 20 families under each unit leader.The
family as a basic unit servesas a focal point through which the effectsof
a packageof nutrition servicescould be effectively demonstrated.Program
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implementationgivespriority to the improvementof the food intake and
nutrition statusof low-incomegroupsin depressedareas.Specifically, the
different targetgroupsare: -.
(a) pre-schoolchildren "
(b) pregnantandlactatingmothers
(c) special undernourishedgroup (those affected by iron deficiency,
anemia,Vitamin A deficiency,goiter,etc.)
(d) schoolchildren
The substanceof the PhilippineNutrition Programconsistsof 5. inter-
ventionschemes:
(a) Food ac_isranceto Severelymalnourishedpre-schoolchildren(Ministry
of SocialServicesandDevelopment).
(b) Food production implemented by.promoting productionof selected
crops in homes, schools,and community (MinistriesofAgriculture,
and EducationandCulture)....
(c) Nutrition information end education through the schoolcurriculaof
the Ministry.of Educationand Culture and farm housewivesthrough
the Bureauof AgriculturalExtension.
(d) Health protection to combatrecognizeddeficiencies,preventinfectious
diseases,and rehabilitationof severelymalnourishedchildren(Ministry
of Health throughits Rural Health Units).
(e) Family planning, population education,and the vital relationshipbe-
tween populationand nutrition is well recognizedand all agenciesare
enjoined to includesuchin their activities.
A basicfeature of theseschemesis the maximum useor development
of local facilitiesand resourcesto makethe community self-reliantandself-
productive. These intervention schemesensure a comprehensivedelivery
of nutrition servicesto the program targets. On the whole, they provide
the basiCinfrastructurefor the total developmentof the family through
communityeffort.
After describing the. elaborate nutrition network, Solon con-
cludes:
As the overall successof the program rests heavily on its effective
implementationat the.grassr0ots,we are pinning our hopes on the grass-
roots workers, the.lifeof the PhilippineNutrition Program.. -
In 1978, a new Nutrition. Improvement Model was started in
six pilot villages in Laguna.and .Batangas by the. Institute of Human
Ecology at the University of the Philippines at Los 8a_os with the
following objectives:
[] To develop a workable village unit model for a national pro-
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gramme of improving nu:trition for the rural poor.
[] To develop a practical training course for village leaders
trainors, and extension workers in making maximum use of
local resources for improving nutrition of the rural poor; and
[] To develop participatory programs at the village level for self-
reliance among residents in attaining high levels of nutrition
and general well-being.
L
The Food and Nutrition Improvement Model (FNIM) approaches
the issue of nutritional upliftment of the rural people by means of
improving their capabilities to produce more nutritious foods locally
and utilize them efficiently. The scheme integrates:
•.. the educational proceu of formulating a barangay-based evelopment
plan (or Barangay Development Framework Plan) which articulatesthe
total development programme of the villagewith emphasison specific
actionableprojects like increasingnutritious food supplyper capita, food
processingand utilization, practical environmenthealth actions, nutrition
education, supplementationand interventions.The project also provides
external material inputs like seeds,farm tools, technicalreadingmatters,
income-generatingprojectsand continuingtechnical assistancein the field
of agr!cultureand nutrition in the form of local training and farm/home
visits.Cultivation of indigenousfood cropsof highnutritivevaluein home-
lots, community gardens,constructionof sanitarywastedisposalsystems,
and provision of safedrinking water pumpsare alsosome infrastructure
andenvironmentalimprovementprojects.
There are four other important features of the project. One is the
proposedconstruction of a BarangayFood and Nutrition Center in each
pilot barangaywhich will serve as the multi.purpose development action
center for the residentsand as a decentralizedoffice for all government
extensionagencieswho assistdevelopmentprojectsinthe barrio.The other
is utilization of local residentstrained by the projectstaff from the Univer-
sity in cooperation with other agenciesand spearheadedby the Barangay
Food and Nutrition Scholar who is also a residentof the barrio. Third is
the envolvementand implementation of the BarengayDevelopment Fram_
work Plan which embodiesthe total developmentplan of the barrio. This
is prepared through the joint planning of the FNIM staff and the local
residentsled by the Barangay Food and Nutrition Scholar and Barangay
Program Planning Committee. Severalgeneral barrio as_ernbly andspecial
committee meetings are conducted during the preparationto ensuretheir
cooperation,support and partnershipand also to suit localcustoms,tradi-
tions, idiosyncracies,and felt needs of the barrio folks. With guidance
and support from the project staff, care is taken that plansare basedon
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identified problem-solution approach with special priorities in favor of
food andnutrition improvementprojects.40
c. Population-oriented integration
in 1976, a nationwide Family Planning Outreach Program was
iaunched based on lessons from past experience 41, namely:
(a) That the bulk of the ruralpopulacehasyet to be effectively reached
by the Population/familyplanningprogram;
(b) That family planningneedsand servicescannot be viewed in isolation.
Although the program would seem to be a model of integration-
multi-agency participation having been a central concept from the
beginning- this was simply integration from the viewpoint of the
channels for service delivery. What was regardedas the more ,impor-
tant viewpoint isthat of theclient.
(c) Tha.t planning and servicedelivery has been primarily nationbl and
centralizedbut it hasbeen realizedthat servicedeliverymustbe based
at the levelof the individualandthe immediatecommunity.The active
involvement of the community itself is regardedasessentialin actually
identifyingandmeetingneeds.
(d) That in orderto meet the goalof reducingfertility to balancemortality
by the year 2000, a two-childfamily mustbecomethe norm but today
the averageFilipino family hasmore than four children.The challenge
is not merely the technicaltaskof providingthe servicesrequiredbut
the needfor massivechangesinsocialattitudes_ndpractices.The norm
of smallerfamily sizemust be communicatedwidely, evaluatedindivi-
dually, and adopted as a personalobjectivebefore even the best of
servicescan be utilized.The conceptof family planning must be related
to the entire development procen, for it is only whena_naller family
makes senseto each couple in lightof the developmentprocessasthey
areawareof it, that they will adopt the practice.
Multi-agency participation continues to be a major approach.
Rather than implementing an independent delivery mechanism for
family planning services, the program emphasizes broad support of
existing service agencies and has encouraged many outside agencies
to add family planning messages and services to their basic opera-
tions. Thus, the program has supported not only clinics and hospitals
but also such ministries as Local Government and Community Devel-
opment, Agrarian Reform, Social Services and Development. Educa-
tion and Culture, etc.
A new major strategy, the population and family planning out-
reach project is designed to supplement the existing network of
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"passive" clinic-based services with a structure capable of reaching
out beyond the clinics to the rural majority. The key aspects of
this strategy are the deployment of a corps of full-time population
workers at the municipal level, the direct involvement of "... provin-
cial and city governments in the management of the program and a
basic emphasis on overall community development as a framework
for family planning services,"
This new Outreach Project aims at transforming the previous
clinic-based family planning delivery system which uses 3,100
outreach workers who are scattered all over the country and who
contact all ever-married women.
The programdesigncalls for the nationwidedeploymentot approximately
50 Provincial/City PopulationOfficers, 95 Provincial/CityPopulationCoor-
dinators 500 District Population Officers and 3,100 full-time outreach
worker¢ Approximately 19,184 BarangaySupply Points (BSPs)are to be
establishedand maintainedthroughoutthe country. The 55 provinceswere
divided into some 5 to 8 districtsof around 10,000 married couplesof
reproductiveage (MCRAS) undera fulltime outreachworker (FTOW) who
hasthe responsibilityof enumeratingall the householdsin hisareawhoare
willing to serveas (Barangay)Village SupplyPoint Officers(BSPOs).Each
BSPOservesaround 100 MCRAs, supplyingfree pillsandcondomsto local
users, irrespectiveof where they first obtained contraceptivesupplies;
keepinga listof contraceptiveusersup to date; and providinginformation
on acceptanceto the FTOW monthly,It is the BSPOwhohas theclosestcon-
tact with the current user; sheknowswhoamongher100 MCRAsiscurrently
contraceptingand what methodsare beingused;andsheknowswho ispreg-
nant and when the approximatedate of deliveryis goingto be.The BSPOs
can motivate and counsel clients during resupply visitsand can assistthe
the FTOW in organizinggroup meetingsin the barangayto discussfamily
planningmatter¢ The BSPOscanalsoassistinthe referralof IUD andvolur_
tary surgicalcontraceptionto family planning clinicsand itinerantteams.
Under the Outreach scheme the family planning clinicscontinue to
provideall typesof contraceptivesuponrequest.The FTOWsareauthorized
to dispensepills once they have undergoneappropriatetraining, Persons
requestingan IUD or sterilizationare referredto the nearestfamily planning
ciinic or hospital.With the launchingof Outreach,the programin the baran-
gay no longer needs to dependsolely on acceptorscoming to the clinic
but can reachout to couplesdesiringfamily planningassistance.42
But as De Leon points out, the success of the outreach project
will be determined largely by "the commitrnen_ and the services of
the front-line field workers upon whom to many of our programs
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depend. The ultimate successof the program restsin our faith in the
capacity of these vital individuals to carry the burden of this massive
social change.,_3
d. Farming-Family Planning Analogies
(A Conceptual Integration)
In the searchfor strategiesto deliver the family planningmessage
to the farming community, Dr, Flavier of the International Rural
Reconstruction movement sought parallels between family planning
and farming and developed what he calls a "receiver-based agricul-
tural approach." The strategyhe says is based on the well-known
principle of rural development - "Starting with what rural people
know and building on what they have." Flavier tries to explain the
three aspectsof family planning: (birth control or limitation in num-
ber, spacing, and infertility) through local agricultural parallels
typical of which are the following:
On birth control
I-I Limiting the number of fruits Of a pomelo tree to ensure
bigger fruits and better quality.
[] The IUD is likened to a stone which prevents a seedfrom
germinating.
On spacing
[] Transplanting rice from a seedbed(planting them tooclosely
will produce little yield).
[] Letting the land lie fallow to producebetter crop¢
On infertility:
[] Smudgingor smoking mango trees to induce them to fruit.
To the criticismthat this agricultural analogyapproachtakes too
long, Flavier seesthis as the program's strong point rather than its
weaknes_ He arguesthat a hard sell approach is always aimed at
acceptancewhiletheir "adaptive" approachputs a premium on com-
prehension and motivation, thus acceptorsare more likely to remain
as continuers.
A study of three approacheswas undertaken: (a) adaptive using
agricultural parallels familiar to and valued by rural families, (b) con.
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vent/one/ using information on anatomy and human reproduction
usinga messagewith a scientific and national orientation. (c) Family
planning service approach which involved periodic, scheduledand
announced visits of the family planning physician or nurseto rural
families.
Preliminary findings in June 1973 lent support to the hypothesis
that the adaptive approach is more effective than the other ap-
proaches. Both the adaptive and conventional approacheswere pre-
ferable to the purely family planning service approach from the
standpoint of both acceptanceand current use.The advantage,how-
ever, was not yet very apparent when the adaptive approach was
compared to the conventional. Eachapproach useda family planning
promoter who servedas liaisonofficer between the family planning
team and the community. In turn, each barrio had a local auxiliary
health worker who served as volunteer and worked under the general
supervisionof the family planning promoter.
e. Multi.Program Package
It has been repeatedly said that "there are very few servicepro-
grams which reach the barrios directly and provide a channel for
diffusing information. Often such programsare not integrated. The
irrigation extensionworker, for example, operates independently of
the rur.alhealth doctor. The resourcesof the programsthey represent
are not coordinated so as to respond to the wider needs of the
community. Insteadthey compete with each other for the attention
of the individual. As a result, their impact is blunted . . . No struc-
tures are developed in the barrios to insure the continuation of
efforts even longafter field workers are gone."
Ostensibly to solve the problems of outreach, integration and
community-based support, Project Compassionwas created to integ-
rate the four major concernsof nutrition, food production, environ-
mental management and family planning. Family development
committees at the provincial, municipal and barangaylevelsplan and
carry out their own family development programs consistent with
the project's national guidelines and objecties and the particular
needs,problems and resourcesof their own communities. Because
local responsibility and action are the keys of the project, existing
barangaysare used to implement and meet its desired targets. The
cent/a/ figure in the barangay network is the unit leader, who will
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serveas the single channel through which the project's packageof
serviceswill be deliveredto the rural family's doorstep.
The project staff providesassistancein the form of information
materials and commodities from the cooperating agencies- Nutri-
tion, Population, Environment Centers and the Green Revolution
Project; and training and orientation of family development com-
mittees. The provinces participating are La Union, Quezon, Rizal,
Albay, Iloilo, Bohol, Davaodel Sur, and MisamisOccidental.44
Some Observations on the "Integrations" Oriented Toward Health,
Nutrition and Population
1. All these programsaim to be communi_-based, indigenizedand
all use local vii/age-level paraprofessionals suchas the Barangay
Health Worker; Barangay Development Nutrition Scholar; Fa-
mily Development Committee and Unit Leader; local auxiliary
health worker; and the BarangaySupply Point. No matter what
the organizational set-up might look like, all these programs
acknowledge that their successdepends upon these grassroots
workers. They have been referred to in various exalted ways
suchas:
[] the life of the Philippine Nutrition Program
[] front-line workers - the vital individuals who carry the
[] burden of massivesocialchange
[] central figure in the barangaynetwork
[] the integratingor unifying factor in PUSH
In the final analysis,the life of an elaborate integrated pro-
gram depends upon the least-trained, lowest-paid and in many
instances, volunteer workers. Despite the rhetoric, there is
certainly a trickle-down process in these delivery systemswith
the center being relatively well-endowed in terms of trained
personnel, resources, salaries, perquisites, etc., all of which
gradually trickle down and dissipateinto tinier bits as the "ser-
vices" get closer to the intended beneficiaries. This is not a
criticism but rather a fact of life that maximum resourcesalways
start from the top. The practical question is how to start from
lower point so that the distance between sourceand recipient
could be shortened and more of the resourcesof whatever kind
could reach the recipients. Decentralization, therefore, has its
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virtues in this regard. Fortunately, all the programs described
represent serious attempts to decentralize delivery.
2. Community participation comes more or less, i.e., in some and
less in others. The Nutrition Improvement Model which is still in
its pilot-testing stage seems to exhibit more of the community
involvement in the preparation and implementation of the Ba-
rangay Development Framework Plan. Although this is supposed
to embody the total development plan of the barrio, "care is
taken that plans are based on identified problem-solution
approach with special priorities in favor of food and nutrition
improvement projects': The Framework Plan, not surprisingly,
has a guided nutrition bias in the definition of the commu-
nity's problems. This is probably true of all integrated pro-
grams where the "integrating" thrust is whatever happens to be
the domain of the integration.
3. There are two general trends in the Family Planning/Population
Program. The first one is an attempt to "integrate" population in
the programs of other development agencies via support and en-
couragement for adding family planning messagesto their basic
operations. Second, the Population Program through the Baran-
gay Supply Points of the Rural Outreach Approach becomes
much more narrowly concerntrated on ,contraception, more
specifically pills and condoms, It is ironical that as the program
reaches the village, instead of "family planning being related to
the entire development process" as has been envisioned, it has
almost been reduced to a pill and condom distribution scheme.
The findings of the 1978 Community Outreach Survey (COS)
are particularly interesting with respect to this:
"The Outreach Project was designedto make two programmethods,
pills and condomsmore readily availableto rural couplesby authorizing
field workers to recruit new acceptorsof thesemethodsand resupplythem
through village-levelsupply points, The COS findingsindicatethat after a
tittle overa yearof operations there wasvirtually no changein the prevalence
of pill use and an increase of only 2 percentage of condom use in the areas
covered most intensively by the Outreach Program. However, there does
appear to have been a considerableincrease in the practiceof contra-
ception. Most of this increasewas in the use of "non-program" methods-
withdrawal, rhythm, combinationsof these methodswith each other or
with condoms, and abstinence.(Rhythm is officially a program method,
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but the practice of rhythm by most couples interviewed in the COS does
not qualify for this designation, sincem0st of them had not received
instruction from program personnel).
The •hypothesis that making supplies of I_articular contraceptive
methods more readily available can substantially increase use of these
methods has not received much support from this initial analysis.of data
on the Outreach Program. However, the analysis also suggests that the
hypothesis has not really be given a fair test. More than half of Barangay
Supply Poin_ (BSP) area resident= were not even aware of the existenc_
of the BSP, Most have not been visited by either the Fulltime Outreach
Worker (FTOW) or the BSPO ....
The findings that prevalence was so much higher in BSP areas than in
the country as a whole and that it seems to have started increasing a few
months after the Outreach Project began suggestthat the Project may have
had an effect, but if so the causal linkages are obscure. Most of the increase
was in methods the FTOWS were not even trained to promote. By their
• own admission, most FTOWs and BSPOs were not doing many home visits
in relation to the number of Married Couples of Reproductive Age (MCRA)
they were supposed to cover. However it is not implausible that the Out-
reach Project might have been principally responsible for the rapid increase
in the use of contraception, especially in the use of non-program methodr_
When the Outreach Project was launched, many of the areas eventually
covered by BSPs were probably exposed tO family planning program efforts
for the first time. Although relatively few individuals (BSPOs and local gov-
ernment officials) and couples (those MCRA visited initially) were affected
directly, it is very likely that there was a diffusion effect, which may have
stimulated interest in family planning and motivation to do something about
family size. Fu_hermore, the FTOWs and BSPOs themselves appeared to
favor the use of relatively ineffective methods as indicated by their own con-
traceptive practice. Without a vigorous campaign to publicize the availability
of supplies at the BSP or to refer potential acceptors t_ clinics, many couples
may have been inclined to try family planning methods like withdrawal or
rhythm that did not require the use of program facilities. Probably the most
remarkable finding from the COS is the apparent degree of effectiveness
with which couples were able to use such methods.
If this interpretation is correct, the first year of the Outreach Prolect
can be considered to have been a succes_ Even though it did not achieve
its intermediate objective of substantially increasing pill and condom use
through making supplies of these methods more readily available, it does
• appear to have increased the use of cOntracePtiOn in BSP areas by nearly 12
percentage points between March 1977 and mid.1978 and with at least
as much of an effect on fertility as it would have achieved by increasing
condom use by the same amount. ''45
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A more recent (1980) evaluation of the Philippine Family Plan-
ning Outreach Project showsmany positiveaccomplishment_ Laing
found that during the first three years of operation, FTOW had
establishedBSPs.disproportionately in rural areas; most BSPswere
well-stocked with pills and condoms;FTOWs and BSPOsappearedto
provide good role models in terms of contraceptivepractice; many
BSPOsdespitetheir statusasunpaid volunteer workers,were actively
involved in home visiting activities and referral of clients toclinics;
and knowledge about, attitudes toward, and practice of contracep-
tion tended to be high among the couples living in BSP areas,The
analysis likewise showed that severalaspectsof outreach operations
were contributing to contraceptive practice, especially to use of the
highly effective clinical methods. Of particular concernto us in this
Chapter is the relation between the time allocation of the FTOW to
particular activities and contraceptive prevalence.Of the following
activitiesengagedin by the FTOWs,
[] Maintaining and monitoring BSPs,
[] Motivating couplesto becomenew acceptors,
t-I Following up drop-outs,
[3 Coordinating with workers of other agencies,
[] Premarital counselling, and
[] Establishingnew BSPs,
the first three were associatedwith higher prevalence; whereas
emphasison the last three was associatedwith low prevalence.Laing
says that the first three maximize contact with married couplesof
reproductive age and provision of information and services in the
BSPsalready established.The latter three activities tend to take time
away from such direct motivational work among the couples most
likely to contribute to high prevalence. This observation under-
scoresthe "cost of coordinating" and its more remote connection
to the expected output of increasingcontraceptive practice. One
wonders to what extent this same observation holds for other coor-
dinative and integrative efforts which take time away from the
specific task on hand. Does it really pay to allocate time for this
purpose?
The most encouragingaspect of the Rural Outreach Project is
the role of the volunteer, unpaid BSPs.As the evaluation points out:
"ThoughtheBSPswereoriginallyconceivedprimarilyassupplypoints,
it appearsthat their major effectshavebeenin termsof motivation rather
424 RuralDevelopmentandIntegration
thanprovisionof service¢,_6
4. Although at the national level the perceivedproblem is lack of
coordination and integration among agenciesconcerned with
rural development, at the village level, this problem is probably
preferable to absenceof services.The 1978 Nationwide Nutri-
tion Survey 47 lends credence to the suspicion that perhaps devel-
opment agenciesare not exactly steppingon eachother's toes at
the village and householdlevel.The following data showthe pro-
portion of Philippine householdswho hadparticipated in various
food and nutrition-related programs:
[] Operation Timbang (34%)
[] Agricultural Development/Food Production (30%)
[] Family Planning(30%)
[] Health Protection (22%)
[] Nutrition Education (20%)
[] Food Assistance(14%)
[] Income Generating Programs(5%)
It is obvious from these data that there is no surfeit of ser-
vices at the household level. The great majority of households
haveyet to participate in these programs.
8. Functional Integration
So far the integrated projectswhich havebeen reviewedarearea-
based; intersectoral multi-agency; or intrasectoral single agency all
of which have focused on the Framework Plan as the integrating
instrument; administrative integration and/or the creation of para-
professional "integrators" at the village level. A very different kind
of integration is illustrated by the Integrated Agricultural Produck
tion and Marketing Project (IAPMP). As a matter of fact it has
been said that "no project similar to the IAPMP hasbeen undertaken
elsewhere. The IAPMP is thus the first of its kind in that it inte-
grated thrustswhich other projects saw as independent and autono-
mous. It is also quite unique in the sensethat it does not bring
together under one agency or authority the different agenciesthat
are involved in the project.''4s
The purpose of the Project is to increase the income of small
farmers and rural entrepreneursand to improve their level of living.
The broader objective to which this project contributes is the
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achievement of national self-sufficiency in key food commoditie_
Unlike other agricultural developmentprojects, the IAPMP combines
four different but complementary and interdependent thrusts, i.e.
National Policy, Academic, Technological Packagingand Outreach/
Extensionwith the following objectives:
(a) National Policy Thrust - To improve the planning and
policy-making capabilities of the Philippine government to
deal with issuesand problems of agricultural and rural devel-
opment. It is expected to strengthen the capability of the
Ministry of Agriculture and related public sectorinstitutions
to identify and evaluate alternative policies affecting the
production and marketing of agricultural outputs and inputs
asthey relate to the needsof small farmers.
(b) Academic Thrust - To develop a continuing supply of pro-
fessionally trained people in Philippine agricultural and food
systems development for government agencies,agricultural
educational institutions, small farmers' cooperativesand agri-
business enterprises. Skills resulting from this thrust are
expected to provide expertise in agricultural marketing,
development planning, management, cooperative manage-
ment, credit and finance, international trade, and processing
of agricultural products.
(c) Technology Packaging Thrust - To contribute to the devel-
opment of institutional capacity to design and test inte-
grated packages of production, processing and marketing
technology. In addition, the Project will provide training
in production, post-harvest technology, by-product utiliza-
tion, processing,marketing and extension education and to
construct and operatea food processingcenter. Technological
packages can be cropping packagesand/or in cornbination
with fish, poultry and/or livestockenterprises.
(d) Outreach/Extension Thrust. To achieve coordinated and
profitable production, processing,and marketing of priority
commodities produced by small farm operators through
improved extension/outreach programs designed to serve
cooperatives, marketing agencies, other agribusinessenter-
prises in the food system and small farm producersof the
priority commodities. This thrust is chargedwith the devel-
opment and implementation of an effective extension
426 RuralDevelopmentandIntegration
de/ivery system to _rovide production technology, market
intelligence and credit planning for small farmers; agri-
business development through feasibility studies, identifica-
-tion and assessment of market potentials of priority com-
modities based on the regional plans; Market Assistance
Centers which will prepare and disseminate market informa-
tion; establishment and management of _armers"cooperatives.
IAPMP is not confined to one location. The operations are
scattered in different provincesof the country such as Nueva Ecija,
Benguet, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan,Bataan etc. Several institutions
and agencies are involved: The Ministry of Agriculture and its
Bureaus of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural Extension, and
CooperativesDevelopment; Central Luzon State University (CLSU),
University of the Philippines at Los BaSos (UPLB) and Kansas
State University in the U.S. for technical assistanceand graduate
studies. Theoretically the impact area is the whole country since
the national policy and academic thrusts by their nature do not con-
fine themselves to specific places. Degree and non,degreetraining
and policy implications are not confined to one impact area. The
Technological Packaging and Extension/Outreach thrusts are more
directly related to project purpose, i.e. increasingincomesof small
farmers but the National Policy and Academic Thrusts are more in-
direct in their effects. This does not mean that these two latter
thrusts are any lessimportant than the other two which substantively
contribute to achievement of Project purpose.Without policies sup-
portive of small farmer production, processingand marketingneeds,
and the trained manpower to undertake the various activities in the
technological packaging and outreach thrusts, the latter cannot
effectively perform its functions toward the realization of project
goals.The need to tailor academic programsat CLSU and UPLB and
to develop policies and programs which are aimed at making the
technological and outreach thrusts more effective in increasing small
farmer incomes, has made it quite sensible to integrate the four
thrusts into one scheme. The Project Paper recognizes that a strong
infusion of academic training into each of the three thrusts is basic
to the attainment of Project purpose.
Although IAPMP comes at a time when "integration" has be-
come fashonable in development circles, it should not be regarded as
another fashionable undertaking tailored to ride on the currently
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reigning bandwagon. As the 1979 Evaluation Report describes it: 49
The impetuscamefrom a combinationof fortuitous aswell asdemand-
ing circumstancesat this stagein Philippineagriculturaldevelopment.The
country has made considerablestudies in rice production attributed to
technology, infrastructure,credit, extension servicedelivery and blessed
by unusuallygood weather. But evengood fortune carriesits own hazards
for a new setof problemsarosesuchas: lack of adequatestoragefacilities;
shortageof funds andbreakdownof the administrativemechanismfor price
support payments; lower pricesto farmers,and little changein food avail-
abilities or lower pricesto the poor majority. In the meantime, a coopera-
tives developmentprogram is underway;regionalagriculturaluniversities
are undergoing further strengtheningto servethe rural areaswhere they
are located; and the national agricultural researchsystem has been orga-
nized to facilitate the generationand utilization of researchresults.The
country's leading agricultural University, through its teaching, research,
and extensionfunctions,hashad a longtradition of academiccapabilityas
well as many years of close collaborationand partnershipwith develop-
ment agenciesconcernedwith agricultureandrural development.The situa-
tion, therefore,callsfor the forgingof new institutional relationshipsto deal
with the newsetsof problemsmoreeffecitvely.
It wasunder thesecircumstancesthat IAPMP was born and it must be
noted that no new componentwascreatedjust for the project.All the ingre-
dient_were in place,soto speak,whenit wasconceived.What isparticularly
innovativeand worth watchingabout IAPMP is the mannerin which the
different ingredientshave been brought together in one concept to serve
a singlepurpose- to raisethe productivityand incomeof smallfarmers.It
is new functional relationships,not new structures,not new organizations,
which are beingbuilt,s°
Some Comments on the IAPMP
There are two major issues which could be raised about IAPMP:
(a) What is integrated in the Project?
(b) How will small farmers benefit from the project?
a. What is integrated in the project?
There are different types of integration which are called for in
IAPMP:
(1) Integration of production, processing, and marketing is only
one aspect of integration in this Project and this might be the
least integrated at the moment. Even these three functions
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are not ordinarily lodged in one agency, institution or locale.
(2) Integration of each agency's project-related activities into the
agency's own integral operations.
• (3) Integration of different project activities within each thrust,
e.g. extension delivery system, marketing assistance center,
and cooperatives development within the Outreach/Exten-
sion thrust.
(4) Integration of different thrust activities within one institu-
tion, i.e., Central Luzon State University is involved both in
the academic, technological packaging, and Outreach/Exten-
sion thrusts.
(5) Integration of the different agencies, institutions, their lead-
ers and personalities. At the operational level, much of the
integrative problems are really interpersonal problems.
(6) Integration of American consultants into the thrusts and into
working relationships with Filipinos.
(7) Integration of the different thrusts toward the attainment
of Project Purpose. Outputs from one or two thrusts could be
inputs into another and corresponding results fed back into
the thrusts that originally provided the outputs. This could"
be label led problem-solving integration.
The complexity of this integrating process is articulated
in the following:
There is a great deal of communicationlinkagesand information
flows •which need to evolve, developand be institutionalizednot in
an administrativeintegrationbut in a mutually informed consideration
of their respective plans, decisions, and actions geared toward a
common purposeof increasingthe productivity and income of small
farmers.As many threadsaspossiblehaveto bewovenwithin, between,
and among thrusts, agencies, institutions and personalitiesso that
IAPMP can beginto operateasone project and nora seriesof parallel,
related, yet, independent sub-proiect_ This is the essenceof what
functional integration meansin the contextof projectobjectives.
The IAPMP Project in its totality is manyprojectsall at once. It is
applied research;it is agribusiness;it is extension; it is cooperatives
development; it is non-formal education; it is non-degreeshort-term
training; it is undergraduateand graduatedegreecurriculumbuikJing;
it is MS/PhD and post-graduatestaff development;it is the translation
into action of an educationalphilosophyfor a regionalagriculturaluni-
versity; and it is an attempt to integrateproduction, processingand
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marketing. It is vertically oriented in a sense,becauseit rangesfrom
elementsof national policy at the top, to considerationof smallfarm-
ers' problemsat the village.From the farmer side, thereis inclusionof
both horizontaland verticalorganizationsincooperativesdevelopment
starting from the SamahangNayon (the village cooperatives), the
Agricultural MarketingCooperatives,and the CooperativeRuralBanks.
The Project is multi-agencyandmulti-institutional, involvinga clientele
of variouseducationallevelsfrom gradeschoolto PhD., but hopefully
all "tied" togetherby a commonconcernfor thosewho are at the vital,
but lower,end of the agriculturaldevelopmentspectrum. It iswittingly
or unwittingly concernedwith institution buildingfrom the Samahang
Nayon at the village level, to policy planning bodies at the national
I_=vel,to academiain the Philippinesand the United States.Whoever
designedthe IAPMP Projectcouldnot possiblybe lackingin imagina-
tion or vision. This descriptionis not merely an exercisein putting
words together but is meant to showthe complexitiesof the project.
Any assessmentof performancemust, therefore, be premisedon this
basiccharacter.51
The IAPMP is creative, complex, timely and relevant. Precisely
because of these qualities, it is difficult to implement. The manage-
ment style requires coordinating without compelling; integrating
without absorbing especially when institutions and personalities are
equally prirna-donnas and relationships are more collegial rather than
super-ordinate-subordinate,
Integrating instruments range from the Project Paper as a com-
mon document; communication linkages through a variety of means;
identifying and working on areas of complementarity and supple-
mentarity such as common information and data needs, purposes,
implementation and evaluation methodologies, and performance
indicators operationalized through the work flow; full utilization of
skills and talents of project personnel even across thrust andagency
boundaries; resource or material linkages which tie the whole project
together.
As in other integrated projects, the hypothesis is that "if inte-
gration actually exists, then the sum total of the products of inte-
grated activities will be higher than when these different activities
are done independently. ''s2
b. How will small farmers benefit from the Project?
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The IAPMP is very much an institution-building and manpower
development project as shown in Figure 6.3.
While the TechnologyPackagingThrust in combinationwith the Outreach/
ExtensionThrust appear to have a direct potential contributionto small
farmer productivity and income,more national policiesarisingfrom data
systemsimprovement, enhancedanaly:ticalcapability etc. and expanded
manpower in the food systemspossessedwith new knowledgeand skills
would improve the environment within which production takes place
and procluctsmove to market more efficiently. For example,the ability
to determine the consequencesof a Particular commodity price policy
on the income of the small farmer and to make decisionsin the light of
suchknowledge is certainly not inconsequentialin its likely impact. The
outputsfrom the academicandpolicythrustsmay be moreindirect,but are
nonethelessinstrumentalmeans for attainingthe purpose.However, the
ethosof what is taught and how it is taught and broughtto bearon small
• farmer problemsmust permeatethe curricularofferihgs,trainingprograms,
and policy researchactivities.There must be a deliberateeffort to analyze
how each policy would affect the intendedbeneficiariesof the project. In
the academicprogramaswell as in policy•analysis,there mustbe • built-in
sensitivityto this major purpose.This would be helpedalongby a planned
exposure of those involved in the implementation of the policy and
academicthruststo the realitiesof agriculturaland rural developmentin
generaland smallfarmerproblemsin particular.53
However, as Figure 6.3 shows, increasing farmers and rural enter-
preneurs' income and level of living is a "little corner piece" of the
entire system. It is largely an indirect impact. Whatever direct effects
accrue to farmers will come as a by-product of the institution-
building and manpower •development system of activities.•
C. The Dynamics of Integration and Coordination •
•Planning and designing integration is one thing; implementing
it is something else. What are some of the complexities, subtleties,
and difficulties involved both in "thought and in deed"? It is neces-
saw to unravel what is imbedded in such an alluring concept as
integration because as one of the Bicol project documents states:
"The evaluative feedback of implementation experience is important
for the design of new projects." In this section, we present some
reflections on integration and coordination which were generated by
actual experiences in project implementation.
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a. Team Work
The Pilot Study of a Cooperative Approach in Rural Develop-
ments4 which was carried out in 8 Laguna villagesfrom 1963-1970
providesus some thought and observationson 4 conceptsof "work-
ing together" quite often used in rural development: coordination,
cooperation, integration and team work. Coordination means "to
bring into common action members of equal rank or order for a
harmonious adjustment or functioning"; cooperation, "to act or
operate jointly with another or others"; integration, "to form
into a whole - to unite or become unitedso as to form a complete
or perfect whole"; and team work, "work done by a number of asso-
ciates all subordinatingpersonal prominenceto the efficiency of the
whole."
In this Project where each team was made up of a crop techni-
cian, a livestock technician and a community development worker,
the team members were asked about their interpretation of team
approach. Their responseswere as follows:
Team approach is:
[] a working procedure (how the team operates)
[] a processdesignedto facilitate team operations in a larger
scale
[] a method with which to carry out job responsibilitieseffec-
tively andefficiently
[] a close coordination of activities such that every member of
the team must contribute to the successof the job being
performed
E3 a system of working wherein different techniciansplan and
coordinate their functionstoward a certain goal
[] a processby which a group works cooperatively for a com-
mon goal
[] the understanding, hence knowing of each other's duties or
activities for possiblecoordination in order to avoid conflicts.
While team approach provides for opportunity to comple-
ment or augment each other's work, it can also function as
a limiting factor in the operations of a particular team mere-
her.
This latter interpretation recognizesthe possiblelimiting effect
of team approach. In present-daydesignsfor coordination and coop-
eration we tend to see only the advantagesbut not the drawbacks.
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It has been pointed out that the "anticipated resu/ts of coordinated
efforts must be extra compensating to offset the cost of cooperating
in terms of the sacrifice cooperators have to make both as individuals
and as members of particular agencies vested with specific respon-
sibilities. "
All the techniciansin the Project agreed that they were working
as a team and the following were cited as evidencesto support their
contention:
a. Each has his own field of specialization and we respecteach
other's job in the performance of our work.
b. We plan our activities together and decide on our individual
planswith the group.
c. In farmers' classes,the technician concerned handles subject
matter in his field of specialization. When casesof animal
diseaseswhich are beyond my competencearisein my barrio,
I call on the livestock technician but I do the follow-up.
d. In the performance of our duties we work cooperativelyand
every member isindispensableto the team.
e. We plan our weekly activities and solve our problems as a
group or as a team.
These evidencesreveal a strongactivity-orientation in their inter-
pretation of team approach with togetherness asa dominant feature.
An analysisof the actual field operationsreveals5 facetsof the team
approach:
[] teamas a smallgroup (withfocusonthe individualswhomakeupthe
team and their interrelationshipsto eachother).This involvesgroup
identityandesprit'decorps.
I'1 teamof functions(with a focuson teammembers'fieldsof specializa-
tion(,
[] teamsquad(with a focuson beingtogetherphysicallyforcompanion-
ship).Theteammembersweremovingphysicallytogethermostof the
time.
[] interagencyteam (with a focuson the agencies'team memberspre-
sent).
[] problem.solvingteam(withafocusondefinedproblemsandananalysis
of the role which particularteam memberscan play in solvingthe
problem).
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Of these 5 facets, the problem-so ring rationale for having a
team was least evident in their own operations.The maintenanceof
the team as a team became very important and its original•raison
d'etre becamealmost secondary.Actually, the team was organized
becausedevelopment problems transcend specific fields of speciali-
zation and specificagenciesand not becausewe want workers to be
together. One of the net effects of the "team groupness", however,
was that each member acquired some degree of expertisefrom his
other teammates thus, making all of them more broadly competent
than before. In this sense,an"integration" of subjectmatter speciali-
zation has taken place within the team members. An assumptionof
this Project isthat:
•The best resultsin agriculturalextensionand developmentcanbe
obtainedwhen the workof the separateagenciesarecoordinatedat the
farmlevelsothateachagencyrepresentedcanmakeitsmaximumcontribu-
tiontothe improvementof farmsandhomes.
This assumptionremainspretty much an assumption. It is diffi-
cult to prove by itself because"best" •implies in comparisonwith
other waysof doingthingssuchaseachagencyproceeding•separately.
The assumption also carried another assumption that individual
agencieshave what it takes to perform their functions and that the
0nly thing required• is to coordinate their work•.•••This is not nece_
sarily so. Bringing an "effective" agencywith a "sluggish" one could
give the latter a "lift" or the former could be negativelycontamina-
ted. The resulting "chemistrY, from "coordinating''• different ele-
ments is not alwaysa matter of addition or mu,tiplicatlon. Coordina-
tion implies equality among the differen_ agenciesinvolved, Opera-
tionally, what doesequality mean?Equality in stature? In resources?
In contribution to the project? Or in opportunity to participate in
decision-making?When the agencywhich initiates coordination con-
tributes• substantially more in terms of personnel, funds and other
resources, and assumesmore than its equal share of responsibility•
for seeingit through, what happensto the _quality betweencoordi-
nator and "coordinated". Beyondthe point of barely noticeable im-
•balance,•joint•or coordinated efforts•eventually end up as a one-
agency dominated project with other organizations providing sup-
porting services.This can be better described as the lead agency
concept.
RuralDevelopmentandIntegration 435
b, Lead Agency Concept
To implement sucha concept in the Libmanan-Cabusaointegra-
ted area developmentwith the National Irrigation Administration as
the lead agency, a memorandum of agreement was signedamong 12
agenciesat the National level and 7 at the regional level, "to assure
that the project would have adequate personnel to implement an
integrated extension program and adequate control over those per-
sonnel to truly integrate their activities.''5s To incorporate non-NIA
personnel, they were to be detailed to the project without jeopar-
dizing promotional opportunities. NIA would maintain personnel
records, pay salaries,wagesand/or incentiveallowances;and conduct
performance evaluation of the personneldetailed to the project. The
execution of the agreement was something different, however. The
cooperating agencieshaveassignedtheir personnelto the project in
varying degreesranging from being "assigned or deployed"; "need
and call basis"; "work and coordinate activities with"; "full-time
detail with conditions"; and "committed on detail". Honadle pre-
sents2 viewswith respectto this "mutation" of the agreement:
(a) without authority over all personnel, integration will not
occur
(b) the memo does not realistically reflect organizationaldyna-
micsand the mutation processwasmerely adjustingto actual
conditions. Both views call for a decision to either fully
implement the original plan or to redesignthe structurewith-
in which agricultural personneloperate. In either case,Ho-
nadle points out that: "a solution createsother problems".
From the perspective of many line agencies,"project organiza-
tion has had marginal effect on their activitieswithin the municipa-
lities of Libmanan and Cabusao. Personnel records have not been
moved to the project, incentive allowanceshave not been givenand,
in spite of memo of agreement and letters assigningpersonnel,the
line agencies essentially retain the services of their technicians in
their own programs . . . activities have also largely remained unin-
tegrated". Honadle saysthat: "without team-building, it is doubtful
that service delivery will be integrated into a coherent or efficient
process. Although team-building may be necessary,it is not suffi-
cient. Informal group dynamics may be the mostimportant element
in project managementduring stressperiods, but when conflicting
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demands are made upon personnel by the project and the line agen-
cies, structure may dominate the outcome." When the "chips are
down", so to speak, project personnel will give priority to demands
of the agency where 1;heir "bread and butter" comes from. In situa-
tions like those, a lead agency might very well recruit its own staff to
carry out functions expected of other agencies. When this occurs,
duplication rather than integration results.
c. Organization and Management of "Integration"
On organization design, Honalde argues that:
. . . organizationand managementdoes make a difference [but] alsocon.
cedesthat "the exact role of organizational factors is elusive." That is,
although structures,proceduresetc. can be stated it is often difficult to
visualizethe effects of specificvariableson specificprojectoutcomes.Fur-
thermore,the stateof the art has not advancedto the pointwherespecific
relationships.., can be quantified. Thuschoiceremainssubjective... And
finally.., appropriate project organizations are situational. That is, identi-
cal formal arrangementscan function very differently in dissimilarenviron-
ments or with dissimilarpeople... In fact, organizationcharts often bear
little resemblanceto actual decision-makingprocessesin rural development
projects... The difficulty of organizationdesigndoesnot decreaseits im-
portance.One way to improve the situation is to turn to a casestudyand
extract from it a rudimentarysketchof a few important landmarksin the
organizationalterrain of ruraldevelopmentprojects,
This lessthan sanguine assessment of the role of organization and
management in development has likewise been revealed by Sapolsky
in connection with PERT (Program Evaluation and Review Tech-
nique) which is "one of the frequently 'tooted' tools for managing
complex tasks involving the synchronization of multiple organiza-
tional units." The author has the following to say about the PERT
myth:
PERT was invented in the U.S. Navy SpecialProjectsOffice which
developedthe Polarisweaponssystem.The Polarisproject wasa greatsuc-
cessand managementtechniciansconsiderit one of the most effectiveap-
plicationsof managementsystemstechnology.
HOW did Polaris succeed? What was the contribution of PERT?
The not unintended impressiongiven in the numerousbriefings,offi-
cial documentsand approved(or planted) newspaperand magazinereports
Rural Developmentand Integration 437
describingPolarismanagementtechniqueswas that at last there hadbeen
devisedan integratedmanagementsystemwhich could copewith the com-
plexitiesof technologicaldevelopment.. Sincethe technologicalsuccessof
the Polariscould be attributed to the SpecialProjectOffice's management
techniques,or so it seemed,Polarisbecamea modelfor the managementof
largescaletechnologyprogram¢
HOW instrumental were such devices as PERT to the success of
the project for which they were developed?
In the caseof Polaris,scientificmanagementtechniqueshad little to
do with the successof the project.The real management of the program was
carried out in an intensely personal fashion throughsmall, informal meet-
ings, and frequent telephone calls Publicbriefingsandmeetingswere staged
for the benefit of an audiencethat soughtto end the project on grounds
of bad management.The tools that formed the'model for the management
of large-scaletechnologicalprograms.., either were not appliedon a sig-
nificant scalein the operationsof the SpecialProjectsOffice (SPO)... or
they were applied, but did not work or they wereappliedandworked, but
had a totally different purposethan that officially ascribed.The existence
of an integrated uniquely effec¢ivemanagementsystem wasa myth origina-
ted by the SPO. The further removedit wasfrom the source,the moreem-
bossedthe mYth tended to become.
The lesson Sapolsky find; in the Polaris experience is that though
PERT was:
aseffectivetechnically as rain dancing,it was neverthelessquite effec-
tive politically... The chief utility of the systemwasnot control of the or-
ganizationbut the appearanceof formal rationalitywhichcouldbe present-
ed to outsideagencies.The successof Polaris wasnot due 1oapplied par_
digms of scientific management. It dependedmuch more on a messy,highly
redundant mode of personal communication and initiative (admittedly in
pursuit of a clear goal), the very patterns condemnedasarchaicandwaste-
ful by many managementconsultantsandsystemsengineers.56
If a technological project such as the Polaris required intense per-
sonal communications in its management, one can only hazard a
guess as to how much of this ingredient would be demanded of "in-
tegrators" in integrated rural development, in other words, the inter-
actions required between .and among structures, bureaucratic and
community personalities and people beneficiaries in an integrated
rural development project could indeed be considerable. The deve-
lopment task are not as clearcut and specifically defined as those of
the Polaris.
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d. Coordination, Integration and Authority
De Guzman in his analysis of "coordination in Government
Delivery Systems", makes the following observations:
• . . the delivery of most governmentservicesat the local levelsis
presently done by variousfield administrators/workerswho are related
to their respectivedepartments•by direct •linesof command. The field
agentsoperating•in a common local governmentarea belongto separate
functional (sectoral)hierarchiesresponsiblefor different governmentpro-
grams/services.There is no generalistrepresentativeof the governmentin
• the areaexercisingoverall responsibilityfor all functions.Thereare studies
which have shown•that this setup has resulted in inconsistentpolicies
and uncoordinated,unsynchronized,fragmented anddiscontinuousimple-
mentation of policiesand programs,so that peopleare not ableto obtain
•complete and•integrated packages of development projectsand services,
It is true that, in an attempt to avoidtheseprograms,coordinatingbodies
•have been set-upat the variouslevels,i.e. •developmentcouncilsat the re-
gional, provincial, city and municipal levels.However, suchdevelopment
councilshavebeenobservedto be generallyweak.
At the municipal level, one areaof reform to remedythe problemof a
lack of a Unified directionat the local level is to transformthe localexecu-
tives from political into careerexecutivesandprovidingthem with adequate
authority to go with their responsibility. Under thisproposedscheme,the
local executivesbecomeareadevelopment managerswho representahigher
authority than thosewhosepolicies,plans,and actionsare to be coordina-
ted. He is to be vestedwith certainpowers, and held responsible by the
central governmentfor carryingout all the functionsin a givenarea.Field
functionalspecialistsreceivetheir orders from him... With an areadevelop-
ment manageroverseeingthe developmentefforts beingcarriedout in one
areaand exercising formal authority over variousfield specialists,aunified
approach to developmentcan beeffected at the local levels...
With respect to the Regional Development Council (RDC), de
Guzman attributes its weakness as a coordinating body in the imple-
mentation of development programs and projects to its lack of
substantive and meaningful authority. It has no power to allocate
• funds and •determine priorities for the region; It even has no formal
authority over its own members. The suggestion for strengthening
the RDC was to vest in it - particularly in the Chairman - adequate
authori_ in order to be able to command the respect and exact
the cooperation of the other officials in the region. s7 (Underscoring
supplied)
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From de Guzman's view, aub_oriry and control is the basis for
strong coordination and integration and the preference is for higher
authority to command respect and exact cooperation from the
agencies being coordinated or integrated. Given this argument, in-
tegration could be a euphemism for centralized control of func-
tions, funds, and personnel of different development agencies in the
name of more effective pursuit of development objectives. Integra-
tion conveys no flavor of equality among parts being integrated.
Absorption in the process of amalgamating disparate pieces into a
whole could even be read into the concept. To be integrated could
mean "to be taken over' and an abso/ute d/ctatorsh/p could be the
ultimate in integration. How does one reconcile higher authority
and control as a basis for coordinative and integrative strength with
people participatory requirements of integrated rural development?
e. Process Considerations in Integration
1. The Case of Integrated Areas Development
Ocampo et al says that:
the generalthesisembodiedin the Libmanan-CabusaoIntegratedArea
Developmentis that an integrated multi_*omponent approach would create
a greater net positive impact that anapproach in which the components are
designed and implemented separately or sequantially. In other words,since
the L/C lAD Project is supposedto integratethe irrigation,agriculturaland
institutionalcomponents,itsoverall impactor benefit wouldbe greaterthan
the sumof the effectsof the samecomponentsindividuallypursued,i.e. one
at atime or moreor lesssimultaneouslybut by differentagencies... Central
to the argumentbehindthe approachis not only the designof the project
but also the processof its implementation... Multisectoral scopeandtem-
poral simultaneily are necessarybut not sufficient conditions here;some
degreeof integrationmust alsobe designedand maintainedto actually pro;
duce the =ynergigticeffects anticipated and desired.In general,integration
impliescongruenceor fit andcoherencein the relationsof a system'sele-
ments and thus a common directionfor its consequences.Integration may
thus take place at various stagesand levelsof a project, and its presence
anddegreemay be indicated.., in the followingterms:
(a) Consistencyamongthe impactsof the project
(b) Complementarity (mutual or unilateral support) among its out-
putsandamongits inputsin spatialandfunctionalterms
(c) Coordinationof the inputsandof the outputs
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An lAD seeks "to achieve consistent impacts in terms of the welfare
of the community." For example, an irrigation project should not be built
in such a manner that the environment is ruined and its useful life shortened
to the disadvantage of farmers. Productivity objectives must not be pursued
at the expense of employment considerations.
Ocampo el" al suggests that complimentarily may be indicated by
whether or not (or the extent to which) an output unilaterally or mutually
supports other inputs and together help magnify an impact. For example
- the use of HYV's is enhanced by the installation of an irrigation system.
Additionally, greater emphasis on institutional processes should reinforce
the effects of technical and physical elements. Whether or not certain other
outputs or conditions necessary for the sufficient functioning of the system
have been missed by a Project (e.g., postharvest _acilities) is another con-
sideration captured by the complementarity concept. The opposite ...
would be a competitive substitute for another, aswhen farm machines re-
place labor, though one may well ask whether the presence of alternatives
is necessarily bad (and whether, on balance, labor intensity on the farm is
increased rather than decreased due to other factors such as irrigation). The
limiting case is where redundancies or excessive costs occur and a point of
diminishing returns is reached.
Coordination of inputs and of output elements is the main integrative
burden of the active intervenors in the system, including especially the
government administrative machinery and social organizations or leaders in
the community. Complementarities, and consistency among impacts aswell,
would be greatly assured if the agencies and community members coordinaP
ted their inputs in time and space... The rigors of the approach may call
for intra- as well as inter-organizational aggregation and integration. From
the viewpoint of government agencies, the issue of integration in an lAD
arises in this form: the extent to which the sectoral agencies at different
levels should engage in collaborative relationships and indeed, the feasibility
of centralizing and unifying sactoral activities within a single agency for the
purposes of an area-specific project .... AdministTatlve integration could
take place at the interagency, agency, and even position levels and could
be detected by formal and informal indicators... What do the organization
charts show in terms of both structure and functions? Do the agency repre-
sentetives meet regularly, forge agreements, and live up to their commit-
ments? Do they time and pace their respective activities so that they are
synchronized and continuous, and are not confusing to other participants?
Despite (or because of) the collaborative or coordinative mechanisms, are
responsibilities and rewards for performance clearly delineated (in the L/C
lAD, differential rewards seem to have been a dtstingrative factor, suggesting
the need for a common compensation for the agencies involved). Is there
a systematic monitoring process that effectively feeds back information to
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control or regulateindividualand inter-agencyactivitiesand project pro-
gress?., . Are client organizationsconceivedandmotivatedasintegralparts
of the 'servicedeliverysystem'or isa cleardistancemaintainedbetweenthe
agenciesand their reapective"clients'?The implementingagenciescouldso
succeedin thesetasksthat the community itselfcould sustainthe integra*
tive processat later stagesfor variouspurposes.But there isalso the riskof
co.optation_ domination, anddependency._ (Underscoringsupplied)
Given the major preoccupation of government bureaucracies with
administrative territorialities, the adrn/n/strat/ve integration aspect of
lAD occupies center stage in implementation problems. To make it
happen therefore, as de Guzman recommends, greater authority and
control is often asked for. When this is achieved, then co-optation,
domination and dependency are not only risks. They become the
essence of integration. At least in theory, integrated rural develop-
ment is supposed to be problem-focused, people-oriented, and area.
based. But in actual operations, it is the pursuit of administrative
integration which seems to dominate but does not necessarily suc-
ceed.
2. The Case of Functional Integration
In the Integrated Agricultural Production and Marketing Project
(iAPMP) which is different from lAD in the sense that it is function-
al rather than area integration, Vincent and Rivera present a number
of elements in the integrative linkages which seems to be quite apro-
pos to lAD:
(a) Organic relationships
The organ izational charts providecluesas to how the varioussub_
unitsof the project relateto eachotheradministratively.
(b) Participative relationships
The levelof participation in integrativefunctions . . . is not re-
solvedin tablesof organizationand plansof work. It entailssuchmat-
ters as vestedinterests,incentivesand rewards, it involvesthe personal
costsof gaininginformationabout the work of othersandin evaluating
the benefitsand lossesthat accruefrom substitutingjoint effort for
individualeffort. At the administrativelevel, the issueis one of ascer-
taining whether the fulfillment of individualthrust and sub-thrustob-
jectivesadd to the fulfillment of overallprojectgoals,orwhetherthere
is undue duplication or inadequateeffort in the pursuit of a common
sub-projectgoal. From an economicperspective,there is a cost to coor-
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dination and the providing of information for aU program actors and
the pay-off to this cost needs to be evaluated...
To acquire the requisite awareness/understanding of what other
individuals are doing or attempting to do, an investment must be made.
Any timeor money spent on acquiring such awareness/understanding is
lost for employment in any alternative activity.
(c) Interest group relationships
The matter of vested interest is closely allied with the incentive/
reward scheme. The level of one's vested interest in the outcomes of the
project may be related to positions of authority and/or perceived
career/professional pay:offs. But they may also be enhanced or dimi-
nished by both monetary (honoraria, perquisites of the job)and non-
monetary (prestige, recognition, sense of Security, etc.) rewards and in-
centives.
(d) Supplementary relationships
By definition, the relationship is supplementary if a given amount
of committed resources, the output of B increaseswith no change in
the outPut of A. The output of B is enhanced if, for a minimal effort, B
is able to utilize a by-product of A. If A provides to B at little or no
cost, something needed by B, then it is possible for B's output to be
increased without having to duplicate the effort of A.
Examplu 1, price data generated by the Bureau of Agricultural
Economics (A)may be routinely provided to the Policy Thrust (B1)
for use in policy analysis; to the Technology Packaging Trust (B2) for
use in the economic analysis of technology packages, and to the acade-
mic thrust (B3) for research purposes.
Example 2, Training materials developed by one institution can be
Used by another institution for comparable training programs.
(e) Complementary relationships
The relationship is complementary if the output of A increases
with an increase in the output of B. Complementarity always exists
where the output from a group exceeds that of the sum of the output
of the individual group members working independently. Collaboration
does not ensure complementarity but it is difficult to find complemen-
tarity without it.
Example, collaboration between the Extension-0utreach and Tech-
nology Packaging ThrUsts could have complementary relationships in
tile sense that the nature of the technology determines the extent to
which it will be diffused and adopted in the Outreach thrust. On the
RuralDevelopmentand Integration 443
other hand, insightsfrom the ExtensionDeliverySystemif fed backto
the Technology PackagingThrust can provide valuable information
about farmers' technology needsand their responseto technology
packageswhich can help in redesigningor in developlng new tech-
nology.
(f) Competitive relationships
Participantsin an integratedprojectmay perceivemany activities,
involvingmany othersto be competitive.That is, for a givenresource
commitment, an increasein the output of A resultsina decreasein the
output of B. Competitiverelationshipsif duplicativetend to beredun-
dant and are therefore, costly in the longrun. Becauseof limitedre-
sourcesin the form of funds, personnel,and their specializedskills,
competitiverelationshipsare extremelycommon.
Example 1, The work load of Universityfaculty membersis very
heavy. It seemsimpossibleto do everythingthey want to do and are
expectedto do. If a new activity is to beaddedto the work loadsome
activity must be given up or someother strategiesmust be employed
(suchas afinancial incentiveto makethe work day/weeklonger).
Example2, Increasedinvolvementor understandingof the work of
one thrust by the participantsof another thrust may be regardedas
"somethingelse to contendwith; an interruptionin one'sown program
of work, in short, acompetitive relationship.''59
3. Problem-Generated "Integration "_°
The Dairy Training and Research Institute (DTRI) of the Univer-
sity of the Philippines at Los Ba_os has a milk collection scheme
which involves milking animals as a backyard activity of small
farmers and landless households in a depressed and isolated area of
Jala-jala, Rizal. Technical support such as breeding, veterinary
services, and continuing extension education goes with the milk col-
lection system. Considering the low incomes in the area, milk pay-
ments make up a sizeable portion of total family income among pro-
ject participants. However, as the milk collection proceeded, and on
the basis of the community problems which became obvious to pro-
ject implementors, several other components were added at different
stages, e.g., feeding program for malnourished children; nutrition
education for mothers and schoolchildren; vegetable production
among mothers and teachers; family planning (mostly tubal ligation);
Barangay Health System which involves the training of Barangay
health aides; pharmacy aides and the establishment of Botika sa
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Baryo (village drugstore); Veterinary Health System which includes
the training of para-veterinariansand Botika sa Hayop (Veterinary
drugstore);sewingclasses;and householdwater supply through water
pumps. A reforestation project is also beingcontemplated for fuel,
livestock feed, fruit growing and bamboosfor fishpens,and erosion
control purposes. It should be noted, however,that theseother com-
ponents come in only after a milk collectionschemehasbeen estab-
lished.
This dairy-based rural development project is not planned inte-
gration in the manner that other integrated projectshave been con-
ceptualized and charted. There is no comprehensiveframework plan,
no integration model, no elaborate planningprocess.Project compo-
nents were added on an ad hoc, opportunistic basisin responseto
problems met in the depressedcommunities of the area where social
serviceswere practically non-existent. Therefore, any input is an
addition in terms of expected impact. It is not really a caseof coor-
dinating or integratingwork of different agenciesbecausethere was
none to coordinate or integrate, It isa multi-sectoralproject adminis-
tered by one institute which soughtthe cooperation of other agen-
cies such as the ComprehensiveCommunity Health Programof the
College of Medicine, the Rural Health Unit, the Bayanikasan Re-
search Foundation (a small private foundation), the municipal
government, the Mary Johnston Hospital, etc., as the need for their
assistancearises.The compellingforce in the addition of components
is the plight of the rural poor, There is no complex organizational
overlay of bureaucrats and experts who capture overheadexpenses
and no big money for incentive pay to workers. Whatever meager
resourcesare available find their way to the communities in termsof
milk payments, family planning,health and other services.
This project in a depressedrural poor, isolatedarea which does
not have a sophisticated blue-printed conceptual model of integra-
tion has never gained enthusiasticsupport from the University. Be-
causethe place cannot easily be reached except by crossingthe not-
so-placid Laguna Lake, it is not convenient for visitors"concerned"
with the rural poor and it is not attractive for "rural development
tourism" either. The staff were constantly criticized for loading the
dairy project with non-dairy components and for engagingin a sub-
sidized scheme. Little do people realize that the huge agricultural
loan programsof government are de facto subsidiesbecauseof the
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high loan defaults and uncollectibles. It is likewise difficult to point
to any government sponsoredprogram which is not heavily subsi-
dized especiallyduring the pioneering stages.This stageof affairs is
further aggravatedwhen one movesto marginalcommunities.
Cooperation from other units of the University and from other
agencieshas not beeneasyto obtain becausecrossingthe Lake is not
only high risk, but also gratis et amore. Unlike most researchand
action programswhich offer honoraria for involvement, this project
had none to use as incentive. In the meantime, the University con-
tinues to espouseits commitment to the rural poor and to its philo-
sophy of multi<lisciplinary approachto problem-solvingwhile multi-
sectoral rural development projects which accrue to the programde-
signersand implementors abound. The subsidy on milk payments
could be regarded as development_riented income transfers to the
rural poor without the indignity of an outright dole-out. With the
cost of the program goesnon-dairy socialserviceswhich are urgently
needed in the area andwhich serveasalternative entry pointsfor the
milk collection scheme.Becauseof the seasonality of milk availabi-
lity, non-dairy components keep the communities in theprogram
even when milking animals are temporarily dry. One of the out-
comes of this tenaciousattempt to continue working in this hard-to-
reach area is the prick of conscienceit hasgenerated from agencies
such as the municipal government which, by jurisdiction, should be
paying attention to theseproblems.The final criticism of the project
revolves around the question: "Is it DTRI's job to be engaged in
multisectoral rural development? Whose job is it really? It would be
ideal, indeed, if relevant units of the University and other develop-
ment agencies would participate and contribute their particular
sectoralservicesto the project but suchcontributions were not forth-
coming despite repeated attempts to invite them. Reasons for this
havealready beencited.
This particular casehasbeen cited to underscorethe problemsof
reachingthe rural poor. There must be no illusionsabout the difficul-
ties involved and the realities one has to confront in the pursuit of
this "development-fashionable" objective.
4. An Additional Dimension to Integration
The most important argument for integrated rural development
(IRD) is the interrelatednessof factors, the systemic,holistic nature
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of development problems. If a project is multisectoral and integrated,
is it also necessary for participant-beneficiaries themselves to perceive
this integration, the interrelationship among the different compo-
nents? Is the understanding of integration important only for pro-
gram design and implementation but not essential for intended bene-
ficiaries?
Ocampo, in his study of tubal ligation adopters in the Dairy-
Based Rural Development Project, found the following:
• (a) Not all the ligate householdsknew of the Milk Collection Program,the
umbrellaprogramunderwhich family planning•operated.Someof them
viewedthe dairy asindependentof the family planningcampaign.
(b) Not all the milk collectioncooperatorswere ableto seea relationship
betweenthe dairy andfamily planningcomponents.
(c) Even among thosewho perceiveda relationshipbetweendairying and
family planning, the main relationship perceived was that the dairy
technicianandthe family planningmotivatorworked togetherandwere
from the sameinstitution.
(d) A question may be asked as to whether it really matters.True, some
clients did not perceive the interrelationship,but they did get the
service. Some milk cooperators perceive quite clearly the concep-
tual and operational integrationof family planningand dairying, But
they did not adopt ligation.Whichis the "better" situation?
(el Servicesoffered under an integrated rural developmentprogramare
likely to havedifferential relevanceto clients,Hencetherewill be diffe-
rentialadoption and impact. For example, some householdsmay have
milking animals (henceare prospectivecooperatorsfor dairying)but
have noneor only onechild hencearenot yet interestedin family plan-
ning. Or the reversesituationmayexist.Operationally,therefore,parti-
cipation in one need not be associatedwith nor be contingenton the
other, i
(f) Conceptually,the integrationcould be madeclear. But to what extent
can it be expectedthat rural peoplewould seethisrelationship?(Even
amongUPLB constituentsthis integrationis far from clear.) Hencesuch
a remark as: '_Vhat hasfamily planninggot to do with dairy produc-
tion?"
(g) That the clientsshouldperceivethe integrationof diverseComponents
of a program is important. It meansthat the agencyhassuccessfully
packagedits programfor clear presentation.But it is not really that
critical for adoption, for clients to avail of services,for recipient to
benefit.61
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f. The Complexities of/nterdisciplinaryApproaches
Integrated ruraldevelopment impliesinterdisciplinaryapproaches.
The United Nations University which hashad a five-yeareffort on an
interdisciplinary dialogue on world hunger bringing together social
scientists (Human and Social Development Programme) (HSD) and
nutritional scientists(World Hunger Programme)reports the follow-
ing:
(1) "Real interdisciplinarity is difficult to achieve" - all the
more sowhen the effort involvesscholarsfrom many cultures
and schoolsof thought.
(2) In generalterms, the socialscientistsargued that "hunger and
malnutrition are merely the most obvious symptoms of a
much more complex set of societal issueswhich must be re-
solvedbefore world hunger can be eliminated". On the other
hand, the nutritional scientistsexpresseda concern for what
could or should be done in the meantime, while suchfunda-
mental societal changeswere coming about, for the millions
of peoplewho are hungry now....
(3) The general thrust of the social scientistsis to emphasizethe
holistic approach - a processby which a large number of
variables are considered simultaneously..... Whereas the
World Hunger Programme is oriented toward the identifica-
tion and amelioration of specific needs(e.g. nutritional defi-
ciencies,post-harvestfood lossesetc.), the Human and Social
Development Programme proposesthat few, if any, effective
long-term developmental consequencescan be obtained for
viewing and acting upon such needsapart from the broader
context of social, cultural, economicand political issueswith
which they are inextricably bound.
(4) The critical question left unanswered is: "How does one
enter into the reality?" Holisrn is a concept with an infinite
capacity of extension and meaningsbut itneeds to be opera-
tionalized. Real problems are "the expressionof actual pro-
cessesin given conditions and haveto be tackled with action
rather than words..." This "reality check" is a constant re-
quirement which assessesthe translation of theory into prac-
tice. 6_
These experiences highlight the intractability of interdisciplina-
rity when one operationalizes. The dilemma between the exigencies
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of "now" and the demandsof basic long-term societal changesis a
tough oneto resolve.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The international developmentcommunity, including the Philip-
pines had gone full circle in its rural development strategies.From
the holistic approach of the community developmentera, the Philip-
pines, for instance,went to singlecommodity production programs
suchas rice, corn, etc., and then back to the interrelatednessof fac-
tors embodied in integrated rural development. This Chapter briefly
examined the concept of integrated rural development; reviewedthe
Philippine versionsof integration in rural development;and analyzed
the dynamics of integrationand coordination.
The Concept of Integrated Rural Development
The new international consensuson rural development that had
evolved since the early 1970's is a more integrated and community.
based approach. Integrated rural development is multidisciplinary
in approach; multi-sectoral in operation; focused on the rural poor;
adopts a total systems aproach; is to be implemented in a defined
geographicalarea; implies a package program;,requires changesin
target group population as well as in the change system; and has
two major objectives: accelerated economic growth with wider
participation and most equitable distribution of its gains. Increasing
capacity and commitment of the people to be involved in the dev-
evelopment process is basic to the operational strategy of iRD.
Although advocates had attempted to distinguish IRD from com-
munity development, there were thosewho upheld the revivalistview
that the new IRD was in fact a revivalof old CD. Nevertheless,trans-
lating IRD into effective actions had been acknowledgedto be more
difficult than expected. In the meantime, developmentadministra-
tors had emergedas the new "technocratic heroes" in this new dev.
Iopment approach.
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Philippine Versions of Integration in Rural Development
To indicate the Philippines own experimentationsin integration,
severalversionsof integration in Philippine rural development were
reviewed.
(1) The CD era left a legacywhich could not be ignoredbecause
it was the first time the village had been the main focusof
national development.
(2) The Human Settlements approach isthe most comprehensive
of all integration becauseit brings together 11 basic needs
with corresponding auxiliary brigades at the village level;
country-wide in scope,both rural and urban;and cuts across
all Ministries. The approach demonstrates how integration
leadsto quick action when vestedin central authority.
(3) The River Basin integrated area development approach was
illustrated by the Bicol River Basin Development Program
(BRBDP) which was described as a test casein the govern-
ment's overall rural development strategy. It wassaidthat in
Bicol "the classicaldevelopment problems are all present".
The program included physical infrastructure; improvement
of essential services; land tenure reform; increasedagricul-
tural productivity; encouragement of private investment in
agri-businessand rural-based industries. The strategy took
into account urban-rural linkages, spatial integration, and
urban functions supportiveof rural development. A compre-
hensive appraisal of Bicol River Basin resourcesand how
these resourcescould be fully developed wasattempted. In
terms of institutional arrangements, the mandate was to
integrate national and local government programsin the area
and to decentralize planning and implementation of rural
development projects.To operationalize this mandate, there
were committees or teams from the sub-regionalto the muni-
cipal level. Feedback from the private sector was also pro-
vided for.
General observations on BRBDP as an integrated area
development approach could be summarizedas follows: (a)
BRBDP could be characterized as the development con-
sultant's paradise which had been one of the moststudied,
feasibility tested and evaluated rural development programs
in the country; (b) the system of articulatinga set of related
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activities in an area, packaging them into a single proposal
and coordinating implementation activities had beensuccess-
ful in that projects had been funded and Wereunderway; (c)
BRBDP wasa combination of Cabinet Godfather by way of a
Minister coordinator, a regional coordinating council, local
participation and foreign assistance; (d) the institutional
aspects were often perceived as "overdesigned" and too
complex; (e) the long gestationperiod for projects to "ma-
ture" and benefit rural peoplegave rise to some cynicism
expressed as the "The Bicol NEVER BASIN"; (f) social
soundnessanalysiswasemphasizedbut technicaland environ-
mental soundnessneeded as .much attention. The delicate
"physical balancing act_.was evident in the pursuit of infras-
tructure projects;(g).employment generation had been rather
modest relative to expectations; (h.) upland development,
although small and unheralded, had more direct impact on
upland farmers and showed integration in a problem-orient:
ed, functional, operational, "thinking small" manner in con-
trast to the sophisticated development management style.
The BRBDP Program Office which was created to "'in-
tegrate"- had a budget o f P'9 million with a 421 member staff
in 1981. This was judged as a "high overhead cost even for an
integrated area development program, the size of the Bicol
River Basin undertaking.": Perhaps this was the Program's
most positive experience in employment generation.
One candid observation on •"integration' in BRBDP said
that: "Coordination, rather integration was very •marked in
•terms of the. processof Bicol Program .implementation...
Integration is probably more useful as a planning device than
as an implementing procedure.-;... Integrated implementa-
lion isa largebite.than •most•systemscan chew."
But.the .mostcavalierassessmentof BRBDP was expressed•
as follows: "The concept of integrated area developmenthas
been talked and written about, and was put to trial.in Bicol.
The BRBDP is operational; it is getting attention all around;
and it isdrawing in resourcesfor rural development."
Theimpact of BRBDP on the socio-economicconditions
and quality of life of the poor majority in Bicol had been
largely undeterminedsofar...
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(4) Unlike the BRBDP, the Sub-ProvincialArea Integrated Rural
and Agricultural Development (AIRAD) project which was
initiated by the University of the Philippinesat Los BaSosin
cooperation with Quezon Province, covereda much smaller
area and was less complex. Its basic instrument was the
Framework Plan which was the overall guideof action by the
• different agenciesand people who would be involved in the
overall developmenteffort in the area. To achievethe values
embodied in the Framework Plan, the approachwas a Tech-
nocratic.Democratic Mix which had a technical planning
group that provided the technical substance of the plan.
Other groups of people were invited to participate only
during appropriate phasesof the planning process.Accom-
panying the Framework Plan was an integration map which
indicated the points of integration; integration instruments
and the identified integrators at differunt levels of integra-
tion. AIRAD had a training and education priority in its
•approach. Training influences productivity which contri-
butes to increased income, which in turn, contributes to
more efficient socialservicesandvice versa.The program had
no specific rural poverty orientation. Technocratic approach
to situational analysis was relied upon and not the "felt
needs" approach.
(5) Unified Training and Area Isolate Development. The Philip-
pine Training Center for Rural Development (PTC-RD) was
established to effect a unified training program to develop
the technical capabilities as well as the functional effective-
ness of the manpower from different agenciesinvolved in
rural development. The aim was to develop strong local
capability and multi-sectoral support for evolving and ira-
plementing strong area-based development programs. The
strategy to achieve this was to implement multi-agency,
multi-sectoral, multi-level training programsinvolvingmulti-
center participation from multi-locations funded from multi-
agency budgets. However, a particular training course was
situation-oriented, area specific; program-based;and people
centered. A defined ecological zone served as a basis for
generating locality-specific technology and for developing
production systems,institutions, and other community living
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support services.The area isolate was used as the principal
mechanismfor inter-agencycollaboration and program com-
plementation.
As of April 1980, PTCRD training outputs consistedof
more than 10,000 individuals, 55 percent of whom were
farmer leaders. Becausethis is potentially the most positive
output of the Centers, farmer-leaders as community-basdd
leaders in rural development require closer scrutiny because
they are probably the actual vehicles for unification of mul-
tiple programs.
(6) Agro-Forestry Development Projects (Environment-Oriented
Integration). Agro-forestation is a compromisebetweentradi-
tionally competing agricultural and forestry land used.it pre-
servesthe salient featuresof both agricultureand forestry. As
an improvement overthe traditional farming technology used
in upland areas,agro-forestationwasdesignedto produce the
following outputs: increasedforested area and wood produc-
tion; increasedproduction of agricultural cropsand livestock;
increased socio-economic level of beneficiaries;stabilization
of forest occupancy; and improved environment. In imple-
menting agro-forestry projects, conflicts between individual
and societal goals, between short-term and long-term bene-
fits, had been evident. It was for this reasonthat in this
environmental or organic integration, community organiza-
tion was brought in for purposesof collective action, respon-
sibility and welfare. After all, the concept of ecology implies
sharing in order to maintain the delicate balance in nature
and to distribute the benefits from nature's bounty. Ecolo-
gical happenings had continued to be real-life lessonsin the
integratedness of the environment.
(7) Integration Oriented Toward Health, Nutrition or Popula-
tion. In recent years, health, population, and nutrition pro-
gramshad been gearedmore than ever to the rural populace
in some form and level of "integration" such as: "unified
servicesfor health; conceptual integration illustrated in farm-
ing-family planninganalogies;administrative integrationof all
government and private nutrition efforts; population and
family planning outreach with the direct involvement of pro-
vincial and city governmentsin the managementof the pro-
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gram and a basic emphasison overall community develop-
ment as a framework for family planningservices.Ostensibly
to solve the problems of outreach, integration and commu-
nity-based support, Project Compassionwas created to in-
tegrate 4 major concerns of nutrition, food production, en-
vironmental managementand family planning.
Some common trends had been discernedfrom all these
examples of integration: (1) all the programsaimed to be
community-based, indigenized and used local village-level
paraprofessionalssuch as the Barangay Health Worker; Ba-
rangay Development Nutrition Scholar; Family Develop-
ment Committee and Unit Leader; local auxiliary health
worker; and the Barangay Supply Point. No matter what
the organizationalset-up might look like, all theseprograms
acknowledged that their successdepended upon these grasp
roots workers who had been identified asthe integrating or
unifying factor. The thrust had really been to create para-
professional"integrators" at the village level. (2) All the pro-
gramsrepresentedseriousattempts to decentraliz;edelivery of
services and exhibited some degreeof community participa-
tion. In the final analysis,the life of an elaborate integrated
program depended upon the least-trained,lowest-paidand in
many instances,volunteer workers. (3) Although at the na-
tional level, the perceivedproblem was lack of coordination
and integration among agencies concerned with rural dev-
elopment at the village level, the 1978 Nationwide Nutri-
tion Survey lent credence to the suspicion that perhaps
agencieswere not exactly steppingon eachother'stoes at the
village and household level. The proportion of households
who had participated in various food, health nutrition and
population programsrangedfrom 5 to 34 percent. The great
majority of householdshad yet to participate in these pro-
grams. Lack of coordination and integration isprobably pre-
ferable to lack of services.(4) The Family PlanningProgram
was most systematically monitored and evaluated and the
contribution of the Barangay Supply Points to the effective-
nessof the outreach program had been most encouraging.
Whether this was a by-product of integration is, however,
impossibleto determine.
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(8) Functional lntegration. The Integrated Agricultural Produc-
tion and Marketing Project (IAPMP) illustrated another kind
of integration. It combined four different but complementary
and interdependent thrusts, i.e. National Policy,Academic
Technological Packagingand Outreach/Extension. All these
components were in place when the project was conceived.
What particularly innovativeabout IAPMP wasthe manner in
which the different ingredients•had been brought together in
one concept to servea singlepurpose- to raiseproductivity.
•It was new functional relationships, not new structures,not
new organizations, which were being built. Several agencies
and institutions were involved (the Ministry of Agriculture,
Central Luzon State University, Kansas State University,
the University of the Philippines at Los BaSosand the Co-
operatives Development Program) and IAPMP was not con-
fined to one location. Integrating instruments ranged from
the Project Paper as a common document; communication
linkages;work arrangements;utilization of skillsand talents
across thrust and agency boundaries;the resource or mat-
erial I!nkageswhich tied the whole project together. Perhaps
the common resource base (funding) was the mostpowerful
integrator in this functional integration.• Ironically, the in-
tegration of production, processing,and marketingwhich was
intended to benefit the small farmer was probably the least
evident during the first three years and would•probably be
the last integration which could be expected to •materialize.
Operationally, IAPMP was verY,much an institution-building
and manpower development project. Whatever benefits
would accrue to small farmers .would haveto con_eas.a by-
product of the institution-building and manpower develop-
ment systemof activities.
The IAPMP was creative but complex and therefore dif-
ficult to implement. The managementStyle required coordi-
nating•without Compelling; integrating without absorbing,
especially when institutions and personalitieswere equally
prima donnas andrelationships were more collegial rather
than super-ordinate-subordinate..
As in other integrated projects, the hypothesiswas that
"if integration actually exists then the sumtotal of the pro-
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ducts of integrated activitieswill be greaterthan when these
different activities are done independently," As in other
integrated projects, support for this hypothesishasyet to be
demonstrated.
The Dynamics of Integration and Coordination
Some relfections on integration and coordination which were
generated by actual experiences in project implementation were
reviewed:
(a) Team work
Team approach had 5 facets: team as a small group;asa
team of functions; as a team squad;as an inter-agencyteam;
and as a problem-solving team, The latter was the least
evident in the operationsstudied.
(b) Lead agency concept
To implement an integrated program, cooperatingagen-
cies were supposedto "assign" their personnel to the lead
agency. Mutations of this arrangementhad occurredand even
if team-building efforts and informal personal relationships
were present acrossagencies,when conflicting demandswere
placed on the staff, project personneltended to givepriority
to the Mother Agency, not to the lead agency. To carry out
the functions expectedof other agencies,the leadagency had
sometimes resorted to hiring its own staff thus, duplication
rather than integration, had resulted.
(c) Organization and management of integration
Although experts had argued that organization and man-
agement does make a difference, they also conceded that
"the exact role of organizational factors iselusive." This less
than sanguine assessmentof the role of organization and
management in development had likewise been revealed in
connection with the famous PERT technique which was
credited for' the successfuldevelopment of the PolarisWea-
pons system. As the analysis of its role in Polarisconcluded:
"The successof Polaris was not due to applied paradigms
of scientific management. It depended much more on a
messy, highly redundant mode of personal communica-
tion.... "
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(d) Coordination, Integration and Authority
It has been suggestedthat authority and control is the
basis for strong coordination and integration and the prefe-
rence is for higher authority to command respect and exact
cooperation from the agenciesbeing coordinated or integra-
ted. Given this argument, integration could be a euphemism
for centralized control and to be integrated, could mean
"to be taken over." In this sense,an absolute dictatorship
could be the ultimate in integration.
(e) Process Considerations in Integration
The caseof integrated area development (lAD)
Integration might take place at various stagesand levels
of a project and its presenceanddegreemight be indicatedin
terms of: consistency among the impacts of the projects for
the welfare of the community; complementarity among its
outputs and among its inputs in spatialand functional terms;
and coordination of the inputs and of the outputs,
The case of functional integration
A number of elements in functional integrative linkages
had been identified: organic relationships;participative rela-
tionships; interest group relationships, supplementary rela-
tionships; complementary and competitive relationships.
The most important generalization which could be derived
from the review of these elements in functional integration
is that: there is a cost to integration and the pay.off to this
cost needs to be evaluated.
Problem-generated integration
A dairy-based rural developmentproject was describeda's
a problem-generated integration becauseit had no compre-
hensive framework plan, no integration model, no elaborate
planning process.Project components were added on an ad
hoc, opportunistic basis in responseto problems met in a
depressed area. It was not really a case of coordinating or
integrating work of different agencies because there was
none to coordinate or integrate.
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An additional dimension to integration
The most important argument for integrated rural devel-
opment had been the interrelatednessof factors, the sys-
tematic, holistic nature of development problems. In this
connection, the following question was asked: If a project is
multisectoral and integrated, is it also necessaryfor partici-
pant-beneficiaries themselves to perceive this integration?
One reply to this question said: "That the clients should
perceivethe integration of diversecomponents of a program
is important .... But it is not really that critical for adoption,
for clients to avail of services,for recipients to benefit."
(f) The Complexities of Interdisciplinary Approaches
The United Nations University which brought together
social scientistsand nutritionists on a World Hungerdialogue
concluded that: "Real interdisciplinarity is difficult to
achieve." The general thrust of the social scientists was to
emphasize the holistic approach whereas the nutritionists
wen oriented toward the identification and amelioration of
specific needs.
By way of an overall summary statement, the following should be
said: Integration was conceived as a solution to certain problem c Jn
rural development but the implementation of integration create_
own problems.
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CHAPTER VII
THE CONCEPT AND PRACTICE OF.FELT NEEDS
AND PEOPLE PARTICIPATION
The community development (CD) of the 1950s and 1960s fo-
cused on "the initiation of comprehensivedevelopment schemesin
individual villageson the basisof what villagepeople perceivedto be
their felt needs. Community developmentactivitieswere customarily
initiated by sendinga speciallytrained civil servantknown.asa multi-
purpose Village-levelworker to the village ... He was to serveas a
catalyst, one who would guideand assistvillagersin identifying theiP
felt needs, then translating these felt needsinto villagedevelopment
plans, and finally implementing these plans - always working
through the activevillage leaders.''1
Although "felt needs" wasa centralpreoccupation of the CD era,
it wasnever clearly defined in operational terms. Such questionsas:
"Who should feel the need? How many sbeuld feel the need before
one can call it a 'felt need'? How does one go about feeling felt
needs?" remain largely unansweredand nebulous.
This chapter presentsthe following:
(a) Approachesto social soundnessanalysis
(b) An operational typologyof "felt needs"
(c) The concept and practice of people participation
(d) The operational definitions and methodologyof people par-
ticipation
(e) Community organization and issuessurroundingthe method.
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A. Approaches to Social Soundness Analysis
Following the disaffections with community development, the
Second Development Decade (1970-80) adopted a strategyof direct-
ing assistancetoward the poor majority and development programs
were subjectedto social soundnessanalysis in the light of this man-
date. Lynch et al outlined the characteristicsof a sociallysoundde-
velopment program as follows:2
(1) It is intended to benefit the poor majority, male and female,
(it is, in other words, for thepoor);
(2) it respondsto a need that is felt, and preferably expressed,
by these men and women (the idea for the program comes,
asit were, from the poor);
(3) It will, in being implemented, enlist the part|cipation of local
men and women, delivering itsbenefits through the poor;
(4) It is so designed,that is, very likely, not only to catch on, but
also to affect favorably the disadvantagedfor whom it was
intended (it will in fact bring itsbenefits to thepoor; and
(5) Should it fail literally to fulfill criterion 2 or 3, it nonetheless
offers a benefit which experts agree is an essentialprerequi-
site for somebasicfelt need of the poor majority.
Lynch suggeststhree approachesto the designof an appropriate
assistanceprogram:
(a) The most common one which relies almost exclusively on
professional opinion;
(b) A conceivable but most uncommon second strategy which
would let the people concerned decide for themselveson
what shouldbe done;
(c) The third approach combines the people's needs and deci-
sion-makingwith competent technical advice: the people lead
and the experts follow.
In this latter approach, people and professionals"working toge-
ther" produce four categoriesof background information: "(a) the
main physicalfeatures of the target area;(b) the potentials, problems
and constraints which the experts see as conditioning the area's de-
velopment; (c) relevant socio-cultural characteristics of the area's
population; and (d) the major problems of the areaas thepeople see
them."
To gather information on sharedconcernsand problems, Lynch
et. al. highly recommendsthe useof social survey techniques which
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start with a relatively large number of in-depth open.ended inter-
views with male and female residentsof the area purposivelyselected
as representativesof variousimportant sectorsof the population who
will help identify what the major concernsand problemsof the area
are, The secondstageis a standard social survey inquiry of a random
sample of residentsusingthe concernsand problemsidentified from
the first-phase interviews. For the Bicol River Basinarea, assessment
of people'sfelt needsincludedthe following:
(a) Community problems freely mentioned by respondentsas
most important;
(b) Life concerns or domains which were of more than ordinary
interest and importance to adult Bicolanosbasedon earlier
studies on values. The final inventory contains 15 domains:
job; income; present housing;food and drink; travel; position
in life; community conditions; health of self and family;
availability of health services;own education; children's edu-
cation; participation in formal organizations;participation in
informal groups; household possessionsand current prices.
(c) Overall life satisfaction and happiness about each of the indi-
vidual life concerns from which Perceived Quality of Life
(PQL) was derived. The basic question asked to determine
PQL for each life concern is something like this: "All things
considered,how do you feel about road conditions and abili-
ty to travel within your province?" The degreeof happiness
is expressedon a seven-point scalerangingfrom very happy,
happy, just happy, neither happy nor unhappy, just unhappy,
unhappyand very unhappy.
(d) Positive choices for selecteddevelopmentprograms suchas:
irrigation and flood control; land reform, daily wage jobs;
credit, etc.
Table 7.1 showsthe community problems mentioned by house-
hold headsas most important. From this table, one can make 2 gen-
eral observationswhich couldbe more significant than the communi-
ty problems themselves:(a) the high proportion of respondents(39
percent) who provided no answerswhen they were askedto identify
problems facing the communities in which they live and which they
consideredassurely important ones. (b) the lack of "crystallization"
of the community problems in the sensethat even the first-ranked
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TABLE 7.1
COMMUNITY PROBLEMS FREELY MENTIONED BY HOUSEHOLD HEADS
AS MOST IMPORTANT, WITH EACH PROBLEM'S RANK ORDER
AND PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS WHO IDENTIFIED IT
(BICOL RIVER BASIN, CAMARINES SUR, APRIL 1974)
Percentagewho
Rank mentionedproblem
Community Problem Order N Percent
Peaceandorder 1 104 16
Irrigationandflood control 2 95 14
Roads 3 69 10
Unemployment(nojobs) 4 57 9
Drinking water 5 54 8
Lackof cooperationor leadership
In the community 6 40 6
Transportationfacilities 7 37 6
Electricity 8 34 6
Dirty surroundings 9 29 4
Highprices 10 23 4
Flooding(outsidericefields) 11.5 21 3
No barrio chapel 11.5 21 3
Land-tenureproblem 13 17 3
Housingfor school,barrio hall 14 8 1
Medicalservices 15 7 1
Recreationalfacilities 16 2 1
Others - 45 7
Total of thosewho gaveanswers 663 61%
No answer 417 39%
Total respondents 1080
, u
Source: Frank Lynchet al; op. ci_
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problem was mentioned only by. 16 percent of the respondents.
These two observationscan be interpreted in two ways: (1) Commu-
nity problems as problems perceivedand sharedby the community
have not yet emerged as such. (2) Respondentsprobably lack the
awarenessand social sensitivity to think and feel in terms of their
community as againsttheir own individual or family problems. Per:
haps a senseof community remains to be felt, developed and arti-
culated. Is the community a social reality that hasproblemsdistinct
from those of the individual or the family? Is a community problem
the sum total of individual problems?
Table 7.2 presents15 life concernsand how Bicolanosfeel about
each one. From this, we can deducethat asfar asunhappinessis con-
cerned, the problems we usually worry about in development pro-
gramssuch as food, social participation, community conditions, job,
travel and health servicesare not the same problems that are salient
to the Bicolanos' unhappiness.What is noteworthy is their unhappi-
nessabout present house and household possessions.Such unhappi-
nesshas an empirical basis in the real life of the Bicolanos. Fifty-
nine percent of them live in housesbadly in need of repair; 56 per-
cent reside in the traditional "bahay kubo" or little grasshut; while
30 percent live in hutsof this kind which need new shingles,walling,
flooring, or entrance ladders if they are to be minimally waterproof
and safe. Unlike the song, the movies and Philippine art which
romanticize this nipa hut, the poor who are leasthappy with their
housingare precisely those who have such homes. Table 7.3 reveals
increasing "happiness scores" from the respondentswhose houses
are made of light materials and are in "poor" state of repair to those
who have houses of strong materialsand are in "good, state of re.-
pair. The former are the most unhappy and the latter, the happiest.
Table 7.4 showsthe relationshipbetween income levelsand the
percentage reporting household possessions.The higher the socio-
economic class,the higher the proportion of those who possessdif-
ferent household itemS. It must be noted that evenamongthe upper-
elite, many households do not own these furniture and household
items but asexpected, the lower classare most deprived of these
things. The averagehousehold owns a little over 3 items out of the
14 in the list. Those who own the least number have the highest
degreeof unhappinesswith this particular aspectof their life.
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TABLE 7.2
FIFTEEN LIFE CONCERNS OF BICOLANO HOUSEHOLD HEADS,
BY THEIR FEELING ABOUT EACH CONCERN AND BY THE EFFECT
THIS FEELING HAS ON THEIR OVERALL HAPPINESSWITH LIFE
(BICOL RIVER BASIN, CAMARINES SUR, APRIL 1974)
Feelingabout Effect of thisfeelingon overallhappiness
thisdomain Strong Medium Weak
Fairly happy Food anddrink Informal groups Formal
(3.24-3.39) Positionin life Community organizations
conditions
Neutral Job Health of self Educationof
(3.40-3.62) andfamily children
Travel HealthSer-
vices
Fairly unhappy Presenthouse Educationof
(3.64-5.53) Income self
Household Prices
possessions
Rating is basedon seven-pointhappiness-unhappinesscalewhere 1 means"very
happy" and 7 "very unhappy". The categories"fairly happy", "neutral" and
"fairly unhappy" result from an interpretationof the averagescoresrecorded.
Source: Frank Lynchet al, op. ci_
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TABLE 7.3
HOUSESOF BICOL RIVER BASIN HOUSEHOLDS BY MATERIALS
AND STATE OF REPAIR, WITH THE AVERAGE HAPPINESSCORE (1-7)
REPORTED FOR PRESENT HOUSING
(BICOL RIVER BASIN. CAMARINES SUR, 1974)
State Happiness*
of Percentage Score
Housematerials Repair N = 3240 (average)
Strong Good 5 2.85
Poor 7 3.11
Mixed Good 10 3.33
Poor 22 3.62
Light Good 26 3.65
Poor 30 3.97
*On this scale,1 means"very happy" and7 means"very unhappy". The overall
averageis3.64.
Source: Frank Lynchet al, op. ci_
Using this approach, Lynch et al were able to arrive at the fol-
lowing conclusions:
(a) Housing has an effect on overall life satisfaction;
(b) The housing situation in the River Basin is not good;
(c) Most people are unhappy about it; but when, if, and as their
disposable income increases, they can be counted on;
(d) People want to repair their homes or replace them with
others of more substantial materials; and
(e) They want to retain or seek ownership of the homes and lots
on which they stand.
Given these findings, housing projects seem to be definitely indi-
cated if they do in fact benefit the low-income poorly housed as
much as the upwardly-mobile better-educated middle class. Perhaps
these areas of unhappiness also account for the attractiveness of
household furniture and appliance stores in the provincial capitals
selling their wares on installment.
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TABLE 7.4
BICOL RIVER BASIN HOUSEHOLD HEADS BY SELECTED POSSESSIONS,
LEVEL OF LIVING AND PERCEIVED QUALITY OF LIFE (PQL) SCORES
AND SOCIAL CLASS(BICOL RIVER BASIN, CAMARINES SUR,APRIL 1974)
Percentagereportingpossessions
Upper Upper
Householdpossession elite Marginal Lower Total
1. Livingroom set 80% 50% 15% 24%
2. Radio 76 64 41 47
3. Chinacloset 54 32 9 - 15
• 4. Bed 87 72 34 43
5. Electricity 65 42 20 26
6. Book (at leastone) 90 65 28 39
7. Sewingmachine 48 38 15 21
8. Newspaper/magazlne 82 50 20 30
9. Clothescloset/aparador 74 52 21 29
10. Diningroom set 46 25 7 12
11. Dresser 52 32 10 16
12. Toilet 84 71 44 52
13. Studytable 54 35 13 18
14. Watersupply 26 18 10 13
Levelof livingscore(mean)
Perceivedquality of life 8.28 5.62 2.36 3.20
(degreeof happinessabout
furnitureandother house-
hold possessions(mean) 3.43 4.28 4.50 4,33
The levelof living scorescan rangefrom 0 to 14, dependingonhow many
of the 14 items the householdreports.The PQL scorescan rangefrom 1 (very
happy with presentfurniture and other householdpossessions)to 7 (very un.
happy).
Source: Frank Lyncheta/, op. ci¢
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Data from Table 7.5 which camefrom preliminary tabulationsof
the 1978-Bicol Multipurpose Survey3 indicate the following:
(a) Although the Bicolanosare not,happy about all their life con-
cerns, those who expressed the greatest unhappiness is only
about 30 percent for three life concerns, namely: road condi-
tion and travel, respondents" education and training; and fur-
niture and other things acquired. The rest of the life concerns
were rated "unhappy" only by 16 to 5 percent of respon-
dents. In general, therefore, one can say that Bicolanos may
not exactly be ecstatic about their life but they do not seem
to be terribly unhappy either. Life for majority of them
seemsto be either just happy or happy.
(b) If we were to baseour development,programs on the results
presentedin-Table 7.5, we would not be as muchconcerned
with food, health, employment, and certainly not about the
status of women. The current thrust on infrastructure devel-
opment particularly on road-building is specifically respon-
sive to the Bicolanos'unhappinessabout road conditions and
travel.
(c) The unhappinessabout furniture and other things acquired is
something which cannot be directly met except through an
increasein incomeand purchasingpower.
Table 7.6 shows a listing of problems identified by people
hoUsehold.heads)and by experts-asarticulated in the BRBDP Corn.
_rehen$ive Development Plan 1975-2000. This list contains =more
)roblems perceived by experts than by household heads. Further-
more, experts tended to have a more macro view of the situation.
The 13 problems identified by both experts and people indicatethat
experts are not exactly insensitiveto what people suffer from. They
seethe same problemsthat people perceive and they seeevenmuch
more beyond that. The only problems mentioned by household
heads but not by experts are: peace and order; :and housing and
householdpossessions.So perhapseven experts are people.
Incidentally, it should be noted that lack of measuresto increase
agricultural productivity such as farm input, technical farm support
services and marketing are problems identified by experts alone.
They remain to be recognized asmuch by people. Furthermore,
problemswhich are the standardfare of integrated rural development
such as "unequal incomedistribution", "breakdowns in coordination
PeoppleParticipation
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TABLE 7.6
PROBLEMS IDENTIFIED BY BICOL RIVER BASIN HOUSEHOLD NEEDS
AND/OR EXPERTS AS MENTIONED IN THE BRBDP COMPREHENSIVE
DEVELOPMENT PLAN, 1975-2000 (1976)
Identifier Problem
A. Household heads alone 1. Peace and order
(Not mentioned in CD 2. Housing
Plan) 3. Household possessions
B. Household heads and 1. Water management
experts 2. Income
3. Employment (jobs)
4. Travel
5. Roads
6. Transportation facilities
7. Drinking wate:
8. Electricity
9. Agrarian reform
10. Community organization
11. Dirty or unsanitary surroundings
12. Health of self and family
13. High prices
C. Experts alone 1. Notably unequal income distribution
2. Low savings
3. Inadequate/poor waterways and water
transport/railway transport
4. Low level of farm-lnput use
5. Low agricultural productivity
6. Inefficient operation or inadequacy of
marketing facilities
7. Weak agribusiness linkages
8. Inadequate technical farm support services
9. Typhoons and adverseweather conditions
10. Breakdowns in coordination among line
agencies
11. Little participation of the local and private
sector in development efforts
12. Low wages
Source: Frank Lynch et al, op. cir.
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among line agencies" and "little participation of local and private
sectorsin developmentefforts" were not identified by the Bicolano
household heads. What does this mean? Should development pro-
gramsgo by thosewho arguethat "a problem is by definition felt by
the person who has the problem; if it isn't felt, it isn't a problem"_
If this were our criterion, agricultural researchand extension, inte-
grated rural development, income redistribution and people partici-
pation will not be part of our developmentstrategy.
What about a need which is "dire but unfelt or cannot be satis-
fied even in part by popular effort. For deprivation is often uncon-
scious, and remedial action the prerogativeof thosewho especially
trained for it. ''s Nutrition, population, health, integrated rural de-
velopment, equity, and even people participation would probably
neverbe part of the development sceneif it were not for the special-
ists (the experts, if you will) who "felt" them for us.Although social
soundnessanalysisemphasizesfor the poor; from the poor; through
the poor and benefits to the poor, the minimum background infor-
mation which shouldbe consideredin the designof a sociallysound
assistanceprogram is quite onerous and all of them are either deter-
mined by experts or gatheredfrom people (poor) by experts; inter-
preted by experts even if in behalf of the poor, with socialscientists
playing the role of the "Voice of the People." While it is poetic to
say, "... development is in people, its objectivesare addressedto
people, it is carried out by people and the outcomes are enjoyed by
people",6 the entire processis strewn by experts. A people-centered
assistanceprogram is very information- or data-intensive.This infor-
mation-generationand production role does not comefree and there-
fore, the experts, both technical and social,are probably the mostac-
tive participants in identifying, defining and articulating people'sfelt
needs.
Lynch et al themselvesacknowledgethe role of professionalnon-
government assistance in the essential task of increasingparticipa-
tion:
Professionalsarerequiredbecauseof thedelicacyanddifficultyof the
assignment:to developinentirecommunities(notjust theupperclass,or
the electedor appointedofficials,or theadultmales,buteveryone)theha-
bit of articulatingneeds,lookingfor solutions(includingtheconsultingof
experts),andmonitoringtheactiontaken.It isalsoouropinionthatgovern-
mp.ntreoresentatives..,cannotachieve.theflexibility,thelisteningstance
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required for this undertaking... Government-sponsoredcommunity orga-
nizationstend to transmit information - not receiveit - in largepart per-
hapsbecausecenturiesof tradition haveso definedthe governmentagent's
•role.
B. An Operational Typo/ogy of "Felt Needs"
Based on the previous discussions and our experiences both in
community development and integrated rural development, we pro-
pose the following typology of '•'felt needs" in operational terms:
(a) People's felt needs are elicited, articulated , analyzed and in-
terpreted by experts either• through in-depth studies, group
interviews and/or random sample surveys of "people". De-
spite the most optimistic assessmentsof people's readiness to
articulate their needs, it is rare that such expressions come
spontaneously without "outside" prodding of some kind.
Community organizers offer a modified approach to the
identification of felt needs by way of what they call part__-
cipatory research, which is purportedly characterized by a
larger people-role in the process. Participatory research aims
"to develop the capability of group leaders and members to
•acquire skills in data-gathering and analysis; devise internal
feedback and evaluation mechanisms; test solutions to prob-
lems, acquire skills in utilizing research findings to solve
• community problems and needs. In this way, the research
• component becomes meaningful not only _o academicians
and project •staff•but especially to the people themselves who
are also searching for more relevant and innovative solutions
to their pressing problems and needs.''7
People's felt needs may be the expressed needs of indivi-
duals and/or families but they may not necessarily be the
community's or the group's needs. As a matter of fact, the
task of a community organizer is precisely to "organize" the
community or to steer the "group formation" process. House
to house visits are •conducted to learn how manY people in
the community have recognized a particular problem or need.
The community organizer encourages selected individuals to
meet with others who are willingto work on a given problem
or need ... Training is •considered an essential input in in-
creasing people's capabilities to solve problems, meet basic
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needs, alter existing conditions that cause lack of equality
and opportunity for growth to develop cooperative and colla-
borative attitudes. 8
In other words, group or community needs and problems
do not automatically emerge as such. They usually need to
be "coaxed" into articulation and crystallization. The skills
and motivations required to carry out the task of developing
in "entire communities (not just the upper class, the elected
or appointed officials or the adult males, but everyone) the
habit of articulating needs, looking for solutions, and moni-
toring the action taken" have to be developed. Contrary to
some of our myths, these skills and motivations do not natu-
rally abound. Even the community as a community as against
a collection of households and families located in a common
space is not ready-made. As a matter of fact, one of the pa-
tent weaknesses of the community development era was the
assumption that such a collection of households and families
constitutes a community. The state of "community-ness" is
something which has to be nurtured and cultivated. As
Brandt puts it:
The conceptof "community" isan elusiveone.What isthe residen-
tial entity - the social-economic-psychological-spatialenvironment;
within which developmentcan best take place?"Community" in the
senseof "a group of frequently interactingpeoplewho share similar
idealsand work togethereffectivelyfor achievingcommongoals" ise_
sentiallyan ideologyfor thosewho participatein it... Creatingsucha
working socialideologywhere it doesnot alreadyexist is noteasy.Per-
haps, it is not even possiblein the short-runalthoughit is certainlya
worthwhile objectiveto fostera senseof community andcooperation
for the achievementof desiredgoals... One canarguethat in... rural
villagestoday, particularlythosethat are developingmostrapidly, there
is in fact an increasein individualambition and the pursuitof private
goals compared to the past. Genuine community is being gradually
eclipsedby modernization,just as it hasbeenthroughoutmuchof the
industrializedworld. Thus,the basisfor cooperationis increasinglyself-
interestanddemonstratedperformance.9
Experience has also shown that the village head who
often speaks or is assumed to speak in behalf of his village has
probably a more parochial view of this village. In some
instances, it may not go much beyond his family backyard.
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And if we were beinghonest to ourselves,our own motivesas
professionalsconcerned with "people and poverty" problems
are not always "purely people and poverty-oriented". We do
have our own agendaeither manifest or latent in a larger or
smaller measure.
(b) Empirically derived needs are needs which arise from an
analysis of large scale or macro-level trends as indicated by
available data over time. Examplesof this type of needsare
those deduced from population figures over time which indi-
cate growth rates, age-sexdistribution, migration, man-land
ratios, etc.; those which arise from environmental studies,
etc. Population control is not ordinarily a people-felt need.
(c) Systematically (scientifically) determined needs are needs
established by the experts through their own special me-
thods. Health and nutritional needsare typical of this type
of needs. As Lynch eta/ point out, a need may be "dire but
unfelt" and remedial action is the prerogative of those who
are specially trained for it. Operation Timbang (age-height-
weight ratios) as a way of determining levels of malnutri-
tion among children and determining amount of calories re-
quired by different groupsof people are examplesof the spe-
cialists' domain. So are Vitamin A deficiencies.
(d) "Educationally-induced" people's felt needs are the needs
described in (b) and (c) which people are "trained" to per-
ceiveand feel astheir own priority needs.As a matter of fact,
this is the essence of development communication, non-
formal education, population education, health education,
nutrition education,agricultural extension, etc.
(e) "Seduced" felt needs are those needs stimulated by the
availability of resourcesfor development activities in special
problem areas such as female liberation (male-female in-
equality, sex discrimination) which may not have any sa-
lience at all for certain groupsof people but which are pur-
sued becausefunds are available for the purpose. This does
not mean that the need would not eventually be perceived
and felt. Felt needs may also be "seduced" by advertising,
the typical approach of which is to "create" a need where
there was none felt before. Quite often, becauseof our com-
mitment to certain "solutions" to problems,we havea situa-
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tion of "solutions runnin 9 around looking for problems". In
other words, the problem is sometimes defined to fit the
solution rather than vice-verse. Credit is one such "patent"
solution for a wide range of problems.
This typology of felt needs is not ideological, not idealist-
ic, not theoretical but pragmatic and operational in the sense
that these are the ways of "felt needs" in the real world.
C. The Concept and Practice of People Participation
1. Arguments for People Participation
A review of some of the rationale for a return to or a rediscovery
of People or Popular (Mass) Participation reveals the disappointments
not only with the old CD but with the growth-oriented strategies in-
cluding the green revolution. The new promise lies in a people-center-
ed approach. The following are expressions of disillusionment with
the "old" and faith in another utopia or at least a new development
rhetoric:
(a) ,.. a basicneedsapproachis not primarily welfareor charity but pro-
ductivity-oriented, aimed at increasingthe productive income of the
poor and strengtheningthe basisfor long-termself-generatingdevelop-
ment. Programmeswhich involvewidest possibleparticipation of the
peoplewhoseneedsare addressed,are mostlikely to be effective...10
(b) Participationof the peoplein the institutionsand systemswhichgovern
their livesis a basichuman right and is alsoessentialfor economicde-
velopment, Rural developmentstrategiescan realizetheir full potential
only through the activeinvolvementof the people, includingthe least
advantagedstrata, in designingpoliciesand programmesand increating
institutionsfor implementingthem.11
(c) The Rural OrganizationAction Programmeof FAO hasbeendirecting
its attention to people'sorganizationasa meansof involvingthe poorin
ruraldevelopment. It startswith the promisethat if rural organizations
are set up in suitableforms and run by the membersthemselves,they
can contribute significantly to popular participation in development.
It also notes,however,that most rural organizationshavereachedonly
the better-off membersof peasantpopulations, in the process,they
havefosterednegativeconsequences,namely:
(1) an overwhelmingmajority of the rural underprivilegedremainsun-
organized,marginalized,oppressedand exploited;
(2} the rural poor do not or hardly participate in the decision-making
regardingtheir economicand socialuplift; and
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(3) rural development, particularly agricultural production, remains
far below its potential 12
(d) although the rural poor in developing countries make up 60-80 percent
of the population, most have virtually no-say in the events that affect
their lives. This is so despite the new rhetoric of development that
asserts the importance of growth with equity . . . More enlightened
though this socially-oriented perspectiVeappears than the old economic
development model, it still fails to catch the true meaning of develop-
ment. The "top-down" strategy so characteristic of high-level techno-
cratic planning remains the hallmark of its approach. Development is
still perceived as done for people, not by them or even with them. It is
around these issues of "development for whom?" and "by whom?"
that the current debate rages.13
(e) ... by the end of the decade ... the significant increase in per capita
GNP was not touching the/ives of ordinary peop/e. /f anything, the
poor are gett/ng poorer. For despite the expectation of economists, in-
ternational capital infusions brought little or no relief to the poverty-
stricken majorities of the assisted nations. 14 Not only was there "no
automatic trickle-down of the benefits of development; on the con-
trary, the development process led typically to a trickle-up in favor of
the middle classesand the rich. ''15
(f) We have often heard that small farmers are poor becausethey lack mo-
tivation and spirit of self-reliance; that they are individualistic especial-
ly when it comes to economic activities or they are just waiting for
government assistance to come and take it as granted. But we also
know that there are in all of thedeveloping countries in Asia, numerous
successful stories of small farmers who work together in undertaking
common activities. Through group action, they are able to give better
life for themselves and for future generations. Although some of them
have been inspired by qutside change agents, the successof their efforts
is due to the small farmers themselvesand their leaders.Many of these
"beautiful" stories have not been told and are buried under a pile of
negative stories about the small farmers... Various programmes have
been designed or are being designedto secure better participation of the
rural poor in planning and implementation through group action. The
goal is to develop viable groups imbued with group responsibility and
spirit of self-reliance. 16
(g) . . . The unsatisfactory experience with conventional development ap-
proaches seems enough to show that some kind of alternative ap-
proaches are warranted if one is serious about wanting to reach the
most disadvantaged ruralpoor. Some change in their social and political
conditions is needed along with new economic opportunities if lasting
improvements are to be achieved in their behalf... The goal of echiev-
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ing structural change for rural workers makes singlesectoror single
programapproachesto the Landlessand near Landless(LNL) inade-
quate in most cases... (but) adop_nga broadmulti-facetedapproach
to rural developmentis not enoughof course.To be successful,a st£a-
tegy for attackingrural poverty must be realisticin terms of costs...
The question of costscould indicate an approachthat elicits a large
amount of voluntary local labor, and it also seemslikely that costs
could be reducedby local initialive in problem-solving, and local re-
sponslT_illtyto maintain assetsonce they are created. If this isvalid,
then an approachwhich stressespopularparticipationin decision-mak-
ing and control appearsnecessaryto achievestructural changeata cost
per unit low enough so that such processescan spreadto encompass
largenumbersof people... We shouldseekto mobilizelocalpeoplefor
their own advancement.The roleof public goodsandserviceswould be
to break sfrategicbottlenecksto further self-actualizingprocesses,but
not to sat-_Jpa centralizedsystemthat tellspeoplewhat to do or makes
them dependenton governmentresourcesto carrythingsout.
Some may object that this approachputsthe burden of develop-
mant on the poor, or that asa strategy,it will contributeto unevende-
velopmentbecausethosewho possessomeresourceswill havemoreto
contribute to their own improvement.A considerationof past experi-
ence suggeststhat projectsin which seriousconsiderationwas never
givento self-reliancewere oftencharacterizedby problemswith chronic
dependenciesand underdevelopment,In all but the most deprived
cases,the poor have some resources,-and there aremajor advantagesto
emphasizingself-reliance.., apart from lower cost to aid donor_, .. in
fomenting sustainedand effectivedevelopmentfor the poor...
Why has it been so difficult for public programsto havea develop-
mental impact on the LNL to date?Central governmentsolDerateat
severaldisadvantageswhen they try to move public goodsan(]services
down to the local levelto benefit the weakest sectorsof the commu-
nity. _. When publlc administration does not reach down to the local
level in .waysthat can support structural improvementsfor the rural
poor, either directly or through intermediaries,how can the LNL be
formed into clientelesthat can effectively seekpublic goodsandservi-
ces?Is there someway to utilize catalyst agents.., The role of sucha
catalyst agentwould be to bring public agenciesinto greaterawareness
of the requirementsof the LNL clientele, and to aid the rural Poor in
acquiring public goodsand services,aswell asenhancingtheir self-help
capabilities.At least six roles have been projected for this catalyst
agent, viz., (1) To convey a philosophy of multi-sectoral planned
change;(2) To act asmediatingagencybetween the state,the economy,
and the LNL; (3) To coordinateservicescoming down to the LNL at
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the local level; (4) To provide research and design assistance to local
project activities; (5) To recruit and train local leaders; and (6) To ini-
tiate lp_ocessesto help LNL to act as a group for their own improve-
ment.
(h) The reasons underlying people's participation are both ideological and
•pragmatic. Ideologically, people know best what is good for them; the
poor represent a massive human resource. Pragmatically, the poor re-
present tremendous labor resource potential; their distinctive ideas and
creative solutions to family and community problems constitute a
reservoir of essential and practical knowledge; and their hiring for local
public works construction generates income. Furthermore, an improved
upkeep and maintenance of community projects results when residents
have had a strong hand in designing and implementing; international
lending agencies specify a community I)articipation component as a
condition in loan or grant project schemes; and people's participation
is necessary to narrow the gap between the people's goals and the
government's aims and strategies.18
(i) To date, the literature of development and popular participation shows
limited Filipino experience in actualizing these concepts. It is impera-
tive that the government should, lead in opening more avenues for the
genuine participation of marginal and disadvantaged groups. The gov-
ernment has to keep in mind that if apa_y is on one side of the conti-
nuum of social participation , the extreme alternative is revolt unless
social action is able to generate genuine popular participation. Whether
through direct or •indirect modes of involvement, the poor have no re-
course but to join protest-conflict organizations in order to gain access
to political power which determines what share of the economic re-
sources will accrue to each sector of the society. Although there is no
assurance that development programs will in fact lessensocial conflict,
encouraging popular participation will at least tip the balance in favor
of inducing non-violenT forms of social action. 19
(j) The rural poor are becoming increasingly aware that if their lives are to
progress, they must bring about a new social order. If the non-violent
people's organizations formed for this purpose are crushed becausethey
protest unjust conditions, or because they are conveniently dubbed sub-
versive by the authorities, then the latter have only themselves to blame
if the harassed mass populace decides that it has no other alternative
but violent revolution to attain a new social order. The wisdom of a
country, after all, lies in its people.2°
(k) Because of accumulated experience suggesting that projects arelikely
to be more successfulin the long run when local officials, organizations
and people are involved in design, decision-making, implementation and •
eva!uation activities, some governments and many international devel-
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opment agancieshavemadedecentralization,localorganizationinvolve-
ment, and participation in the developmentprocessby the poor ma-
jority one of the central concernsof their official policies.One of the
best known is what hascometo be calledin the Americancommunity
as the "CongressionalMandate". This 1973 amendmentto the Foreign
AssistanceAct of the U.S. specificallyillustratesthe focuson partici-
pation by noting: "Decisions concerningthe activitiesto be carried
out are to be made, preferably, by thosebenefited (for example,the
poor) and if not, at leastwith effective consultation and_Substantial
acceptanceby thosebenefited". Similady,severalUN GeneralAssembly
Declarationscall for the active participationof all elementsof socicty,
individually or through associations,in defining and achievingthe
common goals of development,urging UN projects to promote the
adoption of measuresto ensure the _;;m;iive participation of all ele-
ments of society in the preparation and execution of programmesof
economicand socialdevelopment. And, speakingfor the World Bank,
Robert McNamaranoted that there is greater chancefor ruraldevel-
opment successif national governments and projects "provide for
popular participation, local leadership and decentralization of
authoriW" . . . (The new participator/ strategy) is lessvagueabout
what "ending rural poverty" means. Its targets are the large number
of rural poor and the structural or institutionalconstraintsthat limit
their productivity and promote inequity. It aims at complementing
specific development projects such as irrigation improvement effortr
rather than becominga largeheavily-fundednationalbureaucracywith
local level field agents,aswas thecase with communitydevelopment.
As such,it seeksas it maingoalsthe reinforcement of productivity and
welfare objectives of rural development activities, that is, the promo-
tion of wide and equitabledisuibutlon of benefits flowingfrom these
activities,the narrowingof the relative income gapbetweenrich and
poor and the mobilization of awarenessamonglocalgovemmentunits,
grassrootsorganizationsand common people so that they can act
effectivelyto control their owndestiny.21
In summary, the arguments for people participation are as
follows:
(1) People participation is a basic need and a basic human right
which is also essential for effective rural development pro-
grams.
(2) The poor make up the majority of the population in develop-
ing countries but they have virtually no say in the events that
affect their lives.
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(3) Rural organizations can contribute significantly to popular
participation in development but so far, they have reached
only the better-off members while the bulk of the rural
under-privilegedremain unorganized and oppressed.Further-
more, agriculturalproduction is far below potential.
(4) Previousdevelopment strategieshavefailed to reachthe rural
poor. Instead of a trickle-down of benefits to the poor, a
trickle-up processhas occurred in favor of the rich, hence,a
bottom-up rather than a top-down approach is favored. Peo-
ple participation is supposedto be a bottom-up strategy.
(5) Despite the prevalent imageof smallfarmersas individualistic
and dependent on government,there are numeroussuccessful
storiesof small farmers who, through group action, havebe-
come self-reliant and able to improvetheir lives.
(6) To reach the most disadvantaged rural poor, structural
change has to be achievedat a low enough cost per unit by
mobilizing localpeople for their own advancementthrough
voluntary labor, local initiative in problem-solving,and local
responsibility for the maintenance of created assets.Al-
though this approachputs the burden of development on the
poor, self,reliance is preferredto chronic dependencies.After
all, eventhe poor havesomeresources.Besides,the advantage
of sustaineddevelopment for the poor and emphasison self-
reliance lowersthe cost of aid donors.
(7) Public programsdo not have much impact on the landless,
and the administrative system which movespublic goodsand
servicesdoes not reachdown to the local level; Local peopte
do not have equal opportunity to use intermediary institu-
tions either directly or through organizedgroups.The sugges-
tion is to utilize catalyst agentsin sensitizingpublic agencies
to the requirements of the poor, to aid them in acquiring
public goods and services, and to enhance their self-help
capabilities.
(8) People know best what is good for them and the poor re-
present a massive human resource both in terms of labor
potential, practical knowledge, experience, and ideas. Fur-
thermore, it is felt that community projects will be better
maintained if residentshad participated in their designand
implementation. On a very pragmaticvein, "participation" is
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a condition for approval of international development loans
or grants.
(9) Popular participation contributes to non-violent forms of
social action to bring about a new social order. The alterna-
tive is revolt.
• (10)The United States, the United Nations organizations, the
World Bank and other international development agencies
have made decentralization, local involvement and partici-
pation of the rural poor in the development processa central
policy concern. These three features are supposed to rein-
force productivity, equity, and welfare objectivesand, there-
fore, greater chance for successin rural development activ-
ities is expected where they are made part of the develop-
ment strategy.
These argumentsfor people participation lead us to the follow-
ingthoughtson people participation:
(a) From the way people participation has been portrayed, one
cannot help thinking that the international development
community is into another utopia, a new panaceawhich will
solve inequality, poverty, and dependency, will provide the
poor accessto public goodsand services,and will bring about
structural changesto create a new social order at a low cost
becausethe poor will be responsiblefor their own develop-
ment. To ess;stin the participatory process,some kind of a
"miracle worker"- a catalyst agent-functions at the grass-
roots level.
(b) Peopleparticipation is regardedboth as a meansto develop-
ment as well as an end in itself. It isconsidereda basicneed,
a basic right for its own sake. In designingdevelopment pro-
gramswith people participation and in assessingtheir impact,
it is very important to make this means-endsdistinction in
order to avoid the pitfall of substituting "participation" for
the tangible benefits expected from development programs
where these benefits have not been realized. For example,
can we expect more effectively utilized irrigation water and
higher productivity from irrigation projects characterized
by people participation? Or is farmer participation in the
people-participatory way, achievement in itself for the irri-
gation project?
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(c) The current emphasisor reemphasison the virtues and neces-
sity of people participation is a curious trend especially be-
causepractically, the entire developingworld is governedby
some form or somedegree of authoritarian rule (some more,
some less). How does "people participation" fare in such
societies?Is the current focus on this approach due precisely
to the existing political and social structure in the develop-
ing countries?
(d) The task of organizingand realizing power for the powerless
and assetsto the assetlesspoor who comprise the majority
of the population in developing countries in a bottom-up
fashion so that they could be active participants in the devel-
opment processis a Herculeanjob. We can reasonablyexpect
people participation to achievecertain objectivesbut perhaps
we should not expect it to solve all our development prob-
lems. As all past experienceshave shown, the real world is
a lot more complex and the social structure more imper-
meable to changethan is indicated in the rhetoric of partici-
pation.
(e) There are many contradictions in the expectations from peo-
ple participation. For example, the rural poor make up the
majority of the population who have been by-passedor who
have not been touched by development programs, not
reached by public goodsand servicesand are largelyassetless.
Benefits from development havetrickled up and not trickled
down, hence, the poor have become poorer. On the other
hand, the new participatory strategy in the name of self-
reliance placesthe burden of developmenton the poor them-
selves. It has likewise been argued that except in the most
deprived cases,the poor havesomeresources;that they know
best what is good for them; that they havea rich reservoirof
essential and practical knowledgeand creative solutions to
their own problems. If the poor are plagued with all these
problems and at the same time blessedwith all thesevirtues,
one would think that the rural poor would not be asserious
a problem as we see it today. In other words, perhapswe are
expecting too much in putting the burden of developmenton
the poor themselves especially if it is argued that it is a
cheaper way of changing social structure. We are more in-
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clined to believe that there is nothing cheap in changing
the status and quality of life of the poor. As a matter of fact,
one reasonfor our inability to reach the poor is our unwill-
ingnessto pay the cost. Putting the burden of develop-
ment on the poor could be taken by the rich and power-
ful as a convenient and legitimizedway of freeingthemselves
(in the name of self-reliance) from participation in shoulder-
ing this burden. Moreover, self-reliance should include the
capacity of people to gain acceseto resourceswhich they
themselvesdo not possess.
(f) Perhaps the "top-down" and "bottom-up" approachesare
not as much of a contrast asthey havebeen made to appear.
Much of the impetus for participation comes from outside
the local community and not necessarilyfrom the bottom
either. However, it is probably fair to saythat where projects
have been characterized by decentralization, local involve-
ment and people participation, the distanoe from top-down
is shorter and the trickle down easier.But bottom-up is uphill
and the top is not easily accessible,hence, the net effect of
bottom-up could be a bit higher than bottom but lower than
the top.
(g) People participation to be truly "participatory" must allow
people the freedom not to participate in order to prevent
people-participatory advocatesfrom using people for their
own dissent and likewise to pro_ect people from governments
who want people to participate for more effective centralized
con/_o/ disguised as people participation. There must be
room for voluntary non-perticil_tion which fulfills some peo-
ple's desire to be left alone. After all, "people know best".
Who can guarantee that participation will lead them to the
"Promised Land" and whose "Promised Land" is it anyway?
D. The Operational Definitions and Me_odology of People Par-
ticipation
Although much has been written and said about people partici-
pation, Cohen and Uphoff acknowledge that "of all the ways in
which local involvement can be increased,the greatest uncertainties
and confusions surround the participatory approach. Specifically,
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there is little agreement on what participation is or on its theoretical
or applied relationships to processes of development in different
environmental or societal contexts.''22 It is precisely for this reason
that we attempt a review of the operational definitions and metho-
dology of people participation.
(1) Who are the people in people participation?
When the literature on people participation argues for
"genuine participation", there is some implication that other
forms of participation are lessthan genuine. The first opera-
tional question about people participation is what do we
mean by "people"? Who are people? Hollnsteiner says that
the ordinary citizen, the gra_roo_s populace, the man in the
street, the proletariat, the masses are all equivalent defini-
tions of "people': 23 For the purposesof an academicpaper,
this definition may not need any further elaboration but it is
not sufficient for trendating a concept into action; for opera-
tionalizing an approach and for assessingits impact in the
light of all the rationale for people participation. The latter is
analogousto allthe recent outpouringabout the _nall farmer.
Who is he? As someone has said half-facetiously: "A small
farmer is 4 feeteight inches." Unlesswe can define him more
precisely,we cannot say when his situation has improved or
whether hehasbenefited from programsdesignedfor hiswel-
fare. The terms "people'; "proletariat" "grassroots"
"masses" are anonymous, faceless, and amorphous. Even
"the ordinary citizen" is like the "average man" who is vir-
tually impossibleto identify in person.
An operational definition of people in people participa-
tion is essential for still another reason. It is regarded as
bottom.up which is purportedly a contrast to the old CD
which has been critized as top</own. Howbottom isbottom
depends upon which people are involved and how assetless
they are. Does people participation really involve those who
have been unreached before or is it working in the same
socioeconomicarena as the previousdevelopment programs
which havebeen.adjudgedineffective?
Lassan goes much farther in defining the low income
rural people: i.e., those who generally have only two resour-
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cesto rely .on -- their labor and their capacity for collective
action. The assetless rural poor include: landless laborers/
marginal tenants or sharecroppers and small subsistence cul-
tivators struggling with insufficient land or the inputs to
make it productive; and other kinds of rural peoplewho earn
lessthan a defined minimum income such aspetty traders,
small artisans, domestic servants, fishermen, etc. Because
a major assetthesepeople lack is land, they are referred to as
the landless and nearlandless (LNL). Specific criteria to
measure the numbers of landlessand near-landlessmay be
debated, but clearly some combination of assets, income,
and accessto servicesshould be consideredto identify per-
sons whose situation is so adverse that it warrants special
attention ,24
The FAO framework for researchon "The Involvement
of the Poor in Development Through Rural Organizations"
has drawn up certain general criteria for defining the rural
poor. As formulated, the rural poor includeall peoplewl_0:"
( 1) live in rural areason or below subsistencelevel;
(2) are full or part-time dedicated to agriculture, forestry,
fisheries,handicraftsand/or related occupations;
(3) are largely dependent on others, lesspowerful and poor
for work and livelihood. This relationship usually results
in various forms and degrees of oppression and/or
exploitation by powerholdersat local and higher levels.
In addition, the FAO framework stressesthat "poverty
should not only beassessedand combatted on individualand
family basis as lack of food, shelter, clothing, health care,
basic education, adequate employment and opportunities to
participate in local decision-making.., but also,'andprinci-
pally, on a zonal or area basiS. On that level, poverty also
means lack of infrastructure, basic services and facilities,
further, inhuman land tenure conditions, inadequateproduc-
tion structures and shortageof employment opportunities; it
means finally above all, presence of structured forms of
oppressionand/or exploitation of the poor."
On the basis of this framework, Hollnsteiner et al
identified the main categoriesof the rural poor in the Philip-
pines as:
488 PeopleParticipation
(1) Tenants and sharecroppers
(2) Rural landless laborers. These include the sugar migrant
workers (sacadas),workers in coconut, pineapple,
banana, rubber, other plantations, seasonalworkers in
rice and corn lands, and fishery and forestry workers.
(3) Small owner-farmers orsmallholders. Farmers growingall
crops lessthan 2 hectaresin area.
(4) Cultural minorities. This includesself-provisioning(tribal)
people in the forests living off hunting, fishing, shifting
cultivation, etc. and also the varioushill tribes occupying
andtilling ancestrallands.
(5) Settlers. This category includes families that have been
resettled by government as part of the land-for-the-land-
lessprogram or to make way for development projects,
dispossessedfarmers who settled in forest regions and
hilly areas, and refugeeswho have been forced to flee
their land owing to existingpolitical conflicts.
(6) Female rural poor. Those who are not in the labor force
and are classified as housewives,who are agricultural
workers in the rural area.
(7) Rural youth. Children under 15 who form part of the
farming or fishinglabor force.2s
While this attempt at identification of the rural poor
categoriesenables us to make some progresstoward opera-
tionalization, the categories are very gross and criteria for
inclusionare unclear.
The USAID Mission to the Philippines, in itsCountry
Development Strategy Statement for Fiscal Year 1982,z
arrived at a more definitive picture of rural poverty by using
a combination of food threshold estimates, macro-level
figures and insightsfrom a synthesisof severalmicro-studies.
The food threshold consistsof a minimum nutritionally ade-
quate diet for a household of six measuredat current prices.
Any household whose "total annual income is lessthan that
required to feed itself is consideredabsolutely poor.''z7 In
their analysis,food threshold was used as a proxy for total
income threshold. Table 7.7 shows the poverty lines in dif-
ferent placesin the country,
PeopleParticipation 489
TABLE 7.7
POVERTYLINESFORHOUSEHOLDSOFSiX
Rural OtherUrban Manila
1971 P3000 1=3428 P4284
1975 5201 5943 7123
1978 6873 7519 8669
Applying these figures on family income in 1971, Abreraze
estimatesthat 56 percent of all Filipino families were below
this threshold. The incidence of poverty by family was 64
percent in rural areas, 39 percent in other areas and 34
percent in Manila. Around 4 million householdshaveincomes
below the poverty line.
The Country Statement followed a general model which
holds that "achievement of basic human needs is largely
determined by householdincome (cashand kind) and that, in
turn, a poor household's income is a function of: (a) the
productive assets the household controls, (b) the extent to
which household members are gainfully employed, (c) the
amount of transfers the household receivesin the form of
gifts, remittances, free or subsidizedsocial and other services,
and (d) the number of persons in the household.
Table 7.8 shows summary profiles of 4 rural poor groups
namely, upland farmers; paddy rice farmers; landless agricul-
tural workers; and artisanal fishermen. The informal sector
workers provide a glimpse into urban poverty. One signi-
ficant contribution of this work is to portray the dynamics
of poverty in addition to indicators of assetcontrol, produc-
tion orientation, nature of employment, level of indebted-
ness, years of schooling, caloric intake relative to daily
requirements.
Their analysis based on research findings synthesized
from a variety of sourcespresents a very useful capsulede-
scription which is quoted here extensivelyfor its oper_ionai
implications.
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. . . among the rural poor, the landless agricultural wo;kers and
their families are probably the most disadvantaged group. Their
lack of productive assets leaves them only their labor to peddle
in a highly competitive and 9enarally unremunerative setting and
makes them especially vulnerable to income shortfalls. They de-
pend on family, community and plantation ties for job security.
Farm workers within their own villages, especially if guaranteed
a share of the rice harvest, fare somewhat better than plantation
workers on a wage rate. The casual laborer seeking work outside
the village is the most vulnerable to seasonal unemployment.
Average annual income for all types of landless worker house-
holds is about half the poverty threshold. Heavy and recurrent
indebtedness is the unavoidable survival tactic adopted by most.
Living so close to the margin forces male and female household
members to pursue any income generating activities available:
additional hours in the field, duck raising, and pond fishing,
vending, carpentry, basket weaving, etc. When money is unavailable
to pursue crafts or additional agricultural activities, even the
woman is often faced with leaving the area of residence migrat-
ing to an urban center, and working as a bar maid or house servant.
The children's schooling quickly gives way to demand for their
labor. Despite these diverse efforts to achieve a minimum standard,
food intake remains low for lack of adequate purchasing power
and in-kind income. Poor nutrition status especially touches the
small children and increases the probability of illness among
adults which may cost the household lost days of work.
The landless" survival is undermined by _hgir low level of skills
and education, seasonal employment declining real wages, the lack
of alternative employment opportunities, and _e increasing com-
petition for the jobs _at are available. The landless are growing
exponentially as their ranks are filled by their own offspring, by
the children of farmers who inherit no land, by displaced fisher-
men and upland farmers who can no longer make it on their
eroding resource base. In this setting, the prospects for upward
social mobility for the landless appear very dismal.
The upland farmers are nearly as disadvantaged. The swidden
agricul_Jrists (Kaingii_eros'_ have the lowest incomes, but their
ability to shift to different lands may provide a modicum of sub-
sistence. The traditional or indigenous kaingifiero knows (though
does not always respect) the ecology of the rainforest and is able
to extract enough for household food consumption needs. The
marginal kaingi6ero, who is often a displaced lowlander, is les
equipped technologically to grow much on the cleare_l,forest land
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or marginal land with secondary vegetation. After the third or
fourth crop season, he must move on to another plot.
The upland rice and corn farmers represent the largest num-
ber of poor households. Despite higher incomes than the kaingi-
_eros and their control of relatively more land than other farm.
ers, their existence is marginal due in large part to the declining
productivity of their land and subsistence.type farming. Increasing
population pressures on the resource base, over-exploitation of
forest and grass lands by indigenous kaingi6eros and irresponsible
loggers, and inappropriate farming practices followed by marginal
kaiogi6eros are precipitating upland denudation and causing severe
soil erosion and loss of fertility. Since the upland rice and corn
farmer further relies on a more permanent holding, the lossof fer-
tility further limits already low returns from the use of traditional
technology. This forces the family to look beyond subsistence
farming to other sources of income to meet household needs. Off-
farm employment provides a major portion of total income. The
women raise and market vegetables, poultry, and pigs, while the
men often migrate to lowland areas for seasonal work in the
paddies, in construction, and other casual employment. This adds
to the competition for available work and thus pits them against
the landless agricultural workers. Lack of skills, market isolation,
low productivity, and general underemployment keep upland
farmer household incomes about 33% below the poverty threshold,
Not surprisingly in the household's effort to make ends meet, the
family consumes less food and foregoes education for its children,
sacrificing current health and nutrition as well as future prospect
for upward mobility of their children. As the resource base deter-
iorates, we can expect to see an increasingnumber of upland farm-
er households abandoning their land and migrating in search
of employment.
Artisanal fisherman are somewhat better off _an the upland
farmers. Household income is close to 3/4 of the poverty thres-
hold, but they have larger families. Income from fishing is limited
by a declining catch, low prices received by fishermen, and lack of
boat ownership for many. So far, the traditional sharing of the
catch helps cushion the plight of even the poorest. But as fishing
resources dwindle, with the destruction of coral reefs and man-
groves and overexploitation of fishing grounds, the traditional
system of reciprocal obligations may give way to more impersonal
contractual arrangements. This could displace many fishermen who
would have to turn to alternative employment. Already 1/3 of
fisherman households are supplementing their income with
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se_._,nalwork in agricultureand services.Their low incomesare
'reflected in poor nutrition and in limited education for their
children. In view of the fact that artisanalfishing hasprobably
reached its maximum output, future prospectsfor this groupare
not encouraging.
Paddy rice farmers,especiallyfull landownersand thoseon
irrigated land, are, relatively speaking, the least disadvantaged
amongthe rural poor groups.Farmer householdson irrigatedland
probably attain averageannual incomesvery closeto the poverty
threshold. Annual householdincomesfor farmerson rainfed land
fall on averageabout 20%below the poverty threshold.The higher
productivity of their land enablesthe paddy farmers to derivea
largershareof their income from on-farm employment. But the
demands of cash oriented production are creating a cost-price
squeezeand cashflow problemsfor amortizingland owners(cov-
ered by land reform) and tenants.The resultisdecliningnet profit
and food consumption. Rice stocks have to be sold to meet up-
front production expensesand increasingindebtednessis incurred
to buy food and cover additional productionand consumption
needs.The anticipatedyield increaseshave not been fully realized
due to floods, typhoons, inadequatecredit available to purchase
petroleum-besedinputs, low profitability of recommendedferti-
iizer levels, pest damageand inadequateagronome_tricpractices,
Nevertheless,paddy farmers are able to keep their children in
school longer than other poor groups. Many are also becoming
farm managers,hiring labor and findingtime to pursueother activ-
ities. The main factor undermining the otherwise promisingpro-
spectsfor future upwardmobility is the continuingfragmentation
of land, despite the Land Reform's attempt to stop it. Paddy
farmerssubdividealready smallplots of 1 to 3 has.amongsonsor
sub-leaseamong relativesor friends. Oncethe threshold of amini-
really viable plot is passed,the paddyfarmer's livelihoodis directly
at risk.
The urban informal sector worker group is not comparable
with the rural poor groupsas it aggregatesavariety of urbanoccu-
pations.Also, the dynamicsof urban povertyare sodifferent. The
urban informal sector household relies on hawking, vending,
peddling, family enterprisemanufacturingandservicesfor its main
sourceof income. Despitehigherabsolute incomes,when adjusted
for the highercostof urbanliving,householdincomereachesabout
2/3 of the minimum food threshold. Ownership of a houseor
shack representsa major assetwhich often determineswhetheran
informal worker householdoperatesas itinerant vendors or as a
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more permanent establishment,Employment is steadier and in-
volveslonger hoursthan for most rural groups.Yet relianceon a
cash income and isolation from subsistencefood production
increasesthis group'svulnerability. Rural family ties may provide
some cushion in the form of seasonalrice transfers. But food
consumptionis often traded for the education- of their children
who with marketable skills may be able to break into formal
sector salariedemployment. Meanwhile, family nutrition is low;
current incomeand productivity is handicappedby limited access
to credit for expandingthe family enterprise;they lack manage-
ment skills and technologyfor more efficient use of the family
labor; and arefaced by harrassmentfrom governmentregulations.
Finally, competition from the growingstream of rural migrants
in searchof employmentin the citiesfurther hampersthe informal
sectorworkers'effortsto achieveaminimumlivelihood.
While comparison of poor groups reveals varying patterns
of survival, it also highlights rather dramatically a common
set of problems:
dwindling productive sources.available to the poor,
which forces them to rely increasingly on the sale of
their labor services for economic survival;
[] declining real wages and income resulting from sea-
sonally surplus labor, growing numbers in the labor
force, and high inflation;
[] low productivity in the economic activities they pur-
sue;
[] low food consumption and nutrition status;
[] a lack of effective organization that would permit the
groups to articulate their needs and mobilize their
energies to improve their conditions;
I-1 a gradual breakdown of traditionalcoping mechanism
within the village structure that cushion the impact
of poverty. This is resulting in growing displacement
of individuals in these groups and is fueling migration
to more prosperous areas, rural and urban. This in
turn overloads further the traditional structure in
these areas.29
These profiles of the rural poor are in the process of be-
ing field-tested for "goodness-of-fit" with reality. Hopefully,
more refined specifications with respect to the range of varia-
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• tions within and between categorieswould emergeandthese
rural poor could be more definitely located in "geographic,
ecological and socio-economic space." Only then can "_oeo-
pie" begin to be specified as "groups of persons and individ-
ua/s" rather than as a anonymous"mass" without any "flesh
and blood" identity. Only then canwe answermore accurate-
ly the question -- "Who are the people. " Finally "people"
must be identified in terms of the total householdto ensure
that women, youths, infants, pre-school children, the aged,
etc., are included in the definition. Eventually, "people"
must ceaseto be "mass" and mustacquire a specificidentity,
name, and address.
(2) What is participation?
. After the efforts to operationally define "people" the
next question revolves around:"What is participation?"
"Theoretically, the most effective channelsfor people'sparti-
cipation are the organizations set up for this very pur-
pose" 3o but the literature makes a distinction between the
"standard" or the top-down and the "participatory" rural
organizations. The former refers to those organizations"in-
volved more in the implementation of already planned pro-
grams than in planningthem and deciding on the allocation
of consequent resourcesand gains."'3_ The "involvement of
residentsin community programsis mainly along implement-
ation and maintenance, The programs being implemented
at the villagelevel are packagedprogramswhose planningand
decision-making processeswere done by high level policy
makers from the different agenciesand brought to the com-
munity for implementation". 32 The standard procedure is
to organize groupsat the village level to carry out these pro-
grams, hence, it is not unusual to have an organization, a
group or a brigade for each programdesignedat the national
level. Quite often, there are overlapping, multiple member-
shipsand leadershippositions in the community.
In the usual organizations, the foilowing types of partici-
pation can be observedat the local level:
(1) Membership in community organizations set up for
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the mobilization of the community vis-a-visagency
programs (note that the term used here is mobiliza-
tion.)
(2) Contribution of persona/labor, materia/s and mone-
tary assistanceto infrastructure, health and sanitation
projectsetc.
(3) Patronage of agency-initiated institutions suchas nur-
sery schools,credit and consumercooperatives.
(4) Attendance at community assemblies called to disse-
minate information on program implementation plans
and attendanceat skills-trainingseminars.
(5) Cognitive participation in terms of being recipients
of information aboutcommunity activities.
In these instances, "people" have limited accessto deci-
sion-making before a planned program is ready for imple-
mentation. If at all, their only participation in the pre-
planning stage is probably as respondentsto a survey on
their needs and problems. During program implementation,
only community leaders have anything to say about the
allocation of resources emanating from community pro-
grams.33
From the point of view of people participation advocates,
the above-mentioned "involvements" are not genuine partici-
pation.
Hollnsteiner identifies 6 different modes of people's par-
ticipation representing different degrees of direct exercise
of power by the people:
(1) Local elite decision-making mode
(a) "Solid-c/tizen" educated groups appointed by out-
side authorities (people are minimally involved,
if at all, in decision-making).
(b) Appointed Iocalleaders in the government bureau-
cracy (although people involvement is still mini-
real, official character of leaders' authority en-
courages people to join in program activities as
followers or recipients of the benefits entailed).
(2) People acting in an advisory capacity to elites in
authority
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(a) Planners in ex post facto consultation with peo-
ple's groups (people's involvement in discussion
of plans after they have been formulated allows
few genuine options; participation exists but only
in token fashion).
(b) Planners in consultation with people's groups
from the beginningof plan formulation (this gives
people a significant share in decision-makingbut
plannersstill control the process).
(3) People sharing in or controlling local political deci-
sions affecting their lives
(a) People haveone or 2 minority representatives on
a decision-making board (people's participation
is significant because they share in decision-
making by having an official vote on a local
governmentboard).
(b) People have the majority representation on a
decision-makingboard (people haveattained full
participation in controlling the actionsof the offi-
cial decision-makingbody).34
The latter two which are regardedas "significant" and
"full" people participation modes perhaps include only 1-2
or 3-5 personsto represent the people. To be considered
people participation, these few individuals must be truly
representative of the people. How do people choose these
representatives? How "people" are these "people repre-
sentatives?" Would these individuals be different from
those who could have been chosenby the so-called "stand-
ard" type organizations? Do people participatory approaches
have special properties and processeswhich produce special
quality "people outputs" not usually evident in standardor-
ganizations? This special quality or process,if there is one,
must be made more explicit, more defineableand operational
so that it can be more widely realized.
Santiago has some down-to-earth observationson people
representation: "Even in a democracy, a few elected leaders
make the decisionsfor the majority. Involvement of people
in community programs, projects or activities may be done
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as individuals or as groupsdepending on the kind aswell as
the stage of the program or project. To involve everybody
in all stageswill not only be a waste of time but also of ef-
fort• Ideally, planning and decision-makingshould be done
by all in the community but in reality, even a small barrio•
cannot gather its 2000 or more people to plan and decideon
a project. So individuals get to be represented either
-through the group, unit or organization they belong to. The
question to be resolved here is: How representative is the
chosen representative of the values, goal=, interests and
ideasof the individualshe is representing?3s
From the United Nations, popular (people) participation
refers to three distinct but closely related aspects of the
developmentprocess:
(1) massshapingo f the benefits o f development;
: (2) mass contribution to development;• and
(3) mass involvement in the decision-making process for
development. "Popular participation-isseenboth as a
goa! Of development involvingequitable distribution
of national income and equality of opportunity, and
as a •meansfor developmenteffort or as a broad-based
popular involvement in the decision-makingprocess.
The relationship is a two-way venture: People contri-
buting .to the developmental effort increases the
benefits for them, and this then acts as an incentive
-for increased popular contribution to-development
• _.. Popular participation isalsoseen ... as catego-
_'36
rical term for citizen orpeople power.
• In defining community participation in theplan-
ning process,Hollnsteiner identifies 4 stages(i) con-
ceptualizing the problem or defining the issues;(2)
deciding what is to be•done; (3) implementing the
plans and programs; and (4) evaluating the results.
She-points out that the only stageoverwhich govern-
ment and peopleagree on• the need for participatior
isimplementation: 37
Another way of categorizingforms of particiPa-
tion is outlined by Lassen: (1) participation in the
implementation • of a serviceor a project; (2) partici-
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pation in the decision-making on what the serviceor
project should be; (3) participation in evaluation of
the performance of project administrators or quality
of service; and finally, participation in control over
how the project or service is directed in the long run.
Participation only in implementation and benefits is
compatible with a "welfare" approach to extending
services, i.e., gifts in a spirit of charity to passive,in-
ferior recipients. Can such limited forms of participa-
tion produce structural changesin the circumstances
and capabilitiesof the landless-near-landless?38
Unlike "standard" rural organizations where
cognitive participation means being recipients of in-
formation about the organization, its plans, projects,
technology, etc., from sponsoringagencies,people
participation "elevates" cognitive participation to
"being made aware that the community may partici-
pate in decisionsaffecting them and that they may
choose to question, or even to reject, externally
developedplansand programs.''39
In a more pragmatic vein where "participation"
is viewed asa means of intensifying rice production,
Goodell argues that "realization of the potentials
of the new rice technology calls for cohesion and
coordinational sophistication among the small rice
farmers of Southeast Asia far beyond anything they
.have hitherto achieved". She identified three main
components of the high-yielding technology that are
critical to" production gains but are also contingent
upon the intensification of organization among farm-
ers: irrigation, pest management and the financing of
the relatively expensive new inputs.
[] Irrigation. First,thenewricetechnologyoffersmore
frequentandmoreabundantharveststo farmerswho
can useadequateIrrigation,but irrigationprojects
inturnusuallyrequirethatwaterdeliverybesystem_
tized in much greaterdetail: increasinglycomplex
distributionschedulesmust be coordinatedboth
locallyand regionally,t_e amountof. water dell-
veredfor eachunit area mustbe morecarefully
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regulated and used to affect equity of distribu-
tion, farm operations must become synchronized
to avoid excessive water requirement due to hap-
hazard planting schedules, and the irrig'_tors' re-
sponsibilities for finance and maintenance as well as
for disciplining offenders - hitherto carried out in-
dividually - must be consolidated into group action.
Especially during periods of limited water supply, in-
tensified irrigation calls for closer communication
and firmer agreement among the users themselves
and between the farmers and the operating agency's
field personnel. In short, to the extent that increased
rice production depends upon improved water con-
trol in the farmer's fields, it ultimately depends upon
the intensification of organization among the farmers
of the irrigation service area.
[] Pest managemen_ Second, farmers' organizations
must be far more rigorous to control pest infestation
of the new high-yielding rice varieties. Like irrigation.
effective control of insects, rats and diseases can no
longer be left to individual performance. Integrated
pest management begins with the farmers' surveil-
lance of pest populations throughout their shared
area; it includes synchronous planting and harvesting
to increaseecosystem control, as well as simultaneous
spraying or poisoning over adjacent fields. Like irriga-
tion, group pest management depends vitally upon
the exchange of trustworthy information among many
separate, small rice farmers; upon. their ability to
reach consensus and then implement quick decisions
within extensive, composite fields; and upon their
incorporation for financial and juridical measures.
The technical relationships between infestation and
irrigation is well known but we have just begun to
appreciate that organizational solutions to many of
their problems are also interlocked ....
•Though the advantages of increased cooperation
at the farm level which are outlined above derive
mainly'from the technica/ requirements of the new
high-yielding varieties, nevertheless even greater in*
crements in rice production may come from the in-
teraction between more viable farmers' groups and
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more responsivebureaucraciesservingthem: that is,
from the ability of intensified organizationamong
farmers to achieve greater institutional efficiency
within agriculture.As systemsfor pest surveillance
aswell asirrigation extend to wider and wider areas,
their respectivenational administration- in orderto
assurerapid feedback and implementationthrough-
out the chain of command -must decentralize more
and more of the on.farm tasks to the farmers them-
selve¢ That in turn necessitatespermanentfarmers'
associationswhich,aspartnersin agriculturalmanage-
ment, "cantake corporateinitiativesandassumelong-
term corporateresponsibilitie¢
[] Credit Third, to realizethe full potential of the new
high-yieldingtechnologies,most rice cultivators in
Asia need assistancein financingthe relativelyexpen-
sive inputs that must complement the new seeds,
Institutions financing the small farme_ appear to
favor dealing with them in groups, for reasonsof
bureaucratic efficiency similar to those suggested
above, as well as to provide technical supervision
of agricultural loans, In fact, the major thrust for
organizingfarmersin the Philippinesduringthe past
threedecadeshascome from the lendingagencies...
and this will clearlycontinue to be the case.A better
understanding of the internal dynamics of these
groupcredit schemeswill quite likely throw lighton
two major constraintsto higher yields, the farmers'
useof fertilizersandinsecticides.
Thus the intensification of agriculture in South-
east Asia depends upon intensified organization of
farmen¢ But what kind of organization? How is this
organizationto take place?,Ao
So far, Goodell's conceptualization is the most expli-
cit with respect to ;ntensified organization as a means to
intensified production. This explication is Crucial for an
eventual assessment of the extent to which this mean_
ends relationship has occurred. However, the project is
still in progress and results from it are not yet available.
Despite strong advocacy for the people participatory
approach, there isno naivete about the difficulties it
entails. Hollnsteiner enumerates some of them:
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[] It is time-consuming, often nerve-wreckingand can
become a Pandora'sbox of problems.
[] Local communities understandably tend to concern
themselves almost exclusively with their own self-
interests.
Self_he!p projects in which people are expected to
work gratis for the sake of the community may be-
come exploitative if carriedtoo far.
[] In conceptualizing communitY participation, the per-
ceptions are often limited to .the involvement of men
(seldom.women).
[] The administration-sponsored community worker
gets caught between people and administrators in
the event of conflicts betweenthem.
[] People's participation posesproblems to authorities
sensitiveto public protests.4!
Ruttan described integrated rural development as
"an ideology in search of a methodology or a techno-
logy': Does the same description apply to people partici-
pation?
Lassen argues that "participation in group action is
not simply on matter of individual choices such that if
the right incentives are. provided, a person participates
and if disincentives exist, he does not." He says that
"appropriate organizational, techniques need to be
adapted to the circumstances and needs of the target
group." These are referred to associal technology. This
social technology includes the consciousness-raising
methodologiesof Ivan Illich and Paulo .Freire.which have
been concerned with "building up the self-dignity and
decision-making .capacities of poor people in environ-
ments that may b.e highly stratified, exploitative and/or
culturally repressive," Lassencautions against the notion
that because"a program is decentralized-and hasa strong
extension .component, it is therefore participatory." He
further elaborates that "decentralization of authority
from central to. local leVelsdoes not result in participa
tion unlessthere is also a Sharingin planning, decision-
making and evaluation.within the localgroup,-With some
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traditional approaches,the sponsoringinstitution adopts
a paternalistic role. Theprogram per se becomesthe focal
point, asagainstthe developmentof the peoplewhich the
programwasostensibly organizedto serve.''42
This point about decentralization not necessarily
being participatory is a very important one becauseoper-
ations at the local level can simply be dominated by the
local elite. However, one can argue that decentralization
means "participation of the locals". Although this still
means local elites, perhapsthe "trickle-down" processis
considerably shortened. Lassenlikewise makes a distinc-
tion between focus on the program and focus on the
people. This implies that the concernsof the program are
not the concerns of the people.., a situation which is
not unusual when centrally designed programs are im-
plemented uniformly nationwide. But this "mismatch"
eventually "rights" itself in the sensethat people Jo not
take to programswhich do not meet their needs.They
only respond positively to those elements which are
acceptable and comply pro-forma to those that are not.
At any rate, our development experience is littered with
"short-lived mismatches". This is not to say that some
things regardedinitially as not particularly relevantwould
not in time be accepted and enthusiastically adopted via
the "educationally induced felt need" approach.
E. Community Organization and IssuesSurrounding the Method
The most important approach in people participation iscommu-
nity organization (C-O for short). What is community organization
as a method for organizingpeople for power? Hollnsteineret al out-
linesthe following'propositions underlying the C-Oapproach:
E_ Unorganized poor people do not participate actively in so-
cietal decisionsaffecting their lives becausethey are objec-
tively and subjectivelypowerless.
[] When weak individualsband togetherand asa groupconfront
personsin authority positions, their collective numberscan
rectify the earlier imbalance between weak and strong and
allow interaction on an equal basis.
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[] The sheerexperience of participation in group actionsdevel-
ops in ordinarily dependent people a senseof power.
[] Organizing people for power seeks to establish powerful
people's organizations through which the disadvantaged
poor can enter the sphereof decision-making."Power" is the
means by which ordinary people can find redress for their
grievancesand act against those conditions that oppressand
dehumanizethem.
The following are the five basicorganizingprinciplesin CO:
[] People generally act on the basisof their self-interest. Cons-
ciousness-raisingalong everyday issueslike water, light, evic-
tion, etc. begetsearly successes.
[] Move from simple, concrete, short-term, personal issuesto
more complex, abstract, long-term and system issues.For
example, security of land tenure must be broken down into
smallerissuesthat are manageable.
[] The Establishment givespeople the opportunity to become
angry and militant (when authority ignoresor antagonizes
people).
[] Tactics againstthe powerful should be within the experience
of the powerless,and outsidethe experienceof the powerful.
(For example, women petitioning for a community standpipe
but turned away many times before, carry their laundry, soap
and wash basinswith them next time they go to the water-
works office).
[] Throughout the organizing process,people make their own
decisions.
What are the stepsin the C-O process?
[] C.O usually starts with a pair or group of trained organizers
entering a community in response to perceived problem
there. They may be invited by local people or engaged by
groups interested in enhancing people's ability to share in
decision-makingand resources.
[] The organizer starts with ground work or legwork. This isa
processof going around the community on foot and talking
to small groups or individuals about problems and issuesin
the community. This one-to-one series of consciousness-
raisingdialoguescan sometimestake weeks.
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[] When the organizer feels with some of the people that it is
time to begin bringing larger groupsof people together, his
conversationsbegin to,focus on specific issuesand suggest
specific actions suchas holding of a meeting to discusslight
and water issues.
I-] When the meetingactually takes place, part of the organizer's
role will be to help the group identify the target person to
be confronted. This persontakes the role of the "enemy" in
this strategizingprocess.It ismuch easier to get people emo-
tional over a person than an abstract institution.
[] Once people have decidedwhat action to take, one that pro-
bably entails confrontation of some persons in authority,
the organizer teachesthem how to role play (rehearse)the
impendingmeeting.
The experience of being part of a massconfrontation hasthe
effect of erasing ordinary people's fear of conflict... Tac-
tically, people never request or ask for something;they de-
mand it.
[] The object of mobilization is to win a victory, that is, to
attain the goal demanded. The action has to be something
manageable that stands a good chance of success.People
insistcalmly until they get their way.
[] The next step calls for people, leadersand organizersto re-
turn to their communities and engage in group reflection
sessionsto analyze their tacticsand outcomes.
[] Th6"group is not formalized by electing leadersor drawing
up constitution and by-laws although formal organization is
an important part of the C-O process.They wait until the
group feelsstrongand united after a seriesof actions.
Advocates of people participation claim "notable success"for
the C-O or the conflict-confrontation approach for the following
reasons:
[] It directly attacks the powerlessnessand passivityof the poor
and attempts to rectify this with a specifc/nethodology,
[] It recognizesthat communities are made up=of groupswith
different and often conflicting interests.
[] It isa "genuinely" bottom-up strategy.
[] While leadershipis consideredimportant, muchmore empha-
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sis is placed on membership awarenessand participation in
.all phasesof organization,
[] C-O worker need not bea collegegraduateor evencompetent
in rural technology. He or she must have a healthy irre-
verenceof authority: a senseof humor that can be appliedto
organization tactics; creativity in devisingappropriate tactics,
flexibility-sensitivity to changes in situations; tenacity; and
genuine love for people - helping them without fostering
dependenceon oneself.43 '
In •addition to the "groundwork" techniques of C-O mentioned
earlier, Unson describesa secondstrategy used in developingpartici-
pation in two communal irrigation systems.Farmersattended group
•dynamicsand •leadershipseminars.•These seminarsapplied the labo-
ratory •method which consistsprimarily •of creating situations from
which the seminar participants can develop an understanding of
themselves in the context of a working•group and of how and why
•their group operates as it does. Farmers were brought together in
small groups in a series of two-day live-in seminars. During these
two days, they .were_given the opportunity to interact amongthem-.
selves,and to analyze their interactions with the goal of improving
the effectivenessof their association. Important individualand group
processessuch as perception, values,,communication, decision-mak-
ing, consensusand planningwere taken up. Emphasiswas placedon
making the activitiesas relevant as possibleto the farmers' situation•
and encouragingthe farmers themselvesto relate their learning to
themselvesandtheir rolesin the association.
Leadership Seminarswere conducted to improve the leadership
and .management practices of the association'sofficers. Different
leadershipstyles ranging from the authoritarian•to the consultative
and participative were discussed.Officers.were asked to analyze
the leadershipof their organization and to make plans on how to
improve it; an underlying assumption being that the•movement to-
ward a more democratic=and participative style of leadershipwasa
goal.
In this partiCipatory irrigation associationproject, there were two
basic ideas. (1_.,,Muchof the success•ofan associationin managingan
irrigation system is dependenton.good organization; (2) Insteadof
forming associationsbased on models•from •developed countries,
the project• uses indigenous associations.• The project has the fol-
•lowing objectives:
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[] To involve water usersin the planning, constructionand re-
habilitation of their irrigation systemand in all other activi-
ties of the association;
[] To harnessthe associationmembers' potential for leadership
and group action.
[] To strengthenthe existing indigenousorganizationsin order
that they may become self-reliant with regard to system
management, system maintenance, and conflict resolution
amongmembers.
[] To transform the irrigation associations into cooperatives
able to respondto other needsof the members.44
All these objectivesare regarded as the social development goals
of the project. They are ends in themselves. Increase in crop yield
and farmer income, improvements in housing and capability of asso:
ciation members to repay their loan from the NIA are considered
only as corollary socioeconomic goals. This is probably the basic
difference between the usualdevelopment project and the "partici-
patory" one. In the former, "participation" in organizationsis con-
ceptualized mainly as a means to increasedyields, income, repay-
ments, etc., and therefore participation is focused on tlie imple-
mentation phase.
After some experienceswith the People Participation Strategy of
the National Irrigation Administration (NIA), Bagadionspellsout the
questions in detail which need to be addressedin organizing irriga-
tion associations:
[] When should the irrigation association be organized?
Farmers can be organized by turn-out area at a late stageof
constructionjust before completion.
Farmerscan be organizedat the time of construction.
Farmers can be organized before construction; no construc-
tion proceeds until farmers have been organized. This
enables them to participate in the entire development
process (planning, decision-making, construction, etc.).
[] Why is there a need to strengthen the organization?
To develop a strong feeling of ownership of the irrigation
system;
To ensurecontinuing participation throughtime; and
To bringabout greaterequity in sharingbenefits.
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What are the tasks the irrigation association should concern
itself with?
Who shoulddistribute the water?
How shouldwater be distributed?
Who should maintain systemsstructures?
How should labor obligations for system maintenance be
determined?
How often should maintenancebe done?
How would farmers be notified about maintenance sched-
ules?
How should irrigation feesbe determined?
How should irrigation fees becollected and handled?
How would system operational costsbe met?
How would irrigation conflicts be resolved?45
It is worth noting here that all of the detailed questions that
Bagadion posesfor the irrigation associationsarequestionson people
participation in implementation and the role of membersin carrying
out these tasks. Curiously, the issue of benefits from irrigation to
members seemsto be assumedby both the C-O workers and the NIA
administration. As Unson points out, the question often asked by
NIA personnel of the community organizer is... "Wil_ the people's
participation assurebetter managementof the irrigation system and
payment of fees?,,46
Given the above-mentioned features of C-O, the following issues
might be raised:
[] The conflict-confrontation approach is basically Western.
How does it fit into the Filipino socio-cultural-political
milieu?
[] C-O is not only time-intensive, it is also emotionally inten-
sive. It takes special dosageof ideological commitment and
fervor to engagein this approach, How long can a C-O worker
•relentlesslypursue a conflict-confontation stancevis-a-visthe
Establishment? In other words, what is the averageworking
life spanof a C-O before he or shebecomespart of the Estab-
lishment?
[] Considering the particular characteristics "demanded" of a
C-O worker, how many would be availableand willing to take
on this task? Perhaps the products of the activist era (late
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1960s and early 1970s) are better prepared for confronta-
tion but how many would make it a lifetime career? Lynch
et al suggestthat professional non-government assistanceis
required for this undertaking on the ground that "govern-
ment sponsoredcommunity organizations tend to transmit
information, not receive it... in large part, perhapsbecause
centuries of tradition havesodefined the governmentagent's
role.''47 Because the government is the major supplier (and
will remain so in the foreseeable future) of development
workers, what would happen if theseworkers _veretrained to
use people participatory methods in addition to their techni-
cal and bureaucratic expertise? Is this at all possible? Or
would it mean the lossof "people's enemy"?
[] What do people do with power after they have acquired it?
The language of C-O is demand, not request, not ask for.
People can demand security of land tenure; they can de-
mand a larger share of the produce but increasedproduct-
ivity, employment creation, and a better life are thingsthey
have to work for. After victory hasbeenwon over a common
external enemy, how does the group achievesharingof the
burdens and the "spoils" (if you will) of the victory? It
would be the height of naivete to think that in a people's
organization, everyone is equally powerful. How does C-O
prevent these people's organizations from reproducing
exactly the same social structure which they themselves
fought against? Can they be as tough in dealing with the
problem farmer among them (who usesall the irrigation
water at the head of the system)asthey are with the outside
enemy such as the landlord or the government irrigation
engineer?
I-I Who picks up the "emotional debris" and the power struggle
"casualties" from the conflict-confrontation episodesof peo-
ple participation? What about future "return actions" from
the "loser enemy" when for some reason or another, people
becomevulnerableonceagain to that samepower source?
[] How long does an organization which emergesfrom the par-
ticipatory process endure after the C-O leaves the scene?
Does it far better in viability than the so-called standard
rural organization? Becauseof the intensity of commitment
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required, would the C-O tend to foster cl'ependencyon the
_organizer instead of self-reliance? How longdoes it take for
the weaningprocess? Is it ever completely achieved?
As the International Foundation for Development Alternatives
said:
Self.reliancecannotbe dispensedor dictated; it mustbe learned,.and
the /earningprocessstarts with the individual. It isa slowcumulativepro-
cess,stretchingthroughgenerationsandsusceptibleto reverses.Muchthere-
foredependson thetype of educationthatisavailableto helppeoplelearn
to think for themselves.By educationin thiscontextis not meantthe
• conventionalacademicschoolingbut a pedagogyof self-reliance:/earning
to participate;to assumeresponsibility,to takedecisions,to be lessdepend-
ent, to communicate, to serveothers, to receivemessagescritically;...
aboveall learningthroughandthroughoutlife.4e
These• issues notwithstanding, people participation cannot be
accused•of being an "ideology without a methodology" for it has
community organization: as its basic methodology. The more im-
portant issueis somethingelsel Becauseitsadvocatestreatparticipa-
tion asa social development goal as an end in itself - the role of
participation in bringing•development benefits which accrueto the
rural poor, where they havenot been reachedbefore, is lessclearand
difficult to establish. However, if•people considerparticipation as a
"benefit" •in itself rather than as a meansfor obtaining other bene-
fits; then participation has its own reason for doing. In many ins-
tances, however, there is an implicil_faith that people participation
in the planning, implementation,_evaluation•andcontrol •of develop-
ment projects •assuresthat people-will benefit from the projects.
This implicit faith remainsto bedemonstratedsubstantively.
Furthermore, the interpretation of "participation only in imple-
mentation and benefits as "welfare" or "charity" to passive,inferior
recipients, should be_investigatedempirically. Do suchparticipants
only in the benefits really view those benefits as charity? Are they
really: ••passiveand •infer!or•recipients?•An alternative possibilityis
that-they regard these "•benefits•'' as what society• owesthem and
therefore they "deserve" whatever comes to them without feeling
gratitude and inferiority. They might in fact be "active" and not-
-passiverecipients. Maybe, they are not too unaware of other sectors
of society who do not deservewhat they have.••At any rate, this
whole issueis a significantempirical question.
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
"Felt needs" came with the community development era.and
"people participation" was brought by the Second Development
Decade. To find out what these concepts meant in practice, the
following were examined in this chapter: approaches to social
soundnessanalysis;an operational typology of felt needs;concept
and practice of people participation; operational definitions and
methodology of people participation: and community organization
and the issuessurroundingthe method.
Approaches To Social Soundness Analysis
A socially sound development program was defined asone which
is for the poor; from the poor; through the poor and benefits accrue
to the poor. Three approachesto the designof sucha program were
suggested:relying exclusively on professionalopinion; letting people
decide for themselves;and letting people lead while the experts
follow. The experience in the Bicol River Basin area was cited to
illustrate the third approach. The assessmentof people's felt needs,
for example, included the following: community problems freely
mentioned as important; life concerns or domains which were of
more than ordinary interests;overall life satisfaction and happiness
about each of the life concerns (perceived quality of life): positive
choicesfor selecteddevelopment programs;and problems identified
by experts alone.
In comparing the list of problems identified by people and by
experts, it wasfound that experts sawthe same problemsthat people
perceived and they saw evenmuch more beyond that, suggestingthat
perhaps even experts are people. Nutrition, population, health,
integrated rural development, equity and people participation would
probably never be part of the development sceneif the experts had
not "felt" them for the people. However, from the Bicol experience,
it was evident that a people-centered assistanceprogram was very
data-intensive. Experts both in technical and social sciencefields
were the most active participants in identifying, defining, and articu-
lating people's felt needs. Even the "voice of the people" was heard
through the expert.
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An Operational Typology of Felt Needs
Basedon pastand current rural developmentexperiences,a typo-
logy of felt needsin operationalterms wasproposed:
(1) People's felt needs, elicited, articulated, analyzed and inter-
preted by experts;
(2) Emp/rically derived needs which arise from an analysis of
large scale or macro level trends as indicated by available
data overtime, e.g., population growth.
(3) Systematically (scientifically) determined needs established
• by expertsthrough their own specialmethods;
(4) "Educationa/ly-induced" people's felt needs are those de_
cribed in (2) and (3) which people are "trained" to perceive
and feel astheir own priority needs;and
(5) "Seduced" felt needs which are stimulated by the availability
of resourcesfor specialproblem areas.
The Concept and Practice of People Participation
Arguments for people participation could be summarizedas fol-
lows: The poor majority have had virtually no say in events that
affect their lives and development strategieswhich were top-down
have failed to reach them. Besidesbeinga basic human need and a
basic human right, people participation, with decentralization and
local involvement are supposed to reinforce productivity, equity,
and welfare objectives thus greater chance for successin rural devel-
opment is expected. People "know best what is good for them and
they represent a massiveresourcein terms of labor potential, prac-
tical knowledge, experience and ideas. Community projects will be
better maintained if people had participated in their design and
implementation. Besidesthe advantageof sustaineddevelopment for
the poor, emphasison self-reliance lowers the cost of development.
Finally, people participation contributes to non-violent forms of
socialaction to bringabout a new socialorder.
These argumentsfor people participation had led to somefurther
thoughts on the subject: (a) The expectationsof people participation
could make it another utopia, a new panaceato replace"tired" one¢
(b) Becausepeople participation is regardedboth asa meansto devel-
opment aswell asan end in itself, this means-endsdistinction must
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be made in order to avoid the pitfall of substituting "participation"
for the tangible benefits from development programs.(c) The current
people participation emphasisis a curious trend for it comes at a
time when practically the entire deve(oping world is under some
degree of authoritarian rule (some more, some less). (d) There are
many contradictionsin people participation. Putting the burden of
development on the poor could be taken by the rich and powerful
as a legitimized way of freeing themselves (in the name of self-
reliance) from shouldering this burden. (e) Perhaps the difference
between top-down and bottom-up approachesis more verbal than
real for much of the impetus for people Participation comesfrom
outside and not necessarilyfrom the bottom either. (f) Peopleparti-
cipetion to be truly participatory must allow people the freedom
not to participate.
The Operational Definitions and Methodology of People Participa-
tion
Although much had been said about people participation, it was
acknowledgedthat of all the ways in which local involvementcould
be increased,the greatestuncertainties and confusionssurround the
participatory approach. The first operational question about people
participation is: "Who are the people in people participation? "
From the earlier definitions which made "people' anonymous, fac_
less and amorphous, criteria for identification had emerged and
further specification is on its way. Eventually "people" would cease
to be "mass" and would acquire a specific identity, name and ad-
dress. So far, in the rural setting, "people" refers to four rural poor
groups: upland farmers, paddy rice farmers; landlessagricultural
workers; and artisenal fishermen. Although these groups revealed
varying patterns of survival, they exhibited.a common set of pro-
blems: dwindling productive resourcesavailable to the poor which
forced them to rely increasingly on the sale of their labor services
for economicsurvival;declining realwagesand income resultingfrom
growing numbers in the labor force and high inflation; low produc-
tivity in the economic activities they pursue; low food consumption
and nutrition status; lack of effective organizationto articulate their
needs; and gradual breakdown of traditional coping mechanisms
within the village structure. Finally, "people" must be identified in
terms of total households to ensure that women, youths, infants,
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•pre-school children, the aged, etc., would be included in the defini-
tion. .
The second question asked was: "What is participation? " Al-
though there are many ways of categorizing participation, perhaps
they could all be subsumedin these5 categories:participation in the
implementation of a project; participation in the decision-makingon
what the_project should be; participation in•evaluation;participation
in control over how the project is directed in the long run. Partici-
pation only in implementation is regardedas a welfare or charity
approach. It was difficult to distinguishparticipation asa meansand
participation as an end except in one project which specifically
stated "participation" asa-meansof intensifying rice production.
Despite•strong advocacy for participation, there was no naivete
about the difficulties it entails, Participation carries its own risks
and problems. It was further pointed out that-decentralization is
not necessarilyparticipatory.
Community Organization and/ssues Surrounding the Method
People participation is not an ideology without a methodology.
Community organization (C-O)--as its most important approach
has a set of procedures and organizing principles along conflict-
confrontation• lines but in actual practice, many modifications are
accommodated perhaps mostly in the degree to which conflict-
confrontation is pursued. Because•this approach is basicallyWestern
and not Filipino, a number of issuessurrounding.the method had
been raised such as: C-O is time-and emotion-intensive. What is the
average•working life,span of a C-O worker? What do people do with
power after they have•acquired it? Who picks up the emotional
debris and power struggle casualties from conflict-confrontation
episodes?- Considering the intensity required,-does C-O foster self-
relianceor dependency?
The implicit faith that participation would bring more develop-
ment.benefits to the rural•poor has yet to bedemonstratedsubstan-
tively. Finally, there was an empirical question with respect to
whether "participation only in implementation and benefits" was
really viewed as "welfare" or "charity" by the recipientsor assome-
thing that society owed them and therefore there was neither.grati-
tude nor inferiority •in the process.
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CHAPTER VIII
FIELD EXPERIENCESWITH RURAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND PEOPLE PARTICIPATORY APPROACHES
Becausetranslating concept into action is infinitely more com-
plex than putting fiery rhetoric and eloquent languagetogether,
actual field experiencesconstitute, in effect, the test of implementa-
bility. Inthis chapter, we aim to: .
a. Examine a variety of field experienceswith the so-called"stan-
dard" rural organizations and people participatory approaches
• suchas:
(1) Non-governmentsocialdevelopmentapproach
(2) Irrigation associations
(3) Rural organizations
(4) Health servicedelivery systems
(5) People participation at the integrated areadevelopment p.roj-
ect level
(6) Peopleparticipation for irrigation development
b. Identify some insightsand. lessonsfrom the practiceof people
participation in eight different projects:
(1) A socialdevelopment.approach
(2) An agroforestationand upland developmentproject
.(3) Small farmers',grassrootsorganizing to enhance agricultural
productivity.
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(4) Barangaywater project
(5) A _tudy of workers in manufacturing establishments
(6) The BangladeshRural Advancement Committee
(7) The LINK-COD Programme (Linking with Communities for
Development) P[ogramme
(8) The Bicol River BasinDevelopment Program
A. Field Experiences With Rural Organizations and People Parff
cipatory Approaches
(1) Non-government Social Development Approach to Assisting
Low-Income Groups
The Philippine Businessfor Social Progress(PBSP) which repre-
sents private businessmen'ssocial responsibility is supportedby 60
percent of total contributions from 120 companiesgiving one per-
cent of net profit before income taxes. PBSP has had 10 years of
field experience with over 300 assistedprojects nationwide plus an
action-research documentation of the social development process.
The core philosophy of PBSP is self-help basedon the firm convic-
tion that disadvantagedPhilippine communities can and do want to
help themselves. "Social development practice indicates that what is
usually neededto changethis desire into reality is initial external as-
sistance in the form of financial resources and know-how and the
internal competence to use this assistance." This philosophy istrans-
lated into action in the following manner: "PBSP inputs leadto orga-
nized community groups with trained leaders havingincreasedskills
and improved technology implementingon-goingprojectsfor increas-
ed income or production and community improvementtowards
self-reliant communities . . . PBSP seeksto develop communities
which are able to maintain their organization and undertake their
own projectsto meet community needsthrough collectivegroup ef-
fort evenafter PBSPhaspulled out assistancefrom the area."'1
These projects include Food Production (Crops, Livestock, and
Aquaculture); Small Business Program (Social Credit-setting up of
micro and small businessesthrough non-collateral loans;Cooperative
Training and Development); and Human Resource Development
(Community Building Manpower Development, Community-Ba_d
Health and Nutrition Project, Management Development and Func-
tional Literacy). From 1974-1979, PBSPdirectly managedthe Lagu-
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na Rural Development Project which assisted37 barrios usingthe
strategyof community organization.
What is the impact of PBSP'sassistancewhich uses5 strategies:
Community organization, Small-scale industries, Skills Training,
Agricultural Development and Cooperative Development?An inten-
siveanalysisof their first 33 projects revealedthe following results:2
a. Table 8.1 showsthe major benefits derived by project parti-
cipants which came in the form of useful knowledge nad
skills; personal and community benefits. It is significantto
note that a higher proportion of participants mentioned
benefits for the community than for themselves personally,
Furthermore, of the 5 strategiesof assistance,Cooperative
Development and Community Organization were more fa-
vorably assessedin terms of benefits to participants. These
are positive indications of social development impact. Agric-
ultural development was perceivedas the leastcontributory,
comparatively speaking.On the whole, however, about two-
thirds of the participants regardedthe projects as beneficial
in terms of useful knowledgeand skills.About 80 percent in-
dicated that they experiencedpersonalbenefitsand about 90
percent mentioned community benefits and improvements,
Self-reliance seems to be the lowest-rated and understand-
ably so becauseit is probably the most difficult objectiveto
achieve. The more favorable assessmentof cooperativedevel-
opment and community organization compared to the three
other strategiesof assistanceisencouragingfor PBSPbecause
these are the major elements of the social development ap-
proach which underline all their projects,whether small-scale
industriesor agribusinessventures.
Willingnessto continue participating in projectswas ex-
pressedby 90 percent of the participants. What isworth not-
ing is the fact that for CooperativeDevelopment and Agricul-
tural Development with 13 and 14 percent, respectively,un-
willing to continue participation - while the other three stra-
tegies registeredonly 7 to 9 percent "reluctants". What are
the reasonsfor willingnessand for hesitancy?For small-scale
industries, skills training, and agricultural development, wil-
lingnessto continue was prompted by the desire for added
knowledge, and skills to boost earnings. Hesitancy was relat-
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ed to competing demands on their time and effort. There
•were other things to occupy themselveswith unlessthe proj-
ect was for their own benefit. The potential drop*outsfrom
agricultural development projects expressed doubts about
how good systemsmanagementand regulationswere. Some
were too old to be continuously active. With respectto coo-
Perative development, those intending to discontinueor stop
participationcited incompetent •staff and managementand
unsolvedproblemsof the organizationas their reasons.
Community organization was perceived by continuing
participantsasa chanceto be of help and serviceto the devel-
opment of people and the improvement of living conditions
in the community. They agreedwith the socialdoctrinesand
objectivesof the proponent. Others,just like the rest,wanted
additionalknowledge, skillsand income.These latter reasons
werethe same rationale given by participantswho are willing
to continue in cooperative development. Good financial sta-
tus achieved by the cooperative was specifically mentioned
by about a fifth. Personaldevelopm.entand activitiesdirected
for the community's sakewere other reasonsgiven.
Hesitance in further involvement in Community Organi-
zation was the time and work required againstthe demands
of household-chores. Some people specifically stated that
earning something out of the project would be a good incen-
tive. In other words, they prefer community organization to
be income-generatingtoo. Nevertheless,the community orga-
nization messageseems to have gotten across.It seems to be
an accepted objective at least among more than half of those
willing to go on participating in the interest of improving the
community as against-thinking only of their own personal
benefits.
b. In terms of proiect management competence, PBSP'ssurvey
in 1978 of 47 project directors and assistantdirectors show-
ed the •following:
O Conceptual knowledge of social development manage-
ment concepts and principles as outlined in an 18-step
management continuum was rated high for 50 percent of
respondentswho correctly identified at least two-thirds
(13) of the 18 steps. The other half were rated low for
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having identified 12 or lessof the steps.Apparently, even
•cognitive understanding of management concepts is not
easy, let alone its application. In assessingthe effect of
the PBSP seminar on their knowledge of social develop-
•ment management,the respondentsattributed the follow-
ing to the seminar:
[] gaveadditional knowledge .................. 72_
[] confirmed other knowledge. .60%
[] gavenew knowledge ....................... 57%
D clarified other knowledge ................... 55%
[] servedasbasisfor further learning............. 55%
[] conflicted with other knowledge.............. 13%
These findings should be of special interest to practi-
tioners of non-formal education because they illustrate
graphically the absence of a one-to-one correspondence
between "educational input" and "learning output"
simply becausethe learners do not start from the same
baseand therefore any information introduced performs
different functions for different learners.For some learn-
ers, the information may be new; for others,additional,
reinforcing, clarifying, expanding and even conflicting!
The end-result is that only half of the learners understood
two-thirds of the concepts.
[] Management TasksPerformed
The actual job performan_-was compared to the 18
tasks spelled out in the management continuum. Fifty
percent of respondents indicated performance "all the
time" of at least 12 management tasksbut the tasksmost
performed are two controlling/evaluating activities such
as comparing results of operations with standardsof per-
formance; The task least performed is an implementing
activity (i.e., resourcesare procured and organized and
personsare hired to man project operations).
[] Management Practices
On the basisof practicesin financial, perSonnel,pro-
duction and marketing management, one-half of 33 proj-
ect proponents can be rated as Below Average in man-
agerial skills, one-third asAverage; and only 5 or 16 per-
cent asAbove Average.
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Almost half of the projects showed poor financial
management (absence of financial records, misuse of
funds, inability to trace funds, low cashbalanceresulting
from poor collection, inability to repay PBSP financial
advance). Lessthan one-fifth hadhighly competent man-
agers in relation to personnel management. More than
half had obvious inadequacies in program implementa-
tion. Fast turn-over of personnel wasa common problem.
On production management, 80 percent of the projects
suffered from poor handling of production. For agricul-
tural productivity projects, problems like high cost of
fuel, destruction of irrigation pumps, lack of steadywa-
ter supply, lack of resourceshad practically forced stop-
page of operations. It:or small-scale industry projects,
problems included limited volume of production result-
ing from irregular orders, lack of variety in product lines,
unavailability of raw materials, lack of supervisionand
maintenance measures to prevent breakdown of equip-
ment. In marketing management, only one out of ten
projectsreported adequatemarketing outlets.
c. Group development and leadership formation
[] Twenty of the 33 projects had organized grassroots
groups totalling 43 or an average of 2 per project. Over
one-half of the groups were rated above average and can
be considered viable. Forty percent were rated average
and need additional training inputs to develop group
maintenance skills. Six percent were below average. An
assessmentof these groups highlights the existence of
minimal difficulty in the following areas: clear set of
objectives; objectives internalized by members; set of
officers functioning effectively in respective positions;
existence of committees; and existence of an effective
communication system. More difficulty was evident in
such areas as: Discharge of privileges and responsibilities
of members, officers, and committees; regular meetings;
group achievement of objectives. In other words, the
groups performed better in setting up their organizational
structure but had more difficulty in implementing orga-
nizational objectives. There is nothing unusual in this
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assessment.It isalways easier to design an organizational
format than to make it work.
[] Leaders' capabilities for management and leadershipre-
sponsibility were evident in identifying and analyzing
community problems; planning and implementing proj-
ects; evaluating plans; making individual and group deci-
sions regardingcommunity issuesand services;maintain-
ing group cohesiveness;sharingleadershipresponsibilities
and delegatingauthority to other leadersand group rnem-
bers. The group leadersrated themselveslowest in elicit-
ing group/community participation; mobilizing local and
outside resources;and need more skillsfor facing and re-
solvingconflicts within the group andwithin the commu-
nity.
[] Of the 43 grassrootsassociations,66 percent expressed
knowledgeabout PBSPbut one-third admitted they knew
nothing about PBSP.Seventy-one percent of the associa-
tions were able to perceivebenefits they derived through
PBSPassistance,while 29 percent were not aware of any
benefit.
d. Relation between adequacy of project inputs dnd achieve-
rnent of objectives
An evaluation of PBSP'sexperienceswith 25 agribusiness
projectswhich involved a total of 5,265 direct beneficiaries,
93 percent of whom are rice farmers, 4 percent fishermen
and 3 percent swineand poultry raisersyielded the following
results:3
[] Only 5 percent met all objectives; 52 percent partially
met some objectives; and 28 percent did not meet any
objective_
[] Considering4 types of project inputs: physical, manage-
ment, organizational and technical, the 25 projectshad
44 percent assessedasadequatein physical input; 32 per-
cent adequate in management; 24 percent adequate in
organizational input and 36 percent adequate in technical
input. Only projects with adequate inputs in all comp(_
nents tended to attain all stated objectives.
[] Attainment of the increasedincomeobjective seemsto be
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the mostdifficult of all. Onlythose projects(5 out of 25)
which reported adequacy in all 4 inputs achievedthe in-
come objective. As mentioned earlier, a high proportion
of participants in PBSP-assistedprojects acquiredbenefits
in terms of useful knowledge and skills community and
personalbenefits but increasedincome from agribusiness
projects seemsto be more elusive.
e. A community development model using the community
organization strategy
After 5 years, the Laguna Rural Development Project left
37 barriosin 1979 with:
[] 33 viable core groupswith trained leadersequippedwith
organizational and managerialskills that can initiate and
sustainsocioeconomicprojects;
[] 5 viable Municipal Development Councilswith, members
-skilled in organizational and managerial skills;
[] 38 functioning community organization volunteers call-
ed Guides,of the Barrio who can act as trainors, liaison,
maintain group cohesivenessand perform administrative
functions in 21 villages,
[] 3 cluster federations formed to participate in the Munic-
ipal Development Councils on the planning and imple-
mentation of community projects.Their participation is
expected to facilitate the integration of development ef-
forts at the municipal level and to direct the efforts of
agencies,whether government or private, toward services
that meet real needs of their villages. They are also ex-
pected to support core groupsespecially in villageswith-
out trained community workers.4
[] Part of this phase-out strategy is theestablishment of a
Center for Rural Technology Development staffed by
field workers of the Laguna project. It will provide man-
agement consultancy and financial assistanceto core
groups at a fee. In effect, CRTD is an "intermediate"
institution, between the "grassroots"and PBSP.
This Laguna Rural Development Project is really an
exercise in institution-building to developa participatory
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structure from the ground up designedalsoto function as
an integrator of servicesfrom the outside. If this struc-
ture functions as expected, then participation and inte-
gration have been institutionalized. The questions that
remain are: How participatory is the structure asfar as
the rural poor are concerned or is the structure a repro-
duction of the existing national social structure? How
does this "participatory structure" relate to previous
structuresset up by government or private agencies?Is it
new, superimposed,a reincarnation or a retooling of old
structuresfor new functions?
PBSP speaks of the existence of "first-level" propo-
nents - both indigenous and professional,rangingfrom
sectoral and religious organizations to local foundations
who are capable of initiating and sustainingdevelopment
projects. As part of their strategy in building institutions
on field, second-levelinstitutions have been developedas
resourcecenters where new proponents are sent to learn
the rudiments of a particular project's management.
These PBSP-assistedtraining centersare regardedas inter-
mediate institutions which have expanded their opera-
tions to include either the actual managementof commu-
nity projects or intensive technical assistanceand on the
job training to enable lessexperienced proponentsto be-
come better managers. Community projects have also
servedas social laboratorieswhere trainees in community
organization gainfield experience.
The third level in their servicenetwork is the consoli-
dation of learningson field, pilot-testingof new programs
and continuing to develop "least-costsolutions.''5
What is left unsaid,whether deliberate or not, is the
role of this participatory structure as a social pressure
mechanism. Does this mean that Community Organiza-
tion for PBSP is organization and management, not con-
flict-confrontation as describedearlier and as applied by
other organizations?
(2) The Institutional Component of Irrigation Development
One vital objective of the National Irrigation Administration
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(NIA) is the organization and development of irrigators groups/
associationsin existing, on-going,and proposedprojects for construc-
tion and/or rehabilitation. Viable and responsiblewater-users'organi-
zations are considered active partners in irrigation development,
particularly in the promotion of irrigatedagriculture through sustain-
ed implementation of farm levelwater managementprogramand on-
systemsoperation and maintenanceas well. Successof irrigation de-
velopmental undertakingsdepends on a great measureto the active
support and total involvement of organized groups of water-users
themselves. Functional irrigators' groupsare best receiving mechan-
ismsfor any sort of assistancebeing delivered by the government.
They can also act as a catalyst in modifying/redirecting the beha-
vioral patterns of farmersconcerningwater-use.6
In this section, we present studies which illustrate farmer re-
sponseto irrigation associationsin a large irrigation systemand far-
mer participation in communal irrigation systemorganizations.
Senen'sstudy of the SabangIrrigators' Associationwhich isserv-
ed by Lateral B of the Angat River Irrigation System in Bulacanre-
ported the following findings:7
(a) About 70 percent of membersjoined the associationfor self-
oriented reasonssuch as: desire to avail of irrigation services,
extension servicesand training programson crop production;
credit and other advantagesin purchasingsuppliesand to get
help in maintenance and repair of canals and irrigation,
appurtenant structures.The rest (26 percent) joined for rea-
sons of fellowship and cooperation with other farmers; a
senseof duty and compliance with governmentdevelopment
programs;desire to acquire knowledgeand to participate in
cooperative development. Only 4 percentcategoricallystated
that membershipinthe associationis a step towards the even-
tual ownership, operation and maintenanceof the irrigation
systemby the farmers.
(b) In this 5-year old association,only a third underwent training
and 35 percent do not know the purposeof the association.
Almost half said that this purpose is not being realized for
the associationwas no longer active, i.e., no activities, meet-
ings, and projects are attended to. Earlier, however, 82 per-
cent enumerated projectsundertaken suchas rat control, rice
production campaign;training, pest and diseasecontrol, etc.
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Again, only 7 percent of associationprojectsenumeratedper-
tained to. properoperation and maintenanceof irrigation faci-
lities. Almost half also mentioned that there were plansand
projects which were not implemented nor completed. Lack
of cooperation among members and officers, lack of funds
and technical servicesfrom NIA were amongreasonscited for
failure to carry out projects.
(c) Sixty-three percent indicated that the Associationhelped in
strengtheningthe Agrarian reform program but only 50 per-
cent saidthat the programhelped the Association.
(d) Eighty percent paid irrigation fees in 1977 but only 28 per-
cent in 1978. Poor or no harvestwas givenasthe main reason
for non-payment.
(e) Seventy-four percent were willing to givevoluntary contribu-
tions; 68 percentwilling to help perform irrigation functions;
84 percent willing to participate in association'sprojectsand
activities, Ninety-two percent regardedjoining the irrigators'
associationa necessity.They also seemto haveall the "right"
reasons for this "necessity". Gaining benefits, knowledge,
unity and strength were cited. However, when asked on the
responsibilitiesof the associationin the maintenanceof the
irrigation system, 12 percent said it is NIA's responsibility,
not theirs, to maintain the facilities; 8 percent do not know
of any responsibilities;20 percent perceived the responsibili-
ty to be that of reporting damagedfacilities/structuresand
requeststo authorities, Thirty-two percent did not comment
at all on the association'sresponsibilities.
(f) When asked whether members of the irrigators' association
should, can or want to own, operate and maintain the irriga-
tion system, 65 percent said "No", they should not; 63 pep
cent said "No", they cannot;and 70 percent said"No", they
do not want to own, operate and maintain the system. Rea-
sons for the negative replies can be roughly categorized as
lack of capability, lack of time (busy in farming), lack of
knowledge (do not know how), and lack of cooperation
amongfarmers. Otherscandidly remarked that NIA is already
doing the job and should just improve their performance;
farmers do not like the additional responsibilities;somebody
else shouldbe in charge,not the farmers.
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(g) Although a majority of the membersearlier indicatedwilling-
nessto give voluntary contributions and perform irrigation
functions, when askedwhat functions they want to perform
in the operation and maintenanceof the system, 56 percent
either gave no responseor wanted no responsibility at all.
Other respondentspreferred to havethe rolesof NIA person-
nel such as ditchtender, gatekeeper, watermaster;and mem-
ber or officer of the irrigation management team. In other
words, those willing to take on a role were mainly interested
in gainful employment with NIA and not in the role of the
association.
(h) Forty-five percent of themembers reported problemson the
operation of the irrigation system.These were practically all
on supply and demand for water. Curiously, only about 6
percent reported conflicts among members,among officers,
and among members, officers and NIA personnel.This situa-
tion of minimal conflicts is probably due to minimal inter-
action among members.Association officers and NIA person-
nel were usually approached in solvingproblems.The inter-
action, therefore, is mostly between individual member and
officers/NIA personnel and lessamong members. It is a ver-
tical relationsh/p of the individual member with those who
have power to solve his problem and not a horizontal rela-
tionship amongmembersin order to strengthengroup action.
(i) Senen computed members' level of performance based on
knowledge/awarenessof association and irrigation distribu-
tion; participation and interaction; compliancewith rulesand
regulations of the associationand the irrigation system;and
senseof belongingness.High performance level is positively
associatedwith self-oriented reasonsfor joining the associa-
tion; perception that members are contributing to the active
functioning of the association;high rating on the manage-
ment of the cooperative; benefits received;training in irriga-
tion management,increasein yield crop;and expectedeffect
on future income. In general, we can say that benefits ex-
pected, perceived, and anticipated contribute to higher per-
formance levels in the irrigation associationbut the re'lation-
ship between benefits and participation is not always strong
suggestingthe presenceof many other interveningfactors.
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What is most interestingis the fact that members'active
participation in a previous cooperative is negativelyassociat-
ed with performance level in the irrigation association.It is
possiblethat unfortunate experiencesin the previouscoope-
rative have produced cynicismamong those who were active
participantsbefore.
(j) The most important contribution of Senen'sstudy is her test
of the benefit.part/c/pat/on contingency hypothesis which
saysthat:
[] The greater the degree of benefit-participation contin-
gency is, the greaterthe participation will be. That is, the
more that a member obtaining benefit from an organiza-
tion is dependent on his participation in the organization
to obtain the benefit, the more he will take part. This
concept of benefit-participation contingency is an aspect
of exchange between the benefits an individual receives
from the organization and the contributions hemakesto
it.
[] Three broad categoriesof benefit-contingency in organi-
zations are:
(1) Benefits that have no contingency. These are public
goods available to members and non-membersalike.
(2) Benefits which have a moderate contingency. T.bese
are system rewardswhich are available only to mem-
bers but are not very dependent upon the amount
of participation or contribution to the organization.
(3) Benefits with a high degree Qf contingency. Theseare
individual rewards available only to members, and,
furthermore, only to each member in relation to his
participation in or contribution to the organization,s
[] Each respondent was asked what specific benefits other
than cash income they have receiveddirectly during the
last 2 years as a result of their membership in the irriga-
tors' association. For each benefit named, respondents
were asked: "How much of this benefit do you feel sure
you could have receivedwithout attending very many of
the association'smeetings,or taking an active part in the
discussions,activities or programs?Would you say: all,
most, little or none?"
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Table 8.2 showsthat the benefit enjoyed by practical-
ly all the members is irrigation services followed by
extension servicesand training programs. However, 82
percent of the farmers who received irrigation services
said that the enjoyment of this benefit wasnot at all con-
tingent upon their participation in the association.As a
matter of fact, even non-memberscould avail of the irri-
gation services. They said that this was allowed since
these non-rnemberswere paying for the irrigation fees
and the associationwas lenient about this matter. The
non-exclusivity of accessto irrigation services for the
association members means that participation provides
them no special benefits. Even help in the maintenance
and repair of canal and irrigation structures,a benefit
mentioned by about half of the members, is not contin-
gent upon participation. This wasthe caseevenwith such
benefits as knowledge on cooperative development and
cooperationand fellowshipwith other members.9
Ironically, something like "steps toward the owner-
ship, operation, and maintenanceof the irrigation system
by the farmerswhich isthe benefit most contingentupon
participation in the irrigators'associationis the onething
farmers said they should not do, cannot do and do not
want to do. Marketing servicesfor members'agricultural
products, representation to government agencies and
advantages in purchasing supplies and availability of
credit were the other benefits regarded as more contin-
gent on participation in the association.However, these
servicesare lesslikely to materialize in an irrigation asso-
ciation unlessirrigation needsare adequately met, And if
irrigation services can be obtained regardlessof their
membership and participation in the association,what
would motivate them to stay with it? In a large-scaleirri-
gation system, is it possibleto designit such that receiv-
ing benefits from an irrigation system will be contingent
upon their participation in the irrigation association?One
suspectsthat if onecan obtain benefitswithout participa-
tion, this seems to be the "easiest" path to "develop-
ment" regardlessof what people participation advocates
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TABLE 8.2
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BENEFIT RECEIVED BY FARMERS
AND PARTICIPATION IN THE IRRIGATION ASSOCIATION
Kind of benefit receivedandmember Degreeto which benefit received
who receivedeachbenefit iscontingentuponparticipation
(Total N = 100) in the association
Not
at all Some Most All Total
- Percent-
Of thosereceivingthe benefit
1. Adequateirrigationservice(N-91) 82 11 4 3 100
2. ExtensionservicesandTraining
Programs(N = 77) 52 21 20 6 100
3. Advantagesin purchasingsupplies
and availabilityof credit (N= 75) 36 16 31 17 100
4. Knowledgeoncooperativedevelop-
ment (N = 73) 51 12 21 16 100
5. Cooperation/fellowshipwith other
members(N = 73) 45 21 30 4 100
6. Marketingservicesfor members'
agriculturalproducts(N = 71) 14 11 48 27 100
7. Prestige(N = 54) 46 6 37 11 100
8. Shift in tenurialstatus(N = 50) 50 8 36 6 100
9. Representationto government
agencies(N = 49) 35 16 31 18 100
10. Help in the maintenanceandrepair
of canalsand irrigationappurtenant
structures(N = 48) 67 15 12 6 100
11. Stepstowardthe ownership,opera-
tion and maintenanceof the irriga-
tion systemby the farmers(N= 46) 9 2 28 61 100
SourGe:F.R. Senen,"Members'Levelof Performancein an Irrigators'Associa-
tion," unpublishedM.A. Thesis,UPLB, March 1979.
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may think about this as being "charity". We are a long
way from internalizing the "participatory" value. It is
also very possible that people expect benefits as some-
thing society "owes" them rather than benefitsascharity
they have to be grateful for. After all, they are probably
not naive about what other sectorsof society "receive"
directly or indirectly from a "benevolent" government.
Although the large irrigation systemshaveattracted
a great deal of attention and resourcesout of the total
irrigated areasin the Philippines,about 50 percent isser-
viced by communal systems.These systemswhich have
an averageirrigable area of 200 hectaresare expected to
remain of high priority becausethey have a lower per
hectare development cost and have a shorter gestation
period. For the year 1979, funds were provided for the
construction of about 500 communal irrigation projects
(the first time such a number was implemented in one
year).1°
The studydone by de los Reyeson 51 communalgra-
vity systems located in Mountain Province, Ilocos Sur,
Batangas, Quezon, Iloilo, Antique and Davao tells us
about the organization, managementand farmer partici-
pation in these systems. Using the following sevenindi-
cators, namely: a formal association; irrigation-specific
leaders;paid leader;water distributor; water distribution
units, regularly scheduled maintenance; and irrigation
feff requirement, de los Reyes attempted to find the
relationship between management characteristics and
such factors as size of system, farmers' dependenceon
farming, sourceof financial assistance,attendance in wa-
ter management seminar;and kind of organization man-
aging the system. Table 8.3 presentsa summary of the
findings.11
A more structural organization tends to be more charac-
teristic of larger systems. It is also observedmore in sys-
tems where majority of the farmers are dependent on
farming; in NIA-assistedsystems;in systemswhere mem-
bers have attended water management seminars; and
where an associationexists to managethe system.These
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data suggestthat NIA's role in communal gravitysystem
development has been a very positive one not only in
infrastructure building but also in organizingfarmers for
managing their systems. Or as de los Reyes puts it:
"... at leastgovernment assistancehas not led to a dis-
organization of existingsystems."
The following corollary observationsare worth not-
ing, however, for they show the dynamics behind the
generalfindingsstated earlier:
[] Among medium and largesystemsthosewith insufficient
water supply in both wet anddry seasonsare better orga-
nized than thosewith sufficient water supply. The reverse
situation appearsamong small systemswhich havesuffi-
cient water supply but alsohavestructured organizations
managed by strong leaders. In many instances, they
operate under the leadership of one person who may be
performing multiple roles in water distribution, mainten-
ance work and even collection of irrigation fees. (It is
therefore a different type of organization in the senseof
one person performing different roles in a small system.
This is most probably a very authoritarian leadership
style. On the other hand, in a largesystemwhere water is
inadequate, the social pressureto shareand allocate re-
quires that different interestsbe servedand perhapsgreat-
er division of labor and specificationof rolesemerge in
responseto the critical need. In a situation of water ade-
quacy, especially in the case of irrigation defined as a
"public good", one canjust take what he canfor what he
needs. There is probably no real social pressureto con-
serve water since everyone has enough, hence, a highly
structured organizationdoesnot emerge.)
[] One of the most important reasonsfor wanting to im-
prove the management of irrigation systems is to in-
crease productivity. Data from the de los Reyes study
show that "on the whole, systemswhich havewater dis-
tributor, water distribution units and regularlyscheduled
maintenancetend to amassbetter yields than thosewhich
do not possessany of these attributes. Those which have
all three attributes obtain even higheryields. When water
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isscarce,however, the positiverelationshipbetweenthese
management characteristics and farm productivity in a
system becomes nil." In other words, there is a limit to
what organizational and managerial inputs can do in ex-
tracting productivity from Mother Earth. Water availabili-
ty apparently setsthe limit.
[] A major weaknessin the organization of communal asso-
ciations is the lack of involvement of majority of the far-
mers in the deliberation of system management issues
and even in the selection of leaders. In some instances,
leadershave not been changedsincethe Associationwas
set up. "Like most formal organizations in rural Philip-
pines, the communal associationsapparently are not ef-
fective in drawing farmers' participation in decision-mak-
ing processes."De los Reyescites, for example, that "of
farmers who attended meetings, 53 percent report they
never say anything during the meetings. In addition, 27
percent of farmers in association-managedsystemssay
that the rules of the associationare formulated by the
system leaders." (The questionwe need to ask ourselves
at this point is: "How much participation from every-
body can we realistically expect in a farmers' associa-
tion?" Even in the University Council meetingsat the
University of the Philippines at Los Ba_os, lessthan 10
percent or even only 5 percent ever sayanything and it is
also impossible for 100 percent to ever be involved in
policy formulation in this highly educatedbody.)
[] Finally, the de los Reyes study underscores that the
variety of organizational approachesusedin the commu-
nal systems"attest to the farmers' ingenuity and capacity
for meeting the demandsof irrigation management This
belies the popular belief that farmers lack the know-how
to operate and maintain their system. In fact, there is
much to learn from their indigenousways of irrigation
management.Theseways may not completely result in as
efficient system performance as desired by technical spe-
cialists." There is no question that farmershavemanaged
their irrigation systems from time immemorial and can
continue to do so. However, the relentlessonslaughton
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our natural resources particularly water sources has begun
to take its toll, not to mention the increasing demands
for its use. Given this new state of affairs and the spiral_
ling cost of harnessing irrigation water, technical consi- ,
derations in more effective water utilization take on add-
ed significance• It is imperative to understand how
farmers actually manage the systems as an input into the
irrigation expert's conceptualization and design for the
most judicious way of developing irrigation systems. But
organization and management cannot substitute for wa-
ter. Furthermore, while we speak of structure, organiza-
tion and management, in operational terms, as the de los
Reyes study found, "... improved irrigation organiza-
tion.., is largely attributable to the strong leadership of
one local farmer". Management characteristic of a com-
munal system is sometimes co-terminous with the
strength of one personality (most likely an authoritarian
one).
Probably the most well-documented and internationally-known
irrigationassociationinthe Philippinesisthat ofthepilotprojectat
Laur, Nueva Ecija,which representsthe NationalIrrigationAdminis-
tration's(NIA) attempt to integratethe technicaland socialsub-
system wherein:
• . . the capacity of the water user association would be developed
through active involvement in the planning and construction activities:
planning system lay-out, obtaining water rights and rights of way, organizing
volunteer labor inputs to system construction and exerting control over
project expenditures, integrating social and technical development proved
extremely difficult. In one community, it was learned how difficult
dealing with local power strugglescan be - leading to the abandonment of
construction plans until the local association reorganized itself some two
years later. In a secondcommunity, it was learnedthat a high level of com-
mitment from a cohesive farmer group does not necessarily make things
easier for the engineers; scheduling and system design issuesresulted in
numerous delays and changes;organization of volunteer labor presented
unfamiliar problems worked out only through lengthy meetings;and farmer
insistence on monitoring purchases and limiting personal use of vehicles
usinggasolinecharged to the farmers'loansaccountswas not alwayswel-
comed by project engineers.The farmersevenquestionedthe engineerson
basictechnical judgments,suchas the type of materialchosenfor dam con-
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struction, insistingthat the proposedstructurewould not witl_standthe
force of local floods. Finally, however,the new dam wascompleted using
the design favored by NIA's designengineers- only to be washedout afew
months later.
The experiencewas soberingin the difficultieswhich it suggestedthe
NIA must face if it were to work effectively in support of community-
managedirrigation... Yet, it establishedin the mindsof NIA's leadership
that therewere major benefitsto be gainedin return. Not only couldfarmer
participation in systemplanning andconstructionresultin a strongerwater
user associationbetter equipped to operateand maintainthe finished sys-
tem, but it could also result in a better designed and constructed irrigation
system more likely to meet farmer need& (Underscoringsupplied)12
Ironically, there are reports that the brush dam was washed away
a second time and rebuilt once again. If, as Unson says, the first dam
which was washed out used the "design favored by N IA's design engi-
neers", was the second washed-out dam similarly designed? A more
important question might be: Where a technical solution to a prob-
lem is difficult to find, what can community organization contribute
to the search for alternative ways of ap ,proaching the irrigation prob-
lems?
• In a question raised much earlier in this Chapter, we are interest-
ed in finding out how participatory schemes contribute to greater
sharing of development benefits. We ask the same question of the
NIA-Laur project which aims to "develop two communal irrigation
associations to such a degree that their members fully participate and
become self-reliant in managing their irrigation systems." After the
first 10 months of project implementation, Unson reports the fol-
lowing results:
[] Improvements were made in the degree of farmer participa-
tion in their association activities such as meetings and obras
(volunteer labor) and in the planning and decision-making
within the associations in general.
[] Changes in leadership sWle within the associatons also occur-
red. In one association, they moved from a predominantly
consultative system of leadership to a fully participative one.
The other association moved from a predominantly directive
system to a more consultative one.
17 Improvements in the associations' system management and
system maintenance have taken place. 13
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Although these changes in the degree of organizatonal participa-
tion, leadership style, and system management are very encouraging,
sharing in the benefits of development is not yet in evidence (Table
8.4) although Unson optimistically states that "their eventual mass
sharing of benefits seems assured': Perhaps this aspect of participa-
tion can neither be assumed nor assured. It has to be sought and
TABLE 8.4
TYPES OF POPULAR PARTICIPATION IN THE NIA-LAUR PROJECT
(A COMMUNAL IRRIGATION SYSTEF_
Typesof PopularParticipation
Farmer'sactivities Preparatory Masssharing Masscon- Massin-
(in orderof occurrence) activities of benefits tribution volvementin
for popular of develop- to develop- decision-
participation ment ment makingpro-
cessfor de-
velopment
1, Preparationfor and
participationin
groupdynamicsse-
minar _'
2. Drafting andrati-
fication of a setOf
bylawsfor their irri-
gation association v/
3. Holdingelections
for their irrigation
association v/
4. Preparationof their
own plan for the im-
provementof their
irrigationsystem,
that is, locationof
damsite,mainand
lateralcanals ,/
5. Participationinthe
surveyingof their
land "/ ( / )+
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Table 8.4 (con't)
Typesof PopularParticipation
Farmer'sactivities Preparatory Masssharing Masscon- Massin-
(in orderof occurrence) activities of benefits tribution volvememin
for popular of develoP- to develop- decision-
participation ment ment makingpro-
cessfor de-
velopment
6. Acquisitionof wa-
ter rights
7. Acquisitionof right-
of-way waivers
8. Preparationfor and
attendanceof PIA
Officersat leader- v/
shipseminar
9. Readinessto contri-
bute voluntary labor
for construction
10. Preparationof their
repaymentscheme v/
*A check mark indicatesthat the activity belongsto whatevertype of participa-
tion it isclassifiedunder.
+The parenthesessignifythat the participationin decision-makingisonly partial
in this activity.
Source: Delia C. O. Unson, "Social Developmentand the Communal Irrigation
Systemin Laur, NuevaEcija: BaselineandSelected Interim Monitoring
Results," Ataneo de Manila University, Institute of PhilippineCulture,
QuezonCity, July 1978.
pursued. We must never forget that in these 2 project areas, majority
of the respondents considered that their most serious personal and
family problems are economic in nature and almost half of them pin-
point the poor irrigation system as a major cause of their financial
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condition. To improve their economic status via the irrigation sy_
tern, improvements in farmers' production must take place. In the
more directly production-relatedactivities, suchaswater distribution
schedule and cropping patterns, there was hardly any changein the
former and the latter was completely n0n-existent. As Unson ack-
nowledges:
"The presenceand successfulimplementation of official planting
schedulesand of policies on the variety of cropsto be planted by an
irrigation associationreflect a high level of development and sophis-
tication. These two practices savewater and fertilizer and prevent the
spread of plant diseasesand pests. However, they are very difficult to
implement and require the full cooperation of the association mem-
bers. They are also most often practiced in associations where water
is very scarce and must be controlled rigidly to be able to supply all
members."
It would seem that it is in the implementation of these two major
practices (water distribution schedule and cropping pattern) that the
technical and social components of the irrigation association come
together and it is precisely this "meeting ground" which will contri-
bute to the realization of benefits from irrigation. Furthermore,
these are the very activities which require the most of '.'groupness",
"sharing" and willingness to subordinate individual to group welfare.
This should be the crucial test for successin community organiza-
tion. It is also inaccurate to say that these are practices where "water
is very scarce" for where water is abundant, much more can be saved
if water distribution, utilization and cropping patterns were more
effectively carried out. It must likewise be pointed out that in the
Unson study, "implementation of water distribution (poor sched-
uling, inadequate water supply, management)" was-perceived by 75
percent of respondents from two associations as the most serious
Problem in their respective association.
One criterion applied in the selection of the target association for
the NIA-Laur pilot project is thatthe "irrigation association is an in-
digenous one". Although there are many good reasons for focusing
on this criterion, it is also a fact that the tremendous expansion in
irrigation development means that there are many farmers who will
be reached by irrigation for the first time and therefore will have
limited organizational and technical experience to fall back on.
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Levine recognizes the significance of the hardware (physical
infrastructure) and software (nonphysicalmanagerialinputs) require-
ments in fulfilling the three basic functions of irrigation systems-
water delivery, maintenanceand conflict management. He acknowl-
edges,however, that "the particular combination of hardware and
software that is appropriate for specific situations depends on the
interaction of several physical, social and economic factors." He
further admits that "our knowledge of this interaction is limited
and to a largeextent qualitative and descriptive".TM
Soltes reports on an "experimental" attempt to usesome hard-
ware in order to obviate the "software" problem of conflicts asso-
ciated with equitable distribution of available water supply,is In
the Anayan Communal Irrigation System,the whole servicearea was
divided into the treatment and control areaswith Lateral B servingas
the treatment area and with LateralsA and C asthe control area.The
major difference between the two areasis that the control site has
minimal improvements in terms of physical facilities and canaliza-
tion. The system of water distribution follows the conventional
farmer's way which iscontinuous, simultaneous,andfirst come, first
served basis. The treatment site is more developed in terms of its
physical characteristics, e.g., turnouts, intensive farm ditches and
other facilities. The sub-system management technology is being
implemented in the area which practices the rotation method of
water distribution within the lateral. It is divided into 3 sections
for rotation purposesstarting at the tai/_nd first, middle next, and
head last. To fully implement this scheme,improvementsand instal-
lation of different measuringdevicesat certain portionsof the canal
were made. These improvements refer to the construction of con-
crete turn-outs and checkgateswith locks to facilitate control and
diversion of water to different outlets based on the schedule.The
measuring devices installed were the Parshall flume, Vane instru-
ments,and staff gauges.
Although a year of observation in this "experiment" is too short,
early evidences reveal the interaction between hardware and soft-
ware. The following findingsreflect this interaction.
[] Lateral B where sub-systemmanagement technology isbeing
implemented showed a better water managementand distri-
bution to farmer as indicatedby a higher percentage(42 per-
cent) of farmers (as against24 percent in LateralAC) report-
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ing no conflicts over irrigation water in their area. Water
stealing was likewise mentioned more by the latter (44 per-
cent) than by the former (28 percent).
E3 Nearly 5_0percent of Lateral B farmers said that rabuswork
(cooperative work) was called to clean the farm ditches 1-3
times during the dry season. This allows more contacts
among farmers compared to Laterals A-C where 64 percent
said there had been no rabus work called to clean the farm
ditch. The difference was due largety to the more intensive
farm ditches found in Lateral B canal. Lateral A-C would
tend to clean the canal section which passesthrough their
farm individually.,. Becauseof the individual schedulingof
water distribution at Laterals A-C, farmers had to clean a
portion of the lateral canalso that water would flow smooth-
ly to their farms during their schedule.The rabusactivities
in Lateral B encourage more frequent contactsamong farm-
ers which lead to a better understanding as to how they
would solve their common problems and thus motivate them
for group action fo better water distribution and manage-
ment. Lateral 8 farmersalso participate more in group activi-
ties other than rabus.They likewise have more positive atti-
tudes toward attending meetingsand being involved in asso-
ciation activities.
[] As to the role of the watertender and satisfaction with their
job, farmers at Lateral B identified the watertender's role
in terms of water managementand distribution and majority
of farmers were satisfied with their servicescompared with
Laterals AC farmers. Watertenders differed in the way they
allocate time on their jobs. Lateral B watertender cleans
the lateral 2 times a month; Lateral C, 3 times a year; and
Lateral A, once a month. Lateral B spent 50-50 percent of
his time in cleaning and water distribution, respectively.
For Lateral A, it was 20-80 percent while for Lateral C,
40-60 percent. From this, it is shown that Lateral AC water-
tenders were more concerned with water distribution and
havedifficulties in water supply, hence, they spentmore time
on this activity.
When askedwhat the three most difficult problems they
encountered intheir jobswere, watertenders mentioned illegal
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checking of water and water stealingby making holesalong
the main and lateral canal. Lateral B watertender however
realized that the major reasonfor illegal checkingin the past
was the absenceof turn-outs with locks, checkgatesand mea.
suresto control the flow of water, thus farmerscould easily
get water outside of their schedule.When askedwhat farmers
think about the rotation being implemented at the Lateral B
canal, the watertender said that farmers at the tail-end por-
tion of the Lateral B are in favor while someof thoseat the
upper portion have started to expresstheir dissatisfaction
since this rotation starts with tail-end first. When asked as
to the advantagesof the sub-systemmanagementtechnology,
Lateral C watertender said that he knows when the water
decreasesor increasesand can immediately check why, The
farmers at the sametime will know the amount of water that
is flowing. The Lateral B watertender saidthat hehascontrol
of the water and the farmers need not watch for thewater
because it is scheduled and controlled thus their job is
lightened. The Lateral A watertender also said that farmers
know when they will havewater.
These findings illustrate how the application of hardware
(the sub-systemmanagement technology) affects water con-
trol and distribution and consequently farmer behavior vis-
a-visaccessto irrigation water. Given these observations,we
find it tempting to take a secondlook at Weinberg'sarticle
entitled "Can Technology Replace Social Engineering?" His
basic thesisis that "social problems are much more difficult
than are technological problems. A social problem exists
because many people behave individually ir_a socially un-
acceptable way. To solve a social problem one must induce
social change - one must persuade many people to behave
differently than they have behaved in the past. The resolu-
tion of social problems - by motivating or forcing peopleto
behave more rationally - is a frustrating business.Peopledo
not behave rationally; it is a long hard businessto persuade
individuals to forego immediate personalgain or pleasure(as
seenby the individual) in favor of longer-termsocialgain...
in view of the simplicity of technologicalengineeringand the
complexity of social engineering, to what extent can social
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problems be circumvented by reducing them to technological
problems? Can we identify Quick Technological Fixes for
profound and almost •infinitely complicated social problems,
'fixes' that are within the grasp of modern technology and
which would either eliminate the original social problem
without requiring a change in the individual's social attitudes,
or would so alter the problem as to make its resolution more
feasible?,,16
In the implementation of the sub-system management
technology in Lateral B, 68 percent of the farmers had not
been involved in making decisions regarding the schedule of
water delivery and water distribution. Matters pertaining to
water and other problems related to irrigation management
were decided by the watertender/watermaster, the President
of the Association and members of the Board of Directors.
only 7 percent of the farmers say that they decide and im-
plement decisions •related to water and irrigation manage-
ment. 17 Apparently, the nature of the technology does not
require that everyone be involved, that everybody participate
in decision-making and implementation in order to achieve a
more equitable water distribution. As a matter of fact, by
•design, "tail-enders" receive water first. However, farmers are
:not so naive asto really leaveeverything to the few decision-
•makers. Practically all of them find it necessary to create
good interpersonal relations with the watertender/water
master in order to facilitate water requests. They are pre-
pared to communicate and make friends with theperson who
haspower over water.
Weinberg also very rightly said that it isvery difficult "to
persuade people to behave differently •than they have behaved
in the past. The attitude toward water •sharing,for example,
is a good illustration. From the results of the Soltes study,
famrers would not sharewater at all or only if they have fully
irrigated their own farms or if they do not need the water
yet. In other words, it is not really watersharingwhich they
Iiave in mind becausethey will only be allowing others to use
water which they do not need or do not yet need. It is like-
wise interesting to note • that although farmers say that to
improve water distribution is to improve the canal system,
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turnouts and drainage channels, only a third of them men-
tioMed voluntary labor as a way of carrying out these im-
provements. Another one-third would rather have the asso-
ciation obtain a loan and hire people to do these. In other
words, although they want improved water distribution,
majority of them are not prepared to contribute their own
labor to get the job done. They would rather have the asso-
ciation borrow money and hire othersto do it.
Who belongs to the irrigation association?
Consideringthat about 60 percent of our total rice landsare
rainfed, accessto irrigation is a "desired" status in rice farming and
irrigation associationsare being actively promoted as an essential
component of irrigation development. Who belongsto theseassocia-
tions? Are they largeor small farmers?part time or full time? share-
tenants or owner-operators?
The de los Reyes study of 51 communal gravity systemsshows
that 41 percent are managedby a formal irrigation associationand
59 percent havenot organizedthemselvesinto an association.Half of
the systemsare managedby irrigation-specific leadersand the other
half bynon-'irrigation-specificleaders.Most associationleadersoccu-
py other important positionsin the community's economic, political,
and socialdomainsand more than half of the associationleadershold
positions in other Community organizations.Non-associationleaders
are those who occupy positions of authority, those whoseinfluence
proceeds largely from their wealth, and those who own dams or re-
present those who do. In 35 percent of the systems,majority of
members usingthe system are engagedin non-farm occupation. Less
than one-fourth of the systemshaveat leastone leaderwho receives
compensation; the rest do not have paid leaders,la In contrast to
this, the Bula Farmers Irrigators Associationmaintains paid perma-
nent employees who help in itsoperation and maintenance:the Sec-
retary, Treasurer,watermaster,watertender, gatekeeper,bookkeeper.
The President receives'a_200 monthly salaryplus_200 monthly re-
presentation allowance. The Board of Directors receivesP50 per
diem per Board meeting. Recently, they havealsohired a legalcoun-
sel with a monthly legal retainer fee. The associationalsohiresemer-
gency laborers when needed. Although 75 percent of farmer-mem-
bets in this associationhave 6 or lessyears of schooling,9 percent
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have college education; 7 percent aregovernment employees; and 9
percent are businessmen. Sixty-five percent, however, have no occu-
pation other than rice growing. While 77 percent of the farms are 2
hectares or smaller, 3 percent are between 3 to 4 hectares and ano-
ther 3 percent have more than 4 hectares. In this association, 40
percent are share tenants; 37 percent, owner operators; and 37 per-
cent, lessees.19
In the 51 systems studied by de los Reyes, 48 percent are owner*
cultivators; 19 percent, lessees;28 percent, share tenants; and 5 per-
cent, amortizing owners. The average number of rice parcels culti-
vated is two; and average farm size is one hectare. Twenty-eight
percent of all parcels operated by respondents are located outside
the systems studied, and 34 percent of farmers cultivate rice land
outside the irrigation system they belong to. It must be noted here
that although farm sizes are small, almost half are owner-operators.
Four percent have professional and clerical occupations and ob-
viously, farming is a side-income. Most probably they belong to the
new farming category called "farmer-non-cultivator".
The two associations in the Laur project have 44 percent lessees;
22 percent owner-operators; 20 percent, tenants and 14 percent,
mixed tenures. The average farm size is 1.3 hectares in one and 2 hec-
tares in another. Theoretically, there should not be any share tenants
in Laur, Nueva Ecija becausethis province has been the "cradle" of
agrarian reform but for a number of reasons,they exist and doubtless
will continue to do so. Eighty-five percent of members have no other
income earners in the household; and only 30 percent have other
sources of income. Eighty-six percent borrowed money from institu-
tional sources and reported no difficulty in getting a loan. Fifty-three
percent plant secondarycrops like onions; 70 percent use mecha-
nized plowing and 20 percent own hand tractors. What is interesting
in the case of one association in Laur is that the landowners of lessee
farmers have been welcomed as members but with no voting rights.
Officers and members feel that although these landowners no longer
have the prerogative to make decisions regarding farming and irriga-
tion practices as they had under the share tenancy system, they are
still entitled to an interest in the farms and in the association. Other
sources of influence on the association come from adviserswho are
either active or retired farmers. The incumbent mayor was one of
them and the association's president was on his fourth elected term
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at the time of the study.2°
From these data on who belongs,who leads, who advisesand
exerts influence in the irrigation association,it appearsthat although
members are mostly small farmers, non-farmer members and part-
time farmers could very well be the wielders of power in the organi-
zation.
The irrigation associationstudied by Senen is not a communal
system but one which issewed by the Angat River Irrigation System.
Although 88 percent of the members are lessees,two sharetenants
deserve a secondlook. One was operating on 8-hectare farm while
another had 11 hectares.The owner-operatorshad an averagefarm
size of 2.9 hectareswhile the lesseeshad 1.9 hectares.Practically all
the farmerswere dependent on their twice-a-year-rice-cropasa major
sourceof income. Three were part-time farmers: a proiect inspector,
ditch-tender, and a government employee (the only respondentwho
finished college). Almost 80 percent of members,however, have no
other source of income. The 20 percent supplemented income
through tricycle driving, carpentry, vegetable growing, bakery, em-
ployment and cottage industry.21
These details are cited here _o highlight the fact that perhapsit
is not the averagefarm size, the averageeducation, the averagefarm-
er, the averagetenure status and the characteristicsof the majority
membershipwhich deservescrutiny. We should begin to look at the
"minority" members such as the two share tenants who operate 8
and 11 hectares,respectively;the project inspector;the government
employee and only college graduate. They are most likely "minor-
ity" in number but not in power and control. Leadersof communal
systems which do not have formal associations likewise exercise
considerable influence for they come from positions of authority,
wealth or ownership of the dam. These individualsare probably also
the source of "organizational" viability. The arena for developing
"people participation" is therefore a very wide one. De los Reyes
suggeststhat "the participatory approach to communal system
development which NIA currently employs recognizesthe farmers'
capabilities and supports their role in managing irrigation systems.
But the intensive organizational intervention it requires can foster
dependency - a condition which underminesthe farmers' tradition
of self-reliance and local self.governance generated by their expe-
rience in communal systemmanagement''_
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Is this tradition of self-reliance and self-governancea participa-
tory one or is it leader-centered, directed, managed and powered?
What would it take to make it participatory, viable, and contri-
butory to farmer benefits?
Indirect beneficiaries of irrigation development
Although landlessfarm laborersare not membersof the irrigation
associations, irrigation improvements have an indirect benefit to
them in terms of employment. In the 51 systemsstudied by de los
Reyes and IIio, 86 percent of farmers report using hired labor in at
leastone farm operation during the wetseason and 90 percentduring
the dry season.Seventy-nine percent rely on manual harvestingand
threshing and 21 percent on manual harvesting and mechanized
threshing: These tasks are usually done by the landless.The data
show that only 7 percent of the farmers are engagedin hired farm
labor as anadditional income source. Farm labor opportunities also
tend to be more spreadout during all months of the year asa conse-
querme of irrigation anddouble-cropping (Table 8.5). An estimate of
the per hectare rice production costsfor 2 seasonsshowsthat 33 per-
cent is spent for hired cash labor and hired labor paid in kind. Hired
labor representsabout 67 percent of total labor cost.
Another source of impacton hired labor particularly harvesters
and threshers is the yield per hectare. Higher productivity means
more to harvest and more .to thresh. Beingfully or partly irrigated
makes more difference in yield than being near or far from the
dam, given the same cropping season:As expected, fully irrigated
farms report significantly higher yields than partially irrigated ones.
During the wet season,92 percent report water adequacyto be "just
right", "more than adequate" and "much more than adequate" but
during the dry. season,69 percent of farmers regard irrigation water
-as "inadequate" or "very inadequate"_ The overall averageyields re-
ported for the dry seasonare 64.5 (cavans)per hectare for fully irri-
gated and 45.4 for partially-irrigated. The correspondingfiguresfor
the wet seasonare 73.9 and 53.2, respectively.23 Consideringthese
yield differences due to extent of irrigation, there is alsothat much
difference in what could be harvestedand threshedby hired farm la,
bor who are usually the landless.The latter, therefore-,participate in
the benefits of irrigation although they do not belongto the associa-
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TABLE 8.5
OVERALL PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SAMPLE FARMS BY
MONTH OF PLANTING AND HARVESTING OF THE RICE CROP
(PHILIPPINES, MARCH-MAY 1978)*
Overall (all regions) Overall.(excluding Region 1)
Planting Harvesting Planting Harvesting
January 19 7 17 16
February 13 13 6 19
March 5 16 4 25
April 6 17 -9 27
May 11 7 17 12
June 23 10 36 6
July 22 15 25 3
August 18 10 7 13
September 6 14 7 21
October 5 26 7 37
November 15 18 23 18
December 25 14 36 8
Total number
of cases 627 627 399 399
*Percentagefiguresneednot total 100 percent, In fact, owingto the presence
of doublecroppers,figuresexceed100 percent.
Source:JeanneFrancesIIio, "The Farmersin CommunalGravity Systems:Rice
Yields, Work and Earnings," Institute of PhilippineCulture,Ateneo de Manila
'University,1980,
tion and if water were more adequate during the dry season, there
would be even more employment for them. But of course, needless
to say, owner-operators would benefit more. Farmers, however,
argue that landless hired labor do not assume the risks that they do
since laborers' only investment is labor. They do not buy fertilizer,
insecticides and hire labor which could all go down the drain when
harvest is poor particularly when natural calamities strike. A poor
crop, however, is also a loss to hired labor particularly harvesters
and threshers but as the farmer would argue: "At least they did not
pay for all the inputs."
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(3) Farmers'Association and Other Rural Organizations
Formally organized groups in the rural areasare relatively new in
the Philippines but at present we seem to "enjoy" a proliferation of
Suchgroups. On the surface, we seem to be "overorganized". This
phenomenon of organizational proliferation is best illustrated by a
community where we found a feeding program for 35 pre-school
children which wasmanagedby a Mothers' Club (Ministry of Health);
Mothers' Class (Bureau of Agricultural Extension); and a Mothers'
Craft (Ministry of Social Services and Development). The same
mothers belonged to three different organizationswho "shared" the
same feeding program. This could be the "epitome of integration"
except that this feeding programwas probably reported as3 separate
projects by 3 different agencies,hencean inflation of program bene-
ficiaries isa distinct possibility.
Rural organizations have come into being mostly from govern-
ment and some from private sector sponsorshipfor a numberof tea-
sonsbut mostly to facilitate credit, irrigation, production, marketing,
generation and delivery of social services.It has also been said that
"The strengtheningof Filipino rural organizations may add a new
dimension to the development process by giving the peasantry a
vehiclefor true massparticipation. It is hoped that suchparticipation
may in turn effect significant changesin the country's social struc-
tures.''24 This latter hope relatesto the potentials of rural organiza-
tions for enhancing "people power", a lobby for the poor whose
one great source of power lies in numbers if put together, that is.
Even a government-sponsoredorganization isoptimistically regarded
by someasa possible"double-edged sword" which can be supportive
either of the Establishment or of rural peonle. However, either or
both of these interestscan be effectively promoted by the organiza-
tion only if the organization is strong and viable. But this "achieve-
ment" is rather elusive. Indicative of the difficulties involved, a
study of agrarian reform technologists showed that next to the
problem of "contracting landowners" are the problems of "moti-
vating farmers to join Samahang Nayon, cooperatives, etc." and
"organizing arid maintaining compact farms". More of them men-
tioned these two organizational problems than the problem of
"mediating or assisting in the mediating of agrarian reform con-
flicts.''2s
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This section presents experienceswith rural organizationsfrom
studiesdone by Montiel, Cruzado, Santiago, Weerasinghe,Sandoval,
Niduaza, and Talatayod. The organizations studied include baran-
gay councils, Samahang Nayon, cooperatives, farmers' associations,
women's group, Kabataang Barangay, Parent Teacher Association,
Mother's Class, Barangay Rural Improvement Corps, Sports Devel-
opment Association, etc. One of the most important aspects of
rural organization is participation which refersto "the amount and
manner of involvement of members in their respectivegroups. It is
through rural organizations that some development agenciestry to
mobilize grassrootscitizens into action, to enable them to chart
their own directions both as individuals and as a particular sector
of society.''26
The following are some of the highlights from the studiespre-
viously mentioned:
[] Montiel found a change of leadershipin rural organizations
with the advent of the New Society in 1972. Out of 25 possi-
ble posts, only 2 have remained unchangedsince 1972. Be-
causeof the martial law situation, members were askedhow
free they felt in expressingpersonalviewsduring meetings. In
general, 68 percent of members felt that they could freely
expresstheir views. The rest stated that theywere only occa-
sionally free (27 percent) or not free at all (5 percent). More
members from government-sponsoredgroups reported that
they were free to speak out during meetings (78 percent)
than those in private organizations(44 percent).
F'] Only 2 out of the 185 members reported that the establish-
ment of their organization was opposedby some individuals
in the village. This could be interpreted asapathy, passivere-
sistanceor wait-and-see. No opposition does not necessarily
mean endorsement, and enthusiasm for attendance during
meetingswas low. Those who participated said they did so
because they wanted to contribute to barrio development
through the group. Those who were not interestedfelt they
had more important thingsto do in the ricefields,at home or
in school (for youth). On the whole, government-sponsored
groups exhibited more member-involvement than private-
sponsoredones.
[] The averagebarrio resident is usually asked to participate in
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the implementation stageof an•organization'sactivitiesbut is
left out in the planning phase. Mobilization of barrio resi-
dents was often soughtfor the free labor they contribute and
this was most successfulin projectsoriented to the improve-
ment of the community's physical appearance (beautifica-
tion, cleanliness,building repairs), They participated far less
in the more• development-oriented endeavorsof the group,
such as cooperativetraining or health servicesdelivery to mo-
thers.
I-I With respect to benefits from organizational membership,
most respondentsfelt that they have increasedskills in relat-
ing to others (pakikisarna). Some leadershad been helpedto
be more mature and responsibleindividuals. Ten percent of
leadersfelt that the organization was a burden to them and
only 5 percentacknowledgedeconomicbenefits. Ten percent
of rank-and-file members perceived economic improvement
asthe main effect of organizationalmembershipon their per-
sonal lives.
[] Perceivedformal organizational linkup with other groupsis
•relatively low; the problem of low formal linkage is more
acute in the privategroupsthan in the government-sponsored
ones. In terms of informal linkages,relatives of the respon-
dents had more connectionswith governmentagenciesthan
the members themselves. Government-groupsappear to be
more successfulthan private onesin delivering messagesfrom
the grassrootsto the bureaucracyand in facilitating the deli-
very of servicesto the people. Through linkages,they are able
to •mobilize support from amongthe .higher-ups,particularly
government agencies.An organization with more linkagesis
able to deliver servicesmore efficiently to' the local commu-
nity. Most Organizationmembersfelt that barrio people did
not expect them to solvethe problem directly; that solutions
rather lay in the handsof highergovernmentauthorities,with
their group exerting the needed politico-personal pressure.
When asked what their particular organizationscould do to
solve principal barrio problems,most respondentssaid'•'don't
know" or "there was nothing the organization could do".
Only a third felt the groupcould do something.
[] Rural groups studied neither articulate nor process local
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needs. The biggest problem in the barrios is agricultural yet
the most frequently reported organizationalactivities are re-
lated to cleanlinessand beautification campaigns.As Montiel
puts it: "As in most nationwide planning schemes,the local
unit becomesa cog in a national or regionalmachine insensi-
tive to variation at the local level . . . The creation of the
existing rural organizations thus arisesnot as a spontaneous
responseto the farmers' immediate needsbut as the fulfill-
ment of a countrywide plan conceivedwithin a highly cen-
tralized national bureaucracy."
[] The larger the socio-economicdifferences between leaders
and members, the more an organization is able to produce
service outputs. Montiel feels that "the socio-economicre-
sourcesof rich leaders(i.e. money and contacts) make their
organizationsmore efficient at the tasksat hand. In this way,
the variable on better-off leadersfunctions as an asset,and
not as a liability in the organizational machine."
[] A significant finding worth noting is that the characteristics
of participation, administrative performance, and financial
capability did not have significant relationships with any of
the four development functions such as: mobilizing support
within the rural community; articulating and processinglocal
needs and demands; developing two-way communications;
and facilitating the delivery of services.Montiel infers that
"perhaps participation helpsthe membersthemselvesprimari-
ly at the level of the individual but in no significant way in-
creasesthe output services of an organization to its imme-
diate community." This finding on participation isparticular-
ly relevant becauseit is the increasingpreoccupationof many
development agenciesand researchorganizations.27
Just like Montiel's study, Luis found overlappingmembershipin
two or more organizations in the same community in Pangasinan.
Thirty-six percent of respondentsbelonged to 2 organizations; 18
percent to three; 2 membersbelonged to four organizationsand one
even had 5 memberships In this model Barangay,the mostcommon
projects were beautification, improvement of plaza and stage,Christ-
rues celebration, improvements of roads and street lights and loan
assistance.The latter two projectswere leastmentioned but the first
three gave a lot of visibility to the barrio and made it famous. AI-
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though practically all the respondents said that their organization
helped in the development of the barrio, more than a third of them
also admit that their barrio will progressevenwithout their organiza-
tion. However, more than half of them feel that "without the organi-
zation, there is no unity and cooperation amongpeople." Among the
benefits mentioned from the organization, developmentof the spirit
of cooperation, friendship and socialization were most mentioned
(72 percent). Financial and technical assistancecame next (31 per-
cent). Apparently, respondents perceivedtheir organizationas "help-
ful in the barrio mainly in promoting unity and cooperation among
the people, but that the barrio itself is not dependent on the organi-
zation for its welfare.''2e
Empirical evidencesfrom Niduaza's study of 52 SamahangNa-
yons in 4 provincesof Mindanao show that the higher status farmers
were more active and more involved in SN affairs. Active SN mem-
bers had higher educational attainment, higher income and higher
rice productivity. They likewise had larger farm size, assetsand
higher'level of livingand by inference larger farm businessenterprise.
These backgroundsseemto haveequipped them with confidenceand
enabled them to be in a better position to influence the direction of
the SN operation. Actually many high status farmersgot involvedin
SN affairs when the voluntary workers at the organizationalstageof
the program invited them to be directors. This wasdone to improve
the imageof the organization. Niduaza arguesthat "an association of
homogeneously destitute individuals may result in a destitute organi-
zation. •,29 (Underscoringsupplied)
This assessmentreinforces Montiel's feeling that "better-off lead-
ers function as assets, not as liabilities in the organizational ma-
chine." in a similar study, Talatayod compared two barrio associa-
tions and found that the more viable SamahangNayon exceededthe
lessviable one in all of the following six indicators: availability of
leaders, capital, projects, activities, management competence, and
linkage.3°
Organizational leaderstend not only to come from higher socio-
economic status than members but decision-makingalso tendsto be
concentrated in the handsof a few. For example, Cruzado'sstudy of
barangay council members in Bukidnon found that only 2 or 3 out
of the 7 members were leadersin decision-makingandwere the ones
actively running the affairs of the community. The restof the court-
RuralOrganizations 557
cil members were comparatively passive in the decision-making.
Furthermore, only 20 percent of barangay council decisionswere
ever implemented and only one out of five memberswere still inte-
restedin continuing his presentposition. The others believed that the
job took too much of their time and attention, yet there was no re-
muneration, or benefits commensurateto the service they rendered
to the community. Sixty-three percent of barrio council members
had low level of motivation and almost half were not interested in
reelection.31
From e study of a ten-year old farmers' association,Weerasinghe
offers some insightswhich reinforce these findings and some which
are quite dissimilar. The interaction processin the Associationwas
highly centralized. It was greater among the leadersand sub-leaders
than among the followers. The sociometric network revealed that
there were three "stars" or leaders,the President,Vice-Presidentand
one Board member. They were characterized by high incomesand
regular attendance at meetings. They contributed ideas and sugges-
tions to the Associationand were selected by the members as com-
petent and reliable for decision-making.There wasanother sub-group
which appeared to havea supportive role in the decision-makingpro-
cessbut the members did not consider them competent and reliable
for decision-making. The rest of the members (70 percent) did not
contribute ideas andsuggestionsand appeared to be followers. Ma-
jority of them did not attend meetings regularly. In other words,
there is a small group within the associationwhich is responsiblefor
decision-makingon behalf of the entire association.
Although 90 percent of the membersfelt that their level of living
improvedafter joining the association,only 44 percentexpressedwil-
lingnessto remain in the association if there were conflict and di_
harmony within it. Fifty-six percent had no desire to remain under
these "conflict" conditions. Only the "hard-core" members(30 per-
cent) indicated that they will remain in the associationunder all con-
ditions and take responsibility for developing it. The "isolates"
(members in the associationwho were not "chosen" by anybody in
the sociometric questions asked) did not attend meetingsregularly
and most of them would leave if there were disharmony. Further-
more, almost half of them would leaveanyway if they increasedtheir
own incomes. It is obviousthat opportunity to get credit through the
associationwas the major attraction to them. With increasedincome,
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they would have no need to borrow.32
On the other hand, Sandovalreportson a fisherman'scooperative
which has succeeded in acquiring its own gasoline station and in
• pooling its catch to strengthenits bargainingpower with middlemen.
In 1977, it wasnot uncommonfor the gasolinestation to grossabout
P3,000 in a day's operations. The members were also much con-
vinced of the organization'sbenefitsto them. Officers,boardmembers
as well as•membersof various committees hadcommunication access
among themselvesand with any one of them. Although a numberof
the officers were not neighbors, they interacted with each other
more frequently than with other membersof the cooperative.Some
of the officers, however, interactedwith non-officer members.Never-
theless,members with key communication rolesare also the organi-
zation's formal leaders and the _'stars" in terms of sociometric
choices.33 Despite the persistenceof the "star_' leadershippattern
even in this fisherman's cooperative (which was organized through
"participatory community organization" means),there seemsto bea
greater dispersionof interaction and a wider network of communica-
tion between officers and members.The significanceof communica-
tion and information sharingis highlightedby Santiago in her state-
merit that "Genuine participation implies a certain parity of knowl-
edge between the decisioh-makers,leaders,and thoseaffected by the
decision. Those in authority can prevent a meaningfuldialoguewith
the people simply by refusing to give information, limiting commu-
nication and frequent consultation.''34
Given a community which is noted to have a high degreeof
"community-hess", how much organizational and community par-
ticipation takes place? Santiago provides us some answersto this
question through an intensive study she had done of the Ivatans
who migrated to Bukidnon practically asa community from Batanes
and have had.to stick together to survivein the land settlement com-
munity where they found themselves.
[] Involvement of respondents in development programswas
mainly along "implementation and maintenance". The pro-
grams being implemented•at the village level were packaged
programswhose planningand decision-makingprocesseswere
made by high level policy decision-makersfrom the different
agenciesand brought to the community for implementation.
Even in community projectsand activitieswhere peopleand
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leaderswere supposedto work together in the planning, im-
plementation and maintenance phases,there were strong in-
dications that people's participation in "planning and deci-
sion-making" under these conditions was limited to a few. In
the Green Revolution and Food Production programs,all re-
spondentswere involved in implementation and maintenance
becausethe nature of these programswere in effect reinforc-
ing and improving existing farming practices of farming
householdswith emphasison increasedproduction and eco-
nomic self-sufficiency. In Nutrition Education and Popula-
tion Education, no one was involved in planning and more of
• the wives and the youth than the household headswere in-
volved in implementation and maintenance. However, it was
also in these two programswhere there wasa high propo=ion
of respondentswho were non.involved even in implementa-
tion and maintenance. Community projects such as beautifi-
cation, health and sanitation, fiestas, beauty contests, fairs
and exhibits and field days registeredmore participation in
planning, even if still confined to relatively few. It is interest-
ing that only in fund raisingactivities,were about two-thirds
of the youth involved in planning and decision-making.To-
gether with their parents, the involvement continued up to
the implementation phasebut youths dropped off considera-
bly in maintenance.
[] Majority of respondents engaged in neighboring practices
only "sometimes" except for going to the farm togetherand
exchanging farm favors such as planting, weeding, and har-
vesting where more than three-fourths and almost 100 per-
cent,, respectively,mentioned that it wasalways done. Santia-
go pointed out that "socializing" activities within the neigh-
borhood were regulated such that they did not interfere
with the more important activities of the farm. Sunday was
the only free day. The rest of the week was spent in farming
activities from sunriseto sunset. This is a community where
farm work was done mostly by the farmers themselvesand
not by hired labor. This is one place where "bayanihan" is
very much a way of life.
[] Regarding political activities in the community, asids from
"voting regularly at elections" and "listening to other people
560 RuralOrganizations
discusspublic issues", other political involvementswere very
limited. About 5 household headshad campaignedfor a par*
ty candidateand 6 hadrun for a political position but no one
had even contributed money for a party candidate. About 5
had taken a stand on a public issue.(Although these involve-
ments may not seem much, the situation here may be even
better than in many rural communitiesthat we have.)
[] What deservesspecial mention from Santiago'sstudy are the
gains in resourcesand social servicesmade in the community
from the time they arrived to the time of the study. There
were significant gainsin educational facilities, religionand in
the availability of credit, technical assistancefor farm and
home, health and sanitation services, and of officials and
leadersconcerned with community improvements. The only
retrogressionwas in the "adequacy of land for every family."
There was more land availablewhen they arrived than at pre-
sent. This is understandablebecauseof increasingpopulation.
These community gains in resourcesand serviceswere attri-
buted by respondentsto four factors: community leadership,
cooperation between people and leaders,attitudes and drives
of the peopleand social relationsamongpeople. Government
assistanceand God's grace were ranked low by respondents
and no one attributed community improvementsto "luck".
[] It cannot be ignored that "difficult conditions in their place
of origin (Batanes Island) followed by yearsof settlement life
under pioneering conditions in Bukidnon had in part struc-
tured participation patterns". Years of sharedpioneering'ex-
periencesin a "new land" cannot be discounted.Despite the
positive gainsin the community, more than 40 percent of the
youth, would not like to spendthe rest of their life in.it.35
(4) Health Service Delivery Systems
Caritio in her study of 5 rural health delivery systemsattempted
to test three hypotheses:
[] Integrated approaches to the delivery of health and other
servicestend to be more effective than sectoral approaches.
[] In turn, participation also tends to increasethe effectiveness
of servicedelivery.
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I-J Integration tends to be accompanied by participation in that
intersectoralapproachesoften call for the mobilization of the
people.
From Table 8.6 which summarizesdata from Cari6o's analysis,
we arrive at the following findings with respect to the three hypo-
theses:
[] Of the three integrated approaches(with componentsbeyond
health), the community-based project in /eyte registeredthe
highest percentageof actual citizen participation in planning,
implementation, and evaluation of the program and actual
participation among low-income groups. It also showed the
highest proportion of their clientele indicating satisfaction
with the program and, in average,number of health services
received per household whether for low or high-income
groups. The two other multi-sectoral and supposedlyvery
participatory projects such as Project Compassionin Rizal
and the Cebu Human Development Program did poorly in
these indicators of participation and effectiveness.However,
they were highly rated in terms of adequacy of the service
while the Leyte project (of the 5 approaches) registeredthe
lowest endorsementfrom its clientele in this regard. In terms
of averagenumber of benefits per householdand satisfaction
with program among low-income groups, the two projects
(Rural Health Unit in Bataan and the ComprehensiveCom-
munity Health Program in Laguna)fared better than the Leyo
te and Cebu projectsalthough the former were lessintegrated
and lessparticipatory. Basedon the data presented,the three
hypotheseson the interrelationshipbetween integration, par-
ticipation and effectivenessare only partly supported.
A number of observationsare of interest:
[] Respondentsfrom the Cebu Human Development Program
which sought total people participation reported the lowest
number of health benefits per household;the lowest percent-
age of clientele claiming satisfactionwith the programamong
the low-income group;and the lowest percentagewho think
citizen participation is necessaryin planning, implementation
and evaluation of the program. The other programs felt
strongly about citizen participation.
[] The issueof equity (availability of serviceto everyone regard-
lessof personalcircumstances)is of very little salienceto the
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570• RuralOrganizations
clientele in the sensethat very few respondentsmentioned it
as a sourceof satisfactionwith programpersonnel.Adequacy
of the servicewastheoverriding consideration•.
[] When program effectivenessis measuredin terms of improve-
ment in general health conditions of the community, the
RUral Health Unit, the CCHP and the Cebu project were
found effective in their respectivecommunities.The first two
are lessintegrated and lessparticipatory.
[] On the whole, CariSo concludesthat "the 5 programshave
been able to improve health conditions, make people aware
of their existence,deliver servicesto a-largeproportion of the
population including the poor, and manageto satisfy its in-
tended beneficiaries. The programsmay then be said to all
have a salutary effect on the communities they haveserved."
[] CariSo.also concludesthat both the Cebu and Leyte projects
have been "successful in involving the poor in their participa-
tive schemeswhen they madespecialefforts to seekthem out
for specificrolesin their delivery system.However, they have
stopped short of making them priorities as recipientsof ser-
vices. Their greater.participation in the program has not ne-
cessarily led to greater benefits. ,,36
(5) People Participation at the Integrated Area Development Project
Level3.7.
One of the most important rationale for the adoption of the inte-
grated area development (lAD) strategy is to provide for the mobili-
zation and •involvement•of local-leadership and local people in the
•various managementactivities.of the lAD projects.As OlaSo puts it:
"The purpose is to increasesensitivity of governmentinstitutionsto
local problems•and to provide opportunities to insure that theseare
more accurately expressedand the servicesand benefits more widely
distributedand sharedby the greatestmajority• of.the target benefi-
ciaries. Hence, participation of the localPeOPleare expected:
[] during the. analysis of the existing situation Of the area in:
cluding the identification of problems, •constraints,.and
priorities; "
.t-I during the formulation of policies, programs and strategies;•
[] during the social soundnessanalysis.of the project package;
D during the implementation, operation and maintenance of
projects;and
RuralOrganizations 571
[] in-monitoring andevaluatingof project impact."
Given these expectations of local participation from the point of
view of articulated development strategy, how do the Bicolano far-
mers and Project Management Staff (PMS) perceivethese concepts
and how have'they been translated into actual experience?Ola_o's
recently completed study of 302 farmers and 92 PMS memberspro-
vide us some indications from four major on-going lAD projects in
the Bicol basin, namely: Libmanan-Cabusao;pili/Bula, Naga/Cala-
banga and Rinconada, all in the provinceof Camarines Sur. Among
the major findingsof the study are the following:
(a) It is very important to note that Bicolano farmers are no
strangersto local involvement in development project activi-
ties in their communities. Two-thirds of farmer-respondents
recalled havingbeen involved during the pre-BRBDP days in
such activitiesas construction and maintenance (30 percent)
of communal irrigation systems,community waterworks, ba-
rangay roads system,community health center, multipurpose
pavement and school building construction. The majority
(70 percent) had been involved in health and environmental
sanitation; land reform, cooperativesdevelopment, nutrition
program and Masagana99. When askedhow they got involv-
ed in those projects,43 percent mentioned that personnelof
implementing agencieshave asked them to participate; 34
percent said that there was a general consensusabout their
participation; 12 percent said they were requested by ba-
rangay officials. Only 12 percent indicated having volun-
teered themselves.
Thosewho recalled having taken part in the management
of community projects (65 percent) observedthat no restric-
tion was imposed on who should be involved. Participation
was open to everybody. Among those who could not recall
having participated, (35 percent) someclaimed that participa-
tion was exclusiveto project beneficiaries;or only for those
people who have the time. A few suggestedthat participants
were recommendeesof barangay officials and Project staff.
This latter complaint seems to have particular reference to
the hired labor component of projects. Asked if they were
satisfied with the way participation of Iocalpeople was de-
cided, 68 percent of the total respondents gave positive
answers.
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Besidesthese previous experiences in development proj-
ect participation, 68 percent of farmer-respondentsbelongto
community-based organizations. Even if most of these orgao
nizations are part of national schemeswhich are mandated
for implementation at the local level except for some com-
munal irrigation associatons,activities surroundingsuch "imo
posed" organizationsneverthelessprovide "project participa-
tion experience" and leave positive, negativeor cynical views
on the part of farmers.
(b) With the advent of BRBDP, 84 percent of farmer-respondents
are aware of several Basin projects. Ninety-two percent of
projects they mentioned are those which include physical
construction such as irrigation and drainage, barangay roads
network, rural waterworks, school facilities, etc. Only 8 per-
cent of the total projectsmentioned which farmersare aware
of, deal with extension of improved rice production techno-
logy, family planning, animal dispersal and medicinal herbs
for intestinal parasites.Curiously, only one respondent men-
tioned area development program. Incidentally, more than
three-fourths of PMS members interviewed belong to line
agencies more concerned with institutional development.
Only 10 percent come from NIA and 8 percent are Project
Managementstaff.
When PMS member-respondentswere asked what lAD
project component activitiesthey are engagedin, 80 percent
of the activities they enumerated were concerned with ins-
titutional development such as agricultural extension, land
reform, cooperativesdevelopment, organization of irrigators'
associationsand other production units. Only 20 percent of
development activities identified by PMS are physical con-
struction. Apparently institutional-educational activities do
not have muchsaliencefor the farmers. After all, evenduring
pre-BRBDP days, such activities were predominant. Farmers'
greater awarenessof physical construction activities is very
understandable not only becauseof their obvious physical
visibility but also becauseirrigation and roadswere the most-
frequently expressed needsof farmers as revealed by Social
Survey Research Unit (SSRU) surveys conducted earlier in
the life of BRBDP. According to the farmers, their sourcesof
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information about Basin projects include: the PMS (45 per-
cent); neighbors(15 percent); massmedia such as radio and
local newspapers (19 percent); seminars, workshops and
community assemblies(14 percent); and barangay council
(8 percent). 4 percent saw the projects themselves.When
asked if specific activities were provided by the PMS to
enable beneficiaries to be aware of Bicol basin projects, 56
percent of those who acknowledgedbeingaware of them said
"Yes". Among those who said "No", they maintained that
information, education, communication and motivational
campaignactivities shouldbe included in the project package.
They also pointed out that with such campaigns,people will
be well-informed and their participation can easilybe obtain-
ed. They could eventake care of the project if they are aware
of their responsibilitiesin the managementprocess.
According to PMS member-respondents,40 percent of
those they have tapped in the initiation and implementation
of IDA projects come from all major line agenciesin the area
to take advantageof their expertise and to havebetter coor-
dination of work plans and activities. The rest (60 percent)
of those they involved are local officials, farmer-households
and their associations,barangay brigades, SamahangNayon,
landowners, rural youth, couples of reproductive age, etc.
Their reasonsfor involving these local groups of people re-
flect the usual rationale for people participation such as: to
know their needs and problems; to educate them; to make
them aware and get their support, and finally asthe rhetoric
says - "Planning must start with the local people. Their in-
volvement is a major component of the project."
(c) Even with an enunciated policy of people participation,
someone has to make the decision about the nature and ex-
tent to which peoplewill participate in a project. When asked
as to who they think makes this decision, 41 percent of the
farmer respondentssaid the matter is usually discussedwith
the people in the barangay assemblycalled for the purpose
either by the barangaycouncil or by the line agency person-
nel. Assumingthat the barangay assembly is well-attended,
this offers wider participation. Thirty-one percent said it is
usually decided by the barangay council Chairman and 15
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percent said by the members of the.barangaycouncil. How-
ever, 8 percent •observed• that the decision is made by the
PMS and passed:on to the-people for approval. Another 4
percent think that either the Mayor or ViceMayor makesthe
decisions for the people.- However, 74 percent of the PMS
member*respondentsand 67 percent of .the farmer-respon-
dents expressedawarenessof opportunitiesprovided for local
people to be informed and.to participate. Dialoguesand con-
sultations with people in the community are carried out
• through barangayassemblies,meetingsand conferences,semi-
nars. and workshops, I)ublic hearings, farmers' classesand
other training programs, home.visits, community surveysand
information campaigns.About 79 percent of the farmer-re-
spondents said they had attended various kinds of training
• activities. As.a matter of fact, a third have attended 3 or
more training activities.
(d) Participatory functions performed by localpeopleduring the
initial stagesof lAD project activities came in the form of
furnishing •needed data and information, identifying needs
and problems,and identifying, approvingand supportingpro-
grams.and projects.The PMS respondentswho saidthat op-
portunities for local people participation werenot provided
felt that since project management•is still the major respon-
sibility of the implementing government agency, efficiency
should not be sacrificed for the provision of more .time for
local people to be able to articulate their felt needsand aspi-
rations.
(e) For a rough idea of how many farmer-respondents participat-
ed in the different project managementactivities,•Table 8.7
is presented.
In the planning stage, on ly 41 Percent ackn0wledged hav-
ing participated in deciding the main components included in
the IDA project package via seminar-workshops and public
hearings. A check with existing records on project packaging
activities further revealed that in many instances, these activi-
ties involved technical staff of line agencies,lOcal leadersand
the more articulate members of the community. Most physi-
cal infrastructure projects chosen for inclusion in the feasibi-
lity analysis were taken from inventories of capital projects
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TABLE 8.7
PARTICIPATION DURING THE VARIOUS STAGESOF PROJECT
MANAGEMENT AS REPORTED BY 302 FARMER.RESPONDENTS
Information Initial Pre- Monitoring
Campaign Planning Planning Implementation & Evaluation
- Percent-
Yes 67 71 42 60 34
No 33 29 58 40 66
100 100 100 100 100
N=302
submitted by the local government for national funding but
have been shelved for lack of resources.
Farmer-respondents indicated that the initiative to in-
volve them in the planning process always originates from the
project management group or from the local government
leadership. They could hardly remember any occasion when
the people themselves have volunteered their services. Only
37 percent of the PMS acknowledged that local farmers have
been involved in the planning process. Farmer-respondents
who were not involved said that they were not made aware of
the activities, did not have the chance to participate and
lack the capability to participate. The PMS gave lack of capa-
bility, lack of time and lack of interest as reasons for people's
non-involvement in the planning process.
Unlike the planning process, the implementation stage
has been more participatory as perceived by both PMS and
farmer-respondents. About 71 percent of the PMS reported
that project beneficiaries had been given priority in the
implementation by hiring them as laborers, construction fore-
men, engineering survey party members, casual office emplo-
yees, security guards, right-of-way negotiators, local trainors
and seminar coordinators. Some of them were designated as
barangay supply points for information materials, medical
supplies and family planning paraphernalia. The PMS respon-
dents also added that project beneficiaries were trained, orga-
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nized and provided technical and material assistanceto make
them more effective implementorsof the various IDA project
components. The training activitieswere oriented toward the
development of knowledge, attitudes and skills necessaryto
manageand operate physicalfacilities at the farm level (most-
ly irrigation, drainageand barangay road network) on a coo-
perative basis. Some of the PMS respondentsindicated dis-
satisfaction with the performance of project beneficiarieson
the grounds that they lacked appreciation of the benefits
they will get if they are actively involved, lacked cooperation
in carrying out assignedtasks, do not follow instructions
correctly, and are too dependent on government assistance.
It is interesting that the PMS emphasized how parti-
cipants benefited from the projects through hired labor and
training programs while the farmer-respondents perceived
their participation in terms of activities which they "contri-
buted" to the project such as providing free labor: paying
irrigation water fees;givingfinancial sharein the maintenance
of waterworks system;attending seminars/trainingprograms;
organizing project beneficiaries; adopting recommended pro-
duction technology; relocating housingto new barangaysite
and helping recruit volunteers. This difference in PMS and
farmers' perceptionsof what constitutes participation during
implementation is worth noting. It ispossiblethat attendance
in seminarsand training programs,adoption of recommended
technology, etc., are regarded by some participants as
"cooperation" for the sake of project staff in which casethe
beneficiariesare the project staff. Although an overwhelming
majority of "participating" farmer-respondents(87 percent)
admitted being satisfied with their participation in the imple-
mentation, the following reasonscited by the few who were
not satisfieddeserveattention: a) have to pay some kind of
dues; b) participation was imposed rather than voluntary;
c) ineffective technical assistanceand services,and d) delayed
completion of supportivefacilities.
Monitoring and evaluation were the activities least
popular and least participated in. Only a third of the farmer-
respondents indicated any involvement in this process.The
PMS perceived more people involvement at this stage than
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the people themselves perceived. Fifty-five percent of the
PMS maintained that there ware opportunities for people in-
volvement in this particular phase via occasional feedback
and information provided by barangay council and civic lead-
ers, barangay assemblies, meetings and conferences, field and
home visits by PMS, and community surveys and interviews
by PMS. Those who said there was no people involvement in
monitoring and evaluation said that people cannot be expect-
ed to participate in this phase of the IDA projects because
they lack the capability and skills for impartial reporting;
they do not have enough time for this activity; and it is the
implementing agency's responsibility to monitor the status of
their projects.
(f) Quite revealing are the farmer-respondents' perceptions of
barangay officials' and PMS members' leadership styles as
shown in Table 8.8. Obviously, the leadership style of the
barangay official is perceived by the farmers as much more
participatory than that of the PMS. It is not surprising that
TABLE 8.8
BASIC LEADERSHIP STYLES OF BARANGAY OFFICIALS
AND PROJECT MANAGEMENT STAFF
AS PERCEIVED BY FARMER-RESPONDENTS
Project
Barangay Management
Officials Staff
- Percent-
Allow participationof peopleinsome
decision-makingactivities 72 46
Do not allow participationof people
in any decision-makingactivities 14 48
Allow participationof peopleinalmost
all decision-makingactivities 8 7
Do not interferewith people'sactivities 6,,, 2
100 100
N = 302
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80 percent of them expressedsatisfaction with the leader-
ship style which is more participatory. Only 45 percent were
satisfied with the PMS whose style is perceivedasone which
"does not allow participation in any decision making activi-
ty." Furthermore, farmersViewed barangay officials asmore
able than the PMS to elicit local support in the management
of projects and flow of communication from them was per-
ceived as "very regular", as against "seldom", "never", and
"it depends" from the PMS.
(g) With respect to government assistanceand other supportive
facilities and services,53 percent of farmer-respondentsre-
ported satisfactionwith their availability. The 47 percent who
were not satisfied made the following observations:facilities
and servicesare not easily available to all people in the com-
munity; they are unable to elicit•local people participation
in the managementof community projects;someof the faci-
lities and servicesdo not meet basiccommunity needsand re-
quirements; technical personnel are often not available for
consultation, and project implementation is often delayed.
(h) Almost 60 percent of farmer-respondentsreported dissatis-
faction with the nature and extent of their participation in
the lAD project managementactivities. Reasonsfor this dis-
satisfaction are asfollows:
Frequency
of mention
During the initial phase - Percent--
[] .Localinterest groupswere more vocal
and articulate than the generalmembership 53
[] Our suggestionswere not honored
by PMS members 22
[] There wasalways initiation but no
implementation of projects 19
[] Not enoughtime wasgivenusto fully
appreciate the program 6
100
•Total number responding= 140
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During the identification of common needs and problems
I-I Many membersof the community were
not fully informed of this activity 42
I-I Opinions of the participantsare not
respected 23
[] Other membersof the community did
not show interest 20
I-I There was not enoughtime given
peopleto identify needsand problems 10
I-I Many are not capable 5
N = 116 100
During the planning phase
[] Very long process 35
[] Require sometechnical expertise 23
There was no immediate result 21
[] Does not involve majority of people
in the community 12
[] Not much benefit 5
N = 169 100
During the implementation phase
i-I. Our suggestionfor the location of
the irrigation canal/road construction
wasnot followed 30
[] Ineffective technical assistanceand
services 28
[] Our involvementwas sort of imposed
suchas membershipin the Samahang
Nayon and the irrigators'association 24
[] Financialobligations imposed on us
are quite high like irrigation fees 18
N = 169 100
(i) More active participation in IDA Project managementactivi-
ties tends to be associatedwith higher education; higher in-
come; satisfaction with their involvement; owner/amortizing
owner tenure status; community as against individual value
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orientations; favorable attitudes toward participatory con-
cepts; satisfaction with more participatory leadershipstyle of
barrio officials and PMS; membership in community-based
organizations; more attendance in and greater satisfaction
with training programs.
(j) When askeda generalquestion on what they considerwas the
nature of their participation in the Basin projects,41 percent
regarded being project beneficiary as one indicator of parti-
cipation; 37 percent look at their beingproject implementors
as the more common form of people participation; 12 per-
cent believe that being a sourceof information about com-
munity needs and problems constitutes another way of par-
ticipating. The rest contend that being initiators and channels
of feedback information are still other meansof taking part
in project activities.
(k) Ninety-three percent of farmer-respondentsbelievethat local
people participation is necessaryin the managementof IDA
projects. On the other hand', only 69 percent of the PM$ re-
spondentsfeel the sameway, The rest think that local people
have yet to appreciate the wisdom of their involvement in
local development efforts and that they are still too depen-
dent on government expertise and its existing machinery to
perform development tasks.
(I) Farmer and PMS respondentsagreedin their perceptionsof
problems in' generating local participation, i.e. lack of needed
information about community problems and aspirationsand
lack of time on the part of beneficiariesto participate. How-
ever, these 2 groupsdiffered in other perceptions in the sense
that the PMS tended to view the problems as coming from
the beneficiaries as expressed in such responsesas: lack of
cooperation among beneficiaries; their negative attitudes to-
ward participation; lack of appreciation of the benefits they
would derive from projects and lack of education on their
part. On the other hand, farmer-respondents tended to per-
ceive the problems more as arising from the side of govern-
ment agencies as reflected in such responsesas: non-credibili-
ty of government personnel; delayed project implementation
and disregard for local people; lack o¢ coordination among
line agencies; and management still of barangay roads by the
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Ministry of Public Highways insteadof by the community in
order to generate local involvement.
Clearly, there is much room for more frequent, more
regular communication between farmers and Project Manage-
ment Staff. As expressed by both groups, there is need for
intensive information, communication, education and moti-
vation campaigns.
(m) In general, farmer-respondentsexhibited very favorable atti-
tudes toward community action and people participation
concepts. However, their reactionsto someof theseconcepts
are more intriguing than others. For example, despitefavora-
ble endorsementof community-oriented actions, 88 percent
of them believe that "one should always give priority to his
own needs and problems before those of others" and 27 per-
cent think that "working alone is better than working toge-
ther when people could not agreeas a group." That farmers
are not naive about the actual problems in people participa-
tion is reflected in the 88 percent of them who said"it is dif-
ficult to mobilize local people because of factionalism and
competition." About three-fourths likewise realize that "in-
volvement in community development projectsis costly and
time consumingon the part of the people."
The role of local people in data generationand analysisis
endorsed by practically everyone. Perhaps this is evidenced
by their "patience" in replying to interviews and surveys.
Almost all of them also reject the notion that "Poor people
cannot do anything for themselves." However, people parti-
cipation is not attractive to about a third of farmer-respon-
dents who were inclined to "let barangay officials and local
elites decide what is best for the community" and even to
"let local people always anticipate government assistancein
project implementation." Apparently authoritarian leader-
ship style and dependence on governmenthavenot lost their
appeal. Although majority prefer people participation, they
are not so naive as to think that it comeswithout problems
and difficulties evenfrom the sideof people themselves.
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(6) People Participation for Irrigation Development 38
Of all the Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP) re-
lated projects, the participatory approach to irrigation development
which NIA is applying in the Rinconada/Buhi-Lalo (Upper Lalo and
Lower Lalo)area probably representsthe most intensive effort to
mobilize and organize farmers. This project is NIA's initial attempt
"to involve farmers in developinga national irrigation project, parti-
cularly in the designand construction of lateral _analsand terminal
facilities (where) the processof engagingfarmers' participation in
project activities is being utilized as a meansto organize them into
viable irrigators' associations.The plan is to organize farmers into
several irrigators' associationswhich can assumesystem operation
and maintenance tasks in their respectivesections." In 1980, com-
munity organizers primarily responsiblefor organizing farmers into
associationswere deployed, The project emphasizesthat the "prin-
ciple of popular participation is built into the concept of commu-
nity organization: it isessentiallyimpossibleto organizepeoplewith-
out their participation." It has likewise been said that "the partici-
patory approach isaimed at developingthe capacity of the powerless
members of the community which shouldresult in the emergenceof
new leadership."
The philosophy is appealing and the rhetoric is even noble but
how does people participation translate into day-to-day activities
steeredby community organizers(COs)?
The activitiesfor the first few monthsinclude:
•(a) Preparation and verification of farmers' listsfor assignedarea.
(b) Mapping of the irrigation area parcel by parcel layout of rice
lands; delineation of rice fields and coconut lands; finding
out of names of cultivators and landowners; indication of
proposedcanal routes.
(c) Initial community integration activities including contact-
building through house-to*housevisits and courtesycalls on
barangay officials. Groundwork is the CO's initial contact
with farmerson a particular issue.
(d) Identification of potential farmer leaders.
(e) Initial organizingwork startswith sub-groupswithin the rota-
tion area to selecl_signatoriesto the labor contract for each
rotational area. Each sub-qrouDelects 2 representativesand
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sub.grouprepresentativeschoosethe rotational area signatory
by acclamationor group consensus.The chosensignatoryto
the contract must be a trusted representativewho will re-
ceive wagesfor the whole group.The contract containswork
duration, manpower requirement and total cost estimate. The
constructionwork is carriedout under NIA supervision.
(f) Organization of committees to negotiate right-of-way; pre-
pare manpower inventory to assess kills for labor contracts;
surveycommittee and membershipcommittee.
(g) Conduct walk-throughs which are on-site inspectionsof de-
signed terminal facilities. The routes of proposed farm
ditches are traced from start to end. Farmers either approve
the route as designedor suggestchanges.In the period under
review, farmersproposed21 changeswhich consistof relocat-
ing ditch portions and structures;extension or shorteningof
ditches; construction of additional ditches or terminal struc-
tures or eventhe removal of a ditch.
The process of generating people participation is not without
problems and difficulties even in the hands of COs who are the ex-
perts on thinsjob. From the Documentation Researchreports review-
ed, the following problemsand issuesemerge:
(a) People participation is time- and energy-intensiveboth for
COs and farmers. In February 1981, for example, a total of
24 meetingsand 10 walk-throughswere held in Upper Lalo.
Poor attendance in meetings and unavailability of farmers
even during house-to-house visits is a problem frequently
mentioned by COs. In one walk-through, which was planned,
only 4 of the 11 leaderspresent actually participated. Seven
of them said that they were not physically fit to go on long
walks. Since the objective of organizing farmers isto involve
the majority in project activities, low attendanceis not likely
to contribute muchtoward this end.
(b) According to the Project Manager, "the decision to utilize
the participatory approach in the project comesfrom NIA's
top-level management and its implementation lies in the
handsof project staff." Ironically, adoption of the participa-
tory approach seem to be non-participatory on the part of
implementing project staff. It was perceivedas a top-down
decision.
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(C) The role of the COs in NIA is a new one which isnot neces-
sarily in harmony with the role of the Technical Staff (engi-
neers, etc.). The latter tend to look at the effects of farmer
participation as delaying construction which in turn leadsto
sluggishtechnical accomplishmentswhich affect the evalua-
tion of the technical staffl The approach according to them
leads to "increased project cost" due to the hiring of the CO
and "slack time for the engineers". It will be recalled that
construction of terminal facilities was suspendedon January
1, 1981 to enable the COs to organize and mobilize the far-
mers to participate in the designof terminal facilities. Con-
struction will resume as soonasfarmershavereviewed, made
on site inspection and approved NIA's plans for the location
and lay-out of these facilities. It has been pointed out that
benefits from CO work are long-term and not immediate and
that "the ultimate objective is not to construct but to irri-
gate." The test, therefore, of effective CO comes only after
construction and when irrigation becomes a reality. Unless
farmers regard "opportunity to participate" as "good" in
itself, they may not see the benefits from these time-and-
energy-i_tensiveactivitiestill much, much later.
(d) The entry of the CO into the agricultural and rural develop-
ment sceneat the local level hasthreatened some of the exist-
ing government functionaries whose job description are also
organizational and institutional development in nature. The
question asked is whether it is necessaryto hire a new func-
tionary to carry out this participatory approach. Is it possible
to train and reorient the existing workers toward this new
strategy?
(e) One of the most important tasks of the CO isto identify po-
tential leaders, There has been some feelings expressed by
such leaders that the CO who is hired on a fulltime basisis
"unloading" upon them the organizational functions which
he or she has been hired for. When is this "transferring of
functions" a matter of building local leaders' capability and
self-relianceand when is it a "dumping" of responsibilitieson
the "clients"?
What qualities are the COs looking for in a local leader?
The reports indicate that "In general, COs expect the identi-
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fled leadersto haveinitiative; be aware of what goeson; have
time for the project and possesswillingnessto help in the
project. Leaders are also expected to passon to their mem-
bers what COs havetaught them. They plan with the COs the
agendaof meetings;disseminate information about meetings
and their results;and preside over meetings'.'In other words,
the identified leadersare expected to take over many of the
COs' functions on a voluntary basis.With suchexpectations
and demands on their local time and energy, who are the
individuals likely to emerge as local leaders?Is it the power-
lessmembersof the community?
There are evidencesof overlapping leadershipfunctions in
one person such as the Nain Farm Ditch sub-group leader
who is also the labor contract signatory; and the Right-of-
Way Committeee Chairman who is also the secretary of the
Rotational Area. Distributing the "leadership load" is there-
fore part of the participatory thrust, and bringing "new
blood" into the leadershiprole requiresintensivetraining.
On the positive and optimistic side of the participatory ap-
proach as applied in irrigation development, the following presents
the potentials and promises:
(a) One would like to think that once people havebeen involved
in participatory projects, the processwill be irreversibleand
they will not "put up" with strategies which deny them
accessto the process.We likewisehope the participatory pro-
cessin irrigation development will have a spill-overeffect on
other aspectsof life.
(b) When it comesto the "nitty-gritty", the C-O approachreally
meansa great deal of information-generation, processingand
dissemination because participation essentially means com-
munication directed two-ways, horizontally and vertically
from "inside" to "outside" and vice-versa.Perhaps the far-
merswithin the irrigation area haveneverbeen asintensively
"covered" by developmentworkers asthey are now. Such in-
tensity we would like to think cannot but producesomeim-
pact both on people and on agencies.All the efforts to vali-
date farmer's lists,paddy to paddy mapping, etc., must some-
how contribute to the emergenceof the "truth", and the
generation of more accurateand objective information. Per-
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hapssuchbasicdata can be usedasvaluable baselineinforma- '
tion on the project itself.
(c) It is hoped thatthe "legwork" currently employed by the
C-O will set the pace for other workers. The greatestchal-
lenge to the Bicol Program right now is the plight of the
agricultural landless. This problem has not been addressed
directly except in someways in the agr(_forestation project.
The participatory approach in irrigation developmentwhich
aims to include the powerlesssaysabsolutely nothing about
the landless.Actually, labor contracts in the rotational areas
could very well be oriented toward the landless.The abaca
industry is another critical development potential for absorb-
ing the landless.On a more indirect level, irrigation and credit
have their corresponding impacts on the landlessbut these
are not being monitored.
B. Some insights and lessons from the practice of people participa-
tion
Although several experiences in rural organization and people
participation have been previouslycited, we haveadded this special
section because experiences do not always provide lessons.The
lessonsdescribed here-come from experiences in eight projects:
I-I a socialdevelopmentapproach
[] an agro-forestationand upland developmentproject
small farmers' grassrootsorganization to enhanceagricultural
productivity
[] a barangaywater project
[] a study of workers in manufacturing establishments
[] the BangladeshRural Advancement Committee
E] LINK-COD Programme (Linking with Communities for
Development Programme)
[] the Bicol River BasinDevelopment Program
( 1) Social development, income generation and the poor
Although PBSP's projects are characterized by a particular
social development approach, they have an objective analysis and
candid presentation of their experiences. This is probably due to a
built-in evaluative research in all of its assistedprojects in order to
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deliberately learn from the development process. If they are to con-
tribute toward the emergence and adaptation of management tech-
niques and further refinement of social development theory and
practice, lessons have to be objectively derived. Only then can such
lessons be shared through training programs. It is significant, for
example, that although the aim is to help the Filipino poor improve
their lives, PBSP makes no claim to.reaching the poorest of the poor.
As a matter of fact, the following findings point precisely to what
they regard as the "lower limits" of their "downward reach":
[] A monthly income of lW300 (1971-76) seems to be the mini-
mum required for individuals to meaningfully participate
in the projects. For those earning below this amount, assist-
ance must first be mobilized to meet the family's basic needs
before they are ready to risk an income-generating activity.
[] Should funds be made available for income-generating activ-
ities, assistance preferably should be extended to groups
or to individual entrepreneurs who already have other sources
of income or who have an on-going project for expansion.
[] For group projects, a proponent must be responsible for the
management of the funds and economic projects in order
that capital funds are not used for the basic subsistence needs
of these low-income groups.
[] Strategies presently being used cannot be applied to the poor-
est of the poor since any assistance given to them would be
used for survival.
[] In working with low-income groups, income generating activ-
ities and social education must go hand in hand to ensure
successful and meaningful projects and viable groups.
Other lessons from PBSP pertain to strategies for institution-
building:
[] In building up locally based service groups, they have found
it easier to effect group development if the group is homo-
genous hence the strategy indicated is to work with sectoral
groups.
[] The second strategy is to encourage proponents to acquire
skills to run specific types of projects. While proponents need
to be generalists in order to respond to a wide variety of com-
munity problems and needs, special skills particularly for in-
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come and employment-generating components are sorely
lacking.39
These two trends which have emerged from their experi-
encesput us back to the old issuessuch assectoral or multi-
sectoral; generalist or speqialist; the "system integrated" vs.
the "sectoral specialist"
[] In the searchfor "least_cost solutions" PBSPhaspinpointed
the paraprofessional, the community-leader-volunteer who
will be trained at the initial stageof organizinga community
to continue the work of the project .staff.The search for an
alternative was prompted by fast turnover of professional
workers, reluctanceto work in remote areasand slow integra-
tion or acceptanceby a community beingassisted.4°
Earlier in this Chapter, we asked the question of the
Community-Organizer's working life span and level of moti-
vation required to keep them in a long period of "participa-
tion" with low-income groups.Apparently this isa realprob-
lem. The need for shortening the waiting time for the bene-
fits from participation has been recognized. As the 1979
Annual Report says:
Impatiencewith the lengthof timeneededto seetangibleresultsin
our projects hasbeencommonly expressedat all levels.However,as
we gainedmoreexperiencein ourwork,thetime neededfor a project
to get off the groundand showresults,hasshortened.Buttherestill
existsa needfor refinedsystemsandproosduresfor projectdevelop-
ment, acceleratedlearningmodulesandalternativemethodsof tech-
nologytransfer.Thenaggin9 presenceof povertyamongourbeneficia-
riesisa constantreminderto usthatwhilewemaybeableto wait,the
poorcannotaffordthisluxury. 41
Perhaps it is precisely this senseof urgencyand need to show
tangible results that in the past have led to non-participatory tech-
nology-oriented programs which are now being criticized for not
reachingthe poor. Isthere a quick way of doing thiswhich is partici-
patory, self-reliant, viable and not charity? Is it the poor who are
objecting to charity?
Even in a deliberately participatory social developmentapproach
working with grassrootsassociations,taskssuchas defining problems,
planning, implementing, evaluating, sharing responsibilities and
authority and even maintaining cohesivenessareeasieraccomplished
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than eliciting group participation, mobilizing resources and resolving
conflicts. All these three latter tasks are essential for the viability of
the approach itself. Communicating a social development philosophy
to grassroots organizations likewise emerged as a problem with a
third not knowing anything about PBSP, the organization, let alone
be aware of any benefits from it.
(2) Participation and community organization in agro-forestation
and upland development
De los Angeles summarizes for us the role of participation and
community organization in upland development:
Agro-forestation being implemented in upland communities
where farmers are usually distantly located from each other and
where infrastructure and social facilities are markedly inadequate
need to be implemented through the formation of Strong farmers"
organizations. This is emerging as a necessary condition for a sus-
tained effort at agrisilvicultural practices. More specifically, the
building of organizations may be necessary for the following:
(a) conduct of activities via cooperation and mutual support; (b)pre-
servation of peace and order; (c) as a venue for establishing linkages
with government agencies for the latter's provision of inputs, facil-
ities and the like. The effectiveness of organizations in carrying out
a project which seeks to benefit the poor members of upland com-
munities, in particular should thus be analyzed... 42
To illustrate the role of organizations, we cite specific examples:
The summer months were difficult onesfor the farmers.The only
sourceof water for the farms was the nurseryand a gullybelow it. SAMA-
BUN (the uplandfarmers' association)membershad to form human chains
for passingbucketsof water from the sourceto the nurseryseedlingsevery-
day.
One of the strategiesbeingtried to solve the water problem isthe dig-
gingof farm ponds on lower slopingareasof the farms to catch andstore
rainwater for use during the dry seasonor part of it. The pond will also
serveas sourceof water for fire control,asa fishpondandalsofor monitor-
ing sedimentation.Problemsrelatedto the diggingof thispondinclude.....
lack of financial and material resoumesfor building the pond; and, the
considerablyheavy manual labor (which will competewith laborneedsof
other farm activities)neededto dig andbuild the pond. Thefarmersplan to
raisefunds through their marketingcooperative,to subsidizethe needsof
thosewho will buildfarm ponds.
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Fire was also a big problem in the farms. While the SAMABUN rnem-
bers agreed to stop using fire to clear and prepare their farms for cultiva-
tion, they had to protect their farms from nearby farms. At the advent of
thedry season, firebreaks were already built, such that virtually only the
farms of the Villaricans did not burn this summer. The SAMABUN members
were also more motivated to protect their farms because of their tree seed-
lings, and because they experienced having put out grass fires effe'ctivel F
through their strong organized group .....
The old practice of kaingin-making having been stopped, the farmers
found themselves clearing their farms by hand and with the use of the hoe,
and with the help of women and children. As this activity still falls within
the dry season, the summer heat as well asgreat exertions required to clear
the area from cogon grass, which is difficult to weed out is putting quite
a stress on the workers; frequent restsare needed in between weeding tasks.
The SAMABUN members are still confronted with the problem of
land tenure security; their applications for a 25-year lease from the Bureau
of Forest Development have not yet been processed. They are hoping that
successin their agro-forestry activities would convince authorities that they
deserve to be allocated land for cultivation during a long period of time.
Perhaps, even more noteworthy is thepsychological, educational and organi-
zational preparation that the farmers underwent to implement the con-
cepts of agro-forestry. The presence of an organization through which they
aired their ideas, expressed their fears, settled personal differences and other
problems was very important in the dwindling optimism of the members
whenever the time-consuming and back-breaking agro-forestry activities
were experienced .... Recently the officers and members of the SAMA-
BUN . . . decided to form a marketing arm (1) to serve as venue through
which the agro-forestry activities of the SAMABUN and their benefits
would spread to other members of the community; and (2) to handle farm
input and marketing needs of the farmers . . . it was felt that for an agro-
forestry project to succeed, the farmers must be able to control both the
production and marketing aspects of the project. 43
Some very important lessons on Project Design/Development
Process from another pilot project in Upland Development have been
reported by Duganl Because these lessons offer operationally signi-
ficant guidance in how to enlist people participation or as Dugan
calls it "beneficiary involvement", the following account is cited in
some detail:
The development of a design for this project followed a fairly conventional
methodology. Socio-economic surveys were conducted and maps and bio-
physical data were assembled. Seminars and workshops took place tapping
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the most competent expertise available. Dialogues were held with farmers,
municipal officials, community leaders and line agency personnel. Site in-
spections were completed and a good overall picture of current physical
status of the watershed was obtained. With these inputs a project paper was
written, studied, amended and approved. Finally, funding was secured
and implementation was started.
After six (6) months of work in the field it became quite evident that the
most important element in the project had not been sufficiently sounded-
out, namely the people who were supposed to be the beneficiaries of this
entire exercise. Only after six (6) months had elapsed did the project
began to benefit from the ideas contributed by the watershed residents.
These ideas and concerns were not revealed in the surveys, dialogues and
other standard tools employed earlier in the project design.
The two factors that brought about this active involvement were the physi.
cal proof that activities were being undertaken for the farmers' benefit and
the demonstrated respect for farmers' opinions and ideas.
Physical proof consisted of the nursery, seedling prOduction and the graded
trail. Demonstrated respect was offered (to the farmers) by changes in
seedling production targets to conform with their preferences for certain
plant species and by aborting the partially completed construction of a
fidlpond which the farmers openly opposed.
It was not until the two factors stated above were established that the
first concrete progress in beneficiary involvement was achieved. Perhaps
this is best illustrated by quoting a farmer who was expressing himself to
all who would listen (including the project staff and myself) during the
graduation ceremony for our first group of farmer trainees. He said, %_/hen
this project first started I said to myself this will be like all government
projects.., just a lot of talk and no action. All my family end my friends
had the same opinion. It wasn't until I saw the nursery producing seedlings
and learned that these seedlingswere for us, that I began to believe in this
project. When the graded trail was built I be|ieved even more. When you
agreed to plant the seedlings I wanted then I learned that my suggestions
were being paid attention to. Now we have this graduation ceremony and
I see municipal officials and Bicol River Basin officials here enjoying with
us. You can count on my cooperation."
These sentiments were expressed in a mixture of Buhinon and Pilipino.
Much of the essence is lost in this translation. However, the lessons are
clear, r
[] farmers need evidence of sincerity before they will express their
concerns
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[] until this sincerity is proven, responsesto dialogues, socio-economic
surveys and seminars may not be reliable and are probably a consider-
able waste of time, money and effort. They should be deferred until
project activities have provided the evidence farmers seek before com-
mitting themselves.
[] our present project design process may be "putting the cart before
the horse."
There are several simple steps that will need to be taken in any upland
development project.
[] Build a Plurseryand start producing seedlings.
Q Build a graded trail to make it easy to reach the nursery,
[] Station project staff at the nursery where farmers can visit them, get
to know them and eventually feel free to speak openly.
[] Ask the farmer what trees he wants to plant and produce the seedlings
he wants.
It does not take any sophisticated design, or require any in-depth studies
to take these first simple steps. It does require commitment, patience and
skill on the part of project designers and implementors to move forward
from that"point.
Experience suggeststhat any project design process which does not include
these simple steps, or similar activities to overcome skepticism and distrust
in the minds of beneficiaries, may be of questionable value. Beneficiary,
involvement and cooperation are crucial for meaningful design of interven-
tions. An investment of time, funds and effort for the purpose of establish-
ing credibility with the beneficiaries before a project paper can be finalized
seems to be an important requirement. In essencethis means some imple-
mentation activities need to be undertaken as part of the project design
process,and prior to the finalization of a project paper. In the Buhi project
this was possible because it was recognized as a pilot effort from the very
beginning. Other upland projects probably will need to be guided by this
experience.
The above suggeststhat the following sequence may be more appropriate
for project design than the methodology that has been followed to date.44
In addition, Dugan mentioned some pitfalls they encountered in
_e design of their upland development project:
[] Wrong assumptions. Because most of the proposed beneficiaries were
perceived to be subsistence farmers, it was assumed they were more
interested in food production than in generating cash income. It was
subsequently learned during the process of implementation, that the
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farmershaveworked out their own methodsof subsistingquite well if
subsistencemeansprimarily food on the table. Most of their kaingin
making and the deforestation it implies, was done to produce a cash
crop of yellow corn. Since the basicassumptionswere inaccurate. . .
changeswere incorporatedthat were designedto increasecashincome.
D Unresponsive nursery planning, The technicalstudiesthat were con-
ducted to decide on tree speciesappropriate for the areawere incor-
poratedinto project design.This resultedin an over-emphasisof some;
underemphasisof others;and completeomissionof quite a few species
the farmerswantedto plant.., speciesmost interestingto them.
[] ineffective extension agents. Only after working with farmersin the
pilot phasedid the projectfind out that line agencyextensionperson-
neldid not seem to havegoodrapportwith the farmers.This discovery
has led to one of the most usefulinnovationsresultingfrom the pilot
activities, which was the training of people the farmers trusted and
looked up to for leadershipin the barangayas Upland Extension
Leaders.
[] Mistaken priorities in addressing the /and tenure issue. Although the
tenure issuewas recognized as important from the outset, it was
assumed (and probably still is, in most upland projects) that tenure
means first and foremost the/and which ff_efarmer tills. This did not
turn out to be the most important tenure considerationat the project
site,but this wasnot knownuntil 9 months after field work hasstarted.
It was only then that the farmersexpressedtheir first tenure concern
to be security on the lands wherethey had bullt their homes andwhere
they kept small backyardmixed gardensor kept somelivestock.When
this was recognized,it wasnot without a considerabledegreeof chagrin
on the part of project designers.... Isn't our first considerationa
homewherein our families will be safeandsecureandwhy shouldthe
priorities be any different from an upland farmer than they are for
mostof the restof society?45
From these project design pitfalls which were recognized during
the implementation process emerge two larger lessons which may
sound trite and therefore not taken seriously. These lessonsare:
[] Felt needs have to be experienced to be felt/.//
[] Pre-project surveys to determine "felt needs" have to be
regarded as "'pre-project" and largely indicative, not defi-
nitive. Only when the project becomes a "reality" for benefi-
ciaries that needs, participation and involvement acquire
operational meaning. Before that, both project designers and
594 RuralOrganizations
project beneficiaries are "reality testing" in a mutual dis-'
coven/. Question asked of prospective participants before a
project is launched or in anticipation of "development
actions" are by their very nature theoretical or hypothetical
becauseit is yet to happen. Therefore, the perceptionsand
responsesare also very likely hypothetical. A proiect design
is therefore best treated as a "rough sketch", not as a
"'detailed blueprint" for action. This has implicationsfor the
project developmentandfunding process.
(3) Small farmers" grassroots organizing to enhance agricultural
productivity
For two and a half years the small farmer organization project
mentioned earlier in Goodell's paper4s was implemented as a re-
searcheffort to determine whether a bottom-up systemof organiza-
tion can be more effective in stimulating joint action by groupsof
farmers for the purposesof integrated pest management, system-
atized water managementand group credit. Preliminary reportsshow
promising results. For example, "there is evidencethat improving
the timing of farmingactivitiesto make them more synchronous,can
have positive benefits in insectcontrol and may reduce irrigation de-
mands. These kinds of group pest managementand water manage-
ment efforts can only be implemented through organized farmer
groups .... One notable accomplishmentwas in group credit man-
agement when in .the dry seasonof 1980 the farmerswere able to
collectively pay in excess of f_l million in past due Masagana99
loans." Although this isquite a feat in the light of seriousrepayment
problems, the researchstaff admit that they "cannot explain the
timing and causesof this breakthrough and whether the highly per-
sonalorganizationalskillscan be transferredon a wide scale.''47
In a manner of speaking, the results from organizing small
farmers are promising but the lessons are not clear. They have yet
to be discovered.
The project, however, enumeratessomethings they havelearned
about Central Luzon farmers with respect to devisingnew techno-
logy. From our point of view, these lessonsare alsovital inputs into
community organization work with farmers consideringthat they
were also derived from a community organization approachto inten-
siftedrice production.
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[] Farmers are not accustomed to abstract thought (Need con-
stant field practice;despitemastery of the material in lessons,
farmersmay apply little of what they know).
[] Farmers are extremely pragmatic (Lessoncontent should be
timed to events in the field and lessonsneed to be imparted
through activities).
0 Farmers are very sociable in their intellectual habits (Group
instruction is better than individual instruction; reluctanceof
farmers to rely on individual judgement). '
CJ Farmers require authority (They are unsure of themselves,
their ability to experiment and their own common sense,
they are uncomfortable when advised to think on their
own).48
All of these lessonslearned about farmers lend support to the
preceding discussionregarding pitfalls in project design. The more
projectexperiences we analyze, the richer our knowledge base be-
comes. But certain things are lesssusceptibleto being known in ad-
vance of project implementation precisely becauseof project being
designedis "abstract" in many ways until it getson the ground. Only
then can farmersrespondwith pragmatismto somethingat hand.
(4) Barangay water pro/ect
The BarangayWater Project is an attempt to provide household
water supply to more people in the countryside. It is in effect a
project to increase benefits reaching rural people. Who can argue
againstsuch an undertaking when there is such a clamor for greater
equity in socialservices?The lessonsreported by Valera et a/are eye-
openers in the true-to-life difficulties of pursuing such a laudable
objective evenwith the best intentions;
[] In most of the 18 sites visited, the actual number of users
are far lessthan the expected or reported beneficiaries.One
important mason they hypothesized is the water quality.
Where water quality is low, level of use is also minimal. The
other reasons is that there are other sourcesof water in the
vicinity.
[] For siteswith problematic water quality, there are real envi-
ronmental or physical problems. In some instance,water is
hardly available due to the location. There appearsto be no
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immediate solution to these physical problems becausethe
terrain and the location of the desirablewater table could be
far-off from the residential locations.Water may beof drink-
ing quality in other sites but supply is meager. In another
area, water is free flowing, but it is salty. Hence it is rarely
used,if ever, for drinking.
[] In general, where the water is of good quality there are al-
ready other systemswhere people can fetch water. Thus the
barangay water project (BWP) is located in schoolsor in stra-
tegic places for easier access.Sometimes the BWP is just
another system within 100 meters of old but still functional
pumps.49
The lessonslearned from this project are tough indeed partic-
ularly in the light of our desire to bring water supply where there is
none or where there is not enough. Environmental and physical
endowments are such that some barangaysare more blessedthan
others in terms of favorable "water sites" and therefore these are
precisely the sites where more pumps could be made operational. In
unfavorable sites, where people have limited water supply, these are
•also the sites where it is very difficult or impossible to locate the
water project. How does one achieve equity in accessto water ser-
vices under these unequal physical endowments? As they say, "Them
who has gets!" How do we change this state of affairs? Do we have
the technological answers?
(5) Manufacturing establishment workers" response to participa.
tory opportunities
Although the study which will be cited in this section refer to 21
Metro Manila manufacturing establishments and not to the rural
and agricultural populace, we include it in this review because of
the more general implications of the findings regarding workers'
response to "participatory" measures. Researchers from the Asian
Labor Education Center (ALEC) observed that "despite newly-
formulated laws encouraging workers' participation in deciding
issues affecting their general welfare, workers generally remain
passiveand often need an initial push to enable them to air their
views." They likewise noted that "workers are often seen as passive
and docile creatures" and therefore a lot of help isneeded to give
them impetus to participate in deciding matters which affect them.
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The findings showed that while 94 percent of all management
personnel and 62 percent of all workers claimed that workers'
participation existed in the firms studied, "the scope, frequency
and extent of such participation was very limited. Decision-making
on sensitiveissuesis almost always managements' prerogative,noted
the study. Rarely are workers consulted regarding work schedules,
rules, production, work procedures, forecasts and expansion plans.
Generally, workers do not asserttheir right to participate in decision-
making except on such issues as wages and fringe benefits. Thus
workers' participation is limited only to their negotiations with man-
agement on collective bargainingagreementswhich are renewed once
every three years." In some cases the researchersdiscovered that
management seem even more aware of the workers' potential and
capacity to make decisionsthan the workers themselves,s°
The results of this study tell us that the "need'" or "desire" to
participate in decision-making may not be salient or may not yet be
"felt" by the workers themselves. It would probably take an educa-
tional process to transform what may be "latent" into something
much more "manifest". It should be noted however that workers
are more assertive in matters of wages, fringe benefits, and collec-
tive bargaining agreements while deciSion-making on company
procedures is regarded almost always as management'sprerogative.
Perhapsthis is a trend reinforced by tripartite structureswhich de-
fine problems in terms of worker, employers and governmentrather
than as problems affecting the manufacturing firm which have impli-
cationsfor all three sectors.
(6) The Banglao_h Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC)
Although this review is basically centered on the Philippines,we
are presenting here some gems of wisdom from Bangladeshbecause
they are very germane to the issuesof people participation which we
are concerned with, The following are some fundamental lessons
from their experience:
[] The BRAC strategy is "to organize and develop appropriate
village and Ioca-level institutions in order to effectively in-
volve the massesof rural population in mobilizing the corn-
munity's Resourcesfor their own development and to pro-
vide servicesto those whose needsare being ignored."
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[] In their work with rural women and the landless, BRAC
concludedthat:.
[] Organization of disadvantaged groups is only a beginning.
After that, one has to explore viable economic alternatives
for them. Rural women's demand for social and economic
alternatives is greater than the supply. These women (sub-
sistenceand below subsistence)face a strongfinancial moti-
vation. N0n-economic incentives such as prestigeand social
contact come later through the joint economicventures. But
to identify and design viable economic projects which would
ensure a reasonable return to eachrnember isextremely diffi-
cult. But this identification and designis crucialto all else.
Much can be done to involve women in health, family plan-
ni_ng,education and other so_:ialdevelopment efforts both
as beneficiariesand asstaff. However it is economicdevelop-
ment activities which urge most strongly for and tothe rural
poor women.
[] The conscientization process, the dialogues are methods of
recognizing problems and motivating them to seek solutions
actively but in the search for solutions, there is no escape
from productivity increasing technology. Agricultural solu-
tions from new rice seeds,irrigation, poultry, kitchen garden-
ing,goat rearing,paddy husking,sweetpotato cultivation etc.
were in the end the source of the solutions, and sowere the
technologiesin family Planning,scabieseradication,weaving,
silkworm culture, fisheries, horticulture, oral rehydration
etc.Sl
We must therefore be reminded that although the ideology is
Very much social in its call for organizationaland institutional devel-
opment, the operational measures to deal with the problems of the
rural poor are as much technological.
(7) LINK-COD Programme
• . , ,
Similar lessonswere expressedby a political activist engagedin
community organization. Karina Constant/no-David says of their
experiencesin the community of Pantoc, Sariaya, Quezon Province:
"Community organization, as developed in the West and prac-
tised in the Third World has its own clear-cut methodsfor stimulat-
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ing popular participation in social change; but in practice, it often
runs into contradictions: how to arouseawarenesswithout creating
new dependence, to lead or not to lead, to manipulate or to facil-
itate, to break restrictive laws or to respect them .... Without a
clear alternative vision of society, the efforts of community orga-
nizerscan easilycome to nothing...
The average community is confronted by the problem of eco.
nomic welfare. Most of the time the people expect an organizer
to improve their economic conditions. On the individual level, the
problems of death, illness, malnutrition and sanitation cannot be
dismissedby the organizer even while he realizes that organizing
a community meansraisinglevelsof consciousness,confronting basic
•structural problems and not merely improving physical conditions.
Economic projects most of the time serve to inspire the people
towards the benefitsof collectiveaction and self-reliance....
It is only through praxis that political consciousnesscan be
strengthenedand it is only when people are convincedthat changeis
in fact taking place that they will listen and learn the abstractcon-
cepts that rOustbe actualized in experience, Unfortunately thepoor
are unused to the practice of conceptualizing and abstracting. The
mental frame of generationsof hand-to-mouth existence is one that
isrooted to what a personcan immediately seeand hear.''s2
Although "community organization is widely held to be the most
effective means through which people's participation in their own
development can be achieved," and "community organization has a
comparatively well-developed methodology," it has yet to improve
people's lives by their own definition and not that of the "activist."
The use of poverty groups for the community, organizer's own
dissent is a constant temptation.
• (8) The Bicol River Basin Development Program
The latest assessment(1981) of participation in the Bicol River
Basin Development Program made the following comments which
deserveto be sharedbecausethese insightswere derived from actual
experiencesin implementation:s3
(a) The BRBDP had made a strong casethat the wide range of
projectswhich had been designedwasintended to satisfy the
needs of the poor majority of Bicol, One mechanism for
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attaining this goal is the participation of all concerned in the
development process- the project designers,implementors,
and beneficiaries.This participatory approach could be seen
on two planes: a lateral (coordination) link among the
various agenciesand institutions involved in planning and
project implementation; and a vertical link between these
institutionsand the rural people of Bicol.
(b) Beneficiary participation wasdefined as:
[] Enhanced capability to respond effectively to develop-
ment opportunities in a manner that protects their collec-
tive interests (includingprotecting themselves against the
projects planned for them if deemed contrary to their
common good);
[] Built capacity to mobilize local or external resources for
externally or self-initiated projects on a long-term basis;
[] Strengthened confidence of beneficiarieson themselves
and in their own efforts to control events affecting their
lives, so that "if developmentprojects do not come, they
won't die," and
[] Enhancedcapacity to bid for participation as a group in
the various projects which sooner than later will come
their way.
(c) Concern for participation by the poor majority in the devel-
opment process was manifest in various projects in Bico/
fully two decades before BRBDP was established. Popular
participation took varied and innovative forms with ideas
drawn from agricultural extension techniques, community
development practices,urban social work, and social act/on-
oriented missionary work. The conceptual tools and ideolo-
gical biases ranged from: eliciting felt needs; identifying
basic human needs; building christian communities; man-
agement by objectives; consciousness-raising;politicization;
organizational development; behavioral engineering; attitu-
dinal change; cooperativism; and the technocratic approach.
These tools, seldom found in pure form, yielded a rich blend
of strategies and approaches practiced by development
workers of all kinds. In Bicol, as in many other places, the
development scene is characterized by criss_crossing paths
taken by at least a dozen frontline workers but asone exten-
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sion worker noted: "our pathsmeet, but we clo not seeeach
other."
(d) The present everall climate in Bicol is conducive to greater
participation by the people, based as it is on negative fac-
tors (fauLty designs,delays in construction). Becausepeople
live in the area, they cannot help but be involved.As a matter
of fact, there is a growing clamor from the project beneficia-
ries for project planners and implementors to listen to them
mainly in an attempt to fine-tune designs,for when "plan-
ners err, the farmers pay". In this sense dissent and objec-
tions are indicative of someform of participation.
(e) Overtime, "participation" in the strategiesof various agen-
cies havebeen reflected in these forms:
[] Soliciting people's labor or cashresources,sweat equity
counterparts, (whether voluntary or mandatory).
[] Organizing participants mainly for control purposes;
I-1 Enjoining local organizations or communities to help
plan and implement projects with assistancefrom tech-
nical staff (let the people lead and the experts follow);
I"1 _eeing participation as an instrument (an intermediate
goal to broader human development; and finally,
[] Ensurin9 popular participation in crucial policy analysis,
evaluation, correction, plans revision in short,
decision-making. Varying in style, in degree of success
and in the extent to which participation is envisioned,all
these efforts are decidedly moves in the right direction.
In short, in Bicol today, the stage is set, the climate is
right.
(f) A hopeful vision, as trends now indicate, is that before long
there will be a sufficient number of believers, practitioners
and beneficiaries who will clamor for participation in devel-
opment efforts and thus make this trend irreversible. Mecha-
nisms for managing the participatory approach will have to
be made more systematic for replication and spread.
(g) There are numerous opportunities for bringingtogether rural
people from different areasto learnfrom eachothers' exper-
iences,to compare notes on vital issuessuchaswater manage-
ment etc. or how to relate to the bureaucracy and to nego-
tiate with government and private agencies.
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(h) There was general agreement among projects field staff on
the necessity of beneficiary participation in the overall
project planning, implementation and evaluation but there
was less agreement on how to effect the participatory ap-
proach. The general•impressionof theparticipatory approach
is very evocative but its realization remains elusive,
(i) The test which confronts the BRBDP is that•of meansof
ensuring that the benefitS of development do in. fact reach
the poor ma/ority who are the intended beneficiaries.54
GENE RAL ASSESSMENT
As an overall assessment of the various participatory approaches
reviewed, the short-term interim verdict is that: benefitS from parti-.
cipatory development have yet to substantially accrue to the rural
poor.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
To-obtain ,a picture of howconcept translatesinto action, this
Chapter reviewed actual field experienceswith so-called"Standard"
rural organizations and people participatory approaches-andidenti-
fled insights and lessonsfrom the practice of people participation
in eight different projects. "
A. Field Experiences With "Standard" Rural Organizations and
People Participatory Approaches
1. Non,government social development approach to assisting
low-income groups
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The core philosophy of PBSP (Philippine Businessfor
Social Progress)is self help basedon the firm conviction that
disadvantaged Philippine communities can and do want to
help themselves.Social development practice indicates that
what is usually needed to change this desire into reality is
initial external assistancein the form of financial resources
and know-how and the internal competence to use this
assistance.Translated into action, this meant 5 projects:
food production; small businessprogram set up through non-
collateral loans; cooperative training and development and
human resource development. PBSP'sassistanceused 5 stra-
tegies: Community organization; small scale industries;
skills training, agricultural development and cooperative
development. An analysis of the first 33 projects revealed
the following impact:
(a) The community organization messageseemed to have
gotten across.It wasan acceptedobjective at leastamong
more than half of those willing to go on participating in
the interest of improving the community asagainstthink-
ing only of their own personalbenefits.
(b) In terms of pro/ect management competence, conceptual
knowledge of social development management concepts
taught through a seminar showed no one-to-one corres-
pondence between "educational input" and "learning
output" because the learners were not starting from the
same base. For some learners, the information wasnew,-
for others, it was additional, reinforcing, clarifying,
expanding, and even conflicting. The end result wasonly
half of the participants understood two-thirds of the Con.
cepzs. On management tasks performed, the task least
performed was implementing activity. On managemant
practices, half of the projects showed poor financial
management and more than half had obvious inadequa-
cies in program implementation. Fast turn-over of per-
sonnel was a common problem.
(c) On group development and leadership formation, the
groups performed better in setting up their organizm
tional structure but had more difficulty in implementing
organizational objectives. It was easier to design the
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organizational format than to make it work. The group
leaders rated themselves lowest in eliciting group/com-
munity participation; mobilizing local and outside resour-
cesand neededskillsfor resolvingconflicts.
(d) An evaluation of PBSP'sexperienceswith 25 agri-business
p[ojects showed that the attainment of the .increasedin-
come objective wasthe most difficult of all.
(e) PBSP's institution-building network consisted of first-
/eve/ proponents, both indigenous and professional,
rangingfrom sectoral and religiousorganizationsto local
foundations which are capableof initiating and sustaining
development projects;second-level institutions which had
been developed as resource centers where new propo-
nents were sent to learn the rudiments of a particular
project's management. The.third-level in this servicenet-
work is the consolidation of learnings on field, pilot test-
ing of new programs and continuing to-develop least-
cost solutions.
(f) It was apparent that community organization (C-O) for
PBSP meant more of organization and management and
not somuch of conflict-confrontation.
2. The Institutional Component of Irrigation Development
The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) regard
successof irrigation developmental undertakings as greatly
dependent on the active support and total involvement of
organized groups of water-users themselves.The studies re,
viewed on farmer responseto irrigation associationin a large
irrigation system and farmer participation in communal irri-
gationsystemsyielded the following highlights: -
Large irrigation system
(a) When asked whether members of the irrigators' asso-
ciation should, can, or went to own, operate, and main-
tain the irrigation system, more than two.thirds said
"No", they should not' they could not and did not
want to own, operate, and maintain the system. Rea-
sons for the negative replies were lack of capability;
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lack of time; lack of knowledge and lack of cooperation
among farmers. Others candidly remarked that NIA was
already doing the job and should just improve their per-
formance; farmers did not like the additional responsi-
bilities; somebody else should be in charge, not the farm-
ers. Although a majority of the members indicated will-
ingness to give voluntary contributions and pedorm
irrigation functions, when asked what functions they
wanted to perform, more than half either ga_e no res-
ponse or wanted no responsibility at all. Those willing to
take on a role were mainly interestedin gainful employ-
ment with NIA.
(b) The test of the benefit-participation contingency hypo-
thesis which said that; "the more that a member obtain-
ing benefit from an organization isdependent on his par-
ticipating in the organization to obtain the benefit, the
more he will take paR," showed that receiving irrigation
service was not at all contingent upon their participation
in the association. As a matter of fact, evennon-members
could avail of the irrigation service. The benefit which
was perceived as most contingent upon participation was
identified as the ownership, operation, and maintenance
of the irrigation system by the farmers. Ironically, this
was the one thing which farmers said they should not
do, could not do, and did not want to do. The question
raisedwas whether it was possibleto designa large-scale
irrigation system such that receiving irrigation services
would be contingent upon their participation in an irri-
gation association.Furthermore, one suspectsthat many
farmers would prefer to obtain benefits without "parti-
cipation" in the association, if this were possible.
Communal irrigation systems
(c) A study of communal gravity systems found that the
larger systemstended to have a more structural organiza-
tion. It was likewise evident that among medium and
largersystems,those with insufficient water supply were
better organized than those with sufficient water supply.
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The reverse situation appeared among smallsystems
which had sufficient water but alsohad structured orga-
nizations managed bY strong leaders, usually operated
under the leadership of one person.
(d) One of the most important reasonsfor wanting to im-
prove the management of irrigation systemsisto increase
productivity. The study showed that communal systems
which had a water distributor, water distribution units
and regularly scheduled maintenance tended to have
higher yields than thosewho did not possessany of these
management attributes. However, when water was
scarce, the positive relationship between these manage-
ment characteristics and farm productivity in a system
became nil. In other words, organization and manage-
ment could not substitutefor water.
"Participatory" communal irrigation association
(e) In a participatory pilot project aimed at developing
"two communal irrigation associationsto such a degree
that their members would fully participate and become
self-reliant in managing their irrigation system", it was
found that changes in degree of organization partici-
pation, leadership style, and system management had
occurred after several months of project implementa-
tion. However, the question of whether the participa-
tory scheme contributed to greater sharing of develop-
ment benefits was not dealt with at all. As a matter of
fact, the project-report simply•stated that: "their even-
tual masssharingof benefitsseemsassured".
(f) It must be pointed out that majority of the farmers
considered that their most serious problems were eco-
nomic in nature and almost half of them pinpointed poor
irrigation system as a major cause of their financial con-
dition. To improve their economic status, improvements
in farmers' production must take place. Unfortunately,
in the more directly production-related activities such as
water distribution schedule and croppingpatterns, there
was hardly any change in the former and the latter was
completely nonexistent. It was acknowledged by the
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project that these two practices are very difficult to
implement and require the full cooperation of the asso-
ciation members.
It would seem that it is in the implementation of
these two major practices that the technical and social
components of the irrigation associationcome together
and it was preciselythis "meeting ground" which would
contribute to the realization of benetits from irrigation.
Furthermore, the.se were the very activities which re-
quired the most of "groupness," "sharing" and willing-
ness to subordinate individual to group welfare. This
could havebeen the crucial test for successin community
organization.
(g) In this project it was alsoexpected that farmer participa-
tion in system planning and construction would result in.
"better designedand constructed irrigation system more
likely to meet farmer need&" Ironically, the irrigation
dam was washedaway more than oncejust as it had been
before the "participatory" approachwasimplemented. A
more important question might be: Where a technical
solution to a problem is difficult to find, what could
community organization contribute to the solution of the
irrigation problem? Considering the environmental
• realities in the area, perhaps a more realistic solution is
the deliberate planning for a "wash-away" dam which
would be rebuilt after each flood. The role•of C-O could
then be defined in the context of "replaceable" tech-
nology.
Combined "hardware" and "software" in water management
(h) An experimental attempt was made to usesome hardware
in order to obviate the "software" problem of conflicts
associatedwith equitable distribution of available water
supply. The major difference between the treatment and
control areas was that the control site had minimal
improvements in terms of physicalfacilities and canaliza-
tion, The .treatment area with the sub.system manage-
ment technology was more developed in terms of turn-
outs, intensive farm ditches, measuring devicesetc. The
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rotation methods of tail-end first, middle next, andhead
last was used.A year after implementation, farmers'in the
treatment area reported fewer conflicts than the control
site. Furthermore, because of the more intensive farm
ditches which had to be cleaned in the treatment area,
cooperative work was called for more often thus encour-
aging more contact among farmers and more participa-
tion in other group activities. They likewise expressed
greater satisfactionwith irrigation services.
(i) The watertendersrealized that the major reasonfor illegal
checking in the past was the absence of turnouts with
locks, checkgates and measures to control the flow of
water, thus farmerscould easilyget water outside of their
schedule. With the sub-systemmanagement technology
the watertender knew when the water decreased and
increased and could immediately check why. The far-
mers, at the same time, knew the amount of water that
was flowing,
(j) In the implementation of the sub-system management
technology, not many farmers had been involved in
decision-making regardingthe scheduleof water delivery
and water distribution. Apparently the nature of the
technology did not require that everyone be involved in
order to achievea more equitable water distribution. As a
matter of fact, by technological design, tail.enders
received water first.
(k) These findings illustrate how the application of hardware
(the sub-systemmanagement technology) affected water
control and distribution and consequently farmer be-
havior vis-a-vis access to irrigation water. Given this
observation, it was tempting to take a secondlook at the
article entitled "Can technology rep/ace social engineer-
ing" which asked: "In view of the simplicity of technol-
ogical engineeringand the complexity of socialengineer-
ing, to what extent can social problems be circumvent_t
by reducingthem to technological problems?"The article
also rightly said that it is very difficult "to persuade
people to behave differently than they have behaved in
the past." The attitude toward water sharing,for exam-
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pie, is a good illustration of this difficulty. From the
results of the experimental project reviewed, farmers
would not share water at all or only if they had fully
irrigated their own farms or if they did not need the
water yet.
Who belongs to the irrigation association?
(1) From the data on who belongs,who leads,whoseadvice
exerts influence in the irrigation association, it appeared
that although members were mostly small farmers and
many were owner-operators, it is very possible that
non-farm members and part time farmerscould very well
be the wielders of power in the organization. Perhapsit is
not averagefarm size, averageeducation, averagefarmer,
average tenure status and the characteristics of the
majority membership which require scrutiny. We should
begin to look at the "minority" members such as two
share tenants who operated 8 and 11 hectares respec-
tively; and the non.farmer members such as the project
inspector and the government employee who was the
only college graduate.They were most likely, "minority'"
in number but not in power. Leaders of communal
systemswhich did not have formal associationslikewise
exercised considerable influence for they came from
positionsof authority, wealth or ownershipof the dam.
Indirect beneficiaries of irrigation development
(m) Although landless laborers are not members of the
irrigation association, irrigation improvements have had
an indirect benefit to them in terms of employment in
the different production and processingtasks. Irrigation
helped spread out farm labor opportunities during the
year. To the extent that irrigation improved production,
harvestersand threshersbenefited that much more.
3. Farmers" Associations and other Rural Organizations
Formally organizedgroupsin the rural areasare relatively
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new in the Philippines.At presentwe havea proliferation of
•such•groups.•On the surface,we seemto be "overorganized'.
From a review of •experienceswith a variety of rural organi-
zations the following trends emerged:
(a) With the advent of the New Society in 1972, a changein
•leadershipin rural •organizationoccurred. Despite martial
law, majority of the membersfelt that they could freely
expresstheir views.
(b) The averagevillage residentwas usually asked to partici-
pate in the implementation stage of an organization's
activities but was left out in the •planningphase.Mobiliza-
tion of village residents was often sought for the free
labor they could contribute and this wasmost successful
in projects oriented to the improvement of the commu-
nity's physical•appearance.
(c) Government groups appeared to be more successfulthan
private ones in delivering messagesfrom the grassrootsto
the bureaucracyand in facilitating the delivery of services
to the people. Through linkages, they were able to
mobilize support from amongthe higher-upsparticularly
governmentagencie_
(d) The larger the socio-economic differences between
leadersand members, the more an organization was able
to produce service outputs. It was felt that the socio-
economic resources of rich •leaders (i.e. money and
•contacts) made their organizations more efficient at the
tasks at hand. Better-off leadersfunctioned as an asset,
and not as a liability in the organizational machine.
•Another study reinforced this conclusionandargued that
"an association of homogeneouslydestitute individuals
may result in a destitute organization."••
(e) Thecharacteristics of participation, administra_'ve perfor-
mance, and financial•capability did not have significant
relationships with any of the four development functions
such as: mobilizing support within the rural community;
articulating and processing local needs and demands;
developing two-way communications;and facilitating the
•delivery of services.It was inferred that perhapspar_icipa_
tion helped the members themselves primarily atthe level
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of the individual but in no significant way increased the
output services of an organization to its immediate
community.
(f) Overlapping membership in 2 or more organizations in.
the samecommunity wasquite common.
(g) In one study, members perceivedtheir organization as
helpful in promoting unity and cooperation among
peoplebut that the village itself was not dependent on
the organization for its welfare.
(h) Higher status m=-mberswere more active and more in-
volved in organization activitie¢
(i) Organizational leaders tended not oniy to come from
higher socio-economicstatus than memers but decision-
making also tended to be concentrated in the handsof a
few: A study of barrio councils showed that majority of
the members had a low level of motivation and almost
half were not interestedin reelection.
(j) The interaction processis a decade-old organization and
was highly centralized despite its years of existence.The
significance of communication and information sharing
was highlighted for it wasadmitted that "genuine partici-
pation implies a certain parity of knowledge between the
decision-makers, leaders, and those affected by the deci-
sion. "
(k) Many of the programs being implemented at the village
level were packaged programs whose planning and de-
cision-making processeswere made by high level policy
decision-makersfrom the different agenciesand brought
to the community for implementation. Rural orgeniza.
tions were cre_ted as the fulfillment of a countrywide
plan conceived within a highly centralized national
bureaucracy.
4. Health Service Delivery Systems
(a) A study of 5 rural health delivery systems attempted to
test three hypotheses: "Integrated approachesto health
service delivery tend to be more effective than sectoral
one¢ In turn, participation also tends to increase the
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effectivenessof service delivery. Integration tends to be
accompanied by participation in that intersectoral ap-
proaches often call for the mobilization of the people,"
These three hypotheseson the interrelationship between
integration, participation and effectiveness were only
partly supported,
(b) All the 5 programshad been able to improve health con-
ditions; make people aware of their existence; deliver
servicesto a large population including the poor; and
managed to satisfy its intended beneficiaries. The pro-
grams all had a salutary effect on the communities they
had served.
(c) Two projects had been successfulin involving the poor
in their participative schemeswhen they made special
efforts to seek them out for specific rolesin the delivery
system. However, their greater participation in the pro-
gram had not necessarily led to greater benefits.
5. Peop/e Participation at the Integrated Area Development
(lAD) Pro/ect Level
One of the most important rationale for the adoption of
the lAD strategy was to provide for the mobilization and in-
volvement of local leadershipand local people in the various
managementactivities of the lAD projects. A study of people
participation in an lAD project made the following general
observations:
(a) Practically all farmer-respondents (93 percent) believed
that local people participation was necessary in the
managementof lAD projects. On the other hand only 69
percent of the Project Management Staff (PMS) felt the
sameway.
(b) More active participation in lAD project management
activities tended to be associatedwith higher education;
higher income; satisfaction with their involvement;
owner/amortizing owner tenure status; community as
against individual-oriented value-orientations; favorable
attitudes toward participatory concepts;satisfactionwith
more participatory-leadership style; membership in corn-
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munity-based organizations; more attendance in and
greatersatisfactionwith training programs.
(c) The implementation stage had been more participatory
than the planning stage. Monitoring and evaluation were
the activities leastpopular and leastparticipated in.
(d) On the nature of participation during implementation, it
was interesting how the PMS and farmersdiffered in their
perceptions. The management staff emphasized how
participents benefited from the projects through hired
labor and training programswhile farmers perceived their
participation in terms of activitieswhich they "contribu-
ted" to the project such as providing free labor; paying
irrigation water fees,etc.
(e) Dissatisfactionwith the nature and extent of their partici-
pation in different phasesof the project included such
thingsas: local interest groupswere more vocal than the
general membersl_ip;many members of the community
were not fully informed of the activity; planning was a
very long process; their suggestionswere not followed;
there was always initiation but no implementation of
projects;their involvementwas imposed,etc.
(f) When asked about the nature of their participation,
farmers mentioned being project beneficiary; project
implementor; and being a source of information about
community needs and problems.
(g) PMS and farmers' perceptionsof problems in generating
local participation differed in the sensethat PMS tended
to view the problems as coming from the beneficiaries_
while farmers tended to perceive the problems as arising
more from the side of the government agencie¢
(h) In general, farmers exhibited very favorable attitudes
toward community action and people participation con-
cepts. However, they realized also that involvement in
community development projects is costly and time con-
sumingon their part.
(i) People participation was not attractive to a third of the
farmers for whom an authoritarian leadership style and
dependenceon governmenthad not lost their appeal.
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6. People Participation for Irrigation Development
(a) Using the participatory approach, community organizers
were deployed to organize•farmersinto irrigation associa-
tions. Generating people participation wastranslatedinto
such day-to-day •activities as preparation of farmers'
lists; mapping of the irrigation area;groundwork to con-
tact farmers; identification of potential farmer leader_;
organiZation of sub-groupsand committees; conduct of
walk-throughs, etc. The C-O approach, in effect, means
a great deal of information-generation, processingand dis-
seminationbecauseparticipation essentiallyinvolvescom-
municationdirected two-way, horizontally and vertically
from "inside" to "outside" and vice-versa.
B.. Some Insights and Lessons from the Practice of People
Participation
Lessonsfrom the. practice of people participation in eight dif-
ferent projects include the followingi
1. Social development, income generation and the poor
(a) Strategies presently being used cannot be applied to the
poorest of.the poor for any assistance given to them
would be used for.survival.
(b) While social development project proponents needed to
be generalistsin order to respond to a wide varietyof
community .problems and needs, special skills for income
and employment-generating Components were sorely
lacking. They likewise found it easier to effect group
•development if .the group were homogenous. These
,observations bring us back to the use.of generalist or
specialist; sectoral or systems. ,(c) In the search for Yeast-costsolutions" the community.
leader-volunteer paraprofessional had•been pinpointed
as an alternative to the fast turn-over of professional
• workers.
(d) The need for shorteningthe waiting•time for the benefits
from participation had been recognized.
RuralOrganizations 615
2. Participation and community organization in
agro-forestation and upland development
(a) The formation of strong farmers' organizationsemerged
as a necessarycondition for a sustainedeffort at agri-
silvicultural practices,
(b) Active involvement of farmers in upland development
was brought about by two factors: physical proof that
activities were _beingundertaken for the farmers' benefit
and the demonstrated respect for farmers' opinions and
ideas. Implementation activities needed to be undertaken
as part of the project design process and prior to the
finalization of a project paper.
(c) Most of the kaingin-making and the deforestation it
implied was done to generate cash income although it
was assumedthat they were more interestedin food pro-
duction.
(d) The first tenure concern of upland farmers was security
on the lands where they had built their homesand not
on the land which the farmer tills.
3. Small Farmers" Grassroots Organizing to Enhance
Agricultural Productivity
The results from a small farmer organization project to
determine whether a bottom-up system of organization could
be more effective in stimulating joint action by groups of
farmers for the purposesof integratedpest management, sy_
tematized water management and group credit, were pro-
mising in terms of possible benefits in insectcontrol and re-
duced irrigation demand¢ A notable accomplishmentwasthe
farmers' collective repayment of past due Masagana99 loans
worth more than a million pesos.The researchstaff however
could not as yet explain the causesof this breakthrough.
Some things the project had discoveredas to how farmers
learn are very valuable in devisingnew technology. Some of
these lessonsare: Farmers are not accustomed to abstract
thought; farmers are extremely pragmatic; farmers are very
sociable in their intellectual habits; and farmers require
authority.
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4. Barangay Water Project
The Barangay Water Project was an attempt to provide
household water supply to more people in the countryside.
In effect, it was a project to increasebenefits reachingrural
people. In a preliminary analysis of its impact, the actual
userswere found to befar lessthan the expected or reported
beneficiaries. Water quality was an important reason.Where
water quality was low, level of use was also minimal. For
siteswith problematic water quality, there were real environ-
mental or physical problems. In general,where thewater was
of good quality, there were already other systems where
peoplecould fetch water.
Some barangayswere more blessedthan others in terms
of favorable water sites. The question is: How does one
achieveequity in accessto water servicesunder these unequal
physicalendowments?
5. Manufacturing Establishment Workers" Response to
Participatory Opportunities
Findings from the study of Metro Manila manufacturing
establishmentswere included in this review becauseof their
more general implications regarding workers' response to
"participatory" measures. Researchersobserved that despite
newly-formulated laws encouragingworkers' participation in
deciding issues affecting their general welfare, workers
generally remained passiveand often neededan initial push
to enable them to air their views. Workers' participation was
limited only to their negotiationswith managementon col-
lecting bargaining agreements involving wages and fringe
benefits which were renewedonce every three years, in some
cases,managementseemedeven more aware of the worker's
potential and capacity to make decisions than the workers
themselOes.
6. The Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRACJ
Gems of wisdom from Bangladeshwere presented be-
cause there are some fundamental lessonson people partici-
pation offered such as: Organization of disadvantaged groups
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is only a beginning. After _hat, one has to explore viable
economic alternatives for them. The conscienffzation process,
the dialogues are methods of recognizing problems and moti.
vating them to seek solutions ective/y, but in the search for
solutions, there is no escape from productivity increasing
technology.
7. LINK-COD Programme (Linking With Communities
for Development)
Similar lessons were expressed by a political activist
engagedin community organization who said: "The average
community is confronted by the problem of economic wel-
fare. Most of the time the people expect an organizer to im-
prove their economic conditions.., the poor are unused to
the practice of conceptualizing and abstracting.The mental
frame.. , is one that is rooted to what a person can imme-
diately seeand hear".
8. The Bicol River Basin Development Program (BRBDP)
The latest assessment(1981) of participation in the
BRBDP concludedthat:
(a) Concern for participation by the poor majority in the
development process was manifest in various projects
in Bicol fully two decades before BRBDP. Popular
participation took varied and innovative forms with
ideas drawn from extension, CD, urban social work,
and social action<)riented mission work. Conceptual
tools and ideologies seldom found in pure form yield-
ed a rich blend of strategiesand approachespracticed
by developmentworkers of all kind¢
(b) The overall climate in Bicol was judged as conducive
to greater participation by"the people basedas it was
on negative factors (faulty design, delays in construc-
tion). In this sense, dissent and obiections are indic_
rive of some form of participation.
(c) There was genera/agreement on the necessity of bene,
ficiary participation in the overall project planning
implementation and evaluation but there was lessagree-
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merit on how to effect the participatory approach.
(d) The test which continues to confront BRBDP is that
of means of ensuring that the benefits of development
do in fact reachthe poor majority who are the intended
beneficiaries
GENERAL ASSESSMENT
AS AN OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE VARIOUS PAR-
TICIPA TORY APPROACHES REVIEWED, THE SHORT-TERM,
INTERIM VERDICT IS THATBENEFITS FROM PARTICIPA-
TORY DEVELOPMENT HAVE YET TO SUBSTANTIALLY AC-
CRUE TO THE RURAL POOR-
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COMMENTS
The following pagespresent the comments of the four discussants
invited to react to Dr. Gelia 7".Castillo's study. Their comments were
presented during a seminar sponsored by the PIDS on July 28, 1982
at the Operations Room of the NEDA Makati Building.
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COMMENTS OF,
MANUEL SOLIVEN*
I am grateful to Dr. Castillo for a thorough and very interesting
paper. I have been asked to comment specifically on the subject
matter of the Masagana99. I presumethat Dr. Castillo's long thesis
on bayanihan hasa great deal to do with the useor abuseof the con-
cept of bayanihan on the Masagana99 program. Obviously, sociolo-
gistsand economistshavedifferent priorities_Our priorities are in the
manner of physicalattainment like tons of increasein the yields of
certain crops, etc. Whatever abusemight have been used in the con-
cept of the bayanihan in Masagana99 was due to the lack of any
other label to adhere to in the implementation of the program. Ad-
mittedly, the program was a crashprogram. A Singaporeanfriend of
mine once commented that it is all right if a crash program at least
achievesits goal before it crashes.We did achieveour objective in the
first 2 or 3 years of the Masagana99 program.We brought the coun-
try out of a very sorry state of rice deficiency. This iswhen we suf-
fered from a 20 percent reduction in production from the previous
peak yield in 1972-73 and then we suddenly achieveda 26 percent
increasevirtually overnight largely through the Masagana99 program.
True enough, we picked up the bayanihan idea assomethingto latch
on and created the production unit called selda as the main found-
dation for the supervisedcredit program. We felt that with the baya-
nihan spirit, a selda could work for the appreciation of a credit pro-
gram. Hence, we instituted a credit schemewhereby the usual pro-
vision requiring security in the form of a collateral or a secondsigna-
ture for a loan could be satisfied by a bayanihan type of organiza-
tion. At that time, a selda comprised of a minimum of 5 farmers
(each of whom is a borrower) to as many as 15 farmers. The idea
was to pull together people who are related to eachother one way or
another, either brothers, fathers and sonsor close neighborsin the
village. We also prescribed certain guidelines in the determination of
who could constitute a selda. Such rules involved the selection of
farmers who have some common features in their activities or who
*Senior Vice-President, Philippine National Bank.
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have similar-sized farms. The yields were to be more or lessthe same.
There should be no high-performer group nor any "notoriously"
low-performer group. There should also be a predisposition to em-
ploy new technology commonly accepted by all the members of the
selda and the members must be willing to submit themselves to the
guidance of the government extension worker who would be in-
volved in the credit scheme.
There was therefore no intention to abuse the concept of baya-
nihan, which was believed to be part of Philippine morals. The idea
was to use it and adopt it as a means of achieving the goal of reaching
as large a number of farmers as possible and of getting the farmers to
use new rice varieties and adopt new technology that came in the
scene.The record clearly shows that it worked.
The process of crash, as we call it, took place in the third season
when the banking institutions, after getting a 90 percent collection in
the first 2 crop seasons,went overboard and expanded their lending
recklessly. Perhaps, there was a lack of quality control in the formu-
lation of additional seldas especially when the Ministry of Agriculture
extended the coverage of Masagana99 to non-irrigated and rainfed
areas. The results came during the third crop seasonand the banks
were already in big trouble. From then on, it was a process of slow
decline. So much so that many of the banks that got involved in the
program are now facing a situation where they experienced bad loans
constituting 90 percent of their outstanding loans asof last year and
left only 10 percent for lending for the current year. However, let
me qualify this. We did achieve a cumulative collection performance
of 80 percent of actual loan flows. In other words, we got back 80
percent of what we actually lent out. It is a statistical fact that the
accumulation of 20 percent every year builds up in the bank's port-
folio so much so that it comes out 90 percent of its outstanding.
This is what is killing the .banking institution since the allowable
Central Bank default rate is being surpassedin many cases.
I agree with Dr._Castillo's observation that there was a tendency
for the banks in the countryside to become mere dispensers of the
wholesale credit available from the Central Bank and not really finan-
cial intermediaries in the sensethat they forgot the role of generating
savings from the rural community in order to let these savings flow_
into such programs as Masagana99. We cannot really blame the rural
banking system nor the other banks that participated in the program
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becausethat wasthe only beneficial way for them at that time since
generatingdepositsis costly especiallyif 20 percent is kept asreserve.
The money obtained through the rediscountingfacility of the Cen-
tral Bank would cost as low as 3 percent, so let us not place the
blame where it doesnot belong.
On the other hand, in the caseof the Philippine National Bank,
we actually generate more money from the rural communities than
we actually invest in the rural communities. The head office, in fact,
is being subsidizedby funds generatedfrom its rural branches. But
we are trying to correct this. This is the case in sofar asdepositsor
real savingsare concerned.
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COMMENTS OF MELIZA AGABIN*
I would like to comment on afew, specific items particularly on
compact farms and credit. I have taken the liberty of inviting 2 per-
sons who have been very much involved in compact farm implemen-
tation, Mr. Bob Porter, Officer-In-Charge of the Agricultural Credit
Agency (ACA) and Mr. Greg Ramirez. I thought this would be of
interest to them.
From Gelia's treatise, I get a feeling that if you look at the posi-
tive and negative findings on the compact farm studies, you seemto
end up on the negative side. I think this hasto do with the fact that
most of the studies reviewed were done during the early 70s. But
present-day experience on the compact farms, if these were known,
can tilt the balance to the positive side.
I am quite familiar with the operations of some of the ACA
compact farms and they are quite successful in many respects which
would tend to present a different picture. Let me just quickly enu-
merate some of the things that I have closely observed with respect
to the operations of the compact farms that I am familiar with. A
few of these are the compact farms that one finds in Ilocos Norte -
the garlic-based compact farms - and the rice-based compact farms
in Isabelaas well as in Pangasinan.
They operate in a relatively successful manner. First, because
there is a strong leadership and the members believe in this leader-
ship. The members of the compact farm take part in planning and
decision-making with respect to the activities of the compact farm.
Second, the ACA personnel and the farm technicians are there to
supervise the production aspect. They relate closely with the farmers'
group; they are also quite conspicuously present, not conspicuously
absent. The farmers seethem and when they are needed by the farm-
ers, they are there. They respond immediately to the calls of the
farmers. Third, in these compact farms, credit delivery is also what
one might describe as "doorstep delivery." The farmers individually
do not have to go back and forth to the ACA Office to file the loan
application, follow-up the loan, get this loan and so on and so forth.
*Acting Executive Director, Technical Board for Agricultural Credit. !
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By "door-step delivery", the transactioncost incurredby farmers in
getting a loan is tremendously reduced.The farmers, sincethey asa
group purchaseinputs in bulk, are also able to get discountson the
inputs obtained from the loan. These then become savingsof the
group.
Fourth, marketing arrangementsalso exist, Post-harvestfacilities
are within reach and as a result of all these, they areable to feel the
benefits. ACA, in turn, is able to get very good repayments,no less
than 100 percent in at least3 compact farms that I know of. Such
good collection is experiencedin a sustainedbasis.
The compact farm project has, in some respect, enabled the
farmers to undertake expandedfarming operations. Farmersdo coo-
perate and feel tangible benefits. The group becomes viable and is
able to exist on a continuing basis. In fact, farmershavedemonstra-
ted that they will do anything, comply with anything, pay anything
and will even be willing to pay much higher price for the loan inas-
much as they can feel the benefits. These are my observations on
compact farms.
Now on the observationregardingthe benefits of higherproduc-
tivity, which Dr. Castillo finds to be neutral with respectto member-
ship in organization, whether it is compact farms or SamahangNa-
yon, - I agreewith her observation.
But what I believe would be a better measureto take would
either be the increase in yield which translates into higher income
becauseof the arrangementor the pricing receivedby the farmer.
On the economiesof scale, let me go back to the compact farm.
This has to do with land consolidation.The author refersto the ob-
jective of compact farms which says that land consolidation is an
objective because it will bring about economiesof scale.I agreewith
the author's observation that this is not necessarilySowith respect
to small farms. I agreewith her when shesaysthat smallp.rfarms have
higher productivity. This istrue in the Philippines.This is alsotrue in
other Asian countries. The economies of scale principle does not
really work with the plan consolidation per se. The economies lie
elsewhere- in getting inputs, in transportingthe product, in market-
ing. And in placeswhere the land hasto be prepared mechanically
especially in placeswhere labor becomesscarceduring land prepara-
tion time, economiesof scalecan also exist in the useof machineries.
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Let me now go to credit. Manny Soliven has touched on the sel-
das and banking institutions' side of the Masagana 99 credit. I am
happy to know that the author has useda lot of the Technical Board
for Agricultural Credit (TBAC) studies and I guessmy observation
would not be in the form of disagreement but only clarification with
respect to group lending.
Group lending as practised in Masagana99 and other programs
is not really a group loan per se. Loans are still individual loans. The
only significant feature of group lending is the joint loan liability
but loans remain individual accountabilities. Group lending is really
adopted as a measure to compensate for the lack of collateral and
Dr. Castillo observed this in her study.
,_n the ability to repay, the author observed that (a) conven-
tional measurement bases ability to repay only on the basis of the
return from the farm enterprise; (b) credit is basedon the normal
cropping seasonwhich does not take into account calamities, and
also on price assumptions that the farmers will receive under "ideal"
conditions. I would like to go one step further and say that in mea-
suring the ability to repay, we have also failed to consider the farm
household, the cash flow, all his income and all his expensesplus all
the other obligations and debts that he might have at the time that
he is transacting the loan in the bank.
My last points will be on the informal sources of credit. These
are presented more as additional insights rather than criticisms or
comments on what Dr. Castillo has in her treatise. The first observa-
tion with respect to informal sources is that the interest rates have
declined over the last 3 decades. We would like to attribute this de-
cline not only to the expansion of the countryside banking outlets
but also to agrarian reform and, of course, to Masegana99 and all the
other government credit programs: In areas where tenurial arrange-
ments have improved a lot, this haschanged the structure of society,
and credit is based on a different relationship. We have found that
where landlords are no longer there and banks are able to extend
financial services,input dealers more or lessare able to provide credit
comparable to what it would be if you get the loans from the bank
even at regular rates.
Dr. Castillo also observes that interest-free loans are quite subs-
tantial in the informal market. This is one point which I'd like to
stressand is oftentimes overlooked. You know, when one starts talk-
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ing about informal sources,the traditional biases and stigma are
always there. We find however that zero-rate loans were available
even in the 50s, 60s or the 70s. In one TBAC study in the late 70s,
about 1/5 of such loans were reported to be truly interest-free. But,
it is also true that traditional credit arrangements in the informal
sources like talinduan and takipan are still ubiquitous and seem to
be active in areas where the farmers or the community are econ-
omically or tenurially disadvantaged. In fact, we observed that
the determination of the cost of credit under such arrangement is
less dictated by market forces and really more by the traditional
practices.We still find quite a bit of credit from informal sourcesat
excessiverates.This is using3 different yardsticks. If we usethe legal
rate, the ceiling rate or 14 percent, this would amount to about over
70 percent. If we compare it with the economiccost of lending,the
cost that is incurred by the informal lender, then this isstill substan-
tial. The third yardstick is when you compare it with the borrowing
cost of relatively small farmer when he gets his loans from banks.
We find about 2/3 of loansfrom the formal sourceswould be com-
parable to the effective borrowing cost of farmers. We also noted
that the extent of the burden of the high interest rate seemedto be
the same acrossfarm size and educational background but not te-
nure. By tenure, loans to share tenants seem to be more highly
priced..
Dr. Castillo also noted that the default ratesin formal and infor-
mal sourcesof credit do not seemto be muchdifferent. I agreewith
this, but this isnot a recent phenomenon.This wasalso happeningin
the 50s, 60s and in the 70s. And we haveevidences.In earlier studies,
one finds that 28 percent of the loans were defaulted loans. In a
TBAC study, we found the sameproportion but what happensis that
the informal sourcesseemto be able to recoverthese defaulted loans
over the 3 cropping seasons.That is why informal lendersare able to
reducethe cost of riskto about 3 percent on the whole.
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COMMENTS OF
EDGARDO QUISUMBING*
When we were packagingthe Masagana99 p_rogramand deciding
on a legal provision that would substitute for the provisionof colla-
teral or joint signature of the co-maker_.the information available
from the sociologistsat that time were the volumes written about
"hiya" and how Filipinos would do anytlling becauseof it. There
were also volumes written about the bayanihan spirit. These were
what we had at that time and so we thought that if the sociologists
are right, then we could packagea program basedon this premise.
As we went along, though, many things happened and "hiya"
no longer'became as strong as it was.The bayanihanspirit no longer
becamethe way it wassupposedto be. However, at a certain point in
time, I think bayanihan was really very strongbut astimes changed,
the bayanihan spirit also changed. Now, becausethere seemsto bea
tendency to organize production programsin a similar manner as the
Masagana99, that is, using "bayanihan" and "hiya" as the basic
foundation, I would encouragethe sociologiststo put their observa-
tions in paper since the importance of their inputs should be recog-
nized.
Perhapsone of the most important things that had happenedat
the Ministry of Agriculture is the recognition by our Minister of the
importance of the inputs of the sociologists.He seesthe need for a
strong teamwork of sociologistsand technocratsand has made this
a high priority in the Ministry. The kinds of questionsraisedby Dr.
Castillo are vital for us to anticipate. We need certain information to
anticipate things, to tell us what went wrong or what isgood. These
could be used in helping us package more effective programs. It
would therefore be unfortunate if the lessonsthat we have learned
from Masagana99 are not heeded and not utilized in the formation
of new programs.There are a lot of publications documentingthe
lessonsthat could be learnedfrom the Masagana99 andthe problems
it had encountered especiallyon the selda. The alternatives that the
*Director, Agricultural Research Office, Ministw of Agriculture and Deputy Executive
Director, Food and Nutrition Research Institute.
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sociologistscan offer may be tested perhapson a pilot basis.We
therefore welcome whatever assistanceand suggestionsthe sociolo-
gistscan offer becausethe humandimensionhasbeenthe most over-
looked dimensionin almostall our programssofar.
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COMMENTS OF
LEDIVINA V. CARINO*
It is an honor to be a discussantfor Dr. Gelia Castillo'swork in
a public forum like this. When Gelia was making her introduction, I
wondered why she was talking about Maria Clara and Tetchie and
never giving the last name. And then I realized that when you also
talk of Gelia, you don't haveto give the last name. Everyonewould
know you are referring to Dr. Castillo. So when shesaysshemadea
modest attempt, I'm overwhelmed becausewhat would our attempt
be if hers is modest? I would rather usefour big adjectivesregarding
her work and I'll try to document them as I go along. First, monu-
mental, secondl iconoclastic,third, tantalizing, and fourth, provoca-
tive. The part assignedto me is Part II. Part II is on integrated rural
development and participatory development. I will therefore concen-
trate my commentson this part.
The first adjective is monumental. Her work brings together a
huge volume of studies, both published and unpublished. Some of
these studiesare very difficult to get and some I had not even heard
of until I saw them in her footnotes. Surprisingly,there is no refe-
rence to underground literature, The work takes a broad sweep and
summarizesstacks of materials. It is very interestingfor me, having
become a sociologistafter the community development (CD) era to
have a good, compact and concisesummary of CD history and its
comparisonwith integrated rural development. However, the inven-
tory approachto the literature which wasdiscussedby researchpro-
ject rather than by topic hides certain commonalities and differ-
encesin the studiesthat I will bring up when I talk about the other
adjectives.
The second adjective is iconoclastic. You know the original
meaning of that is a destroyer of idol. Integrated rural development
and participation are high in the current hagiographyof administra-
tors, social scientistsand international money lenders,but Dr. Castil-
Io has raised a number of important issuesagainst them. Gelia's
*Acting Dean, College of Public Administr_ion, Unlve_ity of the Philippines. She wls
Director of the U,P, Local Government Center et the time of the =eminar.
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probing eye does not allow idolsto rest;that is why sheis Gelia. She
also showed very clearly why we should not mourn the passingof
. theseidols.
Now, tantalizing. Many projects which would seemto be most
promising were not discussedin terms of their effects. Maybe this is
becausethey were in their conceptualstagewhen Gelia came upon
them and maybe because for some, there was little information as
yet on how they worked out in the field. For instance, I was in-
terestedin how the team mix - in Quezon and the BNH$ -the nutri-
tion project, food, "AIRAD" and agro-forestry project, all of which
seemed to be conceptually very good projects. Do they look good
becausethey have not yet been allowed to work? Here, with apolo-
gies to Gelia, let me quote a favorite Gelia statement. I've heard it
two times before and I've seenit alsoin this volume. She said"Some
programsare successfulbecausethey have not yet been allowed to
fail."So I am tantalized by someof these projects.
Now for provocative. There are a number of statements that
she made throughout the volume that need further analysis and
study. For instance, the statement that institutions take the blame
when technology does not work; or that one makessocialproblems
less intractable by turning them into technical problems;or that in-
tegration should be a planning, not an implementation, device; or
that, in the case of an integration program, one of its elements is
bound to work. I am not sure the last is accurate. I am aware of
some programswhere not evenone works.
The conclusion in Chapter 6 that integration was conceivedasa
solution to certain problems in rural developmentbut the implemen-
tation of integrationcreated itsown problemsprovokesa lot of ques-
tions. FOr instance,what went wrong? Is it inherent in the concept
of integration? Is it in the implementation? Is it the implementors?
Or is it the regular situation in the environment that did not allow
integration to work? Is it the complexity of integration? In other
words, the questionsare: What factors may be related to successful
integration or to unsuccessfulintegration? I think this requiresatten-
tion to such mundane things as thesize of the integrated areas,the
leadershipin those areas;the role of the initiator, andthe participa-
tion of the people, Even funding sourcesand levels.There wasvery
little discussionof funding sourcesand levels. I think this is a com-
mon failing of sociologists.'Sothe question really for the first chap-
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ter here is '_Nhat is integration?" In our own study, we defined in-
tegration in two dimensions:that is, the rangeof activities and the
number of agencies involved in the planning and implementation
processes.Now Gelia's definition is really more complicated. She
introduces other dimensions, f()r instance,beneficiaries' integration
which is area-based,integration around a program or the integration
of personnel. She discussedall of them in successionin this paper.
The remaining question in my mind is: are all of thesetypes creating
their own problems?Or does each type have the sameeffects asthe
others? If so why? If not, why not?
On the question of the dynamics of integrated rural develop-
ment, she mentioned several techniques: team building, usingthe
lead agency approach, usingthe mode of integration. What are the
differential effects of each type? Under what conditions does one
work better than the others?
She also suggestedthat the leader must be provided with ade-
quate authority to command respectand exact cooperation from the
agenciesbeing coordinated and suggestedthat this reads like a means
of centralizing control of functions, funds and personnelof different
development agenciesin the name of more effective pursuit of devel-
opment objeqtives. Further on, she asked if dependencyis not a risk
but- the essenceof integration. There is a point at which I can con-
cedethis, that is,that absolutedictatorship can bethe ultimate form
of integration. However, in areas where we studied administrative
integration, domination and dependencywere not necessarilyconco-
mitants of administrative integration. On the other hand, integration
is supposedto be a partnership of co-equals.But political scientists
talk about the tragedy of the commonswhere a caseof the responsi-
bility of all becomesa case of responsibility of none. That is the
other extreme of integration. But let us not deal with extremes
becausewe aretalking here about integration in an empirical sense.It
is a processwhich is always a difficult balancingact, where negotia-
tions haveto be made frequently and analyzedconstantly.
Another issue relates to development management.This time, I
think I am not speakingasa sociologistas muchasa student of pub-
lic administration. Gelia says that integration is problem-oriented,
functional, situational, operational and therefore one in which you
should not take a development management perspective. Again I
concedethat some people regarddevelopmentmanagementin a blue-
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print perspective.But that blueprint perspectivedoes not invadeall
of development management. In any case, that is not the develop-
ment managementwe teach in the Collegeof PublicAdministration.
We try to deal with solutions in all their specific problem-oriented
operational contexts. Development management,or even its macro-
counterpart development administration, does not require that in-
tegration be regardedasan overarchingcentral irrelevance.
Now to Chapter 7, which I enjoyed the most. There was a dis-
cusdon here of a typology of felt needs. First, one getsa feel of felt
needs from participatory researchwhere people are made the _ubject
of surveys. Second, empirically derived felt needs. That is, you ask
people what they are. Third, physically determined needswhere the
experts"tell you what the needsare that you should feel. Fourth,
seducedfelt needs.You know when a governmentpersoncomesand
says, I have a benefit to give if that happens to be your felt need.
Then the fifth is educationally induced felt need. I have no quarrel
with this typology. I just wish that Gelia spentmore time discussing
what an educationally induced felt need is becauseI think this isvery
important and it would relate to other referencesshe made later to
Karina David's participation with vision. Unlessfelt need has some
educational component in it, then perhaps,we also can not relate it
to the vision of society that we want to have here. Given that each
type of felt need requires different measures,would it not also lead
to different results? Doesn't a seduced felt need have a different
effect from an empirically derived felt need? The implications of
eachpart of the typology shouldbe discussed.
Dr. Castillo has a long discussionon the argument for people's
participation which she said led her to some thoughts which need
further empirical verification and analysis. Because she did not
discussit this afternoon, let me just mention them to you. First, is
participation utopist? Is the catalyst a miracle worker? Is people par-
tioipation an achievement in itself? What isthe relationshipbetween
people participation and the present authoritarian trend in govern-
ment? What are the contradictions and expectations regardingparti-
cipati0n? In her discussion,shementioned that maybe a way of relie-
ving the burden of the rich is by making the poor bear the burden of
development. In practice, she saysthe bottom-up approach and the
top-down approach look like the same thing especially when the
bottom-up approach is sponsored by outsiders who belong to the
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upper portion of society. Another point that she mentioned here is
that freedom not to participate is an important freedom. All these
thoughts that she mentioned are provocative enough to require a
separate research agenda, What is the definition of people's participa-
tion? Who are the people? Again, this is very easy. She started by
looking at the categories of people. What do you mean when you say
"people"? At some point, she also mentioned that experts are also
people, something that is sometimes forgotten. And then the next
question, who are the leaders of the people? I want to point out that
leaders of the poor people have a special characteristic that is not
found ill all leaders of various human groups. That is, they all want
to leave the group as soon as possible. In other words, they don't
want to be poor any longer than necessary. This would have an im-
plication on questions of their representativeness, on their respon-
siveness and on their accountability to the people they are supposed
to lead.
i appreciate also the point she mentioned about community
organization as a technique that uses a confrontational methodology.
Gelia asserts that confrontation is really not a Filipino methodology
and to have participation as confrontational would seem to be alien
to the character of the people. Using it may then affect some parti-
cipation negatively. In fact, it may even be one of the reasons why
participation has not given the results we were expecting.
Another point I like is her argument against the assertion that
participants only in benefits are recipients of charity. This is a favo-
rite of some participation experts. Dr. Castillo however shows that
people are not naive. They realize that the rich have been subsidized
for too long and it is time the poor receive some things gratis, And I
would add: if poverty is more of structural than an individual failure,
then maybe we have to assert in our works that the government does
owe the poor reparations.
Now to Chapter 8. This is the last chapter on field experiences
with rural organization. Gelia lists eight works that deal on partici-
pation with experiences in that field and points out eight other
organizations where she got lessons. My question is: why can't les-
sons be learned from experiences?
The last point - Gelia said as a last statement that "the short
term interim verdict is that benefits from participatory development
have yet to substantially accrue to the poor." I'm dissatisfied with
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that conclusion. What is a short-term interim verdict? How long do
we have to wait? In other words, is it going to take next year, longer
and perhaps more important, how long do the poor have to wait
before we can devise a program that will work for their benefit. I
think some of the programs she mentioned already give some condi-
tions under which some benefits are given to the poor. Shouldn't we
evaluate them on this? Another question we have to raise is: What
kind of benefits do accrue to them and under what conditions? Also,
if you are delivering a lot of services,surely, somebody gets the bene-
fit. Who then captures the benefit? How? What can we do to reverse
the process?
Gelia really has done a lot in bringing the data together. And I
hope you can seduceher to follow up on some of these major points,
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